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GLOSSARY                                      
 
Backdoor A method of bypassing normal authentication to secure illegal remote access to a 
computer 
 
Botnet A zombie army constituted by multiple compromised computers that are exploited to 
perform extensive malicious activities, including phishing, spam, DDoS attack and click fraud  
 
Click Fraud An act that purposely sends fraudulent clicks generated via automated technology 
methods, for example a bot, or via manual clicking on an ad without having any actual interest in 
that ad’s link but only for the purpose of earn the per click fee for the advertiser 
 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) A type of web application vulnerability which allows attackers to 
bypass the security mechanisms imposed on web content by browsers 
 
Cybercrime Any criminal activity that takes place within or by using networks of electronic 
communication such as the Internet 
 
Data Breach Any unintentional exposure, disclosure or loss of data 
 
Domain Name System (DNS) A hierarchical distributed naming system for computers, services, or 
any resource connected to the Internet or a private network 
 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) An assault on a network by using multiple computers those 
act as zombies and work together to send extensive fictitious messages abnormally to increase the 
amount of the targeted network to slow down or interrupt its service for a certain period 
 
Computer Hacking An activity which intentionally access to or interference with computer 
systems without authorisation   
 
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) A standardized system for tagging text files to achieve 
font, color, graphic, and hyperlink effects on World Wide Web pages 
 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTP) A communications protocol for secure 




Internet Service Provider (ISP) A company that provides customers with access to the Internet 
and other related services, such as website building and virtual hosting, through connections using 
copper, wireless or fiber optics 
 
JavaScript A scripting language and functional programming language which is primarily 
implemented as part of a web browser in order to provide enhanced user interfaces and dynamic 
websites 
 
Malicious Software (Malware) Software programmes designed to damage or do other injurious 
actions on a computer system, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware 
 
Netizen Somebody who is a good citizen of an online community 
 
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) An iterative four-step management method used in business for the 
control and continuous improvement of processes and products 
 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) A specific character string that constitutes a reference to a 
resource. 
 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) An Internet standard for email transmission across IP 
networks 
 
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) An email validation system designed to prevent email spoofing 
by verifying envelope sender addresses 
 
Social Engineering An art that relies on human interaction for the purpose of manipulating people 
into performing actions or giving away confidential information 
 
Republic of China (ROC) Calendar The system of numbering years currently used in Taiwan. 
The first year of ROC Calendar is 1912, the founding year of the ROC. For example, 2013 is the 
102nd year of the ROC. Taiwanese judgments in this thesis are described in the ROC year.  
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ABSTRACT                                       
 
This research examines the regulation of phishing in Taiwan, particularly focusing on legal 
regulation but within a context of a multi-dimensional regulatory framework which also necessarily 
includes an examination of international regulation and the interaction between international and 
Taiwan regulatory interfaces given the transnational nature of phishing. Phishing is a malicious 
cyber activity which targets the acquisition of various types of confidential information by 
deception through the use of spoofed emails and/or websites. The increasing threat of phishing to 
information security has inspired a growing demand for regulation. Significant effort has been made 
in academic research and by industry to develop regulatory measures for phishing, which is 
dominated by technological work with comparatively little research on legal regulation. The current 
legal discussion of phishing, both international and Taiwan, very often concentrates on the criminal 
liability of phishers and pays little attention to the alternative role of law in the regulation of 
phishing. Thus this research suggests a broader approach to legal regulation that goes beyond 
criminal law and particularly addresses the role of information privacy law which constrains 
phishing by ensuring the protection of personal information. Phishing has posed crucial challenges 
to the traditional system in terms of both criminalization and legal enforcement. The solution that 
has been mostly addressed by the existing research is cooperation. As phishing is frequently a 
global phenomenon, this research suggests that an international approach involving coordination of 
legal standards and cross-border cooperation of law enforcement is necessary to tackle phishing, 
and also suggests that the fundamental step lies in a converged regulation of phishing consistent 
with its true context. 
 
Weak legal enforcement is a major deterrent to the effectiveness of legal regulation which 
highlights a need for a broad form of regulation that goes beyond law. In addition, a successful 
phishing episode involves a complex of factors including not only weakness in law but also 
vulnerability of technical infrastructure, administrative system and user awareness. A single solution 
is thus unlikely to deal with phishing. This research therefore suggests a multi-dimensional 
regulatory framework comprising different countermeasures developed especially in the areas of 
law, technology, education, and institutional network. It examines the anti-phishing approach 
undertaken in Taiwan employing qualitative methods to supplement the doctrinal research. In the 
context of a shortage of Taiwan scholarship on this subject, the research provides a set of 




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Questions 
 
This thesis examines the regulation of phishing in Taiwan from a perspective which focuses on law 
but within a context which also involves examination of other multi-dimensional forms of 
regulation such as technical, educational and institutional networking. Inevitably, because of the 
transnational nature of phishing, it is also necessary to examine the interaction between Taiwan and 
international regulatory interfaces. The main questions are: what kinds of regulation are we 
currently offered to tackle phishing and what kind of regulation can really help to combat phishing 
effectively?  
 
Phishing, a term that first appeared in the 1990s, refers to malicious cyber activity which targets the 
acquisition of various types of confidential information, such as credit card or bank account details, 
usernames, passwords, or financial or personal sensitive information. Although the study of 
regulation has been long dominated by economists,1 the concept of regulation has evolved and 
become a multi-disciplinary field.2 This thesis adopts a broad concept of ‘regulation’, which is 
different from traditional top-down, command and control system 3  and is not limited to 
government intervention in the private domain4 or a legal rule that implements that intervention5 
                                                     
1 Robson, William Alexander (1962), Nationalized industry and public ownership (G. Allen & Unwin);Veljanovski, Cento 
(2010), 'Economic approaches to regulation', in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 17-38. 
2 Baldwin, Robert, Cave, Martin, and Lodge, Martin (2010), 'Introduction: Regulation—the Field and the Developing 
Agenda', in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 3-13. 
3 Trubek, David M and Trubek, Louise G (2007), 'New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and 
Transformation', Columbia Journal of European Law, Summer. 
4 Mill, John Stuart (1848), 'Principles of Political Economy With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. 1857', 
George Routledge and Sons, Manchester. 
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but refers to any form of force that constrains, controls or adjusts certain behaviour or activity. In 
the context of phishing, ‘regulation’ involves any force that makes it possible to prevent phishing or 
which helps to diminish the potential damage which phishing is likely to cause by increasing the 
cost or difficulty of performing phishing and/or making phishing attacks less productive. A 
regulation of phishing, in this sense, can be any form of countermeasures against phishing; for 
example, hard law and soft law, hardware and software what Lessig called ‘Code’,6 network 
governance7 such as administrative networking of domains and websites connected by public or 
private sectors, or education and training programmes.8  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the forms of regulation are categorized into four: law, technology, 
institutional network, and education. In particular, because of the transnational nature of phishing, it 
is necessary to consider both national and international regulation. The focus is on legal regulation, 
including national and international laws, both hard and soft law, law enforcement and other legal 
approaches that have been adopted against phishing, in order to provide a fuller picture of the 
regulation of phishing. Nevertheless, it is suggested that legal regulation must be considered in the 
context of other forms of regulation. 
 
It is not easy to know the solutions that phishing really demands if we do not have an adequate 
understanding about the nature of phishing – how phishing is organized and practiced, the potential 
damage that phishing may cause, and why phishing can succeed. It is also necessary to consider the 
functions, limitations and interactions of different kinds of regulation, so that we can have a better 
idea of the extent to which each regulation is able to address phishing and the efforts that should be 
prioritized or improved to effectively combat phishing. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
5 Baron, David P (1989), 'Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions', in Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig 
(eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (2), 1347-447. 
6 Lessig, L (2006), Code: version 2.0 (2 edn.: New York: Basic Books). 
7 Castells, Manuel (2011), 'Network Theory| A Network Theory of Power', International Journal of Communication, 5, 
15. 




A number of factors have led to the selection of Taiwan as a case study. Taiwan has a 
well-developed information technology infrastructure, with many similarities to the developed East 
Asian countries. It also has a high incidence of phishing and a strong demand for effective 
regulation, but yet, it faces particular difficulties in establishing an effective regulatory regime. Also, 
as my home country, it has provided me with a good understanding of the situation and access to the 
necessary resources involved in this research. 
 
As phishing is frequently a transnational phenomenon, apart from the primary domain of Taiwan, it 
is necessary to consider other jurisdictions and especially forms of cross-border cooperation. 
Therefore, this research includes exploration of global and Asia-Pacific regulatory regimes of 
personal data protection and the harmonization of legal standards between different levels. It also 
includes examination of the legal frameworks that have been developed against phishing or 
identity-related cybercrime nationally and internationally and the international initiatives that have 
been proposed to enhance cross-border investigation and prosecution. 
 
To provide an analysis of the practical engagement of different stakeholders in Taiwanese 
anti-phishing work, it was considered necessary to conduct an empirical study through holding 
interviews with the experts selected from various fields to supplement the doctrinal research given 
the shortage of Taiwanese research-based literature on this subject. ‘Stakeholder’ herein refers to 
any person or entity which is, in certain aspects, directly related to phishing, such as potential 
victims, financial institutions, domain registrars or registries, ISPs (Internet services provider), 
CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams), technology industry, and law enforcement 
agencies. 
 




a. What phishing is, how it works, and why it can be successful 
b. Why Taiwan has been in the peculiar dilemma of combating phishing and why Taiwan’s 
experience in regulating phishing is valuable to anti-phishing research  
c. Whether Taiwanese laws, in particular the Criminal Code, are capable of adequately dealing 
with phishing and the extent to which they are able to address phishing 
d. Why information privacy protection is important to the regulation of phishing 
e. What specific requirements for personal information protection have arisen from phishing, 
how these requirements have been addressed in Taiwan legislation as well as the global and 
regional legal regimes, and the harmonization of national and international legal standards in 
relation to personal data protection 
f. What challenges have been posed by phishing to legal systems and law enforcement and the 
legal responses that have been made, both nationally and internationally 
g. Why a multi-dimensional regulatory framework is necessary to deal with phishing, how 
different forms of regulation function and interact and whether they are effective 
h. What progress Taiwan has made to develop an anti-phishing scheme based on the joint efforts 
of various stakeholders, how and to what extent the major stakeholders engage in this work, 
how they assess the work, and what improvements may be required for future work 
 
1.2. Related Research 
 
It is necessary to examine the previous research efforts related to this subject before highlight the 
contribution that this thesis aims to make. The academic work on phishing has been diverse, and the 
book by Jakobsson and Myers 9  which provides an explicit analysis of phishing and its 
                                                     
9 Jakobsson, Markus and Myers, Steven (2007), Phishing and countermeasures: understanding the increasing problem 
of electronic identity theft (John Wiley & Sons). 
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countermeasures can be a very useful starting point. Researchers have tried to understand the costs 
that phishing may incur,10 the techniques employed by phishers,11 the reasons why people fall for 
phish,12 and who are more likely to fall victim.13 Significant research efforts have been devoted to 
the development of phishing countermeasures within various spheres. Several researchers have 
provided an overview of different types of anti-phishing measures.14 A variety of technical tools 
have been proposed to prevent phishing messages from reaching users by phishing email filters15 or 
                                                     
10 Anderson, Ross, et al. (2013), 'Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime', in Rainer Böhme (ed.), The Economics of 
Information Security and Privacy, 265-300;Herley, Cormac and Florencio, Dinei (2009), 'A profitless endeavor: phishing 
as tragedy of the commons', Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms (ACM), 59-70;Levi, Michael 
and Burrows, John (2008), 'Measuring the Impact of Fraud in the UK A Conceptual and Empirical Journey', British 
Journal of Criminology, 48 (3), 293-318;Myers, Steven (2006), 'Introduction to Phishing', in Markus Jakobsson and 
Steven Myers (eds.), Phishing and countermeasures: understanding the increasing problem of electronic identity theft 
(John Wiley & Sons). 
11 Bose, Indranil and Leung, Alvin Chung Man (2007), 'Unveiling the mask of phishing: threats, preventive measures, 
and responsibilities', Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 19;Claburn, Thomas (2010), 
''Tabnapping' attack simplifies phishing ', InformationWeek, 25 May 2010;Emigh, Aaron (2005), 'Online identity theft: 
phishing technology, chokepoints and countermeasures', ITTC Report on Online Identity Theft Technology and 
Countermeasures;Grebb, Michael (2005), 'Crime: Crooks Get Behind Plow: 'Pharming' harvests a new crop of thieves', 
Bank Technology News, 1 March 2005;Holz, Thorsten, et al. (2008), 'Measuring and Detecting Fast-Flux Service 
Networks', NDSS;Irani, Danesh, et al. (2008), 'Evolutionary study of phishing', eCrime Researchers Summit, 2008 (IEEE), 
1-10;Karlof, Chris, et al. (2007), 'Dynamic pharming attacks and locked same-origin policies for web browsers', 
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (Alexandria, VA, USA: ACM), 
58-71;McMillan, Robert (2006), 'Who or what is 'Rock Phish' and why should you care?', PCWorld. 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/128175/article.html>, accessed September 16 2014;Milletary, Jason (2005), 
'Technical trends in phishing attacks', (CERT Coordination Center, Carnegie Mellon University );Nazario, Jose and Holz, 
Thorsten (2008), 'As the net churns: Fast-flux botnet observations', 3rd International Conference on Malicious and 
Unwanted Software 2008 (MALWARE 2008) (IEEE), 24-31;Parmar, Bimal (2012), 'Protecting against spear-phishing', 
Computer Fraud & Security, 2012 (1), 8-11;Stamm, Sid, Ramzan, Zulfikar, and Jakobsson, Markus (2007), 'Drive-by 
pharming', in Hideki Imai and Gullin Wang (eds.), Information and Communications Security (Springer), 
495-506;Vijayalekshmi, S and Rabara, S Albert (2010), 'Fending finanicial transaction from phishing attack', The 2nd 
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email sender authentication16 or block phishing websites through the use of anti-phishing toolbars17 
or heuristic-based classification by URL features18 or website content.19 Some researchers have 
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focused on the strategy of ‘notice-and-takedown’ to remove phishing websites as soon as they are 
detected to break the chain of a phishing attack.20 Teaching users to spot spoofed emails or 
websites and enabling them to engage in online secure behaviours by education or training is 
another important method proposed by researchers to combat phishing.21 While nearly all the 
proposed methods claimed to have shown very good performance in combating phishing, some 
researchers have tried to assess the usability and effectiveness of phishing countermeasures, 
including technical tools,22 education23 and takedown strategy,24 and indicate various weaknesses 
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in different types of countermeasures Every countermeasure has its strengths and weaknesses which 
may prove that a single perfect solution may not exist. Therefore, it has been suggested by 
researchers that a combined approach incorporating strategies from multiple interfaces may be the 
only solution to phishing.25  
 
However, in comparison with the above countermeasures, there are much fewer studies of legal 
approaches on this subject, most of which have concentrated on the examination of criminal laws in 
terms of liability rules and legal reforms.26 A similar state of anti-phishing research development 
can be sensed in Taiwan too. While Taiwanese scholarship on phishing countermeasures could 
barely be found prior to 2008, with only a few research proposals of authentication protocol for 
spoofed emails and websites,27 the existing scholarship which has increased in volume but is 
significantly dominated by the studies of technical methods for detection of phishing websites.28 
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Only one piece of scholarly work could be found that directly addresses the legal regulation of 
phishing, but this only focuses on criminal liability.29 In 2010, Taiwan manifested its ambition to 
combat phishing through joint efforts of the stakeholders from various regulatory interfaces by 
introducing two important anti-phishing initiatives, Taiwan Anti-Phishing Working Group and 
Anti-Phishing Notification Window. This is a milestone in the progress of Taiwan’s anti-phishing 
work but has not received any attention from researchers. There is a lack of research that examines 
the practical engagement of different stakeholders in current anti-phishing work. 
 
Sheng et al.30 conducted the first study that integrated the opinions of the experts from various 
areas on the state of phishing attacks, the countermeasures need to implemented, and the incentives 
of various stakeholders in relation to anti-phishing work by carrying out 31 semi-structured 
interviews. The field work that I have conducted is similar to Sheng’s work in the sense that both 
invited the experts from different fields and sought their opinions on phishing countermeasures that 
have been implemented and should be complemented. However, the Sheng et al study represented a 
US-centric view and its focus was on where the efforts should be placed to achieve effective action 
by asking the experts to specifically prioritize the recommendations on a list compiled by the 
authors, whereas my study represented a view of Taiwan aiming to examine the role of each 
stakeholder in the fight against phishing through interviews by using the interview questionnaires 
designed individually for each interviewee given the differences in their working background.31 
 
1.3. Research Contribution 
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1.3.1. A fuller picture of legal regulation of phishing 
 
Law has been a typical regulator prevalently adopted in both real and virtual world to constrain 
certain behaviours by setting rules and imposing sanctions on the rule violators. Legal prohibition is 
an essential element to make a phishing attacker accountable for his attempt, and law may also 
serve other roles in the regulation of phishing. The unique function of law in combating phishing 
should be properly addressed. However, after a review of the related work, we can find an apparent 
shortage of legal research on the regulation of phishing. The current legal debates over phishing 
mostly focus on legal reform for phishing or application of existing criminal rules to phishing but 
with inadequate understanding about the characteristics of phishing and little consideration of the 
complex legal nature of phishing. This thesis aims to contribute a fuller picture of legal regulation 
of phishing by exploring the compatibility of the elements of the relevant provisions and the 
conduct of phishing and investigating the effectiveness of law enforcement in order to understand 
the extent to which legal regulation is capable of dealing with phishing. Although this exploration is 
based on Taiwanese legal regulation, it also looks into the national laws in other domains and 
international laws, both hard and soft law, in relation to phishing and particularly addresses the 
harmonization of legal standards set up at different levels and legal enforcement cooperation across 
borders.  
 
1.3.2. A broader legal regulation of phishing beyond criminal laws 
 
Another contribution this thesis aims to make is to highlight the relationship between information 
privacy and phishing and provide an analysis of the role of personal information protection laws in 
combating phishing in multiple dimensions. As aforementioned, the current legal studies of 
phishing very often concentrate on the function of criminal laws. While criminal law has an 
important role in standard setting to determine the boundaries of permissible behaviour and penalize 
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those who do not comply, its regulatory power over phishing is usually restricted by weak legal 
enforcement, which is especially true in the case of Taiwan. This thesis argues that phishing 
demands a broader thinking of legal regulation that goes beyond criminal laws and suggests that the 
role of substantial personal information protection should be properly addressed to achieve effective 
regulation of phishing.  
 
1.3.3. Multi-dimensional regulatory framework of phishing 
 
A successful phishing attack not only exposes the weakness in legal protection but also unveils the 
vulnerabilities existing in technical infrastructure, inadequate awareness and knowledge of 
information security, and weak administration of domain and websites. Legal solutions may be part 
of the answer; however, these alone are not able to adequately address the problem of phishing 
especially in the context of weak legal enforcement. This highlights a need for seeking a broader 
form of regulation that goes beyond laws. A specific contribution of this thesis is to propose a 
multi-dimensional regulatory framework which comprises four interacting forms of countermeasure: 
law, technology, education, and institutional network. Each form of regulation has its particular role 
in combating phishing and functions differently against each step of the process of a phishing 
attack.  
 
Laws, especially criminal laws, have been a regulator employed to deter phishing attempts by 
imposing a threat of punishment on the perpetrator. Technology is important in the regulation of 
phishing, as it can physically constrain phishers from performing attacks through the codes 
embedded in the hardware or software. Institutional networks regulate phishing by interrupting the 
performance of phishing attacks through close connection and cooperation between different 
organizations involved. The best example of institutional network for phishing is 
notice-and-takedown strategy of phishing websites. Teaching users to spot phishing and act as 
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educated users about information security is also an important measure to curb phishing activities, 
as it helps users to protect themselves and other users which in turn reduces the success 
probabilities of phishing attacks.  
 
Although each form of regulation has its strengths and weaknesses, a combined approach 
incorporating different forms of regulation may be the best solution which maximums their 
regulatory power while minimizes the problems that may impede their effectiveness. However, it 
should be borne in mind that the proposed framework is not intended to be an elixir strategy but 
provide a basic model containing the key elements of developing forms of regulation.  
 
1.3.4. An empirical analysis of experts’ interviews 
 
The thesis provides an analysis of the roles of different stakeholders in Taiwan’s anti-phishing work 
by conducting an empirical study through holding interviews with the key persons selected from 
different fields, including legal, technological, and administrative experts, to learn about their 
practical engagement in the anti-phishing work and seek their expertise on the performance of the 
current work as well as their suggestions for future work. This is a small-scale field work, but is the 
first study that synthesizes the opinions of Taiwanese experts from different fields, and examines 
the efforts that various stakeholders have devoted and are expected to devote to the Taiwanese 
anti-phishing work.  
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
 
The goal of this research is to analyze the multi-dimensional regulation of phishing, with a 
particular focus on the legal regulation of cybercrime and personal information protection in Taiwan 
and the interaction between the regulatory interfaces on different levels. The examination of 
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multi-dimensional regulatory schemes on national and international levels is primarily based on 
existing documents and resources. However, Taiwanese scholarship on the regulation of phishing, 
as I have mentioned in section 2.1, is largely dominated by the discussions of technology with very 
little attention to other dimensions. In order to provide a deeper understanding of a social 
phenomenon and shed light on this unexplored problem, it was hence decided to pursue a 
qualitative study to supplement the doctrinal research.32 
 
1.4.1. Documentary and comparative analysis 
 
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of how and to what extent phishing is regulated 
within different dimensions, a wide range of documentary materials, including, policy documents, 
legislation, case law and secondary literatures including academic papers, national and international 
newspapers, and Internet resources, were gathered and reviewed.   
 
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrimes has provided a fundamental guide for both 
European and non-European countries in altering or formulating their national laws on cybercrime. 
Taiwan also used the Convention as a precedent in the large-scale legal amendment of the Criminal 
Code in 2003 which added a new chapter on the offences against computer use. The first data 
protection law of Taiwan was passed in 1995 largely built upon the OECD Guidelines 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data). In addition, the enactment of the Personal 
Information Protection Act in 2010 incorporated several data protection principles set out by the EU 
Directive (Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
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Movement of such Data) and adopted the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Privacy 
Principles for a greater harmonization with international standards of personal data privacy. 
Through conducting a comparative analysis, this research examines correlations among regulations 
between different interfaces – global, regional and Taiwan – especially in the aspect of the legal 
protection of personal data and criminal law. 
 




As indicated above, the thesis is primarily based on existing documents and secondary resources, 
and the field work is only supplementary. Given this, combined with the limited time and resources 
available to the researcher, it was decided to conduct a small-scale field work, with the participation 
of eight interviewees in total. Nevertheless, each interviewee was representative of a very small 
cohort of stakeholders involved in anti-phishing work and was able to provide valuable qualitative 
information. Further research is intended to build on this valuable study by involving a larger cohort 
as well as to focus on the interaction between the various stakeholders. This field work was 
conducted between April and May 2009 and between September and October 2011.  
 
Selection of sample  
 
The primary objective in selecting the participants was to ensure that expertise in multiple 
perspectives about the regulation of phishing was well represented. Thus the participants were 
chosen from different fields to include legal, administrative and technological experts. For the 
purpose of anonymity, this research does not provide detailed information about the participants but 




Three legal experts were selected; one is the principal lawmaker for the cybercrime laws of Taiwan 
enacted in 2003 and the other two are police officers from specialized investigation units dealing 
with Internet crime. The main reason of this selection was to learn about the legal regulation of 
phishing cases, including the making and application of legislation and the practical operation of the 
investigation and prosecution work. It is noteworthy that the lawmaker expert was also a prosecutor 
and now is executive of an online merchant. A variety of information could be learnt from this 
expert, including legislation application, prosecution of phishers, and the anti-phishing policy and 
measures that an online merchant usually takes. Two experts from different information security 
industries also provided their knowledge about the development and effectiveness of anti-phishing 
technology. These two industries were chosen because they are major companies for information 
security services and products in terms of market share that have been in existence for over ten 
years.  
 
In order to acquire an understanding of how and to what extent an ISP engages in anti-phishing 
work, one participant was selected from the information security department of the leading ISP of 
Taiwan. The other two participants of the administrative area were chosen from the National 
Communications Commission of Taiwan (NCC) and the Taiwan Network Information Center 
(TWNIC). NCC is responsible for regulating the development of the communication and 
information industry and acts as the administrative supervisory authority of ISPs in Taiwan. 
TWNIC is a non-profit organization that oversees domain name registration and IP address 
allocation in Taiwan. In 2009, TWNIC was commissioned to administer the operation of 
TWCERT/CC (Taiwan Computer Emergency Response Team / Coordination Center)33 between 
2009 and 2012, which included the construction of TAPWG (Taiwan Anti-Phishing Working Group) 
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the system and network related resources to help website operators to detect potential vulnerabilities and improve 
the security of their websites. See: http://www.cert.org.tw/eng/index.html.  
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and APNOW (Anti-Phishing Notification Window). This selection aimed to learn about their 
involvement in the current anti-phishing work and the measures they have employed to control and 
manage the threat of phishing.  
 
Data collection method 
 
The phenomenon of phishing involves various perspectives of regulation which in fact go far 
beyond the researcher’s knowledge background. In order to explore this phenomenon from multiple 
angles and gain insights into the experiences and opinions of those engaged in the regulatory work 
of phishing in different fields, the method of in-depth interviews was preferred. 
 
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were employed in this study, where the participants were 
asked open-ended questions by using an interview schedule questionnaire as a guide. To have a well 
understanding of the nature of the participants’ work involved, I made a careful study of the 
organization for which each participant works beforehand. This study included the scale and power 
of the organizations and the responsibilities and obligations of these organizations concerning 
cybercrime and phishing. A separate check-list of questions was hence designed individually for 
each participant in accordance with their working background. The use of open-ended questions 
allowed the participants to answer more freely and widely in their own terms and as Denscombe 
notes, the information gathered is “more likely to reflect the full richness and complexity of the 
views held by the respondent.”34  
 
Having obtained the written consent of the participants, each interview was recorded on a voice file. 
These interviews lasted for an average of 90 minutes and were mostly conducted at the participants’ 
                                                     
34 Denscombe, Martyn (2010), The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects: For small-scale 
social research projects (4 edn.: McGraw-Hill International). 
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office or preferred location.  
 
Key themes of the interview questionnaires 
 
Within the overall variations in the questions, there were the following key themes:  
 
Background information 
Each interview began by asking the interviewees briefly to describe the background of their work, 
including their work content, their position and how long they have been in that position.  
 
Involvement in anti-phishing work 
The questions asked in what ways and to what extent the interviewees were engaged in the 
regulation of phishing. These questions sought to establish the practical experience of each 
interviewee of dealing with phishing and how they examine the effectiveness of their work in 
regulating phishing.  
 
Cooperation or connection with the other stakeholders, both national and international 
The questions explored how the institutions interviewed cooperate with other countries, 
organizations, or even their customers to combat phishing and how they follow up with law 
enforcement to track the phishers. These sought to establish the practices employed to build up 
connections between different regulatory bodies at both the national and international level on the 
issue of phishing.   
 
Evaluation of the current anti-phishing work and suggestions for future work 
The questions asked each interviewee about their view on the overall anti-phishing work that has 






Having transcribed verbatim the audio recordings of the interviews, the next step was to analyse the 
interview data. A grounded theory approach was employed to seek connections within the data and 
develop a concept. The first stage was to explore the data, which involved reading and re-reading 
the transcripts to become thoroughly familiar with the data. This helps the researcher to stay closer 
to the data and thereby reduce the possibility of misinterpretations arising.35  
 
The subsequent stage was the coding of the data. This was carried out manually. The code was 
systematically used to link items of data to the key themes related to the analysis. Colour coding 
was also used to give each category a colour indicating the relevant responses in the transcript. 
After the interview data had been coded and categorised, a follow-up analysis was then conducted 
to seek emerging patterns and connections between the codes and categories and so develop 




To ensure that all of the interviewees were fully aware of the purpose of this study and their rights 
regarding confidentiality and anonymity, each one was asked to provide their informed consent on a 
voluntary basis by signing a written Consent Form, which indicated the purpose of study, the main 
objective of the interview, the recording method, and the protection of data use and identity of the 
interviewees, before they participated in the study. All of the data collected from the interviewees 
could only be used for the specific purpose of the academic analysis. In addition, as the interviews 
involved issues of a potentially sensitive nature concerning the personal experiences and opinions 
                                                     
35 Radnor, Hilary (2001), Researching your professional practice (Buckingham: Open). 
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of the participants in respect to phishing practices, the identity of the participants was kept 
confidential and the data were quoted anonymously.  
 
Accordingly, to preserve their anonymity, the participants were referred to as follows: Interviewee A 
(criminal investigator A), Interviewee B (criminal investigator B), Interviewee C (the expert who 
was prosecutor and participated the lawmaking of the cybercrime law of Taiwan, Chief Information 
Security Officer (CISO) of an online merchant, and is now Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of an 
online merchant), Interviewee D (the expert from the ISP), Interviewee E (the expert from the 
TWNIC), Interviewee F (the expert from security software industry), Interviewee G (the expert 
from the NCC ), and Interviewee H (the expert from anti-spam industry).  
 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
 
This chapter sets out the research questions and the research methodology, examines research 
related to this subject, and highlights the main contribution of this research.  
 
Before the discussion of regulatory issue of phishing, first we need to know what phishing is, why it 
should be regulated, and why phishing can succeed. In that way we can have a better understanding 
of the nature and elements of phishing and a clear picture of the regulations which are demanded for 
deterring a successful phishing attack. Chapter 2 provides a fundamental understanding of phishing, 
including the damage that phishing may cause, the various techniques that have been prevalently 
employed in performing phishing, and more importantly, the key factors that enhance the success of 




Chapter 3 then examines the particularly difficult position of Taiwan in pursuing effective 
regulation of phishing which underlines the fact that Taiwan has been exposed to extremely high 
risk of phishing attacks and also phishing hosts. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed explanation of 
the reasons why Taiwan was chosen as a case study by highlighting the significance of Taiwan’s 
experience in regulating phishing to obtain a better understanding of the difficulties, both general 
and specific and the direction for future improvement. 
 
The examination of the legal regulation of phishing in Taiwan begins with the exploration of the 
Taiwanese legislation related to phishing, with a primary focus on the Criminal Code and the 
Personal Information Protection Act. Chapter 4 examines the extent to which the Criminal Code is 
able to deal with phishing by looking into the applicability of the current provisions to the conduct 
of phishing including the reforms introduced by legislation in 1997 and 2003. This chapter 
investigates the various legal arguments about the application of the Code to phishing and indicates 
the negative influence that these might have produced upon the regulation of phishing. This chapter 
also investigates the difficulty in prosecuting phishing attackers and particularly examines the 
dilemma of Taiwan in seeking mutual legal assistance and engaging in international cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies.  
 
While effective law enforcement is difficult to achieve, phishing demands a broad thinking of legal 
regulation which goes beyond criminal law. Chapter 5 aims to underline the relationship between 
information privacy and phishing and contributes toward an analysis of the role of personal 
information protection laws in the regulation of phishing in multiple dimensions. This chapter looks 
into the legal frameworks that have been developed for protection of personal information on three 
levels, including global, Asia-Pacific region, and Taiwan national level, and examines the 
harmonization and interaction between three regulatory interfaces. This chapter particularly focuses 
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on the examination of the capability of the Taiwanese personal information protection laws of 
adequately dealing with phishing. 
 
Weak law enforcement has been the major deterrent to effective legal regulation of phishing. What 
challenges that phishing has actually posed to legal enforcement work and what legal responses 
have been made, both nationally and internationally, to address phishing and enhance cross-border 
law enforcement are the questions that Chapter 6 examines. The chapter particularly examines the 
national laws in different domains on criminalizing phishing and the international laws, including 
both hard and soft law, which have been developed to promote harmonization of legislation and 
cooperation in legal enforcement against phishing or identity-related cybercrimes. 
 
Legal regulation, as a corrective measure to constrain phishing attacks, is only made possible if it 
can successfully increase the risk experienced by phishing perpetrators of being convicted. This is a 
tough task to achieve without mutual legal assistance and effective law enforcement cooperation. 
The restricted regulatory power of legal regulation suggests a demand for a broader form of 
regulation beyond law which covers all the multi-dimensional phishing countermeasures including 
law, technology, education and institutional network. Chapter 7 therefore looks at the other forms of 
regulation, including technology, education, and institutional network, especially in relation to 
notice-and-takedown strategies, and investigates their respective function, strengths as well as 
weaknesses. As there is no silver bullet to phishing, it is suggested that multi-dimensional 
regulatory schemes may be the only answer to phishing. This suggestion is reinforced by the 
examination of the development of Taiwan’s anti-phishing work and the associated empirical study 
described above. 
 
The concluding chapter revisits the research questions set out in this chapter and provides 











This chapter draws a picture of phishing by looking at its context, structures and the attack 
techniques used in different types of phishing along with an examination of the cost phishing has 
caused and may incur to individuals, businesses and the societies. This chapter also investigates the 
key factors that enhance the success of phishing attacks and provides an overview of the measures 
that have been developed in academia, industry and government at national and international levels 




To study the regulatory issues of phishing, the fundamental step is to understand the object we 
attempt to regulate: phishing. This includes an examination of the following questions: what is 
phishing, what damages may phishing cause to us, how phishing attacks are usually organized and 
performed, and the most important one is, why phishing attacks can succeed. This chapter provides 
a general understanding of phishing and particularly looks into the key factors favorable for 
phishing attacks combined with a brief review of the related work and measures that have been 




2.2. What is phishing 
 
Phishing is a malicious attack by employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge which 
targets the acquisition of confidential information, ranging from financial or personally sensitive 
information to intellectual property or trade secrets, or even military information, from an 
individual, group or organization, usually in an attempt to profit from stolen information or exploit 
solicited data as a stepping stone for subsequent criminal purposes. The term ‘phishing’ is a 
variation of the word ‘fishing’, which was coined in the mid 1990’s to describe the form of attacks 
launched by the hackers who managed to steal America Online (AOL) accounts by duping the AOL 
users into providing their passwords through a spoofed email or AOL’s Instant Message. This word, 
as explained by Myers, arises from the fact that users, or phish, are lured by imitative 
communication to a hook that collects their confidential information.36   
 
Over the last decade, phishing has become the most common and effective way to acquire personal 
information to aid in identity theft or other fraudulent purpose.37 Phishers can easily move money 
from another person’s bank account as long as they obtain that person’s online banking credentials. 
They can also use stolen information, for example usernames or passwords used to logon to Internet 
service platforms such as eBay and Yahoo! Bid, to masquerade as the genuine account holders to 
sell nonexistent goods and thereby defraud buyers of their money. 
 
                                                     
36 Jakobsson and Myers (2007), op. cit. 
37 Anderson, Keith B, Durbin, Erik, and Salinger, Michael A (2008), 'Identity theft', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
171-92;Brody, Richard G, Mulig, Elizabeth, and Kimball, Valerie (2007), 'Phishing, pharming and identity theft', 
Academy of Accounting & Financial Studies Journal, 11 (3);Eisenstein, Eric M (2008), 'Identity theft: an exploratory 
study with implications for marketers', Journal of Business Research, 61 (11), 1160-72;Mercuri, Rebecca T (2006), 
'Scoping identity theft', Communications of the ACM, 49 (5), 17-21;Wall, David (2007), Cybercrime: The transformation 
of crime in the information age (4: Polity). 
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APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group), a global association that brings together industry, law 
enforcement, and government working on reduction and prevention of phishing scams and other 
cybercrimes through development of data resources, data standards and response systems for 
private and public sectors, in their quarterly phishing activity trends report indicated that financial 
and payment services continued to be the top two of the most targeted industries in the second half 
of 2009, accounting for 39 and 33 percent respectively.38 Similarly, the statistics compiled by 
Symantec over 2009 revealed that the sector of financial brands was ranked the top sector for being 
spoofed in phishing attacks, accounting for 74 percent of the total, followed by the sector of ISP.39 
ISP account can be attractive targets because a great number of people are used to using the same 
authentication information for manifold accounts. This information may be further exploited to 
provide access to victims’ other accounts, such as online banking. It can also be used as a key to 
open the door to the free web-hosting space included in these accounts to put up deceptive sites to 
launch further phishing attacks.  
 
The fact that the brands associated with the financial sector are at the highest risk of being spoofed 
may suggest a fact that most phishing attacks are motivated by financial gain, as the data obtained 
from the websites providing financial or payment services, for example credit card details or online 
banking login information, are more likely to yield financial profit in direct way. Although a 
majority of phishing activities are driven by financial gain, the target of phishing is obtainment of 
sensitive information which may not necessarily bring financial or property gain. Therefore the 
essence of phishing is misconduct against information security, rather than property. This distinction 
of a legal nature between phishing and other crimes that directly target a gain of property or profit 
                                                     
38 APWG (2010a), 'Phishing Activity Trends Report: 4th Quarter 2009'. 
<http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_report_Q4_2009.pdf>, accessed August 20 2014. 
39 Symantec (2010), 'Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report –Trend for 2009', XV. 
<http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xv_04-
2010.en-us.pdf>, accessed August 20 2014.     
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should be clearly recognized in order to close the gaps between the existing laws and the effective 
regulation of phishing.40 
 
2.3. The cost of phishing  
 
The costs of crime can be disaggregated as losses, resources costs and externalities.41 Resources 
costs are the expenditures in anticipation of and in response to the crime, and externalities refer to 
side effects from the commitment of the crime which are usually not reflected in market prices. 
Myers indicated that three types of cost should be taken into account when determining the phishing 
cost: direct, indirect, and opportunity costs.42 According to Myers, the cost of phishing includes not 
only the value money or goods that are directly stolen through phishing but also those costs 
indirectly incurred to deal with or redress phishing attacks and the loss of potential customers for 
online commercial merchants as a result of users’ refusal or mistrust of online services. In addition 
to the above costs, Anderson et al. suggested that defense cost which comprise the cost of security 
products, services and training as well as the effort put on detection, tracking, and law enforcement 
work should also be included in the cost of phishing.43  
 
The Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) claimed that losses from phishing scams 
in the UK almost doubled in 2005 to £23.2 million, from £12.2 million in 2004.44 Gartner found 
3.6 million adults lost USD $3.2 billion to phishing attacks in the United States in the 12 months 
                                                     
40 The individual legal nature of phishing and the difference between phishing and other identity-related crimes will 
be further explored in Chapter 6.  
41 Levi and Burrows (2008), op. cit. 
42 Myers (2006), op. cit. 
43 Anderson et al. (2013), op. cit. 




ending in August 2007.45 RSA, in its online fraud report released in January 2014, estimated that 
the global loss to phishing attacks was over USD $5.9 billion in 2013.46 However, as there is 
currently an absence of data from banks and other institutions that suffer damage, estimates on the 
damage caused by phishing may vary widely due to different methods used and assumptions of 
hidden costs such as damage to branding and loss that occur from distrust of online commercial 
services made by the organizations compiling and reporting statistics. 47  In addition, many 
companies may not report phishing losses because of fear of a loss of confidence from their 
consumers and investors.48 
 
Phishing has posed increasing threat not only to Internet users but also to the corporations which 
provide online financial services such as online banking. More than monetary loss users may lose 
their confidence in the security of the online banking system and banks suffer damage to their 
reputation.49 Litan reported that more than 42 percent of surveyed consumers stated that their 
concerns about online attacks such as phishing adversely affect their online shopping behaviours 
and more than 28 percent said online attacks have influenced their online banking activities.50 The 
increase of phishing scams also poses severe threats to legitimate e-mail communications.51 
 
                                                     
45 ‘Gartner survey shows phishing attacks escalated in 2007; more than 3 billion lost to these attacks’, Gartner, 17 
December 2007, http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/565125.  
46 EMC (2014), RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report – January 2014, 
http://www.emc.com/collateral/fraud-report/rsa-online-fraud-report-012014.pdf.  
47 Herley and Florencio (2009), op. cit;Hong (2012), op. cit;Layton, Robert and Watters, Paul (2009), 'Determining 
provenance in phishing websites using automated conceptual analysis', eCrime Researchers Summit, 2009 (IEEE), 1-7. 
48 Nykodym, Nick, et al. (2010), 'Cybercrime and Business: How to not Get Caught by the Online Phisherman', J. Int'l 
Com. L. & Tech., 5, 252. 
49 Featherman, Mauricio S, Miyazaki, Anthony D, and Sprott, David E (2010), 'Reducing online privacy risk to facilitate 
e-service adoption: the influence of perceived ease of use and corporate credibility', Journal of Services Marketing, 24 
(3), 219-29;Furnell, Steven M (2004), 'Getting caught in the phishing net', Network Security, 2004 (5), 14-18. 
50 Litan, Avivah (2005), 'Increased phishing and online attacks cause dip in consumer confidence', Gartner Study (June 
2005). 
51 Ceesay (2008), op. cit;Wang, Jingguo, et al. (2009), 'Visual e-mail authentication and identification services: An 
investigation of the effects on e-mail use', Decision Support Systems, 48 (1), 92-102. 
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2.4. Phishing attack techniques 
 
Emigh conducted a detailed analysis of the information flow in phishing attacks and the technology 
adopted by phishers at each step in the flow.52 Bose and Leung also conducted a study of the 
channels and techniques that are widely employed by phishers.53 In general, the performance of 
phishing attacks is achieved through two channels: phishing emails and malware.54 A phishing 
attack consists of different elements and involves several steps. To provide a better understanding 
of phishing, this section examines the common techniques used in different types of phishing 
attacks.  
 
2.4.1. Email-based attack 
 
A typical social-engineering phishing attack is performed by sending an email55 containing a web 
link which directs the unsuspecting recipients to a plausible website to tempt them to respond to the 
request by inputting their identifying information or other personally sensitive information. A 
phishing message may come from a non-acquaintance or pretend to be sent from a friend, a 
trustworthy organization. It may appear in the format of an MSN message (figure 2.1), a security 
reminder (figure 2.2), an advertising email (figure 2.3) or a greeting email.   
                                                     
52 Emigh (2005), op. cit. 
53 Bose and Leung (2007), op. cit. 
54 ‘Malware’ is an abbreviation for ‘malicious software’, which refers to software programmes designed to damage or 
do other injurious actions on a computer system. Viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware are common examples 
of malware.  
55 Phishing is primarily carried out through the use of email, but it can be done by using text messages via mobile 
phones, which is known as ‘smishing’. A mobile user can also be targeted by ‘vishing’ which uses automated phone 
calls to entice the user to input personal information. It was indicated that smishing and vishing attacks have increased 
in the past several years and they frequently target customers of local banks. Moscaritolo, Angela (2010), 'FBI warns of 
SMS and phone-based phishing scams', SC MAGAZINE. 
<http://www.scmagazine.com/fbi-warns-of-sms-and-phone-based-phishing-scams/article/191565/>, accessed 












Figure 2.1: Sample MSN Phishing Message56 
                                                     












Figure 2.2: Sample Spammed Security Reminder Email (Source: BLOG.TRENDMICRO.COM) 
 




An email-based phishing attack consists of two elements: a plausible email and a counterfeit web 
page, and it usually involves at least the following four steps. 
 
Collecting email addresses 
 
As the first step to launching an email-based phishing attack, it is a prerequisite to acquire the email 
addresses as many recipients as possible. In practice, email addresses can be massively collected in 
multiple ways. A great number of email addresses can be easily obtained via scanning websites, 
news groups, chat rooms or billboards that are open to the public by running particular software 
programs. Additionally, breaching computer security and hacking into the customer archives of 
mail servers is another way to gain myriads of customers’ email addresses through these mail 
servers.  
 
Email generator software is designed for building email lists for marketing or advertising 
campaigns, but it can also be used by spammers to generate and search millions of email addresses 
directly from well-known mail servers. In addition, Dictionary Attack and Directory Harvest Attack 
(DHA) are also the methods that have been prevalently adopted in obtaining bulk email addresses. 
Dictionary Attack is a technique for alphabetically generating emails addresses in the hope that 
some addresses will prove correct. This attack is used to acquire email addresses by trying 




Combined with Dictionary Attack, spammers have developed another attack technique called 
Directory Harvest Attack (DHA), which aims to collect a list of valid email addresses by sending 
thousands of generated email addresses to test the validity of individual email addresses according 
to the response of the targeted SMTP57 server. The success of a DHA attack relies on the recipient 
of the email server, whereby an error message will be sent back if this email address is invalid or 
nonexistent.58 
 
Composing scam emails 
 
A phishing email is usually written in HTML59 format, mimicking an email specifically used by a 
specific brand or entity; for example, a bank, credit card company, charity organization, online 
shopping company, etc. In order to make the email more plausible to convince the recipients, a 
spoof phishing email often uses the logo of a particular brand and copies the particular layout of the 
colour and graphics, even the character model, from the legitimate emails. A phishing email may be 
disguised under a variety of faces; for example a promotion email, a security reminder email or an 
account renewal email, which usually contains a web link that leads the recipients to a faux web 
page.  
 
Irani et al.60 conducted a study of phishing in a corpus of more than 380,000 phishing messages 
over 15 months. According to their analysis, a phishing email is usually composed of two major 
elements: the mail body (content) and the mail headers. The content is the main body of a phishing 
                                                     
57 SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) refers to an Internet standard for email transmission across IP networks.  
58 Bencsáth, Boldizsár and Vajda, István (2007), 'Efficient Directory Harvest Attacks and Countermeasures', IJ Network 
Security, 5 (3), 264-73. 
59 HTML (Hyperlink Markup Language) is a standardized system for tagging text files to achieve font, color, graphic and 
hyperlink effects on World Wide Web pages.  
60 Irani et al. (2008), op. cit. 
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message used by phishers to trick the intended recipients which is usually designed to confuse, 
worry, upset, or excite recipients in order to prompt them to react immediately. It can be further 
split into two parts: a) Cover – the content which is produced to look like the message from the 
legitimate source and b) Sting – the part of the content that tempts recipients to take a particular 
action which is likely to cause pain to them as a result of a loss of personal credentials. The sting is 
commonly performed by requesting recipients to provide their confidential information through 
directly replying to the email or via a clickable URL that directs recipients to a bogus website.  
 
The headers are the part of the message which is added by the mail clients, mail relays and 
spam-filters or virus-scanners which can be used to indicate the path of the message and how to 
unpack it. Mail clients add headers such as “To:”, “From:”, “Subject:” and some headers specified 
by the clients; for example, X-MSMail-Priority, X-Mailer, and X-MimeOLE.  
 
Figure 2.4 shows a phishing email that impersonated the UNICEF International Response Fund to 
call for goods and donations to assist the victims of the Haiti earthquake. The cover of this email 
describes the work of UNICEF and purports relief fund raising for the victims of this large-scale 
accident to make recipients believe that this is a legitimate email sent from UNICEF. The sting can 
be found in Figure 2.4, where the phishing messages asks recipients to make a donation by 
following the link enclosed. The phisher adds “email@unicefusa.org” and “Haiti Earthquake 





Figure 2.4: Sample Spammed Message (Source: BLOG.TRENDMICRO.COM) 
 
Sending phishing emails 
 
Phishing emails typically are massively forwarded and the recipients of the above emails are not 
specified to a particular group of people, which thereby increases the probability of success by 
quantity. While high volume of phishing email originating from a single host is likely to be 
intercepted by anti-spam devices, fewer messages coming from a larger number of compromised 
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host are more likely to evade detection. Botnets hence become a very useful vehicle for phishers as 
they provide a distributed platform for sending phishing emails.  
 
Botnets are widely used for a variety of cyber-attacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks, malware dissemination, click fraud, stealing information, key-logging, mass spam 
distribution and phishing. 61  A bot is an automated software program that performs certain 
commands when it receives an input. Bots in reality are legitimate programs but have increasingly 
exploited for malicious purposes, which are mostly known as IRC (Internet Relay Chat) bots.62 A 
botnet, which is also known as zombie network, is a collection of bot-loaded computers called bot 
client that allow the controller called bot master to control them remotely without the users’ 
knowledge.63 A single command may be either sent from a bot master to a bot client directly or 
transmitted by a command and control server (C&C server) to a bot client.  
 
MessageLabs, an email security service provider, pointed out that over 83.2% of all spam 
worldwide were sent via botnets and one in 280.4 emails comprised a phishing attack in June 
2009.64 According to MessageLabs, Cutwail botnet, which was believed to be the largest botnet 
                                                     
61 Bacher, Paul, et al. 'Know your enemy: Tracking botnets', <http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots>, accessed 10 
June 2014;Feily, Maryam, Shahrestani, Alireza, and Ramadass, Sureswaran (2009), 'A survey of botnet and botnet 
detection', in Rainer Falk, et al. (eds.), The Third International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems 
and Technologies (SECURWARE'09) (Athens/Glyfada, Greece: IEEE), 268-73;Ianelli, Nicholas and Hackworth, Aaron 
(2005), 'Botnets as a vehicle for online crime', CERT Coordination Center, 1, 28;Milletary (2005), op. cit. 
62 The first IRC bot can be traced back to 1989, which was designed for the use of online chatting at the University of 
Oulu in Finland. Nevertheless, it has been abused by hackers for launching various malicious attacks. An IRC bot is 
formed when a computer virus or worm installs a backdoor program, such as a Trojan horse, that creates back doors of 
the infected PCs to offer hackers access. A hacker may search for compromised PCs with open ports and then install 
the bot program onto their hard drives once they have been located.  
63 Abu Rajab, Moheeb, et al. (2006), 'A multifaceted approach to understanding the botnet phenomenon', in Jussara 
Almeida, Virgilio Almeida, and Paul Barford (eds.), Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet 
measurement (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: ACM), 41-52;Saha, Basudev and Gairola, Ashish (2005), 'Botnet: an overview', 
CERT-In White Paper, CIWP-2005-05, 240. 
64 MessageLabs (2009), 'Cutwail's bounce-back; instant messages can lead to instant malware'. 
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with a number of active bots between 1.5 and 2 million, pumped out 74 billion spam message per 
day.  
 
Although sending emails to non-specific individuals, groups or organizations to mislead the 
recipients to bogus websites is still a common phishing phenomenon, it has become less effective 
due to the growing public awareness of phishing and the increasing sophistication of spam filtering. 
Therefore, the attack techniques of phishing have been constantly updated and developed. An 
apparent changing trend is an increase of spear-phishing campaigns.65 Spear phishing is a targeted 
phishing attack that specializes in a particular group of people, company or entity rather than 
non-specific objects. While phishing messages typically appear to come from a well-known 
company or website with a broad membership base, the source of emails used in spear phishing is 
likely to be someone you trust; for example, your friend, colleague, or someone in a position of 
authority. The recipients are at higher risk of falling for a spear phishing attempt because of the 
highly credible email that has been specifically crafted for the recipients and the familiarity with the 
sender.66 Statistics show that spear phishing response is 19%, compared to only 3-5% for the return 
to standard phishing emails.67  
 
Constructing a bogus website  
 
Duplication – 
                                                     
65 Hong (2012), op. cit. 
66 Parmar (2012), op. cit. 
67 SearchITChannel (2006), 'Ready for some spear phishing', TechTarget. 
<http://searchitchannel.techtarget.com/feature/Ready-for-some-spear-phishing>, accessed September 17 2014. 
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A fraudulent website usually imitates the look of the legitimate site that it intends to copy, including 
the logo, graphics, fonts, layouts, and other related elements. In order to confuse users, phishers 
may register a similar looking URL to a genuine URL. For example, phishers may alter a legitimate 
URL by deleting or adding a single letter or replacing a letter or number with an analogical ones, 
such as l and 1 (one), O and 0 (zero), n and h, or v and w. Taking the instance of paypa“l”.com, it 
may be changed into paypa“1” (one).com to mix the spurious URL with the legitimate URL to 
spoof users.  
 
In fact, it is not very difficult to detect the similar-looking URL if more attention is paid to the 
spelling of the words. However, users will be very likely to be misled if the URL of the phishing 
website looks exactly the same as the genuine one. An authentic-looking browser window can be 
created by using JavaScript68 technique to disguise the real URL of the phishing website in the 
browser address bar to deceive users into thinking that they are at the correct website. Figure 2.5 is 
a sample of a phishing site that mimics the eBay login page. The URL that appeared in the browser 
address bar was the actual URL of a phishing site whereas the URL shown underneath the bar was 
created by JavaScript with the same-looking URL as the genuine one in order to hide the real 
address of the spoof site.  
                                                     
68 JavaScript is a scripting language and functional programming language which is primarily implemented as part of a 




Figure 2.5: Sample Phishing Website (Source: .WWW.NEO.COM.TW) 
 
Botnets – 
Botnets are often used by phishers to protect phishing websites from closure and protect themselves 
from being tracing back directly. Rock Phish, which first appeared in late 2004, has been a 
well-known and active group of phishers primarily focusing on European and U.S. financial 
institutions. This group has developed a variety of new attack techniques and purchased volumes of 
domain names to create unique URLs for its phishing messages to get past the blacklist-based filters. 
Rock-phish gangs operate by using botnets and causing them to serve as proxies that relay requests 
and responses to and from the hidden mothership, namely, the server which holds large number of 
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counterfeit websites and stolen information. It was estimated that Rock Phish is responsible for 
between one-third and one-half of all phishing messages that are sent out on any given day.69 
 
Fast-flux technology which is operated on botnets allowing a continual change of website IP 
addresses every few minutes has been widely employed in phishing attacks over the past few 
years.70 A fast-flux network works by resolving a domain name to different sets of IP addresses 
over a short period and returning rapidly changing IP addresses. A browser connecting to the same 
phishing website every three minutes would actually be connecting to a different compromised 
computer.71 The ever-changing list of IP addresses extends the lifetime of phishing websites,72 
making it nearly impossible to entirely locate all of the hosting machines and take them offline.  
 
Lists of bot-infected computers is valuable and they can be rented out, sold or traded.73 Phishing 
has become one of major financial sources for botnet owners, bringing an average income of 
millions of dollars to botnets owners per year. Phishers do not need to create their own fast-flux 
network, they can simply pay USD $1000 to $2000 to botnet owners per month for fast-flux hosting 
services.74 According to Kaspersky Lab, Rock Phish cooperated with a botnet operator, Asprox, to 
upgrade their infrastructure for fast-flux compatibility in 2008.  
 
Pay-Per-Click Ads – 
                                                     
69 Mcmillan (2006), op. cit. 
70 Nazario and Holz (2008), op. cit. 
71 Bacher et al. (2005), op. cit;Holz et al. (2008), op. cit. 
72 Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit. 
73 Wall (2007), op. cit. 
74 Namestnikov, Yuri (2009), 'The economics of botnets', Analysis on Viruslist. com, Kaspersky Lab. 
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Patience is always important for anglers when waiting for fish to take the bait, and likewise the 
phishers must wait for the recipients to link to the bogus website after sending out the lures, i.e. 
phishing emails or messages. Another change is that phishing attacks have been more active in 
tempting users to visit spoof websites by purchasing Pay-Per-Click (PPC) ads on top of search 
engines such as Google and Yahoo.  
 
PPC ads are the ads shown on the right-hand side of a search result page when users type a keyword 
into search engines. PPC is one of the fastest ways to boost web traffic to a website, as relatively 
more people are used to relying on search engines to search websites and find the information that 
they need.75 Promoting phishing websites through PPC ads not only greatly increases the click 
traffic to the fake websites but also significantly raises the risks that users will be deceived.  
 
2.4.2. Malware-based attack 
 
In addition to email-based attacks, phishing can be carried out through a technical subterfuge 
scheme by infecting users’ PCs with malware or exploiting the browser vulnerability of websites.  
 
Infecting PCs with malware 
 
A technical-subterfuge phishing plants malware, in particular Trojan horses, onto Internet user’s 
PCs to scan the stored information or intercept their activities or keystrokes and thereby obtain 
                                                     
75 Juels, Ari, Stamm, Sid, and Jakobsson, Markus (2007), 'Combating click fraud via premium clicks', Proceedings of 
16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium (Boston, MA. USA: USENIX Association), 1-10;Kshetri, 
Nir (2010), 'The Economics of Click Fraud', IEEE Security & Privacy, 8 (3), 45-53. 
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credit card credentials, passwords or other sensitive personal information directly. A Trojan horse 
or Trojan is a type of malware that has been widely used in phishing attacks. It is named after the 
wooden horse that infiltrated Troy, which is actually a piece of harmful software that masquerades 
as benign files used to trick users into loading or executing them on their system. As Trojans do not 
reproduce by infecting other files nor do they self-replicate, Trojans have to spread through user 
interaction such as opening a malicious email attachment or downloading and running a file from 
the websites that are embedded with malware. Users unwillingly download Trojans either by 
clicking on links which contains malicious code or even simply by visiting malicious injection 
URLs.  
 
A Trojan can make several attacks on the infected host after it has been activated, ranging from 
irritating the users or damaging the host, such as deleting files, stealing data, or activating and 
spreading other malware. Trojans are also well known for their use in creating back doors of 
compromised hosts. By installing malware onto users’ PCs, it may turn the compromised machines 
into members of botnet for subsequent criminal use.  
 
In addition to opening PCs’ Internet ports and exposing the ports to bot installation, Trojans can be 
used to steal data from infected PCs through key-logging interception or access to stored 
information. A variety of information, such as banking data, passwords or other sensitive 
information, will be automatically output to another computer controlled by the phishers for 
receiving data when victims input it on their PCs. Phishers may even directly access the data stored 




Milletary provided some examples of Trojans that are prevalent in phishing attacks.76 Bancos, 
originally identified in July 2003, is a representative of phishing malwares that monitors Internet 
Explorer for specific bank URLs and attempts to capture account information. Bancos can overlay 
certain banking websites with a counterfeit one to trick users into disclosing their information. 
Bankash is the first known piece of malware that targets AntiSpyware.77 It attempts to disable 
Microsoft anti-spyware program and steal online banking login information of targeted banks by 
using a keylogger or displaying a fake login page.  
 
Exploiting the browser vulnerability of websites 
 
A typical phishing attack is heavily based on a huge number of fake email messages claiming to be 
sent from trusted resources. However, the increasing sophistication of spam filtering driven by ISPs 
has made it more difficult to ensure that spoof emails reach the targeted objects successfully. 
Removing the email component, phishing techniques thus have been enhanced to abuse the 
vulnerabilities in web browsers that provide phishers with the ability to obfuscate URLs or install 
malware on users’ machines. Exploitation of web browser vulnerabilities could allow attackers to 
create a pop-up window that overlays the address bar to hide the illegitimate URL of a phishing 
website or to change or replace content within the browser window containing the legitimate 
websites.78  
 
A good example of exploitation of web browser vulnerabilities is ‘in-session attack’, which is 
carried out by making use of web-based fake alerts to convince the end users to provide their login 
                                                     
76 Milletary (2005), op. cit. 
77 Broersma, Matthew 'Trojan Targets Microsoft's AntiSpyware Beta', 
<http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Trojan-Targets-Microsofts-AntiSpyware-Beta/>, accessed 15 June 2014. 
78 Milletary (2005), op. cit. 
55 
 
information. In 2008, Trusteer found a JavaScript flaw in all leading browsers, such as Internet 
Explorer, Firefox, Safari, and Chrome, which allows a website to trace the footprint and check 
whether a user is currently logged onto another website.79 Once a user is identified as being logged 
onto a website with malicious code injection, the said code would present a web-based pop-up 
window pretending to be from the website. It may ask users to complete a customer survey or ask 
users to retype their usernames or passwords by claiming that “Your login session has expired. 
Please sign in again” and thereby capture users’ login credentials.80  
 
A website with malicious code injection may also generate a fake security warning pop-up that 
cautions users that their computer has been infected by Trojan (see figure 2.6) and strongly prompt 
them to install the antimalware software it provides (see figure 2.7). However, there are in fact no 
Trojans infections but users will soon be the next victims of Trojans if they decide to click to install 
a Trojan that is masquerading as antimalware software. 
                                                     
79 Trusteer (2008), 'In session phishing attacks', Trusteer Research Paper. 



























Pharming is an updated form of online fraud based upon phishing. Similarly, phishing and 
pharming rely on counterfeit websites in the same attempt to steal confidential information. A 
phishing attack is reliant on users clicking on an enticing link in fraudulent emails; however, 
through DNS cache81 poisoning, a pharming attack re-directs victims to a fictitious website even if 
they type the right web address into their web browser.82  
 
DNS cache poisoning is an attack on the Internet naming system by which pharmers direct users to 
a series of bogus websites by changing the routes from the domain names to the IP addresses and 
thereby dupe unsuspecting victims into divulging their confidential information. One of the first 
known pharming attack happened in early 2005. The domain name for a large New York ISP, Panix, 
was hijacked to point to a website in Australia. Pharming attacks not only threaten the personal 
information security of users but also causes adverse impact on the hijacked website, as the 
legitimate website can no longer be reached once the traffic flow has been re-directed and the 
original address has been moved to a new address.  
 
The techniques used in DNS-based attacks have been constantly updated and sophisticated. Stamm 
et al. examined an attack termed Drive-by Pharming where attackers create a web page, which 
simply when viewed by the victim, changes the DNS setting on the victims’ home broadband router. 
                                                     
81 DNS servers are responsible for transferring letter-based website names, for example (www.google.com) into 
machine-understandable digits (125.13.213.1) to take users to the website of their choice. A DNS cache is a 
component that temporarily stores data about website names and their corresponding IP addresses so that future 
requests for data can be recalled quickly.  
82 Grebb (2005), op. cit. 
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The attackers can direct the victims’ Internet traffic to the attackers’ own websites by which acquire 
victims’ confidential information. 83  Karlof et al. also described a new type of DNS attack 
-Dynamic Pharming. It works by sending victims a web document containing malicious JavaScript 
code which then exploits DNS vulnerability in browsers to hijack a legitimate session after 
authentication has taken place. A dynamic pharming can be used for a variety of malicious purposes; 




Tabnapping, a new type of phishing techniques, was discovered and named by Aza Raskin in early 
2010.85 It works by replacing the contents and label of an open-but-not--active tab with a page 
designed to capture users’ login information after they visit a hostile or compromised website.86 
Very commonly, Internet users work with multiple tabs. For example, a user might open a tab to 
Gmail, a news site, and an infected site. The infected site morphs into a fake Gmail login page when 
the user browsers the news site. The user may be unaware of this, or may assume that the initial 
login session has been timed out and retype login information when he returns to the tab of the 
duplicate Gmail login.87  
 
2.5. The keys to successful phishing attacks and the corresponding 
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Having obtained a picture of the components and tactics of phishing, we now need to understand 
the factors that assist in the performance of phishing attacks. Why phishing attackers can 
successfully hide themselves and dupe unsuspecting users into divulging their confidential 
information? What can we do to prevent a successful phishing attack from happening? This section 
aims to investigate the key factors leading to the success of phishing and the current corresponding 
measures proposed against them.    
 
2.5.1. Transnational nature 
 
The overwhelming majority of phishing attacks are operated from one country to another by taking 
advantage of the borderless nature of cyberspace. The transnational nature of phishing enables 
phishers to obscure their identity and location and to abuse inconsistent legal protection among 
different countries to impede investigation and prosecution, which poses a severe challenge to 
policing strategies.89  
 
The role of laws against phishing usually involves the discussions of three dimensions: 
criminalization of phishing, harmonization of legal standards, and international cooperation of legal 
enforcement. Criminalization of phishing is a prerequisite to make phishing perpetrators liable for 
                                                     
88 This section only provides a brief review of different types of scholarly work developed as a solution to respond to 
phishing attacks. This will be discussed in great detail in latter chapters.  
89 Broadhurst, Roderic (2006), 'Developments in the global law enforcement of cyber-crime', Policing: An International 
Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 29 (3), 408-33;Lovet, Guillaume (2009), 'Fighting Cybercrime: Technical, 
juridical and ethical challenges', Virus Bulletin Conference (Geneva, Switzerland), 63-76;Wall, David (2003), Crime and 
the Internet (Routledge). 
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their conducts. Several studies were generated to examine the phishing laws in various countries 
such as USA, 90  UK, 91  South Africa 92  Saudi Arabia, 93  India, 94  and Malaysia. 95  Instead of 
introducing a new provision specific to phishing, many countries incorporate phishing under their 
existing cybercrime laws or common laws in relation to spam, impersonation, theft or fraud. 
However, as phishing involves both social-engineering and technical-subterfuge schemes and 
usually involves overlaps of the elements of multiple offences, some studies argued that the existing 
legal framework is adequate to fully accommodate the conduct of phishing.96  
 
Another major concern raised about legal solutions is the effectiveness of cross-border legal 
enforcement.97 It is not possible to restrain the attempt of phishing attackers from legal perspective 
if they do not feel the risk of being caught and punished. The difference between legal provisions 
relating to phishing across jurisdictions nevertheless creates ‘safe havens’ for phishing attackers, 
and the anonymity characteristic of cyberspace enables phishers to flee easily from the track. 
Whether laws can curb phishing activities largely depends on successful prosecution of perpetrators, 
which can only be made by promoting the consistency and compatibility of the phishing laws 
between jurisdictions through the development of a set of common standards to be enforced and 
creation of expedient multilateral platform to facilitate international cooperation among legal 
systems.98  
                                                     
90 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Mcnealy (2008), op. cit. 
91 Bainbridge (2007), op. cit;Mcgowan (2006), op. cit. 
92 Granova and Eloff (2005), op. cit. 
93 Almerdas (2014), op. cit. 
94 Nappinai (2009), op. cit. 
95 Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit. 
96 Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Granova and Eloff (2005), op. cit;Nappinai (2009), op. cit. 
97 Broadhurst (2006), op. cit;Cheng, Fa-Chang (2011), 'The Law Enforcement in Cyberspace Criminal: Focusing on the 
Experience between Taiwan and the United States', 2011 Third International Conference on Multimedia Information 
Networking and Security (MINES) (Shanghai, China: IEEE), 577-80;Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Stevenson, Robert Louis B 
(2005), 'Plugging the" Phishing" Hole: Legislation Versus Technology', Duke L. & Tech. Rev., 2005, 6-26;Sullins (2006), op. 
cit. 
98 Menon, Sundaresh and Siew, Teo Guan (2012), 'Key challenges in tackling economic and cyber crimes: Creating a 




Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made to develop a transnational legal 
instrument to respond to the threat of cybercrimes. The well-known examples include the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Council of Europe Convention 
on Cybercrime. While these two international treaties provide a fundamental basis for the 
harmonization of the legal standards to deal with cybercrime, whether they can effectively regulate 
phishing remains a question.99 In order to tackle the rise of cybercrime, significant efforts have also 
been made by several international organizations to coordinate actions between governments 
against cybercrime, for example the United Nations, OECD, G8 and APEC. The establishment of a 
24/7 network is especially important to facilitate cybercrime investigation by speeding up 
communication through a single point of contact and authorizing the contact point to carry out 
certain investigation right away.  
 
2.5.2. High availability of technical resources 
 
The easy availability of phishing kits is also an important factor that enables flourishing phishing 
attacks.100 The technical resources needed for launching phishing attacks such as pre-generated 
HTML pages for popular banks and online commerce entities, scripts for processing user input, 
email and proxy server lists, and even hosting services for phishing websites can be easily bought101 
or downloaded free of charge102 through various sources. Some even provide “bulletproof” web 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(2006), op. cit. 
99 Schjolberg, Stein and Ghernaouti-Helie, Solange (2011), 'A global treaty on cybersecurity and cybercrime', 
Cybercrime Law. 
100 Bose and Leung (2007), op. cit;Brody, Mulig, and Kimball (2007), op. cit;Messagelabs (2009), op. cit;Milletary 
(2005), op. cit. 
101 Dunn, John E. (2007), 'Do-it-Yorself Phishing Kit Found Online', PCWorld. 
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hosting services which guarantee to keep phishers’ websites up under any circumstance.103 The low 
technical requirement for committing phishing makes phishing viable for a larger population, 
including non-technical criminals.  
 
A number of countries have recognized the problem of producing, possessing, or transferring both 
data and programs that may assist in committing a computer offence and have therefore embedded 
provisions that criminalize these conducts. For example, Taiwan Criminal Code makes it a crime to 
produce computer programs for the commitment of the offences against computer use provided 
under chapter 36 of the Code which came into force in June 2003 (Art. 362). The UK Frauds Act 
2006 makes it an offence to possess, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply an article knowing that 
it is designed or adapted for use or in connection with fraud (section 6 and 7). Section 8 makes it 
clear that ‘article’ includes ‘any program or data held in electronic form’. 
 
2.5.3. Increasing sophistication of attack techniques 
 
Phishing attack techniques are constantly updated and reformed from time to time to produce better 
outcome and to circumvent detection. Even the savviest users could be fooled by sophisticated 
phishing attacks. A variety of technical solutions have hence been proposed to serve as the first line 
of defense to prevent phishing emails from reaching users, identifying phishing attacks and block 
fake websites in the first place. Generally speaking, the anti-phishing technical countermeasures can 
be divided into the following four categories.  
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Detecting phishing emails 
 
Whether an email is phishing can be distinguished by identifying phishing email features or 
authenticating its sender. There are several research studies of content-based phishing classification 
using machine learning techniques.104 Machine learning is where an algorithm (classifier) tries to 
classify an email to phishing or legitimate by learning certain features in the email. A well-known 
example is PILFER, a classifer proposed by Fette et al., 105  which identifies phishing by 
incorporating 10 different specific features that are directly applicable to phishing emails, for 
example, nonmatching URLS, HTML emails, number of links, domains and dots.  
 
A convincing phishing email has to make the intended recipients believe that the source of the 
communication is an entity that they trust. The spoofing of email senders has thus become an 
essential tactic used by phishers. The three predominant approaches to email sender authentication 
are Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Sender ID Framework (SIDF) and DomainKeys Identified 
Mail (DKIM).106 Gorling found that despite that SPF is designed for easy adoption and consistently 
implemented in several popular anti-spam solutions, the adoption-ratio of SPF as an anti-phishing 
mechanism is very low. 107  Several methods have also been proposed to enhance email 
authentication, for example, the use of digitally signed mails108 or a particular identity-based digital 
signature109 to better guarantee authorship.  
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Security management of password 
 
Nowadays, it is a very common phenomenon that users have multiple password protected accounts 
over the Internet; for example, Internet banking account, email account or other accounts for 
accessing online services. Many users are used to utilizing the same password for manifold 
accounts due to the difficulty of remembering and managing several different and unrelated sets of 
password, which effectively provides phishing attackers an effortless access to a victim’s various 
accounts once the password is stolen by phishers. A variety of methods have been proposed to 
protect users’ passwords against phishing, including improving both the convenience and security 
logins,110 strengthening authentication schemes,111  preventing users from submitting sensitive 
information to a spoofed website by suggesting an alternative safe path112 or issuing warning,113 
and preventing phishers from stealing such information.114 Nevertheless, studies have shown that 
users are accustomed to ignore security indicators.115 In addition, it was suggested that the usability 
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problem of anti-phishing tools affect not only the performance of these tools but also the 
willingness of general users to employ them.116   
 
Blocking phishing websites 
 
Whether or not users can be kept away from spoofed websites is crucial to determine the success of 
phishing attacks, as the users are immediately exposed to attacks carried by the phishing websites 
once they access to these websites. A number of researches have been conducted to detect phishing 
at the website level, which fall into three main categories: blacklisting and whitelisting, 
heuristic-based approach, and website authentication.   
 
Blacklist approaches detect phishing websites by checking their URLs against a blacklist of known 
phishing URLs. Blacklists can be generated in various ways, including automatic categorization 
using the rules based on phishing patterns, manual verification by administrators or crowd sourcing 
by users. The best-known anti-phishing blacklists are operated by Google and Microsoft which 
integrated a list of phishing URLs into browsers.117 Another popular blacklist is operated by 
PhishTank,118 where anyone can submit suspected phishes and verify other users’ submissions. 
Once a number of people required vote a submission is a phish, it is added to the blacklist. However, 
it always takes time for phish detected to appear on blacklists. A time delay of updating, in the 
meanwhile, produces advantages to the phishers. Sheng et al. conducted two tests on eight 
anti-phishing toolbars by using 191 fresh phish that were less than 30 minutes old. The authors 
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found blacklists were ineffective at hour zero and could only identify 47% -83% of phish even after 
12 hours.119 To change the reactive nature of blacklists, researchers proposed alternative predictive 
blacklisting to detect phishing proactively based on known-bad domains120, features of known 
phishing sites121  or URLs,122  or relevance ranking scheme borrowed from the link-analysis 
community.123   
 
In contrast, the whitelist approach detects phishing by maintaining a trust list on different bases 
such as analysis of users’ online behaviors124 or URL validation.125 For example, PhishingGuard, 
an anti-phishing solution introduced by Kang and Lee, maintains lists containing mapping of trusted 
domains and corresponding IP addresses to prevent access to phishing sites and warns for access to 
suspicious phishing sites by the URL similarity check  
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Heuristic-based anti-phishing technique is to estimate whether a given page has certain phishing 
heuristics characteristics. Most of heuristic-based researches look into URL features126 or/and 
website content,127 including textual and visual content such as words, titles, or images in the 
website, to identify phish. For example, Ludl et al. discovered a list of 18 properties of a phishing 
site, two of which are derived from the page’s URL and the remaining features are extracted from 
the HTML source of a page, including number of forms, input fields, number of links, etc. Although 
nearly all the anti-phishing techniques claimed to have reached very high positive rates (correctly 
identifying a phishing site) while producing low false positive rate (incorrectly labeling a legitimate 
site as phish), Zhang et al. pointed out that the result of testing is significantly influenced by the 
source of phishing URLs and the freshness of the URLs tested.128  
 
Another method proposed to detect a phishing website is to verify the identity of a legitimate site 
and prove it is a genuine site before users through image-based authentication using visual 
cryptography.129 The use of visual cryptography is to decompose one secret image captcha130 into 
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two shares, one resides with user and the other resides with server, such that the original image can 
be revealed only when both are simultaneously available. During authentication a genuine server 
forwards its share and the user forwards his share. Once the original image captcha is revealed to 
the user it can prove the website is genuine.  
 
BogusBiter, a client-side tool developed by Yue and Wang131 to counter phishing in a different way 
from the aforementioned proposals which primarily focuses on helping users identify phishing sites 
or prevents them from giving away credentials. Instead of preventing users from biting the bait, 
BogusBiter feeds large number of bogus credentials into a suspected phishing site once a login page 
web page is classified as a phishing page. The real credential is concealed among bogus credentials. 
It also enables a legitimate website to identify stolen credentials as long as the phishers visit the 
legitimate site to verify the victim’s credential.  
 
While a number of technical solutions have been proposed and developed to defend against 
phishing, recent usability studies have demonstrated an alarming result which put in question the 
effectiveness of both server-side security indicators such as SSL certificate or URL and client-side 
toolbars and warnings to help users avoid phishing attacks.132 Browser security indicators are 
frequently ignored or inappropriately interpreted by users. Most users are not clear about what to 
look for in phishing messages133 and what they are expected to do to respond to warnings.134 The 
result of the above studies suggests two facts: first, maintain security is seen by most users as a 
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secondary goal;135 and second, technology alone is not adequate to address phishing, as its 
effectiveness is largely dependent upon whether users have a baseline level of security awareness136 
and understand what they are supposed to respond and why.  
 
2.5.4. Exploitation of users’ weakness 
 
Phishing is a typical form of social engineering attack which means sending an email seemingly 
from a reputable financial, trustworthy entity or a friend that requests account information, suggests 
a problem, recommends something that might interest you or capitalizes on world events.137 Social 
engineering attacks are attacks made by misappropriating human interaction or social skills to 
manipulate people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. 138  Social 
engineers often attempt to persuade potential victims with appeals to strong emotions such as 
excitement or fear to create a feeling of trust and commitment.139  
 
The success of phishing attacks crucially relies on whether phishing emails favorably dupe the 
recipients into clicking on the link enclosed which will lead them to a catch site or into opening a 
benign-looking file that will infect their computers. This may be achieved by abusing two aspects of 
human nature: trust in acquaintances and a fear of crisis. Comparing an email that comes from a 
                                                     
135 Kumaraguru et al. (2010), op. cit;Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006b), op. cit. 
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stranger, most people tend to trust the same email sent from a friend or somebody they know and 
they are more likely to respond to the request by following the link or executing the attachment.  
 
In addition to taking advantage of human trust in acquaintances, abusing the fear of a crisis in 
human nature is frequently used to influence the recipients. Phishing attackers often send emails, 
the subjects of which appear significantly to concern the interests of the recipients; for example 
‘Immediate security update of online banking’ or ‘Important verification of email account.’ By 
inspiring the general sense of crisis, this sort of email is more likely to attract the attention of the 
potential victims and has more chance of tempting them to follow the advice indicated in the email.  
 
There is no single solution to eliminate social engineering attacks, as it largely deals with the human 
factor. The problem of phishing is that it targets the weakest link in the security chain, namely, 
human.140 Workman conducted a study grounded in social psychology theory to investigate the 
reasons why people may or may not fall victims.141 He found that people feel obligated to 
reciprocate favors such as receiving free software or gift certificates by giving away confidential 
information; for example, company email addresses or employee identification numbers. A savvy 
phisher is proficient at manipulating the weakness of human to interfere with potential victim’s 
ability to analyze carefully the content of the message.  
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In addition to interference of emotion, phishing attacks succeed by exploiting a user’s inability to 
distinguish phishing emails or websites from legitimate ones. Bakhishi et al.142 conducted an 
email-based experiment in which 152 staff members were sent a message asking them to visit an 
external web site and install a claimed software. The result showed that 23 percent of recipients 
were fooled by the simulated attack even though the message was designed to convey signs of a 
deception and the external website was intentionally badly designed in order to alert users. Several 
research studies have been conducted to investigate the factors such as gender or age that could 
impact user’s susceptibility to phishing. 143  Sheng et al. 144  suggested that women are more 
susceptible than men to phishing, whereas Kumaraguru et al.145 found no distinct difference 
between males and females in the tendency to fall for phishing. However, both studies concluded 
that the participants in the 18 – 25 age group are more susceptible to phishing than other age 
groups.  
 
Enabling users to engage in secure online behaviours is another important countermeasure against 
phishing which is frequently done by education and training. 146  Researchers 147  proposed a 
game-based education framework to encourage user avoidance behavior by enhancing their 
avoidance motivation which was determined by five elements: perceived susceptibility, perceived 
severity, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy.148  
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Several researchers have proposed user education or training programs, which are mostly designed 
in the format of game, to help users to better recognize phishing and improve their resistance to 
phishing attacks.149 Game-based education provides a natural and interactive environment for 
learning by doing. PhishGuru, a well-known embedded training system developed by Kumaraguru 
et al.,150 teaches users to avoid falling for phishing by delivering a training message at the teachable 
moment, i.e. when the user clicks on the URL in a simulated phishing email. Another example is 
Anti-Phishing Phil, an online game grounded in learning science principles that enhance users’ 
ability to avoid phishing by teaching them how to use cues in URLs to identify fraudulent 
websites.151  
 
While the results of both lab and real-world experiment indicated that the above education tools are 
effective to help users to better recognize phishing, some researchers raised questions about the 
effect of education measures. An evaluation of the effects of Anti-Phishing Phil found that the 
training appears not to have produced a broad effect on promoting secure behaviour beyond the 
specific points it trained on.152 Researchers153 also argued that phishing tests can do very little help 
to enhance users’ ability to spot phishing. Another problem is that the constant and long-term cost 
of education and training without immediate benefit can be an important factor may negatively 
influence the incentive of the businesses to engage in education scheme.154  
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2.5.5. The transient nature of phishing websites 
 
To avoid detection and trace, the lifetime of a phishing website is usually very short, existing for 
only few days or even few hours. APWG’s statistics revealed an average time online for phishing 
sites was 3.1 days.155 Phishing sites often appear and disappear in a very short time and move from 
one host to another at extremely high speed through the use of free web space or compromised 
machines or by utilizing fast-flux network. In fact, a phishing site does not need to stay alive for a 
long time to be effective. A research article indicated that 80 percent of stolen credentials are 
gathered and become usable by phishers within the first 5 hours and that, by 10 hours, more than 90 
percent of the data that a phishing site is able to collect has already been harvested.156 Whether a 
phishing site could be blocked and taken down within 5 to 10 hours hence becomes crucial to 
suppressing phishing attacks.  
 
One of the key countermeasures to phishing is the prompt removal of the spoofed websites. The 
strategy of ‘notice-and-takedown’, which describes the scheme for the removal of undesirable 
content from the Internet, has been prevalently employed by banks and organizations that are 
impersonated to deal with counterfeit websites. A majority of banks outsource specialist companies, 
which we call ‘takedown companies’, to take phishing websites down by either removing the web 
pages from the hosting machine or requiring a registrar to suspend a domain name from the DNS 
(domain name system) when the domain name in question has been registered especially for 
phishing use or in some complex cases where page request are relayed by ever-changing 
bot-infected machines.  
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To evade being traced, most phishing attackers tend to use free web hosting services or host the site 
on compromised machines rather than on their own machines.157 In this case, it is necessary to 
contact the free web-hosting providers or the system administrator (sysadmin) who looks after the 
machine to ask them to remove the spoofed site. A research158 indicated that whether the brand 
owners are aware of the existence of phishing sites is a key that decides how quickly these sites are 
removed.  
 
However, the use of fast-flux technique can significantly extend the lifetime of phishing sites159 
which has become a huge challenge to the effectiveness of takedown strategies because the 
ever-changing list of IP addresses resolved from a domain makes it almost impossible to locate all 
the hosting machines and shut them down. 160  Rock-phish sites have also largely increased 
difficulty of takedown procedure as they can quickly and automatically switch to another 
bot-infected machine. To have the domain registrars to suspend the domain name in question is the 
only way to remove fast-flux phishing and rock-phish sites which is nevertheless not that easy and 
sometimes rather time-consuming.161  
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Take-down strategy of phishing sites was described as a cat and mouse game,162 as we are currently 
unable to prevent the creation of phishing sites but can only chase them and shut them down. Even 
though, taking down a phishing site as soon as it is detected is requisite to reduce the potential 
damage and victims that phishing site may cause. The effectiveness of a takedown regime can be 
improved by prompting the reaction of the actors responsible for takedown, i.e. domain registrars, 
ISPs and system administrators, to removal requests and enhancing the cooperation between the 
stakeholders involved by sharing their information about phishing URLs with each other.163 
 
This chapter has assessed the reasons why phishing attacks succeed and overviewed the work that 
has been developed on the countermeasures against phishing in diverse fields. Every 
countermeasure has its strengths and weaknesses, which proves that there is no silver bullet to 
phishing and a combined approach incorporating strategies from multiple interfaces may be the 
answer to phishing.164 However, while significant volume of research studies have been conducted 
on developing technological tools to prevent users from phishing attacks, very little research-based 
literature, apart from the debates that focus on liability rules and legal reforms, could be found that 
explores the legal force to address the problem of phishing.165 This may suggest two possibilities: 
one is that technology has been prevalently recognized as a powerful anti-phishing tool which is 
worthy of more development; and the other is that the relation between laws and phishing is not 
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164 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Mcnealy (2008), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit;Wilson and Argles (2011), op. cit. 
165 Savirimuthu, Joseph (2008), 'Identity theft and the gullible computer user: what Sun Tzu in the art of war might 
teach', J. Int'l Com. L. & Tech., 3, 120. 
76 
 
Phishing, a term that first appeared in the 1990s, has posed increasing threats to information 
security and caused tremendous damage on a global scale. Phishing targets the obtainment of 
confidential information which may yield financial gain both directly and indirectly but is not 
always true. The damage that phishing is likely to cause includes the direct monetary loss, the cost 
used to redress phishing and also the loss of customers and the damage to reputation and credit. It is 
difficult to regulate phishing because it usually takes advantage of the borderless nature of 
cyberspace, easy availability of phishing resources, and ephemeral nature of phishing websites. 
Also, a phisher is proficient at exploiting vulnerability of technology and weakness in humans. 
Considerable effort has been made for the development of anti-phishing strategies to prevent 
phishing attacks in different respects. However, having examined the existing research on phishing 
countermeasures, this chapter found a gap of the anti-phishing research between legal and other 
fields. The current research is dominated by technical solutions whereas comparatively little work 
has been conducted on studying the role of laws. In addition, the current legal debates over phishing 
have mostly focused on legal reforms and liability rules of criminal law which is actually not easy 
to be enforced because of the nature of phishing and is particularly difficult for Taiwan to 
implement due to its disadvantaged political status. The next chapter explores the special experience 
of Taiwan as a case study.  
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CHAPTER 3 THE PROBLEM OF PHISHING 




This chapter continues the account of phishing in the previous chapter by considering it in the 
specific context of Taiwan and indicates the specific significance of using Taiwan as a case study. 
This includes general factors such as the nature and prevalence of phishing attacks and the problems 




Taiwan has a well-developed information technology infrastructure and plays an important role in 
the cyber world; however, it has been a major target of phishing attacks as well as one of the top 
hosting country of phishing websites. The severity of phishing threat has inspired a strong demand 
for regulation of phishing, but yet, Taiwan has been in a particular dilemma of developing effective 
regulation due to a complex of factors.  
 
This chapter underlines the particular problems facing in Taiwan in combating phishing to highlight 
the contribution that Taiwan’s experience can make to the research development of phishing. It 
examines the reasons why Taiwan is so vulnerable to phishing attacks and looks into the specific 




3.2. Overview of the phishing problem in Taiwan 
 
Cyberspace provides phishers a borderless platform to launch attacks across countries. In order to 
evade trace and prosecution, very seldom will an attacker host the phishing site that targets the users 
all in the same country where he resides. In most cases, an attacker in country A may target the 
users in country B through a spoofed website hosted in country C. An attacker in country A may 
also target the native users by utilizing a network of bot-infected machines located in country C or 
in more than one other countries. Phishing is a global problem, and it is almost impossible for any 
country to be isolated from the issue of phishing. A country, especially with mature online 
environment and considerable scale of online commerce but insufficient protection of information 
security is at the highest risk of becoming not only the main target but also the hotbed of phishing 
attacks. The situation can be more complicated if some motivations other than financial profit are 
involved, for example, political factors. This is exactly the case of Taiwan.  
 
Taiwan has been one of the main targets of phishing attacks as well as one of the top countries for 
phishing hosting. In spite of sever threats posed by phishing, Taiwan appears to be still struggling 
with effective regulation of phishing. The issue of phishing did not receive proper attention from 
either researchers or government in Taiwan until recently. In addition, Taiwan has always been 
experiencing particular difficulty of taking part of international conventions or agreements and 
engaging in international cooperation due to complicated political factors. This thesis recognizes 
that Taiwan has been at high risk of phishing attacks and has a desire for effective regulation, but 
yet, it faces severe challenges in terms of developing a viable regulatory regime. Taiwan’s 
experience is able to provide a valuable insight into the general and specific difficulties that 
practically reside in managing phishing, which are worth considering for future development of a 
regulatory framework of phishing as well as other similar cybercrimes. This is the main factor 
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leading to the selection of Taiwan as a case study. Taiwan is my home country, which also makes it 
earlier to me to obtain a good understanding of the situation and access the resources necessary for 
this research.  
 
3.3. Taiwan is one of the principal targets and hosts of phishing attacks 
 
Over a decade, Symantec has been researching information security threats and has regularly 
released reports providing analysis of the data about emerging trends and landscape of global threat 
activity. It has published a series of monthly phishing report of the metrics and trends observed in 
phishing activity between May 2009 and March 2010. The statistics given in Symantec’s reports 
showed that Taiwan was the second highest globally ranked country for malicious activities per 
Internet user during the second half of 2006.166 For the specific measurement of malicious activities, 
the above report showed that Taiwan was the top country for phishing hosts and the second highest 
number of bot-infected computers with the Asia-Pacific/Japan region (hereinafter, APJ region). 
Symantec, in its phishing monthly reports, also found that Taiwan was on the list of top five 
countries in the world where the phishing sites were hosted167 and Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan, 
was the top city of hosting phishing sites followed by Jacksonville and Houston.168 
 
The above statistics demonstrate that phishing has caused a severe threat to Taiwan, and this can be 
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imputed to the following causes. 
 
3.3.1. Mature environment of Internet usage and connectivity 
 
Taiwan is a highly computerized country with a high density of Internet users and large numbers of 
Internet hosts. The data gathered by the Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC)169 revealed 
that the number of Internet users in Taiwan had reached 16,217,009, accounting of over 70% of the 
total population by the end of March 2010.170 The figures from CIA World Factbook171 generated 
in 2012 showed that Taiwan has 6,272,000 Internet hosts, giving it a ranking of the third highest in 
the APJ region, after Japan and China.172  
 
Taiwan has a high level of Internet usage and connectivity, along with high-speed Internet 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Internet is a ‘double-edged sword’. While the mature online 
environment may substantially expedite information circulation and boost the development of the 
online economy in Taiwan, it also provides cyber attackers with larger capacities, faster speeds, 
constantly connected systems and more stable connections which inevitably make Taiwan 
vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks, including phishing. 
 
3.3.2. Insufficient management of web server security 
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According to a technical expert from Symantec,173 insufficient management of web server security, 
especially regarding web servers that have been set up by small and medium-sized businesses, 
students or heavy Internet users, is another important cause responsible for the large number of 
phishing hosts in Taiwan. Phishing attackers usually compromise targeted websites by exploiting 
web browser vulnerabilities through an in-session attack to generate a phishing pop-up without 
changing the original content of the compromised website. As the content and functions run by the 
base website generally are uninfluenced, the performance of this kind of phishing attack is hence 
not easy to detect promptly with a shortage of resources and manpower for managing web server 
security.  
 
In fact, it is a universal phenomenon that small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) are more 
vulnerable to various malicious attacks, including phishing. In September 2011, Symantec 
conducted a research survey of 1,900 SMBs around the globe to gain an understanding of their 
familiarity with threats and their actions to protect themselves.174 The findings revealed that while 
the SMBs are familiar with security threats such as DDoS attacks, targeted attacks, and keystroke 
logging, they do not consider themselves in danger as targets of cyber-attacks simply because they 
are a small company. Since the SMBs did not feel at risk, many of them failed to take actions to 
protect themselves. 61 percent did not use anti-virus on all desktops and 47 percent did not use 
security on mail severs.  
 
However, Symantec’s data had proved that the assumption of the SMBs is wrong. Since the 
beginning of 2010, 40 percent of all targeted attacks have been directed at small businesses whereas 
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only 28 percent at large enterprises. The possible reasons can be that cybercriminals recognize that 
targeting large enterprises carries a greater risk of detection and SMBs, just like ‘low hanging fruit’, 
become an easy target to cybercriminals due to a lack of alertness and weak security 
management.175 
 
3.3.3. High volume of bot-infected computers 
 
Botnets have been described as ‘Swiss Army knives of the underground economy’ because they are 
capable to assist in a great variety of malicious attacks, including phishing.176 A botnet is a very 
useful tool to phishers to either deliver phishing messages or host and protect phishing websites 
from disclosure. Taiwan is on the list of top countries hosting phishing websites in the world; 
however, it does not necessarily suggest that these phishing attacks really originate in Taiwan. 
People from other countries may launch phishing attacks on other countries through a scapegoat – 
bot-infected machines in Taiwan. A well-known example is ‘Operation Aurora’, where Chinese 
hackers launched large scale sophisticated cyber-attacks against dozens of commercial companies in 
the United States from mid-September to December 2009 by utilizing compromised computers 
located in Taiwan.177  
 
Number of bot-infected computers can serve as a meaningful indicator of the extent of phishing 
hosts. An increase of number of bot-infected computers, in general, results in a corresponding rise 
of phishing hosts. Lee Hsiang-Chen, the director of the National Police Administration’s Internet 
Crime Investigations unit, indicated in an interview conducted in 2007 that over a third of 
                                                     
175 Macewan (2013), op. cit. 
176 Wilson, Clay (2008), 'Botnets, cybercrime, and cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and policy issues for congress', CRS 
Report for Congress. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32114.pdf>, accessed September 20 2014. 
177 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora.  
83 
 
computers in Taiwan have been installed with bot programs.178 Symantec also found Taipei was the 
top city for bot infections in the APJ region in 2008.179 Why is Taiwan so vulnerable to botnets? In 
addition to the high speed of Taiwan’s Internet infrastructure and a lack of security and 
management by operators,180 it was indicated that insufficient users’ awareness about computer 
security is another main cause that contributes to the botnets problem in Taiwan.181 When users 
discover that their computer is infected, they usually choose to reinstall the operating system of the 
computer. However, reinstallation will only protect the computer from botnet manipulation for a 
short time. The computer is still at high risk of being re-infected if the users don’t have adequate 
knowledge and sense of computer security. 
 
3.3.4. Intense malicious cyber-attacks from China 
 
China has been one of the top active originating countries for many cyber-attacks, and Taiwan, 
unsurprisingly, has been one of the most preferred targets for China’s attackers. While the phishing 
hosts in Taiwan primarily targeted European countries and America, most phishing attacks on 
Taiwan were reportedly originated from China.182 The possible reasons for this phenomenon can be 
the commonality of language and culture and the political tension between these two countries.  
 
The performance of social engineering attacks predominately depends on whether an attacker can 
successfully manipulate the action of potential victims with appeals to strong emotions. This can be 
much easier if the attackers share the same or similar language and culture as the victims. Taiwan 
                                                     
178 Hsueh, Yi-Jing (2007), 'Averagely ten times hacker attackers daily', Business Next, 72. 
179 Symantec (2009b), 'Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report – Trend for 2008', XIV. 
<http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_apj_internet_security_threat_report_04
-2009.en-us.pdf>, accessed August 29 2014. 
180 Chao, Y (2010), 'Google attacks used addresses based in Taiwan', Taipei Times, 16 January 2010;Su, Wen-Bin (2009), 
'Taipei becomes the headquarters of bots in the Asia and Pacific Region', iThome. 
<http://www.ithome.com.tw/itadm/article.php?c=54571>, accessed September 20 2014. 
181 Su (2009), op. cit. 
182 Zdnet (2007), op. cit. 
84 
 
users are more likely to respond to a phishing message written in Mandarin which appears to be 
aware of the hot topics happening in Taiwan society rather than an English-written email. The 
commonalities of language and cultural background largely increases the possibilities of deception 
of Taiwan users,183  which in turn intensifies the phishing attempt of China’s attackers against 
Taiwan. 
 
The political tension between Taiwan and China is another eventful factor responsible for the 
considerable number of phishing attacks against Taiwan. PRC (People’s Republic of China) led by 
the Communist Party has long claimed territorial sovereignty over Taiwan because the island is 
ruled by the exiled ROC (Republic of China) government led by the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese 
Nationalist Party) which was defeated in 1949 during China’s civil war. Both the ROC and the PRC 
agree to a ‘one-China’ policy but have disagreement about the form that a ‘one-China’ policy 
should take. The PRC considers itself the legitimate ruling power for all of China whereas the ROC 
refuses to acknowledge the governing status of the PRC. To maintain territorial integrity, the 
government in Beijing never gives up the use of force to keep Taiwan from declaring independence 
where necessary.  
 
The antagonistic relationship between Taiwan and China has boosted the growth of malicious 
cyber-attacks between them.184 Tsai De-Sheng, the acting director of the National Security Bureau 
of Taiwan claimed that over 3,100 attacks were launched by a Chinese cyber army against Taiwan 
government systems with an attempt to steal sensitive information during 2008.185 This did not 
include attacks against the private sector. In addition, Taiwan’s political activities, for example, 
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legislative or presidential elections, have been usually accompanied with an increase of attacks 
originated by China in order to influence the campaigns.186 In August 2011, Taiwan’s Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), which has long advocated Taiwan becoming its own nation against the 
wishes of both the PRC and Kuomintang, alleged that the Chinese government is behind a series of 
phishing attacks that target information about the party’s election activities.187 According to the 
DPP’s statement, the attackers sent the DPP staffers emails which appeared to be from the 
employees of the other party but contained a virus in the attached files that can be used to monitor 
the compromised computers. The above statement also indicated that some of the attacks had been 
traced to China’s Xinhua Agency, which is a state-run press group.  
 
The peculiar political situation of Taiwan not only exposes Taiwan to fierce cyber-attacks triggered 
by China but also puts other countries involved, especially the USA, at a very high risk of being 
attacked. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and the ROC, which was signed in 
December 1954 and came to an end in January 1980, assisted the ROC in maintaining its legitimacy 
as the sole government of all of China and secured Taiwan from invasion by the PRC until 1970s. 
In 1971, the ROC walked out of the United Nations shortly before it recognized the government in 
Beijing as the legitimate holder of China’s seat in the United Nations. In 1979, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Taiwan Relations Act to maintain commercial, cultural and other relations in unofficial 
form with Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC and the breaking of 
relations between the United States and Taiwan. The Act requires the United States to “provide 
Taiwan arms of a defensive character”; and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist 
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any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system of the people on Taiwan.”188  
 
The United States intentionally stands in an ambiguous position towards security issues in the 
Taiwan Strait, which is known as ‘strategic ambiguity’ – a dual deterrence policy designed to 
dissuade Taiwan from a unilateral declaration of independence, and to dissuade the PRC from 
unilaterally unifying Taiwan with the PRC by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or 
embargoes.189 China expressed strong opposition to the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act and regarded it 
as an open violation against China’s sovereignty.190 To deter U.S. involvement in a future conflict 
over Taiwan, China has been continually investing in military force such as new missile 
technologies 191  and increasingly developing advanced capacity in cyberspace. It has been 
suggested that China attempts to achieve military effects and influence the outcome of conventional 
armed conflicts via cyber-warfare.192 By using the threat of cyber-warfare, China seeks to deter an 
actor from behaving in a manner that is in opposition to Chinese strategic interests, for example, 
ultimate reunification with Taiwan.  
 
3.4. Poverty of anti-phishing research development besides technology 
 
Although nearly two decades have passed by since the emergence of phishing in the mid of 1990s, 
Taiwan appears to show very little interest in the development of anti-phishing solutions except for 
technical tools. Very little Taiwanese scholarly literature could be found that is closely related to 
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phishing countermeasures prior to 2008. A proposal for an email authentication protocol was 
brought forward by Chang et al.193 in 2007 to spot phishing emails by verifying an authentication 
message which is contained in each email and can only be signed by the sender himself. In the same 
year, Fang194  introduced a new type of visual cryptography, named visual cryptography in 
reversible style. Although the author did not particularly address the connection between his work 
and phishing, the technique of visual cryptography has been prevalently employed to identify the 
genuineness of a website which can in turn be used to detect a bogus website.   
 
There is significant progress in Taiwanese scholarly work on phishing solutions since 2008, which 
is nevertheless dominated by the studies over technical countermeasures. A heuristic-based 
approach was taken by some researchers to develop tools to detect phishing websites by identifying 
the features extracted from the web pages.195 A URL classification method was also proposed to 
differentiate phishing sites and benign ones by examining lexical features of URLs which usually 
include domain name, path, filename, and some arguments196 or using both lexical and descriptive 
features of URLs to combine the filtering results. 197  Several studies introduced a mutual 
authentication mechanism between users and severs as an anti-phishing solution which can be 
achieved by different keys, including a data-embedded image uploaded by users198 or users’ 
biometric information.199 One-time-password (OTP) protocol was employed by some researchers 
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to ensure independence between each login and thereby thwart phishing attacks by rendering the 
stolen passwords invalid.200  
 
Instead of distinguishing phishing patterns in web pages, Lee et al. focused on the access contexts in 
which users will fall prey to phishing by exploring users’ web browsing behaviors.201 The authors 
extracted discriminatory features of each clicked URL in a user’s access sequence to capture 
contextual information for phishing detection and demonstrated that their method had achieved very 
high accuracy for predicting the phishing threats of users’ next accesses through large-scale 
experiments. Tseng et al. worked on the frame model of phishing attack knowledge and page 
scenario which be utilized to build up an anti-phishing attack model for detection of phishing 
attacker behaviors.202 The model developed by Tseng et al. can also be used to automatically 
improve the contents of anti-phishing education game by extending the original phishing pages and 
model new pages.203 To transform the continuously increasing anti-phishing knowledge to learning 
materials and to make the materials more readable and easy for students to learn, Yang et al. 
classified anti-phishing knowledge into different levels of learning and proposed an anti-phishing 
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education game that will provide students with game missions according to their different learning 
achievements.204  
 
Although significant progress has been made in developing anti-phishing solutions in Taiwan over 
the past five years, it is an imbalanced development which apparently only focuses on the 
discussion of technology with very little attention on the countermeasures that can be developed in 
other dimensions. There is a distinct shortage of scholarly literature on the legal regulation of 
phishing in Taiwan, with only an article written by Professor Hsueh, Chih-Jen in 2013.205 This 
article explored whether or not there is a need to make a sui generis phishing law by examining the 
application of the current criminal laws to phishing. The author suggested that it is not absolutely 
necessary to add a phishing-tailored law for two reasons. One is that the conduct of phishing is fully 
covered by the current laws. Interestingly, the other reason is that lawmaking is far less effective in 
deterring phishing attacks than enhancement of preventative measures, users’ information security 
awareness, and criminal investigation capability. 
 
However, Hsueh’s work only looked into the criminal liability of phishing and its focus was on the 
Taiwan Criminal Code. While, the Criminal Code of Taiwan is considered in Chapter 4, the 
objective of this thesis is to consider wider aspects of national and international legal regulation in 
its context. In addition to the Criminal Code, the practice of phishing usually contains several steps 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.4.) which may involve violation against trademark or copyright laws. 
More importantly, phishing is a direct infringement of the right to information privacy in its attempt 
to acquire confidential information through deception or malware infection. Phishing attacks can be 
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blocked and its damage can be decreased by strengthening the legal requirement for data holders in 
terms of information management and protection. To phishing, law should not only be a corrective 
measure providing civil remedy or criminal penalty, it can also act as a preventative measure by 
enhancing information security. Chapter 5 examines the influence upon the right to information 
privacy caused by phishing and explores the contribution of the Taiwan Personal Information 
Protection Act to the regulation of phishing. Moreover, the legal regulation of phishing is unlikely 
to be achieved within a single country only as phishing is free of geographical boundaries. It is 
always important to look at the laws in other domains to seek harmonization of legal standards and 
cooperation of legal enforcement with other countries. Chapter 6 studies the legislative responses to 
phishing at both the national and international levels and looks into the international legal 
approaches that have been taken with regard to coordinating the actions against phishing. 
 
3.5. Slow and insufficient progress in anti-phishing work 
 
During the period between 1990 and 2003, Taiwan undertook a series of legal amendments to the 
Criminal Code which brought the Criminal Code into a new era by putting in an individual chapter 
specially designed for the regulation of computer crimes. The new chapter – chapter 36 ‘Offences 
against Computer Use’, which came into force in June 2003, makes it an offence that a person 
access to another person’s computer or obtain, delete, or alter another’s person’s electromagnetic 
records without authorization (Art. 358 and 359). It also criminalizes unauthorized interference with 
computers (Art. 360) and production of computer programs for the commitment of the offences laid 
down in this chapter (Art. 362).  
 
The purpose of the above enactment was to protect the security of computer use, the domination of 
electromagnetic records and computer efficiency. However, while the new legislation have made a 
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significant contribution to addressing hacker problem to certain extent, it appears to have provided 
rather limited help to deal with phishing largely due to inappropriate interpretation of the laws and 
failure of prosecuting phishers. The Chapter 4 of this thesis provides an outline of the legislative 
background and investigates the problems with the practical application of the new legislation to the 
case of phishing.  
 
In addition, Taiwan enacted the Personal Information Protection Act in May 2010 which involved a 
large-scale amendment to the previous law, the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law. 
The Act provides that a private data controller should take necessary technical and organizational 
measures to prevent personal data from being stolen (Art. 27.1) and makes data controllers liable 
for illegal collection, processing and usage of personal information due to their non-compliance 
with the requirements provided by the Act (Art. 28 and 29). While the Act is generally regarded as a 
milestone in the development of Taiwan’s information protection laws, this thesis discusses whether 
the Act is capable of providing substantial protection for personal information against illegal access. 
There is always a gap between ideal and reality. The gap mainly comes from a lack of independent 
privacy protection authority empowered to supervise data controllers and oversee their compliance 
with the data protection provisions and the concession of the executive power of Taiwan to the 
interests of data controllers when facing a conflict between personal information protection and 
business interests. This thesis draws on the key problems observed from the Act which result in 
insufficient protection of personal data in Chapter 5.  
 
The Taiwan government did not pay proper attention to anti-phishing work until recently. Given the 
necessity of integrated effort of computer security teams across different sectors in responding to 
arising security incidents, the TWCERT/CC called on government agencies, ISPs, academic units, 
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computer security industries and business corporations collectively to build up a joint defensive 
alliance, named the Taiwan information Security Strategic Alliance (hereinafter, the Alliance) 
which was formally established on 23 September 2010. Prior to the establishment of the Alliance, 
the Alliance members reached a consensus that anti-phishing work should be placed in their 
prioritized tasks. Accordingly, TWCERT/CC introduced the Taiwan Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(TAPWG) in July 2010 and activated a phishing reporting system known as the Anti-Phishing 
Notification Window (APNOW) in October in the same year.  
 
The APNOW provides an internal and external platform for reporting suspected phishing attacks 
and streamlines the processing procedures of phishing reports by passing the report to the 
corresponding CERTs, including CERTs of commercial, academic and governmental network, or to 
the ISPs directly after it receives a report to suspected phishing emails or phishing sites. The 
establishment of the TAPWG and the APNOW set a landmark in Taiwan’s development of 
anti-phishing work and reflected Taiwan’s ambitions to combat phishing through collective effort 
and an institutional network. The APNOW is supposed to be helpful to tackle phishing by quickly 
coordinating the action between different teams to remove the phishing sites hosted in Taiwan or 
other countries; however, this thesis demonstrates the defects of the APNOW and its limited 
function in regulating phishing by providing an exploration of the structure, processing procedures, 
practical operation and effectiveness of this mechanism in Chapter 7. Furthermore, by means of 
in-depth interviews with the experts from different stakeholders, this thesis examines the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s anti-phishing work by providing an insight of the work engaged by the 
relevant stakeholders and the key factors that have handicapped their performance in the regulatory 




3.6. Obstacles to engaging in international cooperation 
 
The political tension between Taiwan and China has not only made Taiwan a primary target of 
phishing attacks originated in China but also drawn Taiwan into international affairs complexities. 
As indicated by Wang, if the mainland fails to reunify with Taiwan, the revival of the Chinese 
nation would not be meaningful to many Chinese people, who do not wish the sovereignty of China, 
which includes the region of Taiwan, to be altered.206 China considers Taiwan only a local 
government under Beijing’s command but one that will be permitted to enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy, like Hong Kong and Macao. This is known as ‘one country, two systems’ model.207 To 
serve the national goal, China has been taking a hardened posture on the Taiwan issue in making 
and implementing its international policies in order to deter Taiwan form moving towards de jure 
independence.208  
 
Since the day the ROC walked out of the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan has struggled to regain 
the international recognition it had once enjoyed. While the attempt to obtain official international 
status still remains difficult in the short run due to the overwhelming power of China, focusing on 
membership in international organizations has become an alternative way for Taiwan to seek a 
space in international society.209 However, pressure from China continues to impede Taiwan’s 
attempts to participate in international arena by blocking Taiwan’s attendance in international 
conferences or denying Taiwan’s membership or/and observer status to join the international 
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organizations, for example, World Health Organization (WHO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the United Nations.210  
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been the major political battleground between 
Taiwan and China since Taiwan joined APEC in 1991 under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’. Although 
APEC is the most important intergovernmental organization where Taiwan is accepted as a full 
member, Taiwan is not allowed to participate in negotiation processes involving political issues as 
an equal member and the president or high level of government officials of Taiwan such as foreign 
minister or department directors are excluded from APEC Ministerial Meeting because of Chinese 
opposition on political grounds.211  
 
The political force from China has been a major hindrance to Taiwan to equally participating in 
intergovernmental activities and fully engaging in international cooperation that requires statehood. 
Because of its disadvantaged international status, Taiwan has not only been excluded from most 
international organizations but also been prevented to become a signatory for most international 
conventions. As treaties are concluded based on nation-to-nation relationship, the countries which 
recognize China are unable to enter into binding agreements with Taiwan.212 The obstacle to 
pursuing bilateral or multilateral cooperation with most countries in the world further aggravates the 
difficulty of Taiwan in combating phishing. The situation becomes even more complicated when 
the primary threat of phishing attacks and the obstacle to Taiwan’s regulation of phishing come 
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from the same source, namely, China. As phishing frequently has a transnational dimension, an 
anti-phishing solution which can only be practiced within the border is a mere armchair strategy. 
How to avoid the political hindrance and expand Taiwan’s international participation in 




Cyberspace is free of territorial borders. An overwhelming majority of phishing attacks are operated 
from one country to another. This makes every country in the world a potential object of phishing as 
long as it has connection to the Internet. Taiwan has been suffering severe threats posed by growing 
phishing attacks, as it is not only a major target but also one of the top countries hosting phishing 
websites. This may be blamed on the fact that Taiwan has high levels of Internet usage and Internet 
connectivity but in the meantime it has weak management of web security and considerable volume 
of bot-infected computers. Another factor that significantly elevates the risk of phishing to Taiwan 
is the vigorous malicious attacks from China, which are largely assisted by the commonality of 
language and cultures and encouraged by political motives. While Taiwan desires effective 
regulation of phishing, it has experienced a variety of difficulties in achieving this. The research 
development of phishing countermeasures of Taiwan is slow and uneven and only concentrates on 
the technical solutions with little respect for measures in other areas. The movement of the 
anti-phishing work in Taiwan has been lagging and its performance is unsatisfactory. Most 
importantly, phishing is often committed beyond borders and needs to be addressed by an 
international approach which usually involves harmonization of legal standards and international 
legal cooperation. Nevertheless, Taiwan has been suffering crucial political obstacles to engaging in 
international conventions or agreements and legal enforcement cooperation. Taiwan provides a 
good illustration of both the general and particular difficulties in regulating phishing and the efforts 





The next chapter begins the examination of the legal regulation of phishing in Taiwan by first 
exploring Taiwan’s legislation relating to phishing and focusing especially on the capability of the 








This chapter examines the extent to which Taiwanese laws are able to deal with phishing, with a 
particular focus on the Criminal Code. A phishing attack is very often a transnational phenomenon 
and usually involves violation against protection of different legal interests. The chapter first looks 
at the issue of jurisdiction followed by an overview of the legislation related to phishing, including 
the civil law, trademark law, copyright law, and personal information protection law.  
 
The chapter concentrates on the examination of the Criminal Code and particularly two major legal 
amendments to the Criminal Code, the 1997 Act and 2003 Act, focusing especially on the 
difficulties in applying the relevant provisions to phishing and highlights the challenges posed by 




Law has been a typical regulator that usually serves as an essential tool to control certain behaviours 
by setting rules and punishing the violators in either the real or virtual world. To make phishing 
attackers accountable for their conduct, the most fundamental step is to ensure that phishing is a 
legally impermissible behaviour. Phishing has raised a variety of legal issues but has appeared to 
inspire not much legal scholarship in phishing regulation. Chapter 2 reviewed the corresponding 
measures that have been developed to prevent or disrupt phishing attacks and found that there was a 
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dearth of legal scholarship in comparison with other research areas, in particular technological 
research. A study of the role of laws in the regulation of phishing is hence necessary to fill the gap 
existing in the current anti-phishing research.  
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that Taiwan has been one of the major targets as well as the main sources of 
phishing attacks, which makes it pressing to pursue a practicable regulation of phishing. However, 
Taiwan has been struggling with establishing and enforcing effective regulation of phishing due to a 
variety of reasons, comprising both the general factors that have been discussed in Chapter 2 
(section 2.5) and Taiwan-specific factors that have been examined in Chapter 3. A study of Taiwan’s 
experience in regulating phishing can provide a clear understanding of the reasons which make an 
effective regulation of phishing so difficult and the problems to be addressed to better deal with 
phishing. Although the focus of this research is especially on Taiwan’s legal regulation of phishing 
which is dealt with in this chapter and Chapter 5, the global nature of phishing makes it necessary to 
also look into the regulation in other domains and international regulation, which will be examined 
in Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
Phishing, for its attempt to target unauthorized acquisition of a variety of personally sensitive and 
confidential information via Internet networking, constitutes an offence against computer and 
information security and also a direct infringement of personal information privacy. The focus of 
the examination of Taiwan’s legal regulation will therefore be the Criminal Code, with deals with 
the laws relating to cybercrime and the Personal Information Protection Act. This chapter examines 
Taiwan’s legislation relating to phishing, primarily focusing on the Criminal Code and the two 
reforms, the 1997 and 2003 Act. The chapter also addresses the Personal Information Protection Act 
(the PIP Act), but only briefly, with a focus on the comparison between the PIP Act and its previous 
law. The following chapter will provide a detailed examination of the relationship between phishing 
and information privacy and an exploration of the work that personal information protection laws 
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can do in combating phishing, both nationally and internationally.  
 
Phishing is frequently a transnational phenomenon which usually involves multiple jurisdictions. 
This chapter commences by looking into the issue of which jurisdiction may be involved in a 
phishing case. This is followed by an overview of the laws involved in dealing with phishing 
combined with an analysis of their relevance to phishing. Taiwan undertook two major legal 
amendments to the Criminal Code between 1990 and 2003, which brought the Criminal Code into a 
new era in responding to the emergence of new offences consequent on the dramatic growth of 
information technologies. This chapter primarily concentrates on the extent to which the Criminal 
Code is able to deal with phishing by investigating the applicability of the 1997 and 2003 Act to the 
conduct of phishing. There are several studies that examined the issue of cybercrime in Taiwan,213 
most of which focused on an analysis of the demographic characteristics of cyber criminals and the 
characteristics of computer crimes happening in Taiwan. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3,214 only 
one piece of work could be found that specifically examined the applicability of Taiwanese 
Criminal Code to the conduct of phishing.215  While Hsueh concluded that phishing can be 
flawlessly covered by the existing laws of Taiwan, this chapter leads to a different conclusion. 
 
This chapter looks into the arguments, both academically and practically, over the elements of the 
provisions in relation to phishing and explores the negative influence that might have produced 
upon the regulation of phishing. This chapter also addresses the difficulty in arresting and 
prosecuting phishing attackers and examines the challenges to Taiwan’s criminal law enforcement.  
                                                     
213 Chang (2012), op. cit;Jen, Wen-Yuan, Chang, Wei-ping, and Chou, Shih-chieh (2006), 'Cybercrime in Taiwan–an 
analysis of suspect records', in Hsinchun Chen, et al. (eds.), Intelligence and Security Informatics (Springer), 38-48;Liao, 
You-lu and Tsai, Cynthia (2006), 'Analysis of computer crime characteristics in Taiwan', in Hsinchun Chen, et al. (eds.), 
Intelligence and Security Informatics (Springer), 49-57;Lu, Chi-Chao, et al. (2006), 'Cybercrime & cybercriminals: An 
overview of the Taiwan experience', Journal of Computers, 1 (6), 11-18;Wang, Jau-Hwang, et al. (2006), 
'Technology-based Financial Frauds in Taiwan: Issues and Approaches', IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man 
and Cybernetics, 2006 (6; Taipei, Taiwan: IEEE), 1120-24. 
214 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.  






“In the networked world, no island is an island.”216 Cyberspace is borderless, that a crime can be 
committed without the limitation of a geographical boundary as long as criminals have access to the 
Internet.217 Cybercrime is often operated from one country to another in a remote way, and the 
states of domicile or residence of the perpetrator and the victim are usually different. Also, the place 
where a cybercrime is committed tends not to be where the results are felt.  
 
Traditional jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce, has been 
primarily based upon the concept of territory.218 The transnational and immaterial character of 
cybercrimes has posed a challenge to the current initiatives based on geographical boundaries and 
deciding their jurisdiction has become a controversial issue. This section examines the issue of 
which jurisdiction may be involved in a phishing case under the laws of Taiwan. 
 
4.2.1. Legislation  
 
The Criminal Code, in principle, applies to an offence committed within the territory of Taiwan (Art. 
3).219 According to Taiwan’s Criminal Procedure Code, a court of the place where an offence has 
                                                     
216 McConnel (2000), 'Cybercrime…and punishment? Archaic Laws Threaten Global Information'. 
<http://www.witsa.org/papers/McConnell-cybercrime.pdf>, accessed September 21 2014. 
217 Svantesson, Dan Jerker B (2005), 'The characteristics making Internet communication challenge traditional models 
of regulation–What every international jurist should know about the Internet', International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology, 13 (1), 39-69. 
218 Koops, Egbert Jakob and Brenner, Susan W (2006), 'Cybercrime jurisdiction - an introducation', in Egbert Jakob 
Koops and Susan W Brenner (eds.), Cybercrime and Jurisdiction; A Global Survey (Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press), 3-4. 
219 The Criminal Code can also apply to the offence committed outside the territory under certain exceptional 
circumstances, including a. the offences enumerated in Art. 5 based on the universality principle and protective 
principle; b. the offences listed in Art. 6 committed by a public official; c. the offences committed by any national which 
are not specific in Art. 5 and 6 but are punishable by no less than 3 years of imprisonment and are punishable by the 
law of the place where the offence is committed (Art. 7); or d. the offences provided under Art. 7 committed by an 
alien against a national Taiwan (Art. 8). Universal jurisdiction allows any nation to claim criminal jurisdiction over an 
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been committed or where an accused is domiciled, resides, or is located shall claim jurisdiction over 
the case (Art. 5 I). The place where an offence has been committed shall include the places of both 
the conduct and result (Art. 4 of the Criminal Code).220 However, how to recognize the place of 
commitment is always a problem in the case of cybercrime because of its transnational nature. In 
Taiwan’s judicial practice, inconsistent opinions have arisen about the recognition of the place 
where a computer or Internet-related offence has been committed.   
 
4.2.2. Inconsistent judicial interpretations 
 
In a case where a man is accused of posting an advertisement for selling munitions and firearms via 
a website which was available to the general public, the Taipei District Court decided that the place 
where any person within that place could access that advertising information was the place in which 
the offence was committed.221 According to the court’s opinion, Taiwan shall have jurisdiction over 
crimes involving unlawful information in cyberspace as long as any person within the Taiwanese 
jurisdiction can have access to this information.  
 
Under the provision of the Criminal Code, as aforementioned, both the place of conduct and the 
place of result are deemed the commitment place of an offence (Art. 4). Wang argued that the 
foregoing interpretations failed to indicate clearly whether the place where the munitions 
advertisement is accessed is the place of conduct or the place of result.222 Most importantly, in this 
                                                                                                                                                                                
offender for certain crimes, irrespective of the commitment place, nationality, country or residence of the alleged 
offender or victim. Protective jurisdiction provides a state to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct threatens 
the security of that particular state or the functional operation of its government even when this conduct has been 
committed abroad. Randall, Kenneth C (1987), 'Universal jurisdiction under international law', Tex. L. Rev., 66, 785. 
Phishing is obviously not covered by universal or protective jurisdiction. In addition, the penalty for phishing is no more 
than 5 years of imprisonment (Art. 339, 359). To conclude, the Criminal Code cannot apply to phishing if it is 
committed abroad pursuant to the above provisions.  
220 Sup. Ct., Criminal Division, 72 Tai-Shang No. 5894 (1983) (Taiwan) 
221 Taipei Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 87 Yi No. 428 (1998) (Taiwan) 
222 Wang, Ming-Yong (2004b), 'Criminal Jurisdiction over Computer Crimes', The Online Symposium of the Academic 
Research and Practical Deliberation Conference ‘Cyberspace: Information, Law and Society (6), 25-34. 
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interpretation, the court excessively extended the recognition of the place of the offence 
commitment to widen Taiwan’s jurisdiction over cybercrime. Cheng argued that this excessive 
extension of Internet jurisdiction was inappropriate as it could negatively influence the development 
of cyber activities.223 
 
The above interpretation of the Taipei District Court was later narrowed by the Taiwan High Court 
in 89 Shang-Su No. 1175 in 2000.224  The Taiwan High Court considered that the extreme 
interpretation of the place of offence commitment may make every corner of the world fall under 
Taiwan’s jurisdiction, which could lead to improper intervention in other countries’ jurisdictions and 
cause difficulties for Taiwan’s courts in exercising its jurisdiction. In addition to the place where the 
perpetrator was domiciled and the place where the web page host was allocated, the Taiwan High 
Court decided that the jurisdiction over cybercrime should also take account of a. the place where 
the email host was located, b. the place where the host that was used to install the web page or 
transmit the data was located, or c. other specific places involved in different cases. This 
interpretation of the Taiwan High Court regarding criminal jurisdiction over cybercrime has been 
followed in subsequent cases.  
 
4.2.3. The problem of jurisdiction over phishing cases 
 
The application of the Criminal Code is primarily based on territorial jurisdiction (Art. 3), 
supplemented by universal (Art. 5), protective (Art. 5), and national jurisdiction (Art. 6-8). As the 
offences related to phishing are not the same at those specified in Art. 5 and 6, nor offences which 
are punishable by no less than three years of imprisonment (Art. 7 and 8), jurisdiction over a 
phishing case is hence based on the territoriality principle (Art. 3 and 4, and Art. 5 I of the Criminal 
                                                     
223 Cheng, C. I. (2009), 'The Extension and Tension of Internet Jurisdiction', Socioeconomic Law and Institution Review, 
43, 127-60.  
224 Taiwan High Ct., Criminal Division, 89 Shang-Su No. 1175 (2000) (Taiwan) 
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Procedure Code). Accordingly, a Taiwanese court shall claim jurisdiction over a phishing case 
where the offender is domiciled, resides, or located in Taiwan or where the offence takes place in 
Taiwan, with the place of commitment defined narrowly by the Taiwan High Court decision.   
 
Phishing is a malicious activity that directly targets the acquisition of confidential information 
performed in electromagnetic format. The Criminal Code makes it an offence to obtain 
electromagnetic records from another person without authorisation (Art. 359). In one case,225 a man 
was accused of the unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records by acquiring the property in 
the form of New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) 30,000 of Kao, a player of an online game, by inputting 
Kao’s account name and password to log on to the game, and transferring the property to another 
account. The court followed the foregoing Taiwan High Court’s opinion in 89 Shang-Su No. 1175 
and considered the place where (i) the perpetrator accessed the online game web server and input 
the victim’s login account name and password to acquire the electromagnetic records or (ii) the 
online game web server and host was located as the place where the offence had been committed. 
 
Therefore, according to the Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 5 I) in conjunction with the above 
judicial interpretation of the commitment place, Taiwan courts shall exercise jurisdiction over a 
phishing case in any of the following three circumstances: 
 
a. The phishing perpetrator accesses the phishing website and obtains the victims’ confidential 
information within the territory of Taiwan; 
b. The phishing website is hosted in Taiwan; or  
c. The perpetrator resides or stays in Taiwan.  
 
In other words, the Taiwanese courts cannot claim jurisdiction over a phishing case if the offender 
                                                     
225 Taipei Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 93 Yi No. 697 (2004) (Taiwan) 
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accesses the phishing website and obtains information abroad and the offender, without respect to 
his/her nationality, as well as the phishing host is located in another country.  
 
However, as we learnt from Chapter 3 (section 3.3.4), in most phishing attacks that target Taiwan’s 
users, neither the attackers nor the phishing hosts are usually in Taiwan. As a result, an 
overwhelming majority of phishing cases may be dismissed by the Taiwan courts due to their lack 
of jurisdiction, even though these attacks are launched by a Taiwan national who resides abroad and 
may have caused enormous losses to a great number of Taiwan users.  
 
In addition, Art. 4 of the Criminal Code explicitly defines the offence commitment place as the 
place of conduct and damage. A court of the place where a phishing attack causes damage shall also 
take jurisdiction over this case. However, the above interpretation made by Taipei District Court in 
93 Yi No. 697 only recognized the place of conduct as the offence commitment place with no 
mention about the place of damage, which caused an evident loophole in the protection of the 
litigation rights of the phishing victims in Taiwan.  
 
Too broad recognition of the place of offence commitment in a cybercrime case may cause 
inappropriate interventions in other countries’ jurisdictions; nevertheless, too restrictive recognition 
of the offence commitment place, especially in a cross-border cybercrime case, may lead to the 
inadequate protection of the victims of the crimes. The borderless nature of cyberspace enables 
phishers to perform attacks freely without geographical restriction, with the vast majority of 
phishing being committed across more than one country. Phishing attackers, phishing hosts, and 
victims may be located under two or even three different jurisdictions. In my opinion, in addition to 
the court of the place where the phishers and host are located, the court of the place where the 
damage from the phishing occurs should also have jurisdiction over a phishing case in order to 
conform to the legal requirement of Art. 4 of the Criminal Code and also better protect the litigation 
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rights of the phishing victims.  
 
4.3. Relevant Legislation to Phishing Activity 
 
Phishing is a malicious cyber-attack which targets unauthorized acquisition of personal sensitive 
information or financial credentials often through the use of a counterfeit email or/and a bogus 
website. To better convince the recipients and to deceive them into divulging their financial or 
personal confidential information, a phishing attacker mostly forges a phishing message and/or a 
phishing website by imitating the genuine message or website and copying the trademark which 
may have been registered by the legitimated business or organization. Therefore, phishing not only 
constitutes an offence against criminal law but also involves violation against legal protection of 
civil rights, trademark, copyright and personal information. This section considers the civil law, 
trademark law, copyright law, and personal information protection law and identifies how they are 
related to phishing. The examination of the criminal law is in section 4.4.  
 
4.3.1. Civil law 
 
The full enjoyment of privacy concerning personal information is an important element in 
personality development. Phishing, which targets unauthorized acquisition of personal sensitive 
information or financial credentials, apparently constitutes an infringement of the right to personal 
information privacy. Under the tort law laid down in the Civil Code (Art. 184), the injured party 
may claim for the damage caused by the phishing attack.  
 
Under the provision of the Application Laws for Foreign-related Civil Law (hereinafter, 
International Private Law) of Taiwan, claims grounded on tort shall principally be governed by the 
law of the State in which the tort was committed, without difference (Art. 25.1). However, to 
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provide more flexible choices of law for claims grounded on tort committed by disseminative 
means, such as the “press, radio, television, computer Internet or other media methods”, a new 
article was added to the International Private Law in May 2010 which provides three choices of 
laws at the option of the injured party (Art. 28).226 In the case of claims founded on tort by phishing, 
the above provision shall be applied to solve the problem of a conflict of laws.   
 
4.3.2. Copyright Act 
 
It is very commonly noted on a web page that all rights have been reserved. Any breach of 
copyright is strictly prohibited once someone obtains the copyright of the whole contents of the web 
page, including the words, pictures or web page layout. The creation of a phishing web page, for 
example, a bank website or a login page of an email account or other online service, by mimicking 
the authentic websites is deemed as a “reproduction of work” (Art. 3.1(1) and (5)) 227 which causes 
a violation against the copyright of the rightful owner.   
 
A person who infringes copyright shall compensate for damages caused by infringement and shall 
remove or prevent the infringement according to the claim made by the copyright owner (Art. 84, 
88). A counterfeit phishing website is usually openly displayed and made freely accessible by 
unsuspecting visitors to achieve the fraudulent purpose. Besides civil liability, a person who 
distributes the copy or with the intention to distribute by publicly displaying it is punishable by 
imprisonment of up to three years and may be additionally fined NTD 70,000-750,000 (Art. 
91-1.2). 
                                                     
226 The three choices of laws include: a. the law of the State in which the tort was committed or the law of the State of 
domicile of the tortfeasor if the place of commitment cannot be identified; b. the law of the State in which the injuries 
or the infringement have occurred if the tortfeasor should have foreseen that the injuries would occur in that State; 
and c. the law of the State of the injured party if the act caused an infringement of personality rights (Art. 28 I).  
227 “To reproduce”, according to the Copyright Act (Art. 3.1(5)), means to “reproduce directly, indirectly, permanently, 
or temporarily a work by means of printing, reprography, sound recording, video recording, photography, and written 





An important amendment was made in May 2009 to the Copyright Act in respect of the liability of 
Internet service providers for the breach of copyright by users through accessing their services. 
Prior to May 2009, Internet service providers (ISPs) faced a high risk of being sued jointly with a 
person who has violated copyright by posting infringing materials or engaging in similar activities 
through using its service by a copyright holder. The great accountability of ISPs for the online 
infringement of copyright was criticised for having had a detrimental influence upon Internet 
industrial development, as ISPs in fact are almost unlikely to review all of the content posted via 
their service and detect every breach of copyright facilitated by it use.228  
 
The Copyright Act Amendment Bill, which was enacted in May 2009 and was based largely upon 
the ISPs’ liability limitation regime set out in section 512 of the 1998 U.S. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), provided a clear definition of ISP (Art. 3.1(19))229 and established safe 
harbour provisions (Art. 90-4-90-8, 90-10) that ISPs may avail themselves in order to limit liability 
for online copyright infringement by their users. A notice/take down mechanism has been 
established for caching, information storage, and search service providers can now claim the 
protection of a safe harbour (Art. 90-6-90-8). ISPs, except for connection service providers, have 
been required to respond expeditiously to any notification by a copyright holder of infringement by 
users of the service provided by removing or disabling access to the alleged contents or related 
information.  
 
Accordingly, information storage providers should remove or disable access to an imitative 
phishing web page at the request of the copyright holder promptly in order to avoid liability for 
damage caused by the infringement of the copyright. Internet connection service providers (ICPs) 
                                                     
228 See the statement on the draft amendment to the Copyright Act. 
229 ISP means those who provide the following services: connection service provider, caching service provider, 
information storage service provider, and search service provider (Art. 3.1(19)). 
108 
 
are not obligated to do so, because it is difficult for them to assess the content of a website due to 
the nature of their work.230 Although it can actually limit the potential damage caused by phishing 
attacks if ICPs can disable access to phishing websites as soon as they are informed of them, the 
protection of general Internet users from fraud crimes committed through counterfeit websites, after 
all, is not the focus of this Act. The priority of the Copyright Act is the protection of the rightful 
owners of the copyright. 
 
4.3.3. Trademark Act 
 
Knowingly using a trademark which is identical with or similar to another person’s registered 
trademark without the consent of the trademark right holder, and hence damaging the reputation of 
the trademark or confusing consumers about goods or services is seen as an infringement of the 
trademark right (Art. 70.2). Unauthorised use of a trademark registered by any enterprise or 
organisation to fake a web page or email and so tricking individuals to obtain their confidential 
information violates the protection of trademark rights under the above act and the trademark right 
holder may claim compensation for damages and request excluding infringement (Art. 69.1 and 
69.3).  
 
4.3.4. Personal Information Protection Act 
 
Personal information is not only the main target of phishing attacks but also provides valuable 
materials for phishers to craft a highly convincing phishing message for a specific target that is very 
likely to lead to serious data breach incidents involving enormous financial damage and loss of 
personal data. The protection of personal information against illegal collection is a fundamental 
component of phishing regulation and should be guaranteed by laws.  
                                                     




However, very little scholarship could be found that investigates the regulatory relationship between 
the personal information protection laws and phishing, both nationally and internationally. As we 
saw in Chapter 2 and 3, current international and Taiwan legal debates over phishing mostly 
concentrate on criminal rules and reforms,231 and the challenge to law enforcement.232 Criminal 
law is undoubtedly important to the regulation of phishing by deterring phishing attempts through 
imposing the threat of punishment. Yet, this thesis argues that the function of law in regulating 
phishing is more than a corrective measure. It can also prevent phishing by ensuring protection of 
personal information against illegal or unauthorised access or collection.  
 
Taiwan passed it first personal information protection law, namely the Computer-Processed 
Personal Data Protection Law (the CPPDP Law), in 1995. In order to provide adequate legal 
protection for personal data to respond to the increasing sophistication of computer technology and 
also to better harmonize with international legal standards relating to information privacy, 
especially the APEC Privacy Principles, Taiwan initiated a large-scale amendment to the CPPDP 
Law and passed a new enactment of the Personal Information Protection Act (PIP Act) in 2010.233  
 
This section first describes the shortcomings of the CPPDP Law concerning collection of personal 
information by individuals and then examines whether the PIP Act provides better protection or 
causes adverse effect on the protection of personal information against unauthorised collection.   
                                                     
231 Almerdas (2014), op. cit;Bainbridge (2007), op. cit;Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Granova and Eloff (2005), op. 
cit;Hsueh (2013), op. cit;Lynch (2005), op. cit;Mcgowan (2006), op. cit;Mcnealy (2008), op. cit;Nappinai (2009), op. cit. 
232 Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Krebs, Brian (2004), 'Companies Forced to Fight Phishing', The Washington Post. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61916-2004Nov19.html>, accessed September 15 2014;Lynch 
(2005), op. cit;Stevenson (2005), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
233 The Executive Yuan put the PIP Act into practice in two stages. The Personal Information Protection Act, together 
with its enforcement rules, largely came into effect in October 2012, except for Art. 6 and 54 given the difficulty of 
implementation. The resistance of Taiwanese enterprises to two controversial provisions, Art. 6 (special categories of 
sensitive data) and Art. 54 (duty to notify data subjects of personal information indirectly collected without consent 
pre-amendment), eventually forced the Executive Yuan to suspend the implementation of the above two articles. The 
inappropriate influence of business power on the legal protection of personal information will be further explored in 








The CPPDP Law was only valid for ‘computer-processed data’, excluding ‘manually-processed 
information’ (Art. 1). Under the CPPDP Law, the subjects liable for the breach of personal 
information protection included government agencies (Art. 3 (6)) and the enterprises, groups or 
individuals of the specific categories enumerated, but not covering all non-government agencies 
(Art. 3 (7)).234 
 
A non-governmental agency shall not collect or process any personal data unless they are specified 
for a particular purpose and comply with any of the following (Art. 18):  
 
(1) Written consent of the principal;  
(2) An agreement or similar contractual relationship with the principal; 
(3) The information is already known to the public or  
(4) There is a need for academic study and no material adverse effect will be 
caused to the major interests of the principal; and  
(5) Other exceptional conditions empowered by this Law and other laws and 
regulations  
 
A person who intended to make profit for himself by violating the provisions of Art. 18 resulting in 
                                                     
234 The specific categories of enterprises, groups or individuals, including: credit search businesses and groups or 
individuals whose major line of business is to collect or process personal data by computer; hospital, schools and the 
telecommunication, financial, securities, insurance and mass communication industries; and other businesses, groups, 
or individuals designated by the Ministry of Justice in conjunction with the government authority in charge of such 
industry at the central government level (Art. 3 (7)).  
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injury to another shall be punished under the provision of Art. 33. In addition, Art. 34 provided 
punishment to a person who intended to make unlawful gains for himself or for a third party or 
intended to infringe upon the interests of another by illegally outputting a personal data file thus 
causing damage to another. “Outputting personal data” includes illegally sending personal data 





The restriction laid down by the CPPDP Law on both the objects and subjects opened a loophole in 
the protection of non-computer-processed personal data and a breach of regulation of data 
collection by non-government agencies.  
 
Another major defect of this Law is that it provided ample exceptional conditions along with 
inappropriate use of indeterminate legal concepts for the prohibitions of data collection. As the data 
subject is entitled to have inviolable autonomy over his personal information and refuse 
unnecessary intervention,236 any obtainment, processing, or use of personal information without the 
consent of the data subject should be strictly prohibited. However, according to Art. 18, the data 
subject’s written consent was only one of the conditions for permitting the collection of personal 
data and can easily be excluded by other exceptional conditions.  
 
More importantly, it did not constitute a crime to collect another person’s information if it was 
already known to the public or the collection was for research purposes, as long as there is no 
violation of the data subject’s “major interests” (Art. 18 (3) and (4)). “Major interests” – an 
                                                     
235 Shiu, Wen-Yi (1991), The Theory of Personal Data Protection Law (Taipei: San-Min Book Co. Ltd). 
236 Chiou, W. T. (2009), 'Comments on the Constructional Problems of the Amendment Bill of the Computer-Processed 
Personal Data Protection Law – Based on the Ideologies of Information Autonomy and Information Privacy', Yue-Dan 
Jurisprudence Magazine, 168, 172-89. 
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indeterminate legal concept – was used as a criterion to decide the legality of a collection of 
personal information. An indeterminate legal concept is designed by the legislators deliberately to 
leave more flexible room for the administrative authorities to determine the content of the concept. 
However, in the case there is no specific independent authority that takes charge of the task of 
personal information protection, the use of indeterminate legal concepts very likely will lead to 
divergent interpretations on the same concept depending on different organizations which in turn 
may cause a loophole in the legal protection of personal information.237  
 
A person who illegally collected or output personal information will be punished only when this 
collection or output was intended to make a profit for himself or making unlawful gains for himself 
or for a third party pursuant to the provisions under Art. 33 and 34. There was an apparent 
inconsistency in the elements between the above provisions and the similar provision of the 
Criminal Code (Art. 359), where a person who obtains personal information in electromagnetic 
format without authorization shall be found guilty no matter whether the perpetrator intends to gain 
profit for himself or for a third party. This has produced a conflict of legislation. 
 
4.3.4.2. Post amendment: the Personal Information Protection Act 
 
The enactment of the PIP Act set a landmark in the development of Taiwan’s information protection 
laws, which incorporated the standards relating personal data protection set up in the international 
privacy frameworks, in particular the EU Directive and the APEC Privacy Principles.238 While the 
PIP Act was intended to redress the defects of the DPPDP Law and to provide comprehensive 
protection of personal information, this research proves that the above attempt was ineffective.  
 
                                                     
237 This will be further discussed in the following section, 4.3.4.2.  
238 More discussion about the EU Directive and the APEC Privacy Framework, see Chapter 5 (section 5.3.2.2). Chapter 
5 will also provide an analysis of the influence of the above two instruments upon the development of Taiwan’s 
legislation (section 5.3.3.2).  
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Key points of amendment relating to data collection 
 
The PIP Act deleted the limitation on the objects to cover non-computer-processed information (Art. 
1) and extended the scope of protection data to include passport number, medical records, medical 
treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health examination, criminal record, contact information, 
and other information which may be used to identify a natural person in either a direct or indirect 
way (Art. 2 (1)). In addition, the PIP Act broke the business limitation to expand the 
non-government subjects to include natural persons, juridical persons or groups other than 
government agencies (Art. 2 (8)).  
 
The PIP Act amended the provision of exceptional conditions to data collection prohibitions for 
non-government agency and moved it to Art. 19. According to this article, an individual is 
prohibited from collection of personal information unless the purpose of that collection can be 
specified and the collection complies with one of the following conditions (Art. 19.1):  
 
(1) Where there is a legal authorization;  
(2) Where there is a contract or quasi-contract between the data subject and the 
agency;  
(3) Where the data subject has disclosed such information by himself or when the 
information has been publicized legally;  
(4) Where it is necessary to the public interest for statistics or the purpose of 
academic research conducted by a research institution;  
(5) Where written consent has been provided by the data subject;  
(6) Where public interest is involved; and  




Some constraints have been placed on the application of the exemption conditions founded on 
academic research purposes and publicly-available resources. The information disclosed by the 
collector on the basis of the public interest for statistics or academic research should not lead to the 
identification of certain people (Art. 19.1 (4)). The collector or processor should delete or stop 
processing or using personal information ex officio or upon the request of the data subject when he 
realizes that the use and processing of the information is limited by the data subject and the obvious 
worthiness of the protection of the data subject’s major interests or when he has been notified by the 
data subject (Art. 19.1 (7), 19.2).  
 
Deficiencies of the PIP Act in regulating phishing 
 
The PIP Act was intended to strengthen the personal autonomy of information disclosure, search 
and correction. However, while the increase in the number of protection objects and liability 
subjects, to certain extent, was helpful in providing more comprehensive protection for personal 
data, this enactment made insufficient efforts to redress the defects observed in the previous law 
which may produce a reverse-effect on the legal protection of personal information against 
phishing.  
 
In comparison with the CPPDP Law (Art. 18 (1)), disappointingly, the PIP Act still saw the written 
consent of the data subject as merely one of the conditions for the lawful collection and processing 
of personal information rather than an indispensable requirement (19.1 (5)). Liou argued that the 
principle of personal information autonomy can still be easily excluded and has been turned into a 
mere figurehead without proper fulfillment.239 Moreover, this Act failed to resolve the problem 
regarding the use of the indeterminate legal concept that had existed in the previous legislation, but 
                                                     
239 Liou, J. Y. (2010), 'Unsatisfying Progress of Legislation: Initial Comments on the Personal Information Protection 
Act.', Yue-Dan Jurisprudence Magazine, 183, 147-64. 
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instead created more vague concepts, which have further undermined the protection of personal 
information.  
 
The PIP Act deleted the phrase “no material adverse effect will be caused to the major interests of 
the principal” in Art. 18 (3) and replaced it with Art. 19.1 (3) on the ground that there is no need to 
protect information that has been disclosed by the data subject himself and that it was difficult to 
recognize the contents of the “no material adverse effect” and “major interests of the principal”.240 
It was a relatively paradoxical amendment as it seemed to try to avoid the difficulty of determining 
certain vague legal concepts but actually adopted more other indeterminate legal concepts in its 
provisions. Examples include “public interests” (Art. 19.1 (4) and (6)), “publicly available 
resources” (19.1 (7)), and “obvious worthiness of the protection of data subject’s major interests” 
(19.1 (7)). As mentioned in section 4.3.4.1, the use of an indeterminate legal concept is sometimes 
unavoidable given the flexibility of administrative authorities in determining the content of the said 
concept. However, it is always a problem if there is an absence of a specific independent authority 
of personal information protection which can provide a uniform interpretation when inconsistent 
opinions have arisen.  
 
Taiwan currently has no independent authority taking charge of personal information protection 
tasks which can deal with disputes over indeterminate legal concepts. It is predictable that the 
authorities responsible for the related subject sectors are very likely to either shirk the responsibility 
for dealing with the arguments arising over personal information incidents or always make 
favorable interpretations to themselves. A large employment of indeterminate legal concepts, in this 
case, is improper and potentially to lead to discordant interpretations of a single concept which is 
not only unhelpful to the protection for personal information but also significantly increases the risk 
                                                     
240 See the Explanatory Memoranda of the Personal Information Protection Bill, Art. 19, available at: 
<http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@5:1804289383:f:NO%3DE01829*%20OR%20NO%3DB01829$$10$$$NO-PD>, 
accessed September 27 2014 
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of loopholes of legal protection by abusing indeterminate concepts.241  
 
Certain indeterminate legal concepts used in the Act seem to provide phishing attackers an 
exemption from liability for unauthorized collection of personal data. As mentioned in Chapter 2 
(section 2.4.1), a large amount of email addresses as well as personal information can be easily 
acquired by searching or scanning websites, in particular social networking websites, news groups, 
chat rooms that may open to the public manually or automatically. However, the disclosure of 
personal information by someone does not mean consent of the data subjects to anyone to use the 
said information in various ways. It is particularly true if the personal data are revealed by a third 
party without the authorization or awareness of the data subjects. Nevertheless, phishing attackers 
are eligible for an exemption from liability and rationalize their collection and processing of 
personal information as long as they can prove the information has been obtained from “publicly 
available sources” (Art. 19.1 (7)).  
 
Although the data subject can notify the collector and thereby limit the collection, processing and 
use of personal information (Art. 19.2), it cannot provide substantial protection for a data subject if 
he/she is unaware of the collection matter, which is very often true of the victims of phishing 
attacks. The Act apparently failed to provide substantial protection for data subjects against 
unlawful data collection but put them at greater risk of being phished.  
 
To conclude, while the PIP Act claimed and attempted to strengthen protection of personal 
information and redress the problems that previously existed in the CPPDP Law, it actually showed 
inadequate respect for the personal information autonomy and created more problems and loopholes 
of legal protection of personal information against unauthorized collection. This section only briefly 
                                                     
241 The following chapter will continue to explore other problems that a lack of specific authority may incur, see 
Chapter 5, section 5.4.4. 
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examines the effort of the PIP in terms of providing better protection for personal information. A 
more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between information privacy and phishing as well 
as the role of national and international personal information protection laws in the regulation of 
phishing will be provided in Chapter 5.  
 
4.4. The Criminal Code 
 
This section examines the extent to which the Criminal Code of Taiwan is able to deal with phishing. 
Criminal law is an essential element of legal regulation of phishing and is a major deterrent to 
phishing attempts by making phishing an offence and imposing the threat of punishment on 
phishing attackers. Criminalization of phishing is often the first step in legal approaches by many 
countries to respond to phishing, which is usually done by integrating phishing with the current 
criminal legislation,242 upgrading the existing laws to criminalize phishing,243 or adding a sui 
generis law for dealing with phishing.244 As I have mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.1) and will 
discuss in Chapter 6 (section 6.2.1 and 6.3), many countries, for example, India, South Africa, Saudi 
Arabia and Malaysia, did not introduce new laws specifically for addressing phishing but covered 
phishing under their existing cybercrime laws or general laws relating to spam, impersonation, theft 
or fraud. This is also the case of Taiwan. 
 
The rapid growth of information technologies has given rise to new forms of crimes which have 
posed severe challenges to both the national and international legal systems. To respond to the 
emergence of new offences, Taiwan undertook two major legal amendments to the Criminal Code 
between 1990 and 2003, which brought the Criminal Code into a new era. A study of the 
                                                     
242 Almerdas (2014), op. cit;Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Granova and Eloff (2005), op. cit;Nappinai (2009), op. cit. 
243 Bainbridge (2007), op. cit;Mcgowan (2006), op. cit. 
244 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Mcnealy (2008), op. cit. Some states of the USA have enacted specific anti-phishing statutes, 
for example, California, New York, Louisiana, etc. However, the USA currently has no federal law that directly aims at 
prohibiting phishing conduct. 
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background and the key elements of these two legal amendements is considered valuable to provide 
a full picture of the process of how Taiwanese Criminal Code has moved from a traditional criminal 
law based on ideology of physical property to a new criminal law that deals with cybercrimes 
involving virtual property. More importantly, it helps us to obtain a better understanding about what 
the Criminal Code has addressed and what it had failed to address regarding the regulation of 
phishing. This section introduces the legislative background and key elements of the 1997 Act and 
the 2003 Act respectively and paticularly examines the extent to which these two enactments are 
capable of dealing with phishing.  
 
4.4.1. The 1997 Act  
 
The 1997 Act focused on crimes committed using computers and crimes which targeted 
electromagnetic records. The most important contribution of the 1997 Act to the regulation of cyber 
crimes was that it expanded the protection of property from tangible property to electromagnetic 
records. However, this amendment received a lot of critiscms for its lack of careful consideration of 
the compatibility of electromagnetic records and the elements of the crimes against property, in 
particular larceny.245 In addition, the 1997 Act adopted the 1990 Bill which was drafted since 1974 
with very few changes. Several researchers doubted this reckless adoption to satisfy the demands of 
current society for regulation of cybercrime.246 The fierce debates over the 1997 Act resulted in 
more proposals for legal amendments to the Criminal Code which was then passed and enacted in 
2003.  
                                                     
245 Cheng, C. W. (2001), 'Analysis of Electromagnetic Records Larceny', Criminal Law Magazine, 45 (6), 112-38;Huang, 
R. J. (2000), The Limit of Penalty (Yuan Jhao Publisher);Lin, Sian-Tian (2006b), The Specific Provisions of the Criminal 
Code (5 edn., 1; Taipei: Angel Publisher);Tsai, H. F. (2003), 'The regulations of the Criminal Law of the unauthorised 
acquirement act of electromagnetic records', The Jurisprudence Collected Papers of the Chung Cheng University, 13, 
1-196. 
246 Li, Mao-San (1998), Authority, Subject, and Criminal Laws (Taipei: Han-Lu Publisher);--- (2001), 'The virtual image 
and actual features of computer crimes in Taiwan', Collection of Papers on Criminal Policies and Research of Crimes (4: 
Ministry of Justice), 1-16;Liao, Y. L. and Li, S. C. (2003), Computer Crime –Theory and Practice (Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Co. 
Ltd);Liao, Y. L. and Jin, M. C. (2006), 'A comparatively study of two reenactment of Penal Code on computer crime', 




This section provides an overview of the development of the 1997 Act and looks into its effect on 
regulating phishing.  
 
4.4.1.1. The 1990 Bill 
 
A Criminal Code amendment research committee was established in 1974 by the Ministry of 
Judicial Administration,247 with the aim of proposing a comprehensive amendment to the Criminal 
Code of 1935. After fifteen years, the Ministry of Justice brought the amendment bill to the 
Executive Yuan Committee which was then submitted by the Legislative Yuan in 1990.248 The 1990 
Bill was drafted for the proper development of agriculture, industry and commerce and proposed a 
large-scale amendment to the Criminal Code in many respects such as national security, social order, 
and people’s physical health and private property. Although this Bill put eight articles to the 
Criminal Code for punishing computer crime offences, this was only a subsidiary task and was not 
the main focus of the Bill.249 
 
Instead of sui generis legislation, the 1990 Bill extended the application of existing laws250 to cover 
new types ‘information age’ activities involving the infringement of electromagnetic records, illegal 
computer use and attacks on computers. The new Art. 220 III defined for the first time an 
                                                     
247 The Ministry of Judicial Administration operating under the Judicial Yuan was the predecessor of the Ministry of 
Justice operating under the Executive Yuan before 1980. The administration of the Taiwan High court and all other 
courts under its jurisdiction was separated from the system of prosecution under the Ministry of Judicial 
Administration and placed under the Judicial Yuan as part of the judicial reform in 1980. The Ministry of Judicial 
Administration was renamed the Ministry of Justice and shifted from the Judicial Yuan to the Executive Yuan 
subsequently.  
248 On the history of conducting the amendment bill to the Criminal Code, see the 1st meeting record of the 
Legislative Yuan, session 86, Legislative Yuan Bulletin, vol.80, issue 25, 225-26.  
249 The tasks which were involved within the amendment aspect of properly developing agriculture, industry and 
commerce, supra, 239.  
250 The laws which had been updated in the 1990 Bill to deal with computer crimes included the laws of forging or 
altering instruments (Art. 220), larceny (Art. 320), infringement of secrets (Art. 316-318), fraud (Art. 339), and the 
destruction, abandonment, and damage of instruments (Art. 352).   
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electromagnetic record as “any record which is produced by electronic, magnetic or any other 
means unrecognisable by natural perceptive functions and is used for data processing by 
computer”.251 The Bill addressed the protection of electromagnetic records by granting the same 
legal status to them as an instrument and movable property under the provision of the offence of 
forging or altering instruments (Art. 220 II) and the offences against property interests, including 
larceny (Art. 323, 320), abrupt taking, robbery, piracy (Art. 334-1), criminal conversion (Art. 338), 
and fraud and breach of trust (Art. 343).252  
 
In addition, Art. 339-2, which was based on Art. 246 of the Criminal Code of Japan,253 made it an 
offence to obtain another person’s property by inputting false data or giving an unauthorised 
command to a computer or related equipment to create a false acquisition, loss or alteration of 
electromagnetic records. In order to protect information integrity, the 1990 Bill also made it an 
offence to interfere with another person’s processing operation of electromagnetic records which 
results in damage to the other person or the public (Art. 352 II).254 This provision, which was based 
on section 156.20 of the New York State Law and section 303b of the German Criminal Code,255 
saw ‘interference with the operation of electromagnetic records’ as an illegal change to or 
demolition of electromagnetic records and therefore included in the offence of destruction, damage 
or alteration to the instrument (Art. 352). 
 
However, the deliberation of the 1990 Bill was greatly delayed. The Bill involved a total of 220 
                                                     
251 The definition of ‘electromagnetic records’ was slightly amended and moved to Art. 10 V in a later amendment in 
2005. An ‘Electromagnetic record’ was re-defined as ‘any record which is produced by electronic, magnetic, optic or 
any other similar means and is used for data processing of computer.’   
252 Under the 1990 Bill, the larceny law in respect of the protection objects (Art. 323) shall also apply to the offences 
of abrupt taking, robbery, piracy (Art. 334-1), criminal conversion (Art. 338), fraud and breach of trust (Art. 343), where 
appropriate. Accordingly, the 1990 Bill added electromagnetic records to the protected objects under the above 
provisions. Whether it is proper to apply the elements of the above provisions to the case of electromagnetic records 
will be explored further later.  
253 The 1990 Bill Explanatory Memoranda of Art. 339-2, see Legislative Yuan Bill Document Related, no. 246, the 8th 
meeting of the Legislative Yuan, session 85, 273.  
254 It will be further explored in the following section the appropriation of the legislation of Art. 352 II.  
255 The 1990 Bill Explanatory Memoranda of Art. 352 II, supra, 278-279. 
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articles, but the Legislative Yuan had only completed the examination of 27 articles from 1990 to 
July 1995. This situation remained unchanged until 1995 when the Taiwan government placed its 
administrative priority on developing Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific regional operation centre and then 
forced the Ministry of Justice to complete an amendment to the Criminal Code related to computer 
crimes in order to improve the legal environment and enhance legal protection of personal data 
from illegal collection and utilization.256  
 
4.4.1.2. The enactment of the 1997 Act 
 
In July 1995, the legislator Zhang, Jian-Guo proposed an individual amendment bill to the Criminal 
Code (hereinafter, the 1995 Bill) which was intended to facilitate Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operation Centre project and contained the eight articles with exactly the same content as the 1990 
Bill in respect of computer crimes. The only change that the 1995 Bill had made was adding a new 
article, 339-2, to deal with the offence of fraudulently obtaining property from automatic pay 
machines and shifted the former Art. 339-2 to Art. 339-3 accordingly as a result of negotiations 
between the government and the opposition parties. The 1995 Bill eventually became law in 
September 1997.  
 
The 1995 Bill included all the computer crime provisions of the 1990 Amendment Bill; however, 
these two Bills were constructed for completely different purposes. The 1995 Bill intended to 
                                                     
256 The Taiwan ‘Economy Prosperity Scheme’, initiated in July 1993, had the goal of establishing Taiwan as an 
Asia-Pacific regional operation centre as a response to the dramatic growth of economic regionalism, particularly 
within the Asia-Pacific economic region. In January 1995, the Council for Economic Planning and Development of the 
Administrative Yuan officially presented a plan which set the establishment of a modern legal environment for the 
information society as one of the main tasks. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice was requested to complete an 
amendment to the Criminal Code related to computer crimes and to finish the legislation of the CPPDP Law with the 
least delay by December 1995. The background and blueprint of the development of the Asia-Pacific regional 
operation center, see http://park.org/Taiwan/Government/Theme/Asia_Pacific_Rigional/english/foreword/1.htm and 
http://park.org/Taiwan/Government/Theme/Asia_Pacific_Rigional/english/foreword/2.htm. The content of the Plan of 
Building Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Centre, see http://theme.cepd.gov.tw/aproc/html/total(1).doc, 
accessed September 29 2014.  
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establish a legal environment for the information society in coordination with the government’s 
economic policy of establishing Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific regional operation centre, while the 
1990 Bill was drafted with the broader purpose of prompting development in respect of agriculture, 
industry, and business. Liao257 described it as “unimaginable” that almost the same legislation 
could be adopted based on two completely different lawmaking motivations. The specific needs of 
Taiwan’s information society were not sufficiently explored in the recycling of the computer related 
provisions of the 1990 Bill.  
 
In addition, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the 1990 Bill started to be drafted in 
1974, when computers were not prevalent in Taiwan at all. Even in 1983, there were only 1,065 
computers in Taiwan.258 The Internet, which can be traced back to 1968 in America, was first 
available in Taiwan through the Taiwan Academic Network for research purposes at the end of 1991. 
Li259 argued that there existed no clear comprehension of either the conception of computer crimes 
or Internet construction prior to the 1990’s. Surprisingly, the legislation drafted based on incomplete 
knowledge about computer crimes between the 1970’s and 1980’s was enacted in 1997 regardless of 
the changes brought about by the prevalence of computers and the Internet. The 1997 Act was 
criticised as being full of loopholes due to its foundation upon an “old-fashioned” understanding 
about computer crimes.260  
 
Liao pointed out that the hasty passing of the 1997 Act was also influenced by two cases named the 
‘Munitions Godfather’ case and the ‘Anarchist Document’ case, detected in August and September 
in the same year.261  The ‘Munitions Godfather’ case involved a website named ‘Munitions 
Godfather’ posting an advertisement selling firearms which invited the public to access and place 
                                                     
257 Liao and Jin (2006), op. cit. 
258 Li (1998), op. cit. 
259 Li (2001), op. cit. 
260 Li (2001), op. cit. 
261 Liao and Li (2003), op. cit;Liao and Jin (2006), op. cit. 
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orders. This case was considered to be the beginning of headline computer crime which 
significantly expedited the enactment of the 1995 Bill.  
 
The ‘Anarchist Document’ case involved a university student who built a personal web page named 
‘anarchist document’ on the university website. This could be viewed and accessed by the public 
and included instruction on making bombs and discussions about atomic bombs. In fact, the above 
two cases were not examples of typical computer crimes but only constituted the offence of openly 
inciting people to break the law (Art. 153 (1)). However, the method adopted to commit it was new 
to Taiwanese society. It brought a comparatively more serious threat to society as information could 
be largely and efficiently spread through the Internet. 
 
4.4.1.3. The compatibility of the 1997 Act and phishing  
 
Assuming that an electromagnetic record could be flawlessly adopted as the object protected by the 
laws of larceny and fraud, in the case of phishing carried out by deceiving users into giving away 
their financial or other sensitive information may constitute an offence of the fraud of 
electromagnetic records (Art. 339, 343). It may break the law of larceny (Art. 320, 323) if the 
phishing attacker obtains electromagnetic records directly from users’ computers or their related 
equipment by infecting their computers with malicious programmes. The difference lies in whether 
a phishing attacker adopts a fraudulent method to mislead his/her victims and make them believe 
that the imitative website is legitimate.  
 
In addition, it might also constitute the offence of destruction, damage and alteration to an 
instrument (Art. 352 II) if an electromagnetic record is acquired accompanied by change or damage 
to an electromagnetic record.262 A person may commit a crime against secret protection (Art. 318-1) 
                                                     
262 Art. 352 II actually did not specify the interference conducts nor did it define the coverage of protected objects. 
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if he/she leaks another person’s sensitive information or disseminates or transacts the information 
obtained by means of phishing.  
 
However, the compatibility of electromagnetic records and the elements of the crimes against 
property has been strongly questioned by both researchers and judges, not because an 
electromagnetic record sometimes does not have business value but because an electromagnetic 
record is not capable of being stolen (Art. 320) or delivered (Art. 339) within Taiwan’s legal context 
due to its duplicable nature.   
 
In fact, the applicability of the larceny law to electromagnetic records has often been questioned in 
two respects: whether an electromagnetic record is a movable property protected in law and whether 
an electromagnetic record is capable of being stolen. The question whether an electromagnet record 
is a moveable property is less debated, as it has been widely recognised that a moveable property is 
not limited to physical property but also includes intellectual property. What has been argued is 
whether the value of a movable property, as defined by the Criminal Code, should be an objective 
and universal value or a subjective value that is applicable to a particular person or group.  
 
An electromagnetic record, for example an account username or password which is often the target 
of phishing attacks and may be valuable to the record possessor or certain people, still cannot be 
objectively valued and is not deemed a universal object of monetary transaction. The property value 
was generally recognized by most researchers of Taiwan as including both business value (object 
value) and usufruct value (subject value) based on the function of property.263 The business value 
of a movable property should not be seen as a necessary requirement to decide whether it is an 
                                                                                                                                                                                
What did it mean by ‘interference’? Did it mean deletion or alteration of data or did it also include enter or 
transmission of data? It was also unclear about the protected objects under this provision. Did Art. 352 II only protect 
computer data or cover the carrier and system used for that data? These were the questions that the legislators failed 
to answer. 
263 Han, J. M. and Wu, J. F. (2000), The Specific Provisions of the Criminal Code (1 edn.);Liang, H. C. (1994), Research of 
Living Examples of the Criminal Code (Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Co. Ltd.).  
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object which is worthy of legal protection. Accordingly, a meaningful picture or a letter which is 
priceless to a particular individual but may be valueless in a business transaction is also the object 
protected by larceny, as the legal interests protected by the laws against property offences contain 
both objective and subjective values. Therefore, there should be no question about violation of 
property legal interests, once acquiring an electromagnet record incurs a subjective disadvantage to 
the record possessor.  
 
An electromagnetic record as a moveable property that is worthy of legal protection itself is not 
controversial; but the question is whether taking an electromagnetic record can satisfy the elements 
of larceny (Art. 320). The legal interest that the larceny law aims to protect is actually the 
possession of a moveable property.264 It hence cannot be seen as an offence of larceny if obtaining 
a moveable property has not resulted in the loss of possession of the original possessor.265 The 
element of larceny is only satisfied when a person destroys the original possession relationship and 
builds his new possession of that property. As an electromagnetic record is duplicable in nature, it is 
usually obtained through duplication which will not be accompanied by the destruction of the 
control of the original possessor. Researchers266 argued that any analogy with the elements should 
be strictly prohibited based on the principle of legality,267 and therefore the larceny law cannot 
apply to the case of unauthorized acquisition of electromagnetic records as long as its elements 
cannot be satisfied.  
 
Although there were differences in judicial opinion,268  the Taiwanese judicial interpretations 
                                                     
264 Lin (2006b), op. cit. 
265 Tsai (2003), op. cit. 
266 Cheng (2001), op. cit;Huang (2000), op. cit. 
267 The principle of legality is the legal ideal that requires all laws to be clear, ascertainable and non-retrospective.  
268 In a case where an employee obtained customers’ magnetic strip codes from their credit cards by using an 
interception machine, the court considered that the destruction of the original possession was not a requisite for 
satisfying the elements of larceny. According to this interpretation in the above case, whether or not the possessor had 
lost their possession of electromagnetic records de facto did not affect the commitment of larceny. Taiwan High Ct. 
Kaohsiung Branch Ct., Criminal Division, 89 Shang-Yi No. 1264 (2000) (Taiwan)  
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generally hold the same opinions as the scholars about the compatibility of the larceny law and 
electromagnetic records. For example, in a case where an employee allegedly duplicated all of the 
other personnel’s user IDs for accessing the Internet through a Management Information Service, 
the court decided that the defendant was not guilty of larceny, as the control of the said information 
of the original possessor was not destroyed.269  
 
In my opinion, it is questionable to add electromagnetic records to the objects under the provision 
of larceny as well as fraud. Electric energy and thermal energy, the objects which were also listed in 
Art. 323 with electromagnetic records, are consumable energy. Once the energy has been consumed 
by another person, the original energy possessor will not be able to use it. However, it is most 
unlikely that an electromagnetic record be used up as it can be obtained by duplication without 
affecting the original possession relationship.  
 
Similarly, a person who by fraud makes another person deliver financial or other sensitive data to 
him or a third party does not simultaneously cause a loss of control of that person over his data (Art. 
339 I). Moreover, as most researchers suggested,270 the commitment of the offence of fraud 
requires an occurrence of actual damage to property. This is very unlikely to happen in the case of 
phishing unless that information itself has business value and this value will be immediately 
transferred to another person following the delivery of information.  
 
There was apparently a lack of careful consideration by the lawmakers about the peculiar 
characteristic of electromagnetic records. To respect the principle of legality, neither the expansion 
of the elements nor the expansion of a penalty should be admitted. Electromagnetic records, strictly 
speaking from a legal perspective, can be “obtained”, not “stolen”. Since it is inappropriate to 
                                                     
269 Taiwan High Ct., Criminal Division, 91 Shang-Yi No. 2258 (2002) (Taiwan) 
270 Hsueh (2013), op. cit;Lin (2006b), op. cit;Lin, Dung-Mau (2012), The overview of the Criminal Code (7 edn.; Taipei: 
Yi-Pin Publisher);Shiu, Tze-Tian (2011b), 'The provisions and debates of the offence of fraud', Ywe-Dan Jurisprudence 
Magazine, 197, 197-200. 
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include electromagnetic records in the objects of the offences against moveable property, both the 
larceny and fraud laws are not suitable for dealing with phishing. 
 
4.4.2. The 2003 Act 
 
The debates over the 1997 Act pressed the Ministry of Justice to take steps for another legislative 
amendment to the Criminal Code. After three years following the proclamation of the 1997 Act, the 
Ministry of Justice started to draft an amendment bill to the Criminal Code which was passed and 
came into force in June 2003. The 2003 Act set a landmark in the developemnt of cyber criminal 
laws of Taiwan by introducing a new Chapter 36 that specifically focused on the offences gainst 
computer use to enhance the legal protection of computer use, computer efficiency, and control over 
electromagnetic records. Although researchers argued that a perfect solution for combating 
computer crime does not exist and the criminal law merely provides a sense of mental security by 
responding to the general fear of computer crime,271 this Act is of particular significance to the 
regulation of phishing, as it granted electromagnetic records an individual legal status distinct from 
physical property, made it an offence to obtain electromagnetic records without authorisation (Art. 
359), and criminalised the production of malicious computer programs (Art. 362).  
 
However, there have existed many arguments, both academically and practically, regarding the 
elements of the offences related to phishing. This has given rise to the difficulties of application of 
legislation and even caused loopholes of legal protection against phishing. In addition, the 2003 Act 
made it an offence to produce malicious computer programs (Art. 362) which may be helpful, more 
or less, to tackle the supply chains of phishing articles but the effort appears to be inadequate. 
Importantly, as phishing is frequently a global phenomenon, effective law enforcement 
                                                     
271 Jeng, Y. J. (2003), 'Boost courage by whistling – comments on the augmentation of the Chapter 36 of the Criminal 
Code', Ywe-Dan Jurisprudence, 201, 104-15;Liou, Guang-San (1999), The Theory of Computer Crimes (Beijing: The 
Publisher of the People’s University of China) 4. 
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predominately relies on mutual legal assistance and cross-border cooperation. This is a particularly 
crucial challenge for Taiwan because Taiwan has been in a very difficult position in matters 
involving international cooperation because of its complex position relating to statehood.  
 
This section first provides a brief review of the legislative background of the 2003 Act. To provide 
an understanding of the extent to which the 2003 Act is able to deal with phishing, it considers the 
key provisions of the 2003 Act and the difficulties in applying them, especially its effectiveness in 
dealing with phishing supply chains and prosecutions in the Taiwanese context.  
 
4.4.2.1. Background  
 
In May 2001, the Ministry of Justice invited the experts concerned from industrial, governmental, 
and academic circles to form a research team on legislation related to the prevention of computer 
crimes which took the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime272 as the principal referral 
model for drafting the amendment bill.273  Two years later, a hacking event highlighted the 
inadequacy in relation to cybercrime and triggered the fast passing of the amendment bill.  
 
On 28th March 2003, a secondary school student hacked into the official website of the presidential 
palace of Taiwan as a joke. This student was reportedly not prosecuted for the offence as he was 
very regretful and sincerely apologised for his wrongdoing. The truth, however, was that there was 
no available legal provision for dealing with a hacker attack at that time. In order to quickly remedy 
the legislative loophole, the amendment bill was submitted to the Legislative Yuan hurriedly on 3rd 
April 2003 and came into force on 25th June in the same year.  
                                                     
272 The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which was signed in 2001 and enforced in 2004, is the first and 
only binding international instrument dealing with crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks. 
More examination of the CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime, see Chapter 6, section 6.3.2.2. 
273 Ye, C. S. (2003), 'The comparison of legislation amendments to the Criminal Code in relation to computer crime and 
the research on practical problems', in Ministry of Justice (ed.), Collection of Papers on Criminal Policies and Research 
of Crimes (6:4), 1-17.The author held a post in the Department of Prosecutorial Affairs of the Ministry of Justice during 




The 2003 Act amended the provisions which had received intense criticisms in the 1997 Act by 
removing electromagnetic records from the objects of larceny (Art. 323) and interference with the 
processing operation of electromagnetic records (Art. 352 II). The Act also introduced a new 
chapter entitled ‘Offences against Computer Use’ to the Criminal Code which was intended to 
combat the crimes that targeted computers and electromagnetic records. This new chapter inserted 
the offences of unauthorised access to computers (Art. 358), unauthorised obtainment of 
electromagnetic records or deletion of or alteration to electromagnetic records (Art. 359), 
unauthorised interference with computers or related equipment (Art. 360) and the production of 
computer programs for the commitment of the offences regulated in this chapter (Art. 362). 
 
4.4.2.2. Key amendments in relation to phishing 
 
To obtain a clear picture of these amendments related to phishing, this section provides a 
comparison of the 1997 Act and the 2003 Act as indicated in the diagram below. 
 
 





Penalisation of access to computers without authorisation (Art. 358) 
 
The 2003 Act made it a crime to access another person’s computer without authorisation (Art. 358), 
for the purpose of dealing with hacker attacks. As the legal interest that this provision aimed to 
protect is the security of computer use, whether this offence is constituted depends on whether the 
owner or possessor of a computer has a reasonable expectation of computer security evidenced by 
the use of certain protection measures. The lawmakers hence considered it necessary to place a 
limitation on the access methods.274 An offence under Art. 358 is committed once a person accesses 
another’s computer either by inputting the password of other person, breaking down a computer’s 
protection measures or utilizing a loophole in the computer system. Whether or not this access has 
resulted in any damage to the public or another person does not affect the commitment of the 
offence.  
 
Unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records (Art. 359) 
 
The 2003 Act removed electromagnetic records from the protected objects of larceny (Art. 323),275 
and this removal also produced the same effects on the law of fraud (Art. 339, 343). The Act added 
a replacement article, Art 359, which deals with the offence of the unauthorised obtainment of 
electromagnetic records.  
 
To protect information privacy, integrity and availability, Art. 359 made it an offence to obtain, 
delete, or alter the electromagnetic records of another person’s computer or related equipment 
without authorisation. While the larceny law aimed to protect the property interests of 
                                                     
274 Ye (2003), op. cit. 
275 As Art. 323 shall apply to other offences against property interests where appropriate, the removal of 
electromagnetic records from the protected objects of Art. 323 also produced the same effects on the laws of abrupt 
taking, robbery, piracy, criminal conversion, fraud, and breach of trust.  
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electromagnetic records generated from possession, Art. 359 was intended to ensure the security of 
electromagnetic records against unauthorised obtainment, deletion or alteration. An Art. 359 offence 
is only committed when obtainment conduct has caused damage to another person or the public, 
differing from what is laid down in Art. 358. Unauthorised access to computers (Art. 358) was 
hence compared with housebreaking, while the unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records 
(Art. 359) was compared with moving or taking property from a house in addition to 
housebreaking.276  
 
Unauthorised interference with computers or related equipment (Art. 360) 
 
Art. 360 intended to substitute for Art. 352 II by changing the protection object from 
electromagnetic records to computers and computer-related equipment and by detailing the methods 
of interference. Ke suggested that ‘interference’ herein refers to a temporary loss of function of 
computer or Internet system, and this function can be reinstated once the interference is 
eliminated. 277  The legislators also limited the interference methods to the use of computer 
programs and other electromagnetic ways. Art. 360 also requires occurrence of damage to the public 
or another person.   
 
Criminalization of production of malicious computer programs (Art. 362) 
 
The 2003 Act made it an offence to produce computer programs for the commitment of the offences 
outlined in Chapter 36 (Art. 362). In order to diminish the negative effect on the computer software 
industry or academic research, Art. 362 places a restriction on the intention of the perpetrator. The 
offence of the production of malware is committed only when the perpetrator intends to provide that 
                                                     
276 See the speech of Yan, Da He, the standing vice-minister of the Ministry of Justice, the 16th meeting record of the 
Judiciary Committee, session 3, 5th term, Legislative Yuan Bulletin, vol.92, issue 26, 137. 
277 Ke, Y. C. (2003), 'The comments on the legislation relating computer (Internet) crimes of the Criminal Code', 
Ywe-Dan Jurisprudence Classroom, 11, 117-29. 
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malware for the purpose of committing the offences regulated by Chapter 36. It does not constitute 
a crime under Art. 362 if the production of malware does not result in any damage to another person 
or the public, which is the same as the offences laid down in Art. 359 and 360. 
 
No trial without complaint (Art. 363) 
 
How to strike a balance between the criminal punishment of cybercrime and the autonomy of the 
cyber world is always a question that needs to be considered when dealing with criminalization of 
certain online behaviours. To avoid excessive government intervention in cyberspace as well as to 
concentrate the limited judiciary resources on combatting grave computer crimes, the 2003 Act 
concluded that the offences in Chapter 36, except for offences involving using computers of 
government organizations (Art. 361), are indictable only upon complaints (Art. 363).278 
 
4.4.2.3. The arguments over the elements of the provisions  
 
There have existed different academic and judicial opinions about the elements of the provisions 




In terms of Art. 359, it has been argued by several researchers that putting three conducts - 
obtainment, deletion, and alteration which were different in nature into one article was likely to 
have a negative influence on the integrity of the legislative system.279 More importantly, what is the 
                                                     
278 According to the Criminal Procedure Code, the victim of a crime can file a complaint (Art. 232). A statutory agent or 
the spouse of the victim may also file an independent complaint even it is against the opinion of the victim (Art. 233 I). 
In the case if the victim is dead, his/her lineal blood relative, collateral blood relative within the third degree of kinship, 
relative by marriage within the second degree of relationship, family head, or family member may file a complaint as 
long as this complaint is not contrary to the opinion of the victim (Art. 233 II).  
279 Hsueh (2013), op. cit;Ke (2003), op. cit;Lin, Guan-Hong (2006a), 'A research on the Chapter 'Offences against 
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‘obtainment’ recognised under this provision? Literally, Art. 359 did not the manner in which a 
person obtains electromagnetic records into a particular requirement. However, it was suggested 
that ‘obtainment’ in Art. 359 should be understood as accessing the victim’s computer and acquiring 
information from the storage of the computer. A typical example is where a person intentionally 
infects another person’s computer with the Trojan malware and thereby gains access to the 
information in the storage. This opinion has also been advocated by several judicial 
interpretations.280 Therefore, simply learning the contents of electromagnetic records by browsing a 
computer without obtaining of a copy of the records or obtaining the records by the way other than 
accessing to the victim’s computer does not constitute an offence under Art. 359. 
 
Nevertheless, the above interpretation of ‘obtainment’ has caused a problem in applying Art. 359 to 
phishing. A phishing perpetrator may be found guilty of the crime of unauthorised obtainment of 
electromagnetic records (Art. 359) if he acquires confidential information from the victim’s 
computer via a technical subterfuge scheme such as malware infection or keylogger. However, Art. 
359 is inapplicable to other cases of phishing. For example, there is a loophole where a person 
directs users to a spoofed website and obtains the data from users’ response.  
 
Phishing can be carried out in various ways, and is sometimes accompanied by accessing someone’s 
computer, but this is not always the case. In fact, Art. 359 was enacted for the protection of 
information security and integrity rather than computer security. A discrimination between the 
obtainment methods is unhelpful in protecting information against unauthorised collection but could 
cause a gap of criminalization of phishing. In my opinion, the term ‘obtainment’ should be 
interpreted broadly and Art. 359 should be valid for all forms of unauthorised acquisition of 
electromagnetic records, irrespective of the method employed to obtain it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Computer Use' of the Criminal Code ', Criminal Law Magazine, 50: 6, 82-118. 
280 For example, it was judicially interpreted in Hsinchu Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 93 Chu-Jen No. 685 (2004) (Taiwan) 
that obtainment of electromagnetic record referred to duplicating it to a storage which was under the possession of 






The 2003 Act largely used the term ‘unauthorised’ as an element in the new provisions (Art. 
358-360) without specifically defining its context. The arguments over the term ‘unauthorised’ 
mostly focused on two questions:  
 
a. Does ‘unauthorised’ include doing something exceeding the authorisation?  
b. Does ‘unauthorised’ cover ‘consent obtained by fraud’?  
 
a. Exceeding the authorisation 
 
Some researchers suggested that ‘unauthorised’ means doing something without proper reason or 
legal authorisation,281 while an alternative view argued that ‘unauthorised’ conveyed not only doing 
something without authorisation but also doing something exceeding that authorisation.282 The 
disagreements about the line between authorised and unauthorised have resulted in divergent 
judicial interpretations and produced different legal effect – a breach of the criminal law or an 
infringement of a civil contract. The Taipei District Court has interpreted Art. 359 in a case where a 
bank employee was accused of downloading the customers’ credit card data to a hard disk attached 
by the defendant to his personal computer issued by the working bank. The court found that the 
defendant had not committed the offence of unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records as 
he was allowed to download the customers’ data to his computer in order to test the maximum flow 
of the back website within the range of his responsibility. Although the judgment indicated that the 
employees of that bank were strictly prohibited from attaching a USB or any other equipment used 
                                                     
281 Gan, Tian-Guei (2011), The Specific Provisions of the Criminal Code -Part I (2 edn.; Taipei: San Min Ltd);Lin (2006b), 
op. cit. 
282 Liao and Jin (2006), op. cit. 
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for data storage to the computer, downloading customers’ data onto an additional hard disk was not 
an offence against Art. 359, but merely a violation of the internal regulations of the bank.283  
 
The above judgment was later abandoned by the Appeal Court. The Taiwan High Court found the 
appellant guilty of the crime of the unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records (Art. 359), 
as all the internal employees except for the personnel specified were strictly prohibited to access the 
credit card system as well as the customers’ credit card information. The appellant’s conduct of 
gaining a copy of the customers’ credit card information without permission to access the credit 
card system had constituted an offence under Art. 359.284  
 
The context of ‘unauthorised obtainment’, in my opinion, should refer not only to obtainment 
without authorisation but also to obtainment which goes beyond authorisation. According to the 
theory of agency in Taiwanese civil law, exceeding the authority conferred by the principal is 
deemed as unauthorised agency, unless it is subsequently acknowledged by the principal (Art. 170 
of the Civil Code). Collecting electromagnetic records while overstepping the range of authorisation 
thereof should be seen as the unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records and be penalized 
under Art. 359. 
 
b. Consent obtained by fraud 
 
Another question is: should a person be found guilty of unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic 
records if he causes another person to give away his records by fraud? This is often the case in 
phishing. A social-engineering phishing attack is usually carried out by delivering a 
genuine-looking email or website to deceive the users into believing it is from a legitimate source. 
                                                     
283 Taipei Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 98 Su No. 245 (2009) (Taiwan) 
284 Taiwan High Ct., Criminal Division, 98 Shang-Su No. 3246 (2009) (Taiwan) 
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Even if it is a consent obtained by deception, researchers suggested that it should be understood as 
“non-unauthorised” and hence does not satisfy the subjective elements of the offence of 
unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records (Art. 359).285  
 
Hsueh286 provided a detailed analysis of the criminal penalties for phishing by examining how the 
Taiwan Criminal Code deals with phishing. He indicated that Art. 359 can be used to deal with 
phishing only if it is carried out without the awareness of the victims. For example, in the case of 
phishing through malware infection, the victims are unlikely to make consent because they are 
completely unaware of the data collection matter. According to Hsueh, Art. 359 is not applicable to 
the case that a person obtains information by fraud as it is performed under the consent of the data 
possessor and hence does not constitute unauhorised obtainment. Whether it is a fraud-induced 
consent does not influence the effect of consent. In addition, Hsueh indicated that Art. 339 II, which 
makes it an offence to cause another person to deliver property by fraud and thereby taking illegal 
property benefit is adequately capable of dealing with phishing that is carried out by deception. The 
law of fraud (Art. 339) was intended to protect the integral property interest of the property 
possessor; and as suggested by Hsueh, in the example that a person who uses another’s 
fraudulently-obtained login information for Internet banking service to transfer the victim’s money 
to himself or to a third party should be found guilty of the offence under Art. 339 II because the 
integral property of the victim has been damaged.  
 
However, I have a different opinion about the applicability of Art. 339 II and Art. 359 to phishing. 
An electromagnetic record has been no longer the object of fraud since the enactment of the 2003 
Act. The 2003 Act made significant amendment to the 1997 Act, and one of the key amendments 
                                                     
285 Hsueh (2013), op. cit;Huang, Chang-Ren (2009), The General Provisions of the Criminal Code (2 edn.; Taipei: New 
Sharing Publishing Ltd);Lin, Yu-Shiung (2011b), New General Provisions of the Criminal Code (3 edn.).  
286 Hsueh (2013), op. cit. 
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was to remove electromagnetic records from the protected objects of larceny (Art. 323).287 As Art. 
323 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the provision of fraud (Art. 343), this removal naturally 
produced the same effects on the offence of fraud (Art. 339). Since an electromagnetic record is no 
longer the object protected under the provision of fraud, it is inappropriate to still make Art. 339 II 
to deal with phishing. Assuming that electromagnetic records are still the object that the fraud law is 
intended to protect, as I have indicated in section 4.4.1.3, there are several questions about the 
compatibility of the elements of the fraud law and phishing. Taking the example provided by Hsueh, 
a person who is defrauded of login information for Internet banking service does not necessarily 
nor directly result in loss of property but only increases the risk that someone might take his money 
by using the said information. The login information itself does not have business value and cannot 
be transacted, therefore a delivery of the said information does not necessarily mean damage to the 
victim’s integral property interest. Given the incompatibility of phishing and the elements of the 
fraud law, I doubt that Art. 339 II is capable of dealing with phishing. 
 
In terms of Art. 359, I realize that fraud-induced consent is generally regarded as legally valid and 
may be used as an excuse to prevent the defendant from satisfying subjective elements of the 
offences against personal legal interests.288  The offences against personal legal interests are 
generally divided into two: offences against property and offences against personality. As people are 
allowed to dispose their property at free will, a consented disposal of property is usually valid even 
if the consent is obtained by deception. However, whether consent can be used as an excuse for the 
offences against personality is another question. By looking into the Criminal Code, we can find the 
lawmakers put the element of ‘unauthorised’ in 10 articles, including offences against freedom (Art. 
306), offences against privacy (Art. 315, 315-1, 316, 317, 318, 318-1), and offences against 
computer use (Art. 358, 359, 360). Although the lawmakers did not specify the nature of legal 
                                                     
287 See section 4.4.2.2.  
288 Baker, Dennis J (2009), 'The moral limits of consent as a defense in the criminal law', New Criminal Law Review, 12 
(1), 93-121;--- (2011), The right not to be criminalized: demarcating criminal law's authority (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.). 
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interest about computer use, they stated that Art. 359 was enacted to protect the security of 
information with respect to information privacy, integrity and availability (see section 4.4.2.2). 
‘Unauthorised’ seems to be a special element laid down by the lawmakers in the offences against 
personality. The obtainment of electromagnetic records without authorisation should not be seen as 
an offence against property, but an offence against personality. Whether it is appropriate to take 
consent obtained by fraud as a proper reason and an excuse to prevent satisfaction of the element of 




Under the provision of Art. 359, a person who obtains financial or sensitive data from another either 
by malware infection or deception will not be found guilty if this obtainment has not resulted in 
damage to another person or the public. It was hence suggested that ‘electromagnetic records’ 
herein should be sensitive information, such as business confidential data, financial information or 
other personal sensitive information, the disclosure, destruction, or alteration of which may cause 
loss or damage to another person.289 Similarly, the offences of Art. 360 and 362 also require 
occurrence of damage but there is controversy about the context of damage and whether damage 
has been caused.  
 
While researchers argued that the damage to another person or the public should be capable of a 
broad interpretation,290 the judicial interpretation of damage is rather restrictive. The first judgment 
to interpret Art. 359 and 360 of the Criminal Code in Taipei Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 94 Su No. 
1514 (2005) (Taiwan) resulted from the conduct of two employees of a company which operated a 
website that redirected users back to their site through the unauthorised alteration of the users’ 
                                                     
289 Tsai (2003), op. cit. 
290 Kennedy, Gabriela and Doyle, Sarah (2007), 'A snapshot of legal developments and industry issues relevant to 
information technology, media and telecommunications in key jurisdictions across the Asia Pacific–Co-ordinated by 
Lovells and contributed to by other leading law firms in the region', Computer Law & Security Review, 23 (2), 148-55. 
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computer files with a computer program in order to increase the amount of traffic to its website and 
to prevent users from accessing websites which provided similar services. The court found that the 
malware had interfered with the capability of the users’ computer to connect to the Internet and 
thereby disabled the users to freely access specific Internet content, thus causing damage to the 
individuals. However, a later Appeal Court decision found that the malware had not damaged the 
users, as it had not caused vital interference with the “major” function of the computer system but 
merely influenced the users’ visit to specific websites through changing the host files in the users’ 
computers.291 
 
While Tsai suggested that the damage should not be limited to monetary loss,292 in judicial practice, 
Art. 359 has not applied to unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records unless this 
obtainment has led to monetary loss to another person. In one case a man intercepted another 
person’s keystrokes through planting a keylogging program onto the PC in an Internet café and 
thereby obtained the victim’s ID and password of online game account. He then logged onto the 
victim’s online game account to acquire virtual property. The court only found the defendant was 
guilty of having unauthorised access to another person’s computer (Art. 358) and unauthorised 
obtaining of another person’s virtual property existing in the form of electromagnetic records (Art. 
359) without considering the issue of the interception of another person’s account credentials.293  
 
Although the 2003 Act recognized that an electromagnetic record is entitled to independent legal 
protection separate from property law, the judges of Taiwan have appeared not to change the old 
way of thinking. Many of them still see the unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records to 
be property crimes and hence give discordant interpretations of Art. 359 between cases relating to 
the records that are generally acknowledged as ‘valuable’, such as virtual currency or credit card or 
                                                     
291 Taiwan High Ct., Criminal Division, 95 Shang-Su No. 3830 (2006) (Taiwan) 
292 Tsai (2003), op. cit. 
293 Fuchien Lienchiang Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 93 Su No. 4 (2004) (Taiwan) Similar interpretation can be seen in 
Kaohsiung Dist Ct., Criminal Division, 93 Jen No. 2416 (2004) (Taiwan) 
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banking information, and the records other than these, which is often true in the case of phishing 
such as username, password or personal sensitive information. An offence under Art. 359 is 
constituted only when there is damage to another person or to the public, but the damage does not 
have to be monetary damage. It is nevertheless practically difficult to prove the existence of damage 
other than monetary loss. Therefore, whether it is necessary to require for occurrence of damage in 
Art. 359 is worthy of proper consideration.   
 
4.4.2.4. Inadequate effort to tackle phishing resources 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 regarding successful phishing attacks (section 2.5.2), the readily 
availability of a variety of phishing resources, such as pre-generated counterfeit pages, list of email 
and proxy server, scripts for processing user input, and even hosting services for phishing websites 
which can be easily purchased or downloaded for free has been an important factor that boosts the 
growth of phishing attacks.294 This should be addressed by placing legal prohibition of the 
production, transfer, or possession of phishing articles to make a person who produces, supplies, 
transfers or possesses any computer programs, data or service intending to facilitate the practice of 
phishing to be liable for his conduct.  
 
A major amendment under the 2003 Act was to make it a crime to produce computer programs for 
the commitment of the offences provided under Chapter 36 (Art. 362). Art. 362 nevertheless only 
penalizes the person who makes malicious computer programs without addressing the punishment 
to the person who disseminates them. In addition, it only focused on the ban of computer programs 
without taking into account the other resources that are actually frequently provided for assisting in 
offence commitment.  
                                                     
294 Bose and Leung (2007), op. cit;Brody, Mulig, and Kimball (2007), op. cit;Dunn (2007), op. cit;Messagelabs (2009), 




Raising the difficulties for potential phishers in performing phishing attacks is a good way to curb 
phishing activities, which can be done by diminishing available resources for phishing attackers. 
However, the 2003 Act does not address this issue satisfactory, and Art. 362 needs to be reviewed.  
 
4.4.2.5. The failure to prosecute phishing295 
 
The failure of prosecution of phishers can be attributed to two major factors: lack of complaint and 
ineffective law enforcement. The offences laid down in Chapter 36, except for Art. 361, are 
indictable only upon complaint (Art. 363). A court shall dismiss phishing cases if the accuser 
withdraws the claim against the defendant after the two parties have reached a compromise. In some 
cases, phishing victims are completely unaware that their information has been stolen, even after the 
phishing conduct has been detected.296 A court shall dismiss a case on the ground of absence of 
complaints if there is no complaint raised by any victim of a phishing attack.  
 
If the victim of phishing raises a complaint, it mostly ends up with non-prosecution as the defendant 
cannot be specified. In a case where Microsoft Corporation was accused of conspiring with an 
unknown person and let that person use the MSN message service to send the victim a web link 
leading the victim to a counterfeit MSN login page which spoofed the victim into leaking his 
username and password, the prosecutor did not bring the case to court, as a corporation could not be 
a defendant in criminal law and the said unknown person could not be specified either.297  
 
Cyberspace, by its borderless nature and anonymity characteristic, permits people to reach anyone 
through the power of network and adopt different persona during online communication. While 
                                                     
295 Chapter 6 will specifically look into the challenges posed by phishing to law enforcement work combined with the 
national and international responses to this issue. 
296 For example, Banciao Dist. Ct., Criminal Division, 94 Jen No. 3682 (2005) (Taiwan) 
297 See Taipei Dist. Prosecutor Office, 96 Jan No 2275 (2007) (Taiwan)  
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cyberspace allows people to enjoy a totally different life from what they have in the real world, it 
brings new challenges to the traditional legal system. Phishing attackers usually intentionally 
include several different jurisdictions and host phishing websites in free web-hosting environment 
or bot-infected machines298 to obscure their location and identity in order to make investigation and 
prosecution as difficult as possible. Effective law enforcement, to a significant degree, depends on 
traceability and successful prosecution of phishing attackers, which is nevertheless difficult to 
achieve and demands cross-border cooperation between law enforcement, legislation and private 
sectors.299 Establishing cooperation with other countries in the absence of bilateral or multilateral 
mutual legal assistance agreements is an uneasy task, and it becomes even more difficult in Taiwan 
because of its awkward position in international society and the political pressure from China.300  
 
Chang, Yao-Chung301 conducted an important academic work that introduced the existing model of 
cooperation between Taiwan and China in combating cross-Strait crime and examined the extent 
that this existing cooperation is able to apply to cybercrime. Although there are two agreements 
signed through non-governmental organizations between Taiwan and China in 1990302 and 2009,303 
Chang pointed out that the current cooperation model seems not to be working when it comes to 
cooperation against cybercrimes, probably because cybercrime is a too sensitive issue to both 
governments as they are frequently the target of cyber-attacks on each other. The author further 
                                                     
298 Mcgrath and Gupta (2008), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit. 
299 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
300 The examination of the political obstacles to Taiwan to engaging in international cooperation, see Chapter 3, 
section 3.6. 
301 Chang (2012), op. cit. 
302 The Kinmen Agreement was signed in 1990 between the Red Cross Societies of Taiwan and China authorised by 
their respective governments. This Agreement primarily focuses on the repatriation of criminals and suspects who 
have illegally entered each other country and implies cooperation between Taiwan and China in arresting the above 
individuals.  
303 The Agreement on Cross-Strait Mutual Assistance in Crime Matters was signed between the Taiwan-based Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the mainland-based Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in 2009. 
The SEF is an organization set up by the ROC government (Taiwan) in 1991 for handling technical or business matters 
with the RPC. Its counterpart in China is the ARATS. Both sides agreed on collaboration on combating crimes 
recognized in both jurisdictions, particularly focusing on majors crimes involving kidnapping, weapons, drugs and 




indicated that, in some cases involving serious crimes, Taiwanese investigators will seek 
cooperation through informal channels like guan-xi (interpersonal relationship) or assistance from 
international companies to locate the source of attack. This may be helpful to the investigators in 
clearing the cases once the criminal is located but can do very little to further arrest and prosecution 
without mutual legal assistance.  
 
Mutual legal assistance, either based on bilateral or multilateral treaty or convention or non-treaty 
request, is the key to effective law enforcement cooperation against cybercrime. However, Taiwan 
has been suffering from seeking legal assistance in investigation into cybercrimes due to its 
disadvantaged political position.304 It is fundamentally important to look for alternative methods of 




This chapter examined Taiwan’s phishing legislation, including the Civil Law, the Copyright Act, 
the Trademark Act, and the Personal Information Protection Act and focusing especially on the 
Criminal Code and the two legal reforms, the 1997 Act and 2003 Act.  
 
Personal information is not only the main target of phishing attacks but also frequently exploited to 
craft a spear phishing message as a leading vector to a data breach that is very likely to result in 
numerous phishing attacks. The protection of personal information against unlawful or unauthorised 
collection and use is hence a fundamental component which should be included in the regulation of 
phishing. Although the enactment of the PIP Act in 2010 attempted to strengthen protection of 
personal information and redress the problems that previously existed in the old law, this chapter 
                                                     
304 Chapter 7 will demonstrate the empirical evidence of the difficulties experienced by Taiwan in seeking legal 
assistance by an analysis of the interviews with the key persons from Taiwanese law enforcement authorities as well as 
other fields. See Chapter 7, section 7.8.3. 
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argued that the Act, instead of correcting the pre-existing problems regarding the improper use of 
indeterminate legal concepts, actually adopted more vague legal concepts in the exceptional 
conditions to data collection and even created loopholes of legal protection. While the use of an 
indeterminate legal concept itself is not harmful and sometimes is unavoidable given the 
administrative flexibility, it may become a trouble if there is no specific authority taking charge of 
disputes over indeterminate legal concepts by providing a uniform interpretation after a 
coordination of the opinions of different organizations or authorities. This is exactly the case in 
Taiwan. Taiwan currently has no independent authority responsible for the tasks of personal 
information protection, in this case, a large employment of indeterminate legal concepts in the 
exceptional conditions to data collection prohibitions is not only improper but also increases the risk 
of abusing these concepts to evade liability for illegal data collection and may even encourage 
phishers to leverage efforts to obtain personal information from so-called ‘publicly available 
resources’ for subsequent malicious use.  
 
Taiwan, like many other countries, does not make sui generis law that aims at prohibiting phishing 
but deals with phishing by applying the existing criminal law. Taiwan undertook a succession of 
legal amendments to the Criminal Code and introduced two Acts in 1997 and 2003 to respond to the 
rising of new forms of offences following the rapid growth of information technology; however, 
this chapter questioned their applicability to the conduct of phishing. The 1997 Act granted an 
electromagnetic record the same legal status directly as a movable property, but it failed to consider 
the conflict between the elements of the property crimes, especially larceny, and the object of 
electromagnetic records. The 2003 Act introduced a new Chapter 36 which was specially designed 
for the protection of security of computer use and electromagnetic records to the Criminal Code. Yet, 
there have existed discordant opinions, both academic and in judicial practice, on several elements 
of the offences relating to phishing, such as ‘obtainment’, ‘unauthorised’ and ‘damage’. While 
researchers suggested that the element of ‘damage’ should be capable of broad interpretation, the 
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judges in Taiwan often gave different decisions depending on whether monetary damage has 
occurred. This has given rise to the difficulties in applying the Criminal Code to phishing which in 
turn undermined its capability of dealing with phishing.   
 
This chapter especially argued the inadequate effort that the 2003 Act has made to combat the 
supply chains of phishing resources as it only penalizes the makers of malicious computer programs 
and its focus is only on the prohibition of computer programs without punishing the disseminators 
or dealing with the creation or transfer of other phishing articles. Most importantly, the transnational 
nature of phishing often leads to failure of prosecution because of a shortage of mutual legal 
assistance and legal enforcement cooperation. The political dilemma of Taiwan makes effective law 
enforcement difficult to achieve, which highlights the need for a broader thinking of legal 
regulation that goes beyond criminal laws as well as the necessity of looking for other forms of 
regulation that goes beyond laws. The following chapter examines how personal information 
protection laws can contribute to the regulation of phishing in different aspects other than imposing 









This chapter looks into the role of information privacy protection in the regulation of phishing and 
examines the laws relating to personal data protection that have been developed in the global, 
regional, and Taiwan national interfaces, focusing especially on the interaction between these three 
regulatory interfaces and the extent to which Taiwan’s personal information protection legislation is 




This chapter argues that the need for legal control over phishing to go beyond the criminal law to 
take prevention into account by ensuring the security of personal information against unauthorised 
or illegal collection and disclosure. While criminal law has an important role in standard setting to 
determine the boundaries of permissible behaviour and penalize those who do not comply, whether 
it can actually deter phishing attackers still remains a question.305 Legal regulation in the context of 
phishing demands a broad thinking which goes beyond criminal liability. However, as I have argued 
in previous chapters,306 both international and Taiwan legal debates over phishing have too often 
concentrated on the discussion of criminal laws in terms of liability rules, legal reform, and 
                                                     
305 The challenges of phishing to criminal legal enforcement have been discussed in Chapter 2 and 4 and will be 
explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  
306 See Chapter 2 (section 2.5.1), Chapter 3 (section 3.4) and Chapter 4 (section 4.3.4). 
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challenge to enforcement. While several researches and media press have suggested an increase of 
phishing-leading data breach incidents307 and revealed a substantial growth of spear-phishing 
campaign which exploits freely available data on social networking websites, 308  very little 
scholarly discussion could be found that addresses how protection of information privacy and 
regulation of phishing relate to each other in different respects.  
 
This chapter aims to contribute toward an understanding of the role of information privacy in the 
regulatory framework of phishing. It first highlights the relationship between phishing and 
information privacy and identifies the essential requirements raised from the regulation of phishing 
for legal protection of personal information. It then examines the privacy legal frameworks that 
have been developed at the global, regional, and Taiwan national levels, with a particular focus on 
the impacts of international developments upon Taiwan in passing its first data protection law in 
1995 and subsequently amending it in the enactment of the Personal Information Protection Act in 
2010. Most importantly, the chapter assesses whether the above Act is capable of providing 
adequate protection for personal information to facilitate better management and control of phishing 
or it may cause reverse effect on personal data protection by drawing the key problems observed 
from this Act.  
 
5.2. Information Privacy and Phishing 
 
                                                     
307 Baker, Wade, et al. (2011), '2011 data breach investigations report', Verizon RISK Team, 1-72. 
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accessed August 30 2014;Rivner, Uri (2011), 'Anatomy of Attack', RSA Blog. 
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<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/cyber-attack-on-rsa-cost-emc-66-million/2011/07/26/gIQA1ceK
bI_blog.html>, accessed September 17 2014. 
308 Bonneau, Joseph and Preibusch, Sören (2010), 'The privacy jungle: On the market for data protection in social 
networks', in Tyler Moore, David Pym, and Christos Ioannidis (eds.), Economics of information security and privacy 
(Springer), 121-67;Jagatic, Tom N, et al. (2007), 'Social phishing', Communications of the ACM, 50 (10), 94-100. 
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There are three significant aspects to the relationship between information privacy and regulation of 
phishing. 
 
First, phishing, as conduct which targets the unauthorized obtainment of a variety of confidential 
information including personally identifiable data, financial or other sensitive information by means 
of deceptive email messages or malware infection, undoubtedly, is a typical example of the use of 
information technology to threaten information privacy. The personal data protection law may 
constrain phishing attempts by imposing punishment on illegal collection of personal information.  
 
Second, phishing has been increasingly used as a leading vector of large-scale data breach. Instead 
of individual users, more and more phishing attacks, especially spear phishing, target the public or 
private entities that hold large databases of personal information. While the issue of 
phishing-leading data breach has received increasing media attention,309 it seems to draw little 
academic attention. 
 
Third, a social networking service enables individuals to communicate and share information with 
their family, friends and hundreds of millions members instantly, whereas it also makes them 
expose their personal information with or without consciousness on a global scale. This has inspired 
a growing privacy concern and prompted significant number of research studies over information 
privacy with regards to social networking sites,310 which nevertheless did not particularly address 
                                                     
309 Hipolito, Joahnna Marie 'Anatomy of a Data Breach', (updated November 15 2011) 
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Computer‐Mediated Communication, 13 (1), 210-30;Fogel, Joshua and Nehmad, Elham (2009), 'Internet social network 
communities: Risk taking, trust, and privacy concerns', Computers in Human Behavior, 25 (1), 153-60;Gross, Ralph and 
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ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society (ACM), 71-80;He, Jianming, Chu, Wesley W, and Liu, Zhenyu Victor 
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phishing. The most important academic work about phishing and social networking sites was 
provided by Jagetic et al.311 in 2007 where the authors found that the vast amount of personal 
information available from the social networking websites dramatically enhances the success of 
phishing attacks which is evidenced by the result of their experiment conducted upon the students at 
the Indiana University in 2005. Bonneau and Preibusch312 provided an analysis of the privacy 
practices and policies of over 45 social networking sites in which the authors indicated that the 
privacy market did not function properly in social networks, and the social networking sites 
surveyed disregarded anti-phishing work and hardly took any measure to protect their users from 
phishing attacks. This can be addressed by strengthening legal regulation with regard to social 
networking service providers in terms of reinforcing data security measures, enhancing the privacy 
environment for their users, and ensuring their users are well-informed about the risk potentially 
relevant to their creation of profiles on the sites.  
 
This section begins with a brief review of the historical development of the concept of information 
privacy, which is followed by an examination on the sources of threat to information privacy, with a 
particular focus on phishing. It also suggests the key elements that should be particularly included 
in the personal data protection legislation in order to better correspond to the requirements raised 
from phishing regulation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(2006), 'Inferring privacy information from social networks', in Sharad Mehrotra, et al. (eds.), Intelligence and Security 
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150 
 
5.2.1. Concept of information privacy  
 
Gavison suggested that the concept of privacy is constituted by a complex of three independent and 
interrelated elements, namely secrecy, anonymity, and solitude, which were shorthand for “the 
extent to which an individual is known, the extent to which an individual is the subject of attention, 
and the extent to which others have physical access to an individual”.313 A loss of privacy occurs, 
accordingly, when others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him, or gain 
access to him. 
 
Privacy has several dimensions, which usually cover bodily privacy, territorial privacy, privacy of 
communication, and information privacy.314 It involves the protection of a person’s body against 
invasive procedures such as drug testing and cavity searches; the resistance to intrusion into the 
close physical areas surrounding a person, such as residence and the workplace; the privacy of mail, 
telephone calls, email and other forms of communication; and the control of whether or how 
personal data can be gathered, stored, processed or disseminated. Privacy is a term which has been 
broadly interpreted; as Volio observed, “In one sense, all human rights are aspects of the right of 
privacy.”315 
 
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis316 took “the right to be let alone”, the phrase coined by Judge 
Cooley, as a distinct ground for the protection of the private individual against the unjustifiable 
infliction of mental distress caused by the growing abuse of the press.317 The work of Warren and 
                                                     
313 Gavison, Ruth (1980), 'Privacy and the Limits of Law', Yale law journal, 421-71.  
314 Banisar, David and Davies, Simon (1999), 'Privacy and human rights: an international survey of privacy laws and 
practice', Global Internet Liberty Campaign. Rosenberg, Richard S (1992), The social impact of computers (Academic 
Press Professional, Inc.). 
315 Volio, Fernando (1981), 'Legal personality, privacy and the family', in Louis Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of 
Rights (New York: Columbia University Press ).  
316 Warren, Samuel D and Brandeis, Louis D (1890), 'The right to privacy', Harvard law review, 193-220. 
317 Gavison argues that Warren and Brandeis regarded the right to privacy as a special case of the right to be let alone 
rather than equating the two. Gavison (1980), op. cit..  
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Brandeis has not only had a profound impact upon American law318 but has also been significantly 
influential internationally on the subsequent theoretical and legal development of the right of 
privacy.  
 
The 1960s and 1970s saw the advent of information technology which enabled the surveillance 
potential of powerful computer systems, in conjunction with a distinct shift in the direction of 
information privacy from the sustainability of a seclusion space to the defence of the data subjects’ 
control and determination over the handling of data about themselves. Although Zamyatin319 
sensed the forthcoming change long before it happened, his concern was aroused by the threat of 
authoritarian governments harnessing technology to achieve anti-democratic ends. Technology, 
itself a determinant of the change, has been gradually recognized from about 1950 onwards.320  
 
The dramatic growth of automatic data processing and the Internet has largely accelerated the 
capacity and speed of information storage and transmission, bringing us to a new information age – 
an age in which the vast bulk of personal information can be accessed, stored and transmitted within 
seconds across national frontiers. A rapid cross-border data flow significantly assists the 
development of social and commercial activities; however, it has also posed a crucial challenge to 
data protection with regard to ensuring that the data subjects have sufficient control over their data. 
                                                     
318 The views of Warren and Brandies were accepted and the existence of a right to privacy was first recognized in a 
1905 case, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., in the state of Georgia. Although there was continued debate 
for the following thirty years on whether the right of privacy existed at all, the majority of American courts allowed the 
plaintiffs to seek legal remedies for the invasion of the right of privacy. In the first half of the 20th century, the 
American courts created an independent basis for liability which in fact comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of the 
four different interests of the plaintiff – intrusion into the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, public disclosure of private 
facts which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man, placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public 
eye, and the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant’s advantage. Prosser suggests that 
these four invasions were built on the same basis, i.e. the right to privacy; however, they differ and have little in 
common. While intrusion and public disclosure involve an invasion of private things, false light does not, nor does 
appropriation. Publication disclosure and false light rely on publicity, whereas intrusion and appropriation do not. Only 
appropriation requires use for the defendant’s advantage, which is not seen in the other three types of invasion. 
Prosser, William L. (1960), 'Privacy', California Law Reivew, 48 (3), 383-423. 
319 ZAMYATIN, Evgeny Ivanovich, GLENNY, Michael V, and GUERNEY, Bernard Guilbert (1972), We... Translated [from 
the Russian MS.] by Bernard Guilbert Guerney. Introduction by Michael Glenny (Penguin). 
320 Clarke, Roger (2000), 'Beyond the OECD guidelines: privacy protection for the 21st century', Canberra, Australia: 
Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd. Retrieved August, 5, 2009. 
152 
 
It has hence inspired an increasing demand for the data subjects to choose freely under what 
circumstances and to what extent their personal data will be collected, used, and processed, whether 
they are held by themselves, other individuals or public or private controllers. In this context, 
privacy, as Westin defined, “is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”321 
 
Over the past few decades, the rapid technological development and intensive collection of personal 
data have profoundly changed the world around us, and posed new challenges regarding the 
protection of personal data. Today, technology allows individuals to communicate, share and 
exchange information about their life, family, or work with others in a highly efficiently manner; 
however, this at the same time makes their information publicly and globally available on an 
extraordinary scale. Social networking sites, such as Facebook, MySpace and Twitter, which 
provide networking services that enable individuals to share and update their ideas, activities, 
interests and events with hundreds of millions of members across the globe, may serve as an 
obvious example of this phenomenon. Although the development of information technology may 
have brought about a more convenient communication method, it has been accompanied by an 
increase in the extent and potential risk of the invasion of information privacy.  
 
To conclude, privacy has varied dimensions and can be defined widely according to the specific 
context and environment. The protection of privacy initially focused on the right to solitude of an 
individual, including his home and family but there has been a tendency to broaden the traditional 
concept of privacy to one which perhaps more precisely corresponds to the demands of the modern 
age. The increasing sophistication of information technology in terms of its speed and capacity to 
collect, analyze and disseminate information has inspired a greater concern about information 
privacy and introduced a sense of urgency to protect personal data against inappropriate disclosure, 
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collection, use, and process.  
 
The threats to information privacy come from various sources, which may include information 
technology, government, commercial corporations, and cyber criminals. The following subsection 
will look into the sources of threats to information privacy, particularly focusing on the threat posed 
by phishing.  
 
5.2.2. Threats to information privacy 
 
5.2.2.1. The sources of threats  
 
It cannot be denied that the Internet provides a platform for new forms of communication and 
interaction that, to a certain extent, better safeguard privacy because of its characteristic of 
anonymity. People may feel more comfortable about expressing themselves, communicating with 
others, or engaging in cyber activities without being identified. Information technology can also 
enhance privacy through the use of encryption techniques in browser software, which permits the 
transfer of credit card numbers, login information and other personally sensitive data in a secure 
manner.  
 
However, in the digital era, information technology has also been viewed as the source of many 
privacy concerns. It is possible, using the current protocols for Internet communication, to record 
every activity of an individual, the information he receives, the people he communicates with and 
his preferences. Technological development has created tools for collecting personal data which 
have become increasingly elaborate and less easily detectable. For example, cookies322 allow 
                                                     
322 A cookie is “a small piece of data sent from a website and stored in a user’s web browser while the user is browsing 
that website. The browser sends back the cookie to the server to notify the website of the user’s previous activity 
every time when the user loads the website.” See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie#cite_note-1.  
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publishers to monitor a user’s web behaviour to generate customized advertising across websites for 
a particular user based on what is known about the website he has visited. A server may uses 
cookies for various purposes, which may include maintaining data related to a user such as 
shopping cart contents or authentication credentials, personalizing web content based on the user’s 
preferences, and tracking the user’s web browsing habits. A cookie per se is harmless, as it cannot 
carry a virus, nor does it install malware on the user’s computer. Cookies may help users to navigate 
faster around those websites that they visit regularly and find the goods that interest them; however, 
it may lead to an invasion of privacy, especially when users are unaware that they are being tracked 
or, even worse, when cookies are stolen by hackers to gain access to users’ web accounts.323  
 
The government can also diminish the privacy of information through schemes for compelled 
identification, census enumeration, database profiling, and the regulation of the use of privacy 
enhancing techniques, such as encryption. The threat to privacy posed by government actions is 
particularly harsh, as citizens often have little choice but to comply. The great power of government 
surveillance has been a major source which substantially endangers people’s right of privacy. 
Particularly, after the event of 9/11/2001, the anti-terror climate led to the expansion of surveillance 
and government control over digital personal information by enthusiastically adopting surveillance 
measures, such as CCTV cameras in public spaces, increased border scrutiny, accessing personal 
information collected by the private sector and observing online speech and activities.  
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Another noticeable threat to privacy comes from corporations based on the ‘personalization’ or 
‘one-to-one marketing’ business models. As Lloyd suggested, we are moving to a situation where 
information becomes the major measure of wealth and power.324 Because of the strong commercial 
incentive, the majority of business corporations tend to extract as much information as possible 
from their customers by asking extensive questions. It is no longer sufficient for customers to make 
payments for goods and services, as they must also provide their personal details that are not really 
related to a particular transaction before any commercial relationship is established. While some 
requests may be necessary and appropriate, much more data collection appears to be unrelated to 
the transaction purpose. For example, a customer should expect to provide his home address if he 
wishes an item to be sent to his home, but he need not answer questions about his buying 
preferences, shopping habits, how he learnt about the website, or other questions which appear 
unrelated to the transaction.  
 
In fact, data subjects should be entitled freely to exercise their right to information privacy without 
suffering from a potential disadvantage. However, on the overwhelming majority of websites, 
individuals are not allowed to purchase goods or access services unless they have registered for a 
new account by providing the so-called mandatory information about themselves. This may involve 
inappropriate interference with the individuals’ right of information privacy if they can only choose 
to leave the website or yield to them, which means that they are not allowed to have any discretion 
over the extent of information they provide.  
 
Cyber criminals, especially those who directly target acquisition of confidential information such as 
hackers or phishers, have also been a major source responsible for the increasing threat to 
information privacy. The following subsection will particularly look into the relationship between 
                                                     
324 Lloyd, Ian J (2000), Legal aspects of the information society (Butterworths). 
156 
 
phishing and information privacy and examine the role of personal information protection in the 




A direct infringement of information privacy 
 
A phishing attack, which directly targets the unauthorized obtainment of various confidential 
information such as personally or financially sensitive data, without a doubt, is an immediate 
invasion per se of information privacy. Accordingly, imposing threat of punishment on the people 
who access, collect, process or use personal information without authorization can be a way to deter 
phishing attempts. 
 
A leading vector for data breach 
 
Phishing schemes, especially spear or targeted phishing, have been intensively used to gain a 
toehold in the victim’s environment for a data breach.325 It is no longer only the end user who 
becomes the victim of a phishing attack, but enterprises and even governments are now truly at risk. 
It is a comparatively efficient way to obtain information, as the attackers can easily walk off with 
masses of personal information as long as they can gain access to the database systems operated by 
the private or public sector. 
 
A data breach refers to an unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure or loss of data. These 
                                                     
325 Baker et al. (2011), op. cit;Oussayef, Karim Z (2008), 'Selective privacy: Facilitating market-based solutions to data 
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data are generally kept in the target organization’s systems or networks, and are usually confidential 
and sensitive in nature. They may include personally identifiable information, customer data, trade 
secrets, etc. Data breaches can be triggered by insiders; for example, employees who intend to do 
harm to the company by purposely taking information from it. A data breach can also accidentally 
occur326 or can be actuated by malicious attackers. Hacking, malware, and social (phishing) were 
indicated to be the common threat actions that cause a data breach.327 A data breach is often 
committed by breaking into the targeted data base through making use of a weakness in the targeted 
infrastructure, system, and application, or employing techniques such as SQL injection328 and 
session hijacking.329 It is also frequently triggered by phishing individuals who work for or are 
closely associated with the targeted entities and so can gain access to a database through the 
compromised computers or network.  
 
Although network infrastructure weakness has been a main object targeted by cybercriminals to 
intrude into database systems, recent data breach incidents reveal the increasing interest of 
cybercriminals in attacking a critical element, which is extremely difficult to manage and control 
but easy to overlook, namely, humans. The manipulation of human weakness, such as trust or 
curiosity, is described as “an ever-present bane” to any robust secure infrastructure.330 
 
The Executive Chairman of RSA331 sent an open letter to its customers on 17 March 2011, 
                                                     
326 For example, lost or stolen devices that carry information or the unintentional disclosure of information in 
conversations or online, such as through instant messaging or via social networking platforms.  
327 Baker et al. (2011), op. cit. 
328 For example, a hacking group, LulzSec, claimed on June 2, 2011 that it has broken into several Sony Pictures 
websites and gained access to more than a million customers’ confidential information, including their passwords, 
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330 Hipolito (2011), op. cit. 
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disclosing that a data breach had occurred within RSA. It was reported that this incident resulted in 
the compromising of information on nearly 40 million RSA security tokens and a reported cost of 
US$66 million.332 The attackers behind the RSA breach, as explained in the report by Uri Rivner,333 
launched a social-engineering attack by sending two different phishing emails with the subject 
“2011 Recruitment Plan” to two small groups of RSA employees over a two-day period. One of the 
said employees opened the attached Excel file with the same file name as the subject after he 
retrieved the email from his Junk Mail folder, unaware that the attachment contained a zero-day 
exploit.334 This exploit installed a backdoor that allowed the attacker to gain elevated access to the 




Diagram 5.1: RSA breach 2011 
 
Another well-known phishing-leading data breach happened between 17 and 19 April, 2011, where 
Sony PlayStation Network underwent an illegal unauthorized intrusion which resulted in the 
personal information of 77 million user account holders being stolen. According to Sony’s blog 
announcement of 26 April, the stolen information included names, addresses, log-in and password 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the RSA BSAFE security software and the SecurID authentication token.  
332 Tsukayama (2011), op. cit.  
333 Rivner (2011), op. cit. 
334 A zero-day attack is a computer threat that seeks to exploit computer application vulnerabilities those are 
unknown to the software developers.  
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details, password security answers, email addresses, and birth dates. The users’ purchase history and 
credit card information had probably been compromised too.335 
 
A mutually complementary relationship is found between phishing and data breach, where phishing 
significantly facilitates the chance and success of data breach, the large volume of stolen personal 
information obtained from a data breach, at the same time, remarkably enriches the creation of 
targeted phishing attacks which in turn leads to numerous phishing scams.336 For example, in 
August 2007, hackers broke into a U.S. online recruitment site, Monster.com, and swiped the 
contact information such as names, addresses, phone numbers or email addresses of more than 1.6 
million jobseekers. The stolen information was subsequently used in phishing scams by sending the 
victims legitimate-looking Monster messages with attempt to infect their machines with a Trojan 
horse.337  
 
Phishing and data breach can mutually enhance each other, which means a single phishing incident 
may result in countless phishing attacks coming after a data breach. Today’s growing population 
relies on computers338 to engage in their daily social or commercial activities. While corporations 
tend to extract as much personal data as possible from their customers, the extensive collection of 
individual’s personal data may involve not only an inappropriate interference of individual’s control 
over their data but also an unpredicted danger of unlawful access if the data cannot be properly 
safeguarded. The dramatic increase of phishing-leading data breach incidents makes it a pressing 
task for data controllers to take necessary security measures such as technology or organizational 
measures to protect personal information database against malicious access or collection. This 
                                                     
335 Seybold (2011), op. cit. 
336 Acquisti, Alessandro, Friedman, Allan, and Telang, Rahul (2006), 'Is there a cost to privacy breaches? An event 
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337 Hidalgo, Amado (2007), 'A Monster Trojan', Symantec Blog. 
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should be guaranteed by distinct legal obligation provided by the law.  
 
Exploitation of social networking sites (SNSs) 
 
A standard phishing attack is usually broad-based, whereas the strategy engaged in the foregoing 
RSA case is highly-targeted, which is known as a spear phishing attack. As I have mentioned in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.4.1), there is a substantial growth of spear-phishing campaign in terms of both 
quantity and quality. A recent Symantec’s report339 showed an increasing number of users, in 
particular their work-related email accounts, have been targeted by spear phishing attacks over the 
past decade. In addition to individual users, 61 percent of business-targeted spear phishing attacks 
aimed at SMBs with less than 2,500 employees and 39 percent of which were sent to large 
enterprises comprising over 2,500 employees. This caused nearly 1 in 2 of large enterprises suffered 
at least one spear phishing email in 2013.  
 
Compared with standard phishing which employs mass-mail attacks in a hope that some would take 
the bait, spear phishing attacks are much more targeted which involve low volume of customized 
messages used to dupe particular individuals within a specific organization into visiting a fake 
website or downloading malware onto their machines. Although spear phishing campaigns are 
limited in volume, they offer higher user open and click-through rate of 19%, compared to only 5% 
for standard phishing attacks.340 Despite that a spear phishing attack is much more complex and 
costly than traditional phishing, the rewards are much greater too. A report from Cisco Security 
Intelligence Operations (SIO)341 estimated that while a spear phishing attack can cost 5 times as 
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much as a mass-mail phishing, it can yield profit of more than 10 times.342 
 
The success of spear phishing campaigns can be imputed to a number of factors, most of which 
have been discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.5). The most important reason for why spear phishing 
emails are so convincing is that they are designed to be highly personalized which significantly 
improves their authenticity and thus increases the likelihood of the recipient complying with their 
request. Spear phishing messages are well-crafted and customized based upon knowledge about the 
recipients, including their personal information, position in the company, work, interests or 
interpersonal relationships. Conducting a background research on the recipients is extremely helpful 
to attackers when concocting a compelling phishing message that can solicit the recipients to follow 
the link enclosed or open the attached file. This can be illustrated by the attack experienced by 
Google where an attacker targeted an individual within Google who had access to high-value 
information by sending the target a web link from a friend’s Facebook account which was 
embedded with new piece of malware after spending a few months on monitoring the target’s online 
activities and collecting personal information via social networking sites. This message successfully 
fooled the unsuspecting target into believing it really came from a friend and clicking on the link 
which ultimately allowed the attacker access to Google mainframe server.343  
 
The exponential growth in usage of social networking services, such as Facebook and Twitter, has 
                                                     
342 While a traditional phishing attack mostly targets the confidential information of individual users, including their 
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advanced materials used by the military, this campaign was code-named Nitro. A Nitro attack is carried out by sending 
the employees of the target companies, ranging from a handful to 500 recipients, an email containing an executable 
file which carries a backdoor Trojan that allows the attackers to traverse the network, infecting additional computers 
and searching for access to a system storing intellectual property secrets. See: Chien, Eric and O’Gorman, Gavin (2011), 
'The Nitro Attacks, Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry', Symantec Security Response. 
343 Parmar (2012), op. cit. 
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dramatically changed the interconnection between individuals through establishing a mobile 
communication capacity. The users of these services can make instant contact with their friends and 
also meet new people by sharing their profiles, interests, and diaries, as well as updating their 
activities. While social networking sites (SNSs) allow individuals to exchange and share 
information instantly, they make their personal information publicly available to many around the 
world. This has inspired a growing concern about privacy with regard to SNSs. Most importantly, 
SNSs have become a dominant source providing large amount of sensitive and personal information, 
such as name, data of birth, living place, occupation and hobbies, for phishers to compose a targeted 
phishing message for a specific individual. 
 
The popular press stressed the danger of SNSs to privacy especially among younger users.344 
Researchers have investigated the potential threat to privacy concerning SNSs.345 One of the first 
academic studies of privacy and SNSs was conducted by Gross and Acquisti in 2005.346 The 
authors analyzed the Facebook profiles of more than 4,000 Carnegie Mellon University students 
and found that while the users generously provide a large amount of personal information in an 
online social network, they care very little about the potential privacy risk and barely use privacy 
preference settings, which had exposed themselves to various risk in both real and virtual world. In 
another work,347 Acquisti and Gross found that privacy concerns do not lead to obvious changes in 
the bahaviours of SNSs users. The authors also suggested that while some users feel confident in 
their ability to control the information they provide and manage external access to their information, 
they may misunderstand or ignore the visibility of members’ profiles and the actual size and 
compositions of SNSs. In addition, women were found to be more concerned about privacy and 
                                                     
344 George, Alison (2006), 'Living online: The end of privacy', New Scientist, 2569, 1-50;Kornblum, Janet and Marklein, 
Mary Beth (2006), 'What you say online could haunt you', USA Today. 
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-03-08-facebook-myspace_x.htm?csp=N007>, 
accessed September 7 2014. 
345 Ellison (2007), op. cit. 
346 Gross and Acquisti (2005), op. cit. 
347 Acquisti and Gross (2006), op. cit. 
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identity information disclosure than men.348  
 
Several studies indicated that the released data obtained from social networking sites can enable 
accurate inference of information about an individual which is supposed to be private and 
undisclosed.349 Network’s ties can not only connect someone’s profile to hundreds of peers directly 
but also extend the connection to thousands of others who may be actual friends but many are 
complete strangers.350 It is almost impossible in practice to maintain a real private profile once you 
decide to build social relations with others through online social networking sites.   
 
Users’ account information for accessing social networking service itself is often targeted by 
phishing attackers,351 and the stolen account credentials are frequently exploited to assist in various 
phishing attacks over social networks, for example spreading worms through infected links352 or 
even requesting money from unsuspecting online ‘friends’.353 Most importantly, the plentiful 
personal information that is able to be found on SNSs provides the best material for phishers to 
generate a highly convincing message and increases the power of a phishing attack. A number of 
studies have been conducted to explore how effectively publicly available personal information 
from social networks helps to yield successful phishing attacks.354 Jagatic et al. used freely 
available data by crawling SNSs to build a database with tens of thousands of relationships. They 
then performed an actual but harmless phishing attack on students aged 18- 24 at the Indiana 
                                                     
348 Fogel and Nehmad (2009), op. cit. 
349 He, Chu, and Liu (2006), op. cit;Lindamood et al. (2009), op. cit;Xu, Zhou, and Li (2008), op. cit;Zheleva and Getoor 
(2009), op. cit. 
350 Gross and Acquisti (2005), op. cit. 
351 Arrington, Michael (2008), 'Phishing For Facebook', TechCrunch. 
<http://techcrunch.com/2008/01/02/phishing-for-facebook/>, accessed September 8 2014. 
352 Waugh, Rob (2010), 'Watch your wall: New Facebook attack has stolen passwords from 45,000 users - and could be 
spreading through infected links', Daily Mail. 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2083118/Facebook-hacked-Ramnit-worm-stolen-passwords-45-000-u
sers.html>, accessed September 13 2014. 
353 Frommer, Dan (2009), 'What a nigerian facebook scam looks like', The Business Insider. 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/nigerian-scammers-still-roosting-on-facebook>, accessed September 11 
2014. 
354 Jagatic et al. (2007), op. cit;Johnson, Jakobsson, and Menczer (2007), op. cit. 
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University in April 2005. The above experiment revealed that the exploitation of social network 
data dramatically enhances the success of a phishing attack, which increased more than 4 times 
success rate to make users become victims, compared to a traditional phishing attack.  
 
New technological development and the changing online environment have led to the explosive 
online-disclosure of personal information, with or without the consciousness of the data subjects. 
This has made it an increasingly difficult task for individuals to control and protect their 
information against unauthorized collection, processing and use. While educational campaigns 
about privacy concerns with regard to SNSs are essential to help users be less vulnerable to 
phishing by heightened awareness of the risk and the potential misuses of publicly accessible 
personal information, SNSs should also take responsibility to provide their users adequate 
protection of privacy. However, Bonneau and Preibusch,355 in their analysis of the privacy practices 
and policies over 45 SNSs, argued that significant variation in privacy controls, data collection 
requirements, and legal privacy policies among SNSs has resulted in a “dysfunctional” privacy 
market in social networks. The authors found that the SNSs surveyed paid no attention to 
anti-phishing work and hardly took any particular measure to protect their users from spoofed SNSs 
or protect the users’ account credentials from being stolen. In addition, while the privacy policy is 
crucial for users to rely on when they give informed consent to data collection, the authors indicated 
that the privacy policies of most SNSs surveyed were too long to be expected to be read by most 
users. All the SNSs surveyed reserved the right of data collection and most reserved the rights of 
data sharing in their privacy policies, whereas few provided the duration of data detention and 
nearly half of the SNSs did not explicitly grant users the right to have their data deleted upon 
request.  
 
Vast amount SNSs data have been increasingly abused by phishers to craft a spear phishing attack 
                                                     
355 Bonneau and Preibusch (2010), op. cit. 
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which usually leads to large-scale data breach incidents and subsequent numerous phishing attacks. 
To ensure users’ control over their personal information and prevent potential exploitation for 
phishing, it is hence important to strengthen the role of law in the protection of personal information 
by requiring SNSs, as well as other data controllers that hold great number of highly sensitive 
information such as banks or other financial institutions,356 to make sure their users are well 
informed of the risk they are taking and are provided with a proper environment to best manage and 
control their personal information, for example, enhancing accessibility of privacy policies both 
technically and linguistically, reducing permissive privacy default settings and improving usability 
of privacy setting interfaces. SNSs should also avoid unnecessary data collection and undue 
limitation on users’ management of privacy control.  
 
5.2.2.3. The demands for personal information protection laws in terms of phishing 
 
The growing challenges and threats posed by phishing to privacy have prompted an urgent demand 
for the strengthened protection of personal information and specific regulations governing the 
collection, use, and processing of personal data. The following elements need to be particularly 
included in the personal information protection laws in order to effectively address phishing.  
 
Maintaining the confidentiality of personal data 
 
Keeping personal information in a ‘personal’ and ‘confidential’ status is the most basic requirement 
for data protection, whether it is held by the data subjects themselves or other data controllers. The 
unnecessary disclosure of personal information should be avoided and the data controllers should 
strictly limit the number of personnel who are authorized to access the data. To reduce the risk of 
                                                     
356 Fox, Mark A. (2006), 'Phishing, pharming and identity theft in the banking industry', Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation, 21 (9), 548-52. 
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phishing, the data controllers especially banks or other financial institutions should also avoid 
sending emails or texting messages to request their customers to transmit personal information via 
emails or messages.357   
 
Ensuring the security of databases 
 
The dramatic rise in the number of data breach incidents carried out via phishing schemes or 
exploiting the infrastructure weakness has generated increasing demand for sufficient and 
appropriate security measures that can effectively safeguard the privacy of personal data. In 
addition to technological measures for monitoring and detecting any invasion or unusual activity, 
personnel should receive training on information security and management, as well as the response 
to threats. It is also essential for data controllers to enhance their protection against unlawful access 
by adopting routine security practices such as penetration tests or system vulnerability scanning to 
elevate the overall defensive ability of both the personnel and systems.  
 
Strengthening the data subjects’ control and choices regarding their data 
 
When users decide to hand over their personal data, it does not mean they intend to render or ease 
their control over the data. In contrast, the data controller should be obligated fully to respect the 
data subjects’ right to their personal information, including the right of access, correction or deletion, 
and the right of choice regarding the collection, processing and use of their information. Any 
collection from either the data subjects or data controllers, or any disclosure of personal information 
to a third-party should not be permitted unless it is with the consent of the data subjects. The data 
subjects should be well informed regarding the handling of their personal data and their consent 
should be seen as a requisite condition which can only be dispensed under very limited 
                                                     
357 Ciocchetti, Corey (2007), 'The Privacy Matrix', Journal of Technology Law & Policy, 12, 245. 
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circumstances. Also, it is important to enhance the protection of the data subjects’ free choice of 
how and to what extent they would expose their personal data without inappropriate interference or 
limitation. 
 
5.3. Information Privacy Laws 
 
This section examines the multilayered privacy laws, including the international, regional and in 
particular Taiwanese national laws based on the specific requirements appropriate to the regulation 
of phishing. This section also includes a study of the data privacy frameworks that have been 
undertaken by several international instruments since the 1970s, with a particular focus on their 
impacts on the development of data protection laws in Taiwan.  
 
5.3.1. Privacy as a human right 
 
5.3.1.1. International agreements 
 
A few may argue for the end of privacy as a human value;358 however, for the vast majority of 
people, privacy is a critical human right that must be defended. The core privacy principles in 
international human rights instruments can be found in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). 359  Art. 12 of the UDHR, which specifically focused on the protection of 
territorially and communication privacy, states: 
 
                                                     
358 Whitaker, Reginald (1999), The end of privacy: How total surveillance is becoming a reality (The New Press). 
Whitaker argues that the introduction of new technologies and surveillance are constantly compressing the private 
spaces of individuals and making them more and more transparent.  
359 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 
December 1948, consists of 30 articles and represents the first global instrument of rights to which all human beings 
are inherently entitled. Full text of UDHR, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/udhr.html.  
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No-one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interferences or attacks. (Art. 12 
of UDHR)  
 
By adopting similar language, Art. 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)360 provides: 
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. (Art. 17 of ICCPR) 
 
The term ‘unlawful’ here means that no interference or attack can take place unless it is authorized 
by law, which itself must observe the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.361  
 
The Human Rights Committee stated, in its General Comment 16, that Art. 17 required the legal 
implementation of data protection guarantees in both the public and private bodies. 362  The 
                                                     
360 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in March 1976. The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty which commits its party 
states to respecting civil and political rights. It is monitored by the Human Rights Committee through reviewing regular 
reports of its party states on how the rights are being implemented. The ICCPR, along with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, form the International Bill of 
Human Rights. Full text of ICCPR, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.  
361 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, see: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx.  
362 General Comment 16: The gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other 
devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law. Effective measures 
have to be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a person’s private life does not reach the hands of 
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Committee reads into Art. 17 a limitation on the collection of personal data and mentions the need 
for security measures to ensure the confidentiality of personal information and also the right to 
information access and rectification. However, it is worth noting that the protection object, i.e. the 
personal information or personal data listed here, are formulated differently by the Committee. 
Whereas the limitation on gathering and holding applies to general ‘personal information’ without 
specification, the Committee clearly states that effective measures are needed for safeguarding 
‘information concerning a person’s private life’. Also, it seems that the right to information access, 
rectification and elimination is formulated only in relation to ‘personal data stored in automatic 
(computerized) files’. Nevertheless, three different formulations of personal information provided 
by the Committee may lead to difficulty and inconsistency of application.   
 
Differing from the above provisions that focus on the prohibition of ‘interference with privacy’, the 
equivalent provisions of Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)363 are 
framed in terms of a ‘right to respect for private life’: 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
                                                                                                                                                                                
persons who are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible with 
the Covenant. In order to have the most effective protection of his private life, every individual should have the right to 
ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data are stored in automatic data files, and for what 
purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies 
control or may control their files. If such files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed 
contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to request rectification or elimination. 
363 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a multilateral treaty drafted in 1950 by the Council of Europe, 
came into force in September 1953 to protect human rights and fundamental freedom in the member states of the 
Council of Europe. The ECHR established a supra-national court, the European Court of Human Rights, which hears 
complaints brought by the party states or any person who feels that his rights has been infringed under the ECHR by a 
party state. The execution of the judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights is monitored by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.   
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society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. (Art. 8 of ECHR)  
 
The ambit of the ‘right to respect for private life’ has been interpreted by the European Commission 
of Human Rights as being ‘such that it secures to the individual a sphere within which he can freely 
pursue the development and fulfillment of his personality’.364 Art. 8 of the ECHR does not merely 
compel a state party to abstain from interference with private life; it additionally comprises ‘positive 
obligations’ of the state party to take action to ensure that private life is effectively respected.365  
 
Although Art. 17 of the ICCPR and Art. 8 of the ECHR appear to lack explicit and comprehensive 
data protection guarantees compared with those found in instruments related specifically to data 
protection, the above two provisions demonstrate a willingness of the Human Rights Committee 
and the Strasbourg organs to adapt the provisions to take account of the potential danger that the 
new form of data processing creates regarding the privacy of individuals.366  
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union367 has specific sections on the privacy 
of private and family life (Art. 7) and on the protection of personal data (Art. 8), which provide: 
 
                                                     
364 Deklerck v Belgium, 1980, Application No. 8307/78, 21 Decisions and Reports of the European Commission of 
Human Rights, pp.116-125.  
365 Marckx v Belgium, 1979, Application No. 6833/74, ibid.  
366 Bygrave, Lee A (1998), 'Data protection pursuant to the right to privacy in human rights treaties', International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, 6 (3), 247-84.  
367 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, drafted by the European Convention, enshrines certain 
political, social, and economic rights for the citizens and residents of the EU member countries. It was ‘solemnly 
proclaimed’ by the European Parliament, the Council of European Union, and the European Commission in December 
2000. The Charter’s uncertain legal status ended with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. 
It consists of 54 articles and only applies to EU member states when they are implementing EU law.  
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Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications. (Art. 7) 
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him 
or her, and the right to have it rectified.  
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority. (Art. 8) 
 
The above provisions are maintained by the Treaty of Lisbon.368  The Convention places a 
restriction on the processing of personal data by indicating the need to ensure that the manner and 
purpose of the data processing are fair and specified. It also mentions the data subject’s right to 
information access and rectification, as well as the need to ensure that the data are processed on the 
basis of the data subject’s consent or the law. Art. 8 also requires the control of compliance made by 
an independent authority.  
 
5.3.1.2. Two basic rights invented by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
 
The right of privacy as a fundament human right is expressly recognized in the key international 
instruments and also recognized by most countries around the world. The recently-written 
constitutions in some countries, such as South Africa and Hungary, explicitly include specific rights 
                                                     
368 The Treaty of Lisbon amended the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009.  
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to personal data protection369 and the right to access these.370  
 
In 1983 and 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court created two important basic rights – the 
right to informational self-determination and the right to the confidentiality and integrity of 
information technology systems, which have been regarded as significant landmarks in the history 
of data protection in Germany.  
 
Right to information self-determination 
 
In 1983, the German federal government planned to conduct a general population census based on 
the Population Census Act which had been passed in the previous year. However, this led to a fierce 
public debate, resulting in the filing of a lawsuit at the Federal Constitutional Court due to a fear of 
government surveillance and unjust invasion of privacy caused by a statistical census. In the same 
year, the Court decided that the foregoing Act was partially unconstitutional and ruled, on the basis 
of Art. 1 (human dignity) and Art. 2 (personality right) of the Basic Law of the Federal Public of 
Germany, (GG) that:371372  
 
the basis right warrants […] the capacity of the individual to determine in 
principle the disclosure and use of his/her personal data. 
 
A “right to informational self-determination” was understood by the Court as: 
                                                     
369 The Constitution of Hungary 2011, Freedom and Responsibility Article IV (2).  
370 The Constitution of Hungary 2011, Freedom and Responsibility Article IV (2); the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996, Section 32(1).  
371 BVerfGE 65, 1; “Volkszählungsurteil” 1983. 
372 Rouvroy, Antoinette and Poullet, Yves (2009), 'The right to informational self-determination and the value of 
self-development: Reassessing the importance of privacy for democracy', in Serge Gutwirth, et al. (eds.), Reinventing 




the authority of individual to decide himself, on the basis of the idea of self-determination, 
when and within what limits information about his private life should be communicated to 
others. 
 
The reasoning of the Court was based on ideas from the sociological system theory, particularly the 
work of Niklas Luhmann, who considers that the function of fundamental rights is to guard the 
demarcation lines between societal sub-systems and the role of privacy is to protect the consistency 
and the individuality of the individual.373  
 
Right to the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems 
 
On 27 February 2008, the Court ruled Art. 5.2 (11) of the Constitution Protection Act, passed in 
2007 in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, to be null and void.374 This provision empowered the 
Constitution Protection Agency to carry out reconnaissance of the Internet and gain secret access to 
information technology systems (online searches). Having determined that the existing rights are 
inadequate to protect citizens from the threat to their personality rights, the Court established a new 
basic right of the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems to close the 
regulatory gap. 
 
This new fundamental right, like that to informational self-determination, is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution but derived from the right of personality (Art. 2 GG) in conjunction 
with human dignity (Art. 1 GG). Art. 1 GG states that “Human dignity shall be inviolable”, which 
                                                     
373 Hornung, Gerrit and Schnabel, Christoph (2009), 'Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision 
and the right to informational self-determination', Computer Law & Security Review, 25 (1), 84-88. 
374 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822, available at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg08-022en.html.  
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establishes a general overriding principle in the German legal system, and is designed to provide a 
“stop-gap” solution once the legislation falls behind social changes.375 In the hierarchical structure 
outlined by Cannataci by using the example of the 1991 Romanian constitution, legislation on data 
protection and the right to privacy underpin the realization of the supreme value of dignity and free 
development of personality.  
 
It appears to establish a three-tier hierarchy at the top of which one finds supreme 
values of dignity…and the right to unhindered development of personality. In the 
second tier immediately below this, one finds three constitutional provisions 
dedicated in information law: Art 26 tackles the right to private life, Art 30 the 
right to freedom of expression and Art 32 the right to access public information. 
These constitutional provisions establish the basis on which the third tier of 
ordinary legislation on data protection or media or freedom of access to public 
files provide the more detailed rules which exist to promote a culture in which 
ground rules for the access, distribution, and use of information […]376 
 
5.3.1.3. The right of privacy in Taiwan’s Constitution 
 
Similarly, the right of privacy is not explicitly enumerated under the Constitution of Taiwan.377 It 
was first mentioned by the Justices of the Constitutional Court (hereinafter, the Justices)378 in 1992 
in the Judicial Yuan Interpretation (hereinafter, J. Y. Interpretation) No. 293, which states that Art. 
                                                     
375 Abel, Wiebke and Schafer, Burkhard (2010), 'The German Constitutional Court on the Right in Confidentiality and 
Integrity of Information Technology Systems–a case report on BVerfG, NJW', in V. Madhuri (ed.), Hacking: A Legal 
Quandary (Icfai University Press), 167-91. 
376 Cannataci, Joseph A. (2008), 'Lex Personalitatis & Technology-driven Law', SCRPIT-ed, 5 (1).  
377 The Constitution of Taiwan was announced on 1 January 1947 and adopted on 25 December of the same year.  
378 The Justice of the Constitutional Court of Taiwan, also known as the Council of Grand Justices, is an independent 
judicial organ that is subordinate to the Judicial Yuan. It is empowered to provide rulings primarily on the 
interpretation of the Constitution and the uniform interpretation of statutes and regulations. On the authority of the 
Justice of the Constitutional Court, see http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_02.asp.  
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48 II of the Banking Act:379 
 
[…] was enacted to protect bank customers’ confidential information on their 
individual properties and to prevent banks from freely and unilaterally disclosing 
such information, with a view to protect the people’s right of privacy. 
 
Nevertheless, the “right of privacy” mentioned in the above interpretation was regarded merely as a 
legal right rather than a constitutional basic right. The nature of the right of privacy remained 
ambiguous until 15 December 2004, on which date the Justices expressly recognized the 
constitutional status of the right of privacy in J. Y. Interpretation No. 585.380  
 
The right of privacy […] is an indispensable fundamental right protected under 
Article 22 of the Constitution because it is necessary to preserve human dignity, 
individuality, and the wholeness of personality development, as well as to 
safeguard the freedom of private living space from interference and the freedom 
of self-control of personal information. 
 
Art. 22 of the Constitution states that “All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not 
detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution”. In this 
Interpretation, the Justices not only recognized that the right of privacy is an indispensable 
fundamental right under the Constitution but also divided it into two dimensions: the freedom of 
private living and the freedom of self-control of personal information.  
                                                     
379 J. Y. Interpretation No. 293, available at: 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=293.   
380 J. Y. Interpretation No. 585, available at: 




The Taiwanese government planned to implement new national identity cards which were to be 
issued in July 2005 in accordance with the 1997 Household Registration Act. Under Art. 8 II of this 
Act, all citizens over the age of 14 shall be fingerprinted for record keeping when applying for a 
new identity card. However, this programme incurred a strong question of its constitutionality and 
led to a ‘Movement to Refuse Fingerprinting’ formed by an alliance of over 100 human rights 
groups.381 In June 2005, the Justices issued a temporary injunction to halt the programme. Over a 
three-month period, the Justices made an interpretation (J. Y. Interpretation No. 603)382 on 28 
September 2005 which ruled that Art. 8 of the 1997 Household Registration Act was inconsistent 
with the intent of Art. 22 and 23 of the Constitution, and thus no longer applicable.  
 
This was a milestone in the history of personal data protection in Taiwan, as this was the first time 
that the Justices prohibited the continuous application of a law based on the protection of the right 
of privacy. They also firstly explicitly defined the right of information privacy as:  
 
[…]the right to decide whether or not to disclose their personal information, and, 
if so, to what extent, at what time, in what manner and to what people such 
information will be disclosed. 
 
The above understanding of the Justices with regard to the right of privacy is close to the right to 
information self-determination created by the German Federal Constitutional Court. In addition, 
both the right of information privacy and the right to informational self-determination are grounded 
                                                     
381 “Taiwan Constitutional Court places fingerprinting plan on hold”, Privacy International, 21 June 2005, at: 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/taiwan-constitutional-court-places-fingerprinting-plan-hold. [Accessed 
on 15 January 2012] 
382 J. Y. Interpretation No. 603, available at: 
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on the core value of human dignity and personality development. Nevertheless, the Justices further 
addressed that the right of privacy is also designed to guarantee: 
 
the right to know and control how their personal information will be used, as well 
as the right to correct any inaccurate entries contained in their information. 
 
According to the Justices, the right of information privacy is not an absolute right and the State may 
impose appropriate restrictions on such a right by enacting explicit laws pursuant to Art. 23 of the 
Constitution, where it is necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to 
avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.  
 
5.3.2. Personal data privacy frameworks 
 
5.3.2.1. The paradigm of fair information practices  
 
‘Fair Information Practices’ (FIP) were initially articulated by a US government advisory committee 
in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s seminal 1973 report entitled Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens (hereinafter, the HEW report).383 In the HEW Report, the 
Advisory Committee recommended the enactment of legislation establishing a Code of Fair 
Information Practices for automated personal data systems and formulated five principles for 
safeguarding the requirements for automated personal data systems: 
 
a. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret.  
b. There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is contained in a 
                                                     
383 For the full text of the HEW Report, see http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm.  
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record and how it is used. 
c. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about himself that was obtained 
for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent. 
d. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information 
about himself. 
e. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal 
data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to 
prevent their misuse.  
 
The FIP essentially lies in Professor Alan Westin’s work on the “criteria for weighing conflicting 
interests”.384 Since its origin in 1973, the FIP has become the dominant US approach to information 
privacy protection385 and has been widely incorporated into the national data protection laws of 
other countries as well as international data privacy initiatives.  
 
5.3.2.2. Development of international personal data privacy frameworks 
 
The first law that expressly protected information privacy was passed in Europe in the early 1970s. 
The West German state of Hesse enacted the first data protection statute, the Data Protection Act 
(Datenschutzgesetz), in 1970. Sweden followed in 1973 with the Data Act, which was the first 
legislation about data protection at the national level. On 27 January 1977, West Germany 
introduced a comprehensive data protection legislation – the Federal Data Protection Act – for both 
the public and private sectors which created an independent Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) 
who is responsible for ensuring that the Data Protection Act is implemented by advising the Federal 
government and individual ministers. 386  France followed in the late 1970s by introducing 
                                                     
384 These were included in chapter 14, ‘Restoring the Balance of Privacy in America’ in Westin (1970), op. cit.  
385 --- (2003), 'Social and political dimensions of privacy', Journal of social issues, 59 (2), 431-53. 
386 Flaherty, David H (1992), Protecting privacy in surveillance societies: The federal republic of Germany, Sweden, 
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legislation relating to personal data and computer files with law Nr. 79-17 of 6 January 1978.  
 
However, inconsistencies among the regulatory regimes in European countries caused concern that 
it might become a restraint on trade. To address this risk, significant progress in data protection has 
been made by establishing the basic privacy principles provided by international privacy guidelines 
since the 1970s. Over the last three decades, countries have begun adopting comprehensive privacy 
laws which tend to be based on the framework set out by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD),387 the Council of Europe (CoE),388 and the European 
Union (EU).389   
 
The 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines 
 
The OECD’s work on privacy and transborder data flows began in the early 1970s. Whereas free 
flows of personal information make a significant contribution to social and economic development, 
they also inspired increasing concern about the protection of privacy. While recognizing disparities 
in the national legislation that created a hindrance to the free flow of personal data between 
countries, the OECD determined to develop guidelines to harmonize the national privacy legislation 
which could uphold the fundamental right of privacy and diminish restrictions in the international 
data flows at the same time.  
 
The OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
                                                                                                                                                                                
France, Canada, and the United States (UNC Press Books).  
387 The OECD, constituted of 34 countries, is a forum of countries committed to democracy and the market economy, 
providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices, and 
coordinate the domestic and international policies of its members.  
388 The CoE, founded in 1949, is an international organization promoting co-operation between all of the countries of 
Europe with regard to legal standards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of law and cultural 
co-operation.  
389 The EU is an economic and political union that was formally established when the Maastricht Treaty came into 
force on 1 November 1993. The EU, constituted of 27 member states, has developed a single market through a 
standardized system of laws which apply in all member states.  
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Data (hereinafter, the OECD Guidelines),390  adopted on 23 September 1980, were the first 
internationally agreed statement of the core information privacy principles. The OECD Guidelines, 
accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum which provides information on the formulation of 
guidelines, embraces eight basic privacy principles in Part Two: the limitation of collection and use, 
data quality, purpose specification, security safeguards, openness, individual participation, and the 
accountability of the data controllers.  
 
The CoE’s 1981 Convention 
 
The OECD’s work was carried out in close co-operation with the CoE. The Committee of Ministers 
of the CoE adopted two resolutions on data protection concerning electronic data banks in the 
private391 and public sector392 in 1973 and 1974. Both resolutions listed a number of basic rules 
relating to the obtaining of data, the quality of data, and the rights of individuals to be informed 
about data and data processing activities, recommending that the governments of the member states 
should take steps to give effect to the above principles when personal information is stored in 
electronic data banks.  
 
The Committee of Ministers adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (hereinafter, the CoE’s 1981 Convention or simply the 
Convention)393 grounded on the foregoing two resolutions on 17 September 1980 and opened for 
signature by the member states of the CoE on 28 January 1981. The Convention laid down the core 
principles of data protection in Chapter II, which included the quality of the data in terms of its 
                                                     
390 For the full text of the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, see: 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata
.htm#part1.   
391 Resolution 73 (22) 
392 Resolution 74 (29) 
393 For the full text of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, see: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/108.htm.  
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collection, processing, storage, and usage (Art. 5), special categories of data (Art. 6), the 
requirement for data security measures (Art. 7), and the right of data subjects to access their data 
(Art. 8).  
 
The EU Directive 1995 
 
The shift of the European Union from an economic to a broad-based political union brought it with 
an urgent need to ensure the uniform protection of information privacy. Nevertheless, the OECD 
Guidelines are not legally binding and permit broad variation in their national implementation.394 
The CoE’s Convention will have legal force in those countries which ratify it; however, it also 
permits broad variance across various national regimes. As a result of the uneven application of and 
prevalent variation among national laws, in July 1990, the European Commission395 published a 
draft Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of such Data which was amended by the European Parliament396 
in March 1992 and eventually adopted on 24 October 1995 (with effect from October 1998). 
 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of such Data (hereinafter, the EU Directive 1995)397 is another milestone in the global initiative 
regarding the protection of personal data. It established a Europe-wide set of legal principles for 
privacy protection and represented the international consensus on the content of data protection 
rights. Most importantly, due to the prohibition of the transfer of personal data from member 
                                                     
394 OECD Guidelines para. 45 expressly “permit Member countries to exercise their discretion with respect to the 
degree of stringency with which the Guidelines are to be implemented”.   
395 The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union which proposes legislation, and oversees 
and implements decisions and the requirements of the EU treaties. 
396 The European Parliament is the legislative body of the European Union, composed of 754 members, who are 
elected through direct voting.  




countries to other countries that lack an “adequate level of protection”,398 the EU Directive 1995 
exerts significant international pressure for increased data protection on countries outside Europe, 
including the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.399 
 
The EU Data Regulation 2012 
 
Rapid technological development and globalization have significantly changed the way and scale 
how data is collected, processed and used. In addition, the divergence in the implementation of the 
EU Directive 1995 among the 27 EU Member States has led to an uneven level of protection for 
personal data accompanied with erosion of the consumer confidence with online activity. In May 
2009, the European Commission launched a review of the current legal framework for data 
protection, starting with a high-level conference and a public consultation that run until the end of 
2009. On 25 January 2012, a proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation (a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data) was published to set out new 
rules on the processing of personal data (hereinafter, the EU Data Regulation 2012).400  
 
To strengthen the online privacy rights, the above proposed regulation provides the data subject’s 
right to be forgotten and erasure, which enables the data subjects to request erasure of personal data 
relating to them when they no longer want their data to be processed or there are no legitimate 
grounds for retaining it (Art. 17). It also introduces the data subject’s right to data portability to 
                                                     
398 EU Directive 1995, Art. 25 (1). The Directive provides that the adequacy of the protection afforded by the 
transferee country “shall be assess in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer”, including “the 
nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing”, “the rules of law, both general and 
sectoral,” in the transferee country, and the “professional rules and security measures which are compiled in that 
country” (Art. 25 (2)). 
399 Fischer‐Hübner, Simone (1998), 'Privacy and security at risk in the global information society', Information 
Communication & Society, 1 (4), 420-41. 




transfer data from one service provider to another without being prevented by the controllers (Art. 
18). Data subject’s consent for data processing should be given explicitly pursuant to the Regulation 
(Art. 4 (8)). In a case of a personal data breach, the controller is obligated to notify the data breach 
to the supervisory authority without undue delay, where feasible within 24 hours (Art. 31.1). Where 
the data breach could adversely affect the data subject, the controller is also required to inform the 
data subject about the data breach without undue delay (Art. 32.1).    
 
The APEC Privacy Principles 
 
In order to promote electronic commerce and to ensure the free flow of information within the 
APEC started its work on developing a consistent approach to information privacy protection 
among APEC members while avoiding unnecessary barriers to information flow in 1995.401 It 
established the APEC Electronic Commerce Steering Group (ECSG) in 1999 and has tended 
towards developing a regional privacy instrument since 2002. At a meeting held in Thailand in 
February 2003, the APEC ECSG set up the APEC Data Privacy Subgroup402 to develop a common 
APEC approach to privacy. At this meeting, Australia proposed the development of APEC privacy 
principles by taking the OECD Privacy Principles as a starting point was coupled with an 
implementation mechanism which addresses the issue of inter-country personal data transfer. The 
proposal, developed by the Data Privacy Subgroup, was renamed the APEC Privacy Framework403 
and endorsed by APEC Ministers at a meeting held in Santiago, Chile, in November 2004.  
 
                                                     
401 Lam, Tony (2005), 'An Overview of the Principles Established by the APEC Privacy Framework', APEC Technical 
Assistance Seminar: Domestic Implementation. 
<https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/files/infocentre/1tonylam1_ppt.pdf>, accessed September 27 2014. 
402 The APEC Data Privacy Subgroup meets twice yearly and reports to the ECSG, which ultimately reports to the APEC 
Ministers. It comprises eleven members: Australia, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand and the United States.  





The APEC Framework, for the purpose of promoting electronic commerce and ensuring the free 
flow of information within the APEC region, sought to establish a consistent approach to 
information privacy protection among APEC members while avoiding the creation of unnecessary 
barriers to information flows. The Framework set forth nine APEC privacy principles (I-IX)404 in 
Part III, which deal with most of the broad topics laid down in the international or national sets of 
privacy principles, including the collection, quality, security, use, access to, and correction of 
personal information.  
 
The APEC Privacy Principles (hereinafter, the APEC IPPs) were rooted in the OECD Guidelines 
with the addition of two further principles: ‘Preventing harm’405 and ‘Choice’.406 Nevertheless, 
they did not include the OCED Guidelines concerning purpose specification407 and openness.408 
Although the APEC IPPs have been criticized for the weakness inherent in the OECD Guidelines,409 
as well as their minor enhancement of the OECD Guidelines that were set up more than twenty 
years ago, 410  they are generally recognized to be the most significant international privacy 
instrument since the EU Directive 1995.  
                                                     
404 The nine APEC Privacy Principles are: Preventing Harm, Notice, Collection Limitation, Use of Personal Information, 
Choice, Integrity of Personal Information, Security Safeguards, Access and Correction, and Accountability. 
405 The principle of Preventing Harm recognizes that privacy protection should be designed to prevent harm to 
individuals through the wrongful collection or misuse of their personal information and that the remedy to privacy 
invasions should be proportionate to the likelihood and severity of the risk of harm. APEC Privacy Framework, Part III 
at para. 14.  
406 The principle of Choice recognizes that individuals should be provided with mechanisms to exercise choice in 
relation to the collection, use and disclosure of their information. APEC Privacy Framework, Part III at para. 20. 
407 The Purpose Specification Principle provides that the purposes for which personal data are collected should be 
specified no later than the time of the data collection. The OECD Guidelines, Part Two, para. 9.  
408 The Openness Principle requires a general policy of openness about the developments, practices and policies with 
respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, 
and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller. The OECD 
Guidelines, Part Two, para. 12.  
409 Clarke enumerated the inadequacy of the OECD Guidelines in several aspects, which mainly included: 1. they failed 
to provide a specialist privacy protection body which is able to supervise government agencies and corporations; 2. 
they fell short of the protection of the free exercise of the right of privacy without a fear of disadvantage; and 3. they 
should be enhanced following the development of privacy-invasive technology in order to reflect the need for 
protection. Clarke (2000), op. cit. 
410 Greenleaf, Graham (2005), 'APEC's privacy framework sets a new low standard for the Asia–Pacific', in Andrew T. 
Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds.), New dimensions in privacy law: international and comparative perspectives 




APEC is the only inter-governmental grouping and places no treaty obligation on its member 
economies. Decisions made within APEC are undertaken on a voluntary basis. The APEC 
Framework does not require any particular means of implementation but only lists several options, 
including “legislative, administrative, industry self-regulatory or a combination of these 
methods”. 411  It also accepts “a flexible manner that can accommodate various methods of 
implementation, including through central authorities, multi-agency enforcement bodies, a network 
of designated industry, or a combination of the above”.412 
 
5.3.3. The personal data protection law of Taiwan 
 
Taiwan initiated the legislation work regarding personal data protection in the 1980s and adopted 
the CPPDP Law which was built upon the OECD Guidelines in August 1995. However, as we saw 
in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.4), this Law failed to provide effective regulation of the collection of 
personal information nor adequate protection for personal information, which prompted the new 
enactment of the PIP Act in 2010.  
 
The personal data protection frameworks established in the OECD Guidelines, the CoE’s 
Convention, and the EU Directive, as aforementioned, have provided the most prevalent examples 
of privacy frameworks and serve as the foundation for many countries, including both member and 
non-member states around the world, for tailoring or establishing national data protection laws. The 
APEC IPPs, which are essentially rooted in the OECD Guidelines, have also afforded the criteria of 
data protection for its member countries. As a member of the APEC, the enactment of the PIP Act 
not only incorporated several data protection principles set up in the EU Directive but also 
                                                     
411 The APEC Framework, Part IV, Section A. Guidance for Domestic Implementation, para. 31.  
412 Ibid.  
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especially adopted the APEC IPPs, particularly the principle of ‘Preventing Harm’, ‘Collection 
Limitation’ and ‘Notice’.413  
 
This section examines the interaction of the data protection legal frameworks between different 
levels, including global, regional, and Taiwan, by providing an outline of the key amendments of 
the PIP Act in comparison with the international frameworks and an analysis of the impacts that the 
EU Directive and the APEC IPPs have produced upon the development of Taiwan’s legislation.  
 
5.3.3.1. Key aspects of the amendment  
 
Scope of application 
 
In tune with the OECD Guidelines and the APEC IPPs, the PIP Act removes the constraint laid 
down in the CPPDP Law and extends the scope of its application to cover non-computer-processed 
data (Art. 1). Hence, it is valid for general data, irrespective of the particular methods and 
machinery employed. The PIP Act also breaks downs the sectoral boundaries and expands the scope 
of non-government agencies to “natural personal, juridical persons or groups other than government 
agencies.” (Art. 2 (8)) 
 
Definition of personal information 
 
Standing in the point of the EU Directive with regard to the definition of personal data,414 the 
definition of personal information given in the PIP Act covers “the information which may be used 
                                                     
413 MOJ (2010), 'The Passing of the Personal Information Protection Act after Three-reading Procedure of the 
Legislative Yuan', (The Department of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Justice, Taiwan). 
414 Art. 2a “personal data” shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable nature person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, particularly by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factor specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity.  
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to identify a natural person, both directly and indirectly.” (Art. 2(1)) Unlike the Directive, the PIP 
Act enumerates several types of personal information that is capable of identifying an individual in 
either a direct or indirect way, including his name, date of birth, I.D. card number, passport number, 
characteristics, fingerprints, marital status, family, education, occupation, medical records, medical 
treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health examination, criminal record, contact information, 




The privacy of personal information should be underpinned by appropriate security safeguards 
against accidental or unlawful destruction or loss, authorized access or disclosure or alternation. 
Based on the division drawn by the OECD Guidelines,415 security measures can categorized into 
three types: physical measures, such as locked doors and identification cards, organizational 
measures, such as authority levels with regard to access to data and obligations for data processing 
personnel to maintain confidentiality, and technical measures, such as the detection or monitoring of 
unusual activities and responses to threat. The EU Directive particularly requires the confidentiality 
of processing that the processor or any person who has access to personal data authorized by the 
controller or processor is prohibited to process data unless the processing is under the instruction 
from the controller (Art. 16).  
 
In addition, appropriate security measures should be guaranteed not by the controller but also by the 
processor who acts on behalf of the controller. The EU Directive stresses the need for the controller 
to ensure that the data processing carried out by the processor is governed by sufficient technical 
and organizational security measures and compliance with those measures (Art. 17.2). The level of 
                                                     
415 The Explanatory Memorandum of the OECD Guidelines, Part II, para. 56.   
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security measures, according to both the EU Directive (Art. 17.1) and the APEC IPPs,416 shall be 
proportional to the likelihood and severity of the harm threatened and the sensitivity and nature of 
the information to be protected.  
 
In order to protect personal data from being stolen, altered, damaged, destructed or disclosed, the 
PIP Act provides that a government agency should assign specific personnel417 to deal with matters 
regarding the security and maintenance measures of personal information files (Art. 18) and a 
non-government agency should take proper security measures (Art. 27.1). The central government 
authority responsible for the subject sector may designate a non-government agency to establish the 
plan for the security measures for the personal information files (Art. 27.2).  
 
The proper security measures referred to in the PIP Act, according to its Enforcement Rules, are 
necessary technical and organizational measures to prevent personal data from being stolen, altered, 
damaged, destroyed or disclosed (Art. 12.1). Notably, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) adopts the 
PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle for the management of information security and lists several 
necessary measures, as indicated in the diagram below (Art. 12.2). 
 
                                                     
416 APEC Privacy Framework, Part III at para. 22.  
417 The specific personnel, under the Enforcement Rules of the PIP Act, mean the people who have professional ability 
to manage and maintain personal information files and are capable to perform the regular task of securing and 




Diagram 5.2: PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) Cycle 
 
Liability of controllers 
 
Under the CPPDP Law, a controller who violates the protection of personal data against unlawful 
and unauthorized collection (Art. 18) is only punishable if the controller intends to make profit by 
doing so and this wrongdoing has caused injury to an individual (Art. 33). The PIP Act increases 
liability on a controller by providing punishment to a violation of the prohibitions of personal data 
collection (Art. 15, 19) if this violation may result in injury to an individual regardless of the 
intention of the controller (Art. 41).418  
 
Where personal information has been illegally collected, processed, and used due to the 
                                                     
418 A violation of the prohibitions of personal data collection (Art. 15, 19) which may result in injury to an individual 
should be imposed of a sentence or custody of no more than 2 years, or a fine of no more than NTD 200,000 (around 
US$ 6,666), or both (Art. 41.1). A person who intends to make profit by unlawful or unauthorized collection of 
personal data which may cause injury to an individual should be imposed of a sentence of no more than 5 years and a 
fine of no more than NTD 1,000,000 (around US$ 33,333) (Art. 41.2). 
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non-compliance of the controllers with the PIP Act, the controllers should be liable for 
compensation for both the property and non-property damage incurred by the said illegal collection, 
processing and usage of the personal information (Art. 28, 29). A government agency can exempt 
from damages only if the illegal collection is caused by a natural disaster, incident or other force 
majeure (Art. 28.1). The liability is inapplicable to a non-government agency if it can prove itself to 
be unintentional or non-negligent (Art. 29.1).  
 
By contrast to the CPPDP Law, the PIP Act increases the total amount of compensation ten-fold 
with regard to damages caused to multi data subjects by the same cause and fact, which should not 
exceed NTD 200 million. However, if the interests involved are over NTD 200 million, the amount 
of compensation should be set according to the interests (Art. 28.4, 29.1).  
 
The increase of liability and huge amount of compensation for damages has led to extreme anxiety 
among both the government and non-government agencies. The enterprises have been trying to 
force the MOJ to support their interests by lessening the liability of the controllers and delay the 
enforcement date of the PIP Act. In a meeting held by the Executive Yuan on 17 February 2012, the 
MOJ agreed to partially suspend provisions of the PIP Act including those relating to criminal 
liability of controllers with regard to unauthorized collection, processing or use of personal data 
(Art. 41)..419 Although Art. 41 was eventually put into force in October 2012, the MOJ has finalized 
its draft to re-amend to this article by decriminalizing violation committed not for profit (Art. 41.1).  
 
5.3.3.2. The practice of the international data protection principles at the national level in Taiwan 
 
Table 5.1 and 5.2 below indicates how and to what extent the data protection principles420 
                                                     
419 Huang, Yan-Fen (2012), 'The proposed suspension of the controversial provisions of the PIP Act', iThome. 
<http://www.ithome.com.tw/node/72444>, accessed September 7 2014.  
420 Given the theme of this research, I do not intend to examine the principles in detail but rather focus on the 
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established in the EU Directive and the APEC IPPs have been embodied in the PIP Act, together 
with the comments of this author. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
principles or provisions related to the unauthorized collection of or access to personal data.  
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421 Under Art. 10 of the EU Directive, the controller shall provide further information where “it is necessary with 
regard to the specific circumstances to guarantee fair processing.” 
422 Art. 3 provides data subjects’ right of review, duplication, supplement, correction and deletion of their personal 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                     















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                     





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4. Challenges to the Personal Information Protection Act 
 
Having incorporated the data protection principles established at the global and regional levels, 
Taiwan attempts to provide an overarching law for regulating the operations of personal data in tune 
with international standards. This section aims to investigate whether the primary data protection 
law of Taiwan, i.e. the PIP Act, is capable of providing adequate and effective protection for 
personal information especially in respect of prohibition of unauthorized access or collection, 
strengthening data controllers’ safeguard of database, and enhancement of data subjects’ control 
over their personal data which are particularly important to the regulation of phishing or it may 
bring reverse-effect on the protection of individuals against phishing.  
 
5.4.1. Obscure orientation of the PIP Act 
 
According to Art. 1, the PIP Act was enacted to regulate the collection, processing and use of 
personal information in order to prevent the infringement of the right of personality and to enhance 
the proper utilization of personal information. Therefore, the regulations are expected to accelerate 
the utilization of personal information and prevent violations of the right of personality at the same 
time.  
 
The enactment purpose of the PIP Act basically inherits the CPPDP Law with only a slight change 
of wording. Although the PIP Act was intended to protect personal information, it did not mention 
any about the protection of right to information privacy. This may be understandable in the CPPDP 
Law, as the right of privacy remained of uncertain legal status in the 1990s; however, it is 
questionable why the PIP Act enacted in 2010 bypasses the right of information privacy since such 
a right has been expressly perceived as a constitutional right by the Justices of the Constitutional 
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Court since 2003.  
 
The obscure enactment purpose of this Act revealed the intention of the lawmakers to evade 
creating a balance between two interests – the interests of the data subjects with respect to their 
information privacy and the interests of the controllers regarding the collection, processing, and use 
of personal data. While this Act which was supposedly constructed upon a privacy-protection 
regime should prioritize the protection of information privacy, it actually refused to engage in direct 
involvement in the right of information privacy. The obscure orientation of this Act makes itself in 
an awkward regulatory position in the protection of personal information.  
 
5.4.2. The blurred line between identifiable and de-identifiable information 
 
Whereas there is less argument about the distinction between personal, directly identifiable 
information (PDI information) – e.g. name, I.D. card number, passport number – and personal, 
indirectly identifiable information (PII information), a fierce debate has been inspired in both the 
public and private sectors in Taiwan regarding the line between PII information and other 
de-identifiable information (non-PII information) since the PIP Act was passed. According to Art. 3 
of the Enforcement Rules of the PIP Act, PII information refers to information which cannot be 
used solely to identify an individual, and it can be ascertained only through comparing to, 
combining with or connecting to other information.  
 
In fact, the distinction between de-identifiable or supposedly anonymous information and 
identifiable information in either a direct or indirect way has gradually become blurred due to 
several factors. The widespread availability of publicly available information may contribute to the 
erosion of this dichotomy. In addition, piecemeal anonymous consumer data can be combined by 
businesses into profiles that can be linked to a specific person in order to carry out comprehensive 
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data collection.425 Technological advance may also be an important factor that helps to blur the line 
between de-identifiable and identifiable information. For example, the utilization of ‘browser 
fingerprinting’ technology can gather and combine innocuous data about a consumer’s web browser, 
such as browser plug-ins426 and fonts and the type of operating system used uniquely to identify 
and track the consumer.427  
 
The increasing ease with which data can be linked to specific individuals has been accompanied by 
the decreasing significance of distinguishing ‘identifiable information’ from ‘de-identifiable 
information’. The constraint on the scope of personal information also leaves an unregulated 
circumstance in which the information is sensitive to a person but may not be linked to him. The 
context of personal information should be broadly recognized and not subject to discrimination 
based on whether or not it can be used to identify a person. All sensitive data associated with a 
person should be appropriately protected. 
 
5.4.3. The unnecessary burden on data subjects of protecting their data quality 
 
Data quality, which requires that personal information should be accurate, complete, and kept 
up-to-date to the extent necessary for the purpose of use, is one of the fundamental principles set 
forth in both the OECD Guidelines428 and the EU Directive 1995.429 It is also enshrined in the 
APEC Framework in the Principle of Integrity of Personal Information.430 The EU Directive 
further addresses the need for controllers to ensure that personal data which are inaccurate or 
                                                     
425 Barbaro, Michael, Zeller, Tom, and Hansell, Saul (2006), 'A face is exposed for AOL searcher no. 4417749', New York 
Times. 
426 A plug-in is a set of software components used in web browsers to enhance the functionality of an application. 
Well-known examples of plug-ins include Adobe Flash Player, QuickTime, and Microsoft Office.  
427 Larkin, Erik (2010), 'Browser Fingerprints: A Big Privacy Threat', PCWorld. 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/192648/browser_fingerprints_a_big_privacy_threat.html>, accessed September 16 
2014. 
428 The OECD Guidelines, Part Two, para.8.  
429 The EU Directive 1995, Art. 6.  
430 APEC Privacy Framework, Part III at para. 21. 
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incomplete are either erased or rectified (Art. 6.1(d)).  
 
Although the principle of data quality is composed of the elements of accuracy, completeness, and 
up-to-dateness, the PIP Act only lays special emphasis on the protection of data accuracy. Art. 11 of 
the PIP Act provides that both government and non-government agencies should ensure the 
accuracy of personal information, and make corrections to or supplement personal information 
either ex officio or upon the request of the data subject (Art. 11.1). In principle, the agency should, 
ex officio or upon the request of the data subject, delete or discontinue the processing or use of 
personal information when the specific purpose of its collection no longer exists or has expired over 
time (Art. 11.3).431  
 
The Enforcement Rules of the CPPDP Law put an obligation on the data subjects to provide an 
“explanatory description supported by sufficient proof” when they request correction of or 
supplementation to their personal information (Art. 25). This is destructive to the legislation system 
as the Enforcement Rules, which should be supplementary to the Act, are not allowed to exceed the 
Act and place additional obligations on either the data controllers or the data subjects. More 
importantly, it reflects the lawmakers’ bias in favour of the controllers, as this provision unfairly 
shifts the responsibility of the data controllers for ensuring the data accuracy to the data subjects by 
placing an unnecessary burden on the latter. This provision, disappointingly but unsurprisingly, is 
retained in the Enforcement Rules of the PIP Act. The MOJ only changes the phrase “explanatory 
description supported by sufficient proof” to “appropriate explanatory description” (Art. 19). 
 
5.4.4. Lack of privacy protection authorities 
 
                                                     
431 Art. 11.3 is inapplicable if the processing or use of personal information is necessary for the performance of an 
official duty or fulfillment of a legal obligation, or it has been agreed by the data subject in writing. See the proviso of 
Art. 11.3 of the PIP Act.  
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Where a violation of the PIP Act has resulted in personal information being stolen, disclosed, 
altered or infringed in other forms, Art. 12 obligates the controller to notify the data subjects in an 
appropriate way after ascertainment. By using Sec. 42a of the German Federal Data Protection Act 
(hereinafter, the German FDP Act) as a precedent, the MOJ adds a new article to the enforcement 
rules (Art. 22) which provides information with respect to the methods and content of the 
notification.  
 
The data subjects shall be informed in writing, by telephone, text message, email, fax, electronic 
record, or in other ways that may be able to reach them. Where notifying the data subjects would 
require a disproportionate cost, such notification may be replaced by the Internet, news items or 
other effective measures which can make the issue known to the public, if appropriate to the 
technical feasibility and the privacy protection of the data subjects (Art. 22.1).  
 
In addition to the notification of the data subject regarding the nature of the unlawful disclosure and 
recommended measures to minimize possible harm, the German FDP Act also requires the private 
data controller to notify a competent supervisory authority432 of the nature of the infringement, and 
recommend measures to minimize the possible harm, the possible harmful consequences and the 
measures taken as a result (Sec. 42a). By contrast, the PIP Act only requires both the government 
and non-government agencies to notify the data subject of the nature of the infringement and the 
responding measures that have been taken by the controller (Art. 22.2).  
 
Under the FDP Act, the supervisory authority shall be authorized to notify the data subjects, and to 
report the violation to the controller for prosecution or punishment when it finds a violation of this 
Act or other data protection provisions (Sec. 38(1)). It may also order remedial measures and may 
                                                     
432 According to Sec. 38(1) of the German FDP Act, the supervisory authority is responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of this Act and other data protection provisions governing the automated processing of personal data 
or the processing or use of personal data in or from a non-automated filtering system.  
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prohibit the collection, processing or use of personal data if these violations are not remedied within 
a reasonable time (Sec. 38(5)). The need to establish a data protection authority was also recognized 
by the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (Art. 8) and the EU Directive (Art. 28.1). The EU 
Directive requires that a supervisory authority should be endowed with appropriate powers in 
respect of investigation, intervention and engagement in legal proceedings where a violation has 
occurred (Art. 28.3). 
 
It would be valuable to have one or more independent privacy protection authorities which can 
represent the interests of individuals. A privacy protection authority should be empowered to 
supervise the government agencies and corporations and monitor their compliance with the data 
protection provisions. As an effective option for individuals, the privacy protection authority can 
also prosecute and sue corporations which fail to comply with the legal requirements and cooperate 
with and exchange information regarding threats or enhancement measures regarding data 
protection with different bodies. Such an authority is particularly important in competing against the 
power of the government agencies and large, wealthy corporations. An independent privacy 
protection authority is the true demand to the data subjects for helping them protect their personal 
data but it has been never considered by the lawmakers of the PIP Act.  
 
5.4.5. The overriding interests of the controllers rather than the data subjects 
 
Apart from special categories of information, a government agency can only collect or process 
personal information where there is a specific purpose and compliance with one of the following 
conditions (Art. 15): 
 
a. Collection or processing is necessary for the exercise of official authority vested by law; 
b. The data subject has given his written consent; or 
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c. There is no harm to the right and interests of the data subject. 
 
A non-government agency or individual can only collect or process personal data if (Art. 19.1): 
 
a. It is in accordance with law; 
b. There is a contract or quasi-contract between the data subject and the agency; 
c. The information has been disclosed by the data subject or publicized legally; 
d. It is necessary for the public interests and carried out by a research institution for statistical or 
academic research purposes; 
e. The data subject has given his written consent;  
f. It concerns the public interests; or 
g. The information is obtained from publicly-available resources.  
 
The right of information privacy is a recognized fundamental human right which can only be 
limited by law under very exceptional circumstances pursuant to Art. 23 of the Constitution.433 To 
respect the data subjects’ right of informational self-determination and effectively protect their right 
to privacy with respect to personal data, any collection should be strictly banned unless it is carried 
out under the data subject’s consent or in accordance with the law.  
 
However, the PIP Act, with very little regard to the spirit of information privacy, provides ample 
scope for exceptions, exemptions and vague concepts such as the ‘public interest’ and ‘major 
interests’ for justifying exemptions. The PIP Act allows the government agencies to legalize their 
unauthorized collection of personal information once they can prove that such collection is not 
harmful to the right or interests of the data subject (Art. 15 (c)). This provision obviously mistakes 
                                                     
433 Art. 23 of the Constitution: All of the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be 
restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement of the freedoms of other persons, to 
avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.  
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cause for effect, as any collection of personal data without authorization by law or the data subject, 
is an infringement of the right to information privacy which is also per se a harm to the interests of 
the data subject. If not caused by an insufficient understanding of the right of information privacy, 
this may be taken as a clear example of the lawmakers’ intention to diminish the hindrance of 
individual privacy protection to efficient governmental operations related to personal data 
collection.  
 
In addition, the PIP Act provides non-government agencies with a legitimate basis for personal 
information collection as long as the said information is obtained from publicly-available resources 
(Art. 19.1(g)).434 The “publicly-available resources”, according to the definition provided by the 
Enforcement Rules, means “media, Internet, news, magazine, government gazette and other 
accesses through which the general public may be aware of or contact, and thus obtain personal 
information.” (Art. 28) These resources may include social networking websites, chat rooms, news 
groups or other websites that are open to the public. Nevertheless, the information obtained from 
the above resources is not necessarily disclosed by the data subjects themselves. It can be made 
public by a third-party without the awareness or consent of the data subject. Even if the data subject 
discloses his own personal information, this should not be understood as constituting unconditional 
permission for any person to obtain or use this information. However, by putting aside the data 
subject’s interests in his personal information, this provision encourages the private sector or even 
cyber criminals to engage in the large-scale harvesting of personal information through scanning 
websites, probably by running particular software programs. This, once again, reflects the primacy 
of the controllers’ interests over those of the data subjects. 
                                                     
434  Non-government agencies should delete or stop processing or using personal information which has been 
obtained via publicly-available resources, ex officio or upon the request of the data subject, where there is an obvious 
worthiness of the protection of the data subject’s major interests (Art. 19.1(g), 19.2). However, it comes to a question 
of what is the extent of the ‘obvious worthiness of major interests’? Also, in what ways can a data subject be expected 
to request the deletion or discontinuation of use or processing of their information if they have little chance of being 
aware of the data collection matter? This provision appears to consider the right of information privacy; however, it 




The continuous intervention of enterprises, as mentioned in the previous subsection (3.3.1), has 
been a major reason causing the Executive Yuan to delay implementation of the PIP Act for 28 
months, exacted in May 2012 and enforced in October 2012. The pressure exerted by the 
enterprises had successfully propelled the MOJ to initiate the re-amendment of the PIP Act even 
before it came into effect and eventually stopped the Executive Yuan from bringing Art. 6 and 54 
into force.   
 
The Executive Yuan held back the enforcement of these two articles on the grounds of difficulty of 
administration. The decision of the Executive Yuan not only inspired controversy over the 
constitutionality435 but, most importantly, it shows the concession of the executive power of Taiwan 
to enterprises when facing a conflict between personal information protection and business 
interests.  
 
As discussed in the previous subsection (5.3.3.2), Art. 6 places a prohibition on collecting, 
processing, and using special categories of data concerning body, health, sexual life or criminal 
records; in the meantime, it also provides four exceptional conditions to the prohibition. This 
provision, however, has been strongly opposed by most Taiwanese enterprises especially those 
involved in dealing with special types of data, on the grounds of the difficulty of meeting the 
foregoing four conditions specified. As a result, the Executive Yuan decided to suspend the 
enforcement of Art. 6 and, for the convenience of the enterprises, proposed the addition of two 
exceptions which permit the collection, processing and use of the said data when “it is with the 
                                                     
435 The Constitution of Taiwan states that the Executive Yuan should send an enacted law back to the Legislature for 
reconsideration within ten days after it has been passed if the Executive Yuan believes that this law is difficult to carry 
out (Art. 57). The President of the Executive Yuan shall abide or resign from office if the original law is upheld by 
two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan. Some argue that the Executive Yuan broke the mechanism 
established by the Constitution to deal with unenforceable laws and that this suspension of the partial provisions of 
the PIP Act is unconstitutional. Chen, H. L. (2013), 'Taiwan's PIPA into force, with controversial sections removed', 
Privacy Laws & Business International Report. 
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consent of the data subject” or when “it is necessary to serve and protect public interests”. The 
abstract legal concept of “public interests” has been repeatedly used by the lawmakers to remove 
notice duty of data controllers (Art. 9.1(d) (e)) and justify the unauthorized collection, processing, 
and use of personal information (Art. 16(b) (e), 19.1(d), and 20.1(b) (e)). While the use of an 
indeterminate legal concept is sometimes necessary to promote administrative efficiency, it can 
cause chaos in terms of administration due to the inconsistent explanations of the same concept, 
especially when there is an absence of central government authority in charge of personal 
information protection tasks, which is precisely the case in Taiwan. This re-amendment to Art. 6 is 
unfavourable to the protection of special types of sensitive data but only helpful to the data 
controllers to legitimize their unauthorized collection or use of the foregoing data.   
 
Under Art. 54 of the PIP Act, a controller is obligated to fulfill its notice duty to the data subjects 
with regard to their personal information that has been indirectly obtained before the amendment 
within a year from the effective date. Nevertheless, this provision has occasioned strong complaint 
by the finance, telecommunications, and other industries about the difficulty of implementation 
within the time limit and the excessive cost of carrying out the notice duty.436 To respond to the 
enterprises’ disapprobation, the MOJ, with no regard to the right of a data subject of access to his 
personal information, decided to exclude Art. 54 from the enforcement of the PIP Act and has 
proposed to amend to this article to loosen the notice duty of a controller by replacing with a 
requirement of notice only before using the personal information. The continuous compromise of 
the MOJ with the enterprises is accompanied with the sacrifice of the interests of data subjects. The 
PIP Act, which is expected to stand with the interests of the data subjects, has unfortunately become 
a law driven by the economic interests of the controllers. 
 
                                                     
436 Council for Economic Planning and Development (2012), ‘Personal Information Protection Act being implemented 
in two stages’, Taiwan New Economic Newsletter, 141, 24 October 2012, available at: 





This chapter argued that, in the context of phishing, law can serve not only a corrective measure 
which deters prohibited behaviour through coercion or punishment, it is also a preventative 
initiative which functions by ensuring the security of personal information databases and the control 
of data subjects’ over their personal information against unauthorized access, collection and 
disclosure. Yet, there is a dearth of scholarly work on the subject. The chapter indicated that 
phishing is a direct infringement of information privacy and is often used as a leading vector for 
data breach which usually involves exploitation of personal information gathered from social 
networking sites. Phishing and data breach are complementary to each other. While phishing 
significantly facilitates the chance of attackers to gain a toehold in a specific target’s environment, 
the great amount of stolen personal data obtained from a data breach also greatly enhances the 
creation of numerous phishing scams. Social networking service allows individuals to share and 
update information about their family, work and activities with hundreds of millions of members 
across the globe instantly; however, this at the same time provides phishers effortless access to a 
vast volume of personal data which has been increasingly exploited for crafting a personalized 
phishing message for a specific target, known as spear phishing. The growing threat posed by 
phishing to information privacy underscores a pressing need of strengthened legal protection of 
personal information which should particularly maintain the confidentiality of personal data, ensure 
data controllers’ obligation towards database security, and reinforce individuals’ control and choice 
regarding their data.    
 
The first information privacy protection law was passed in West Germany in 1970, which was 
followed by a succession of data protection enactments in other European countries. However, the 
inconsistency among regulatory regimes about personal data protection has caused a restraint on 
trade and inspired a desire for international standards for harmonization of national privacy 
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legislations. Since the 1970s, significant progress has been made in establishing international 
privacy guidelines since the 1970s. The frameworks set out by the OECD, the EU, and the APEC 
particularly had profound influence upon Taiwan’s enactment of personal data protection laws. The 
PIP Act of Taiwan especially incorporated the principles set out by the 1995 EU Directive regarding 
‘prohibition of the processing of special categories of data’ and ‘notice of data collection’ and 
adopted the APEC IPPs, ‘preventing harm’, ‘collection limitation’ and ‘notice’. 
 
While Taiwan has made certain efforts to provide an overarching law for personal data protection, 
there appears to be no clear consensus about what is the central interest that it should endeavor to 
protect. This chapter put forward arguments to the PIP Act in five points, especially based on the 
requirements arising from the regulation of phishing. This research argued the significance of 
discriminating between ‘identifiable information’ and ‘de-identifiable information’, as the line 
between these two kinds of information has become blurred and this discrimination is very likely to 
leave an unregulated circumstance in which the information is sensitive to a person but may not be 
linked to him. Therefore, this research suggested that the term ‘personal information’ should be 
broadly recognized and not subject to discrimination based on whether or not it can be used to 
identify a person.  
 
In addition, the public expectation is that the protection provided by the PIP Act should be 
maximized, whereas the expectation of the government and businesses is that the detrimental effect 
incurred by the Act should be minimized. It is understandably difficult to achieve a balance between 
these two values – the value of information privacy and the value of efficiency of data collection, 
processing, and use; however, the creation of unnecessary burden on the data subjects of protecting 
the quality of their data along with an ample scope of exemption of controllers from the prohibition 
of the collection, use and processing of personal data reflected the lawmakers’ evident bias in 





The difficulty of balancing between two different values highlights the importance of a data 
protection authority which can effectively represent information privacy interests and has sufficient 
powers and resources to monitor the controllers’ operations in relation to personal data and ensure 
the proper implementation of the data protection provisions. Unfortunately, plans for an 
independent data protection authority or agency have never been included in the blueprint of the 
Taiwanese government.  
 
The continuous battle between the enterprises and the MOJ regarding the elements of liability 
caused a great delay in the enforcement date of the PIP Act. The primary concern of most 
enterprises is how they can ‘legally’ collect and use individuals’ personal information to the 
maximum standard while decreasing their risk of being sued for compensation to the minimum 
standard. Little consideration has been given to how to reduce unnecessary intervention in 
information privacy and underpin the safeguarding of personal information against unauthorized 
access. This is the fundamental difference in the expectations regarding the PIP Act of the 
controllers and the data subjects. Whether or not the lawmakers can close the gap without sacrifice 
of specific one-sided interests is the key determining whether the PIP Act can provide substantial 
protection to information privacy or is a law that exists in name only. This is also crucial to 





CHAPTER 6 HARMONIZATION OF LEGAL 




This chapter investigates the challenges that phishing has posed to legal enforcement and the 
solutions required to address weak legal enforcement. It considers the progress that has been made 
in the development of hard law and soft law, both nationally and internationally, to respond to 
phishing and the challenge of cybercrime to legal enforcement. This chapter also examines the gaps 
in criminalization between the existing national and international legal instruments and phishing in 
terms of the elements of acts and objects and concludes with suggestions for steps to pursue 




As we saw in the previous chapters,437 the transnational dimension of phishing has been a crucial 
challenge to law enforcement. The borderless nature of cyberspace permits phishing attacks to be 
operated freely beyond the restriction of geographical frontiers and allows phishers to obscure their 
location and identity to evade tracing and prosecution. Phishing is frequently a transnational 
phenomenon, and phishing sites are usually ephemeral and can reappear quickly after they are 
removed. These all largely increase the difficulties for legal enforcement agencies in investigating 
and prosecuting phishing perpetrators. The challenges posed by phishing to legal enforcement have 
                                                     
437 See Chapter 2, section 2.5.1 and Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.5.  
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raised increasing concerns of legal solutions438 which usually involve national approaches to 
criminalizing phishing and international approaches to harmonizing legal standards and cooperation 
between legal enforcement agencies across countries.  
 
This chapter looks into the legal approaches that have been taken, both nationally and 
internationally, to respond to phishing and the challenges that cybercrime has posed to legal 
enforcement, with an aim to contribute towards an examination of their effectiveness in the 
regulation of phishing. It firstly demonstrates the weaknesses in traditional legal enforcement 
systems and examines the challenges that phishing, by its transnational and transient elements, has 
posed upon legal enforcement work and how these can be addressed by an international integrated 
and harmonized approach to legal standards and cooperation. Thus the chapter explores both 
national laws, using UK and US as examples and international attempts at harmonization both 
through hard and soft-law measures as well as international cooperation mechanisms, with a focus 
on the 24/7 networks that have been established to facilitate contact and coordination of 
investigative actions against cybercrime between countries.  
 
6.2. Challenges to legal enforcement  
 
While the value of legal regulation lies in effective legal enforcement, phishing, by its nature, has 
posed crucial challenges to legal enforcement work. Cyberspace provides a playground for 
cybercriminals to engage in a variety of malicious activities beyond the restriction of geographical 
frontiers, which makes it an uneasy task to control a particular online behaviour and drastically 
increases the difficulties of legal enforcement. 439  Lynch 440  and Sullins 441  addressed several 
                                                     
438 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Menon and Siew (2012), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
439 Broadhurst (2006), op. cit;Lovet (2009), op. cit;Wall (2003), op. cit. 
440 Lynch (2005), op. cit. 
441 Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
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problems with the legal enforcement of phishing laws. Jurisdictional problems always prevent 
proper investigation. Another significant problem is that law enforcement agencies, in general, have 
insufficient technical knowledge and training to deal with phishing.442 Phishing technology is 
rapidly evolving; however, it is difficult and costly to increase the technical knowledge of the 
members of law enforcement agents and keep them continuously updated. On examining the legal 
enforcement system of USA, Lynch found that the local police were unenthusiastic about spending 
limited resources investigating a crime that occurred in another jurisdiction whereas the federal 
investigation agencies may not help the individual victim unless it involved a certain amount of 
loss.443The weakness in traditional law enforcement demonstrates the need for a new approach.444 
 
6.2.1. Transnational nature 
 
Phishing frequently involves two or more jurisdictions. The transnational nature of phishing has 
been recognized as a key challenge to legal enforcement work.445 Phishing attacks can be carried 
out by hosting sites or targeting people in different countries, and can be operated by a single person 
or organized group consisting of members from multiple countries. Cross-border criminal 
investigations demand the cooperation of law enforcement agencies in all of the countries 
involved.446 However, national sovereignty447 does not allow investigations to be carried out 
within the territory of different countries without the permission of the local authorities.  
 
                                                     
442 Brenner, Susan W and Schwerha IV, Joseph J (2001), 'Transnational evidence gathering and local prosecution of 
international cybercrime', J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., 20, 347;Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
443 Krebs (2004), op. cit. 
444 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Menon and Siew (2012), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
445 Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Lynch (2005), op. cit;Stevenson (2005), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
446 Sofaer, Abraham D and Goodman, Seymour E (2001), 'Cyber Crime and Security. The Transnational Dimension', in 
Abraham D Sofaer and Seymour E Goodman (eds.), The transnational dimension of cyber crime and terrorism (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press), 1-34. 
447 Roth, Brad (2005), 'State sovereignty, international legality, and moral disagreement', The annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association (Washington, DC, USA). 
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Mutual legal assistance (MLA) is an essential tool in the global fight against transnational crime, 
even in the absence of a bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance treaty or convention. While 
a country may seek legal assistance from another on the basis of non-treaty letters of request, it is 
sometimes rather time-consuming. Each country has different laws with regard to the procedures 
and the authorities which deal with or govern the non-treaty based requests for legal assistance in 
criminal investigations and enforcement. In some countries, for example, Japan, a non-treaty 
request is required to be processed via diplomatic channels, while it may be sent to the judicial 
authorities directly with no need to go through diplomatic procedures in other countries, for 
example, the UK and the US.448 
 
More importantly, although more and more countries are abandoning basing MLA on dual 
criminality, which requires that the conduct in question is criminalized in the law of both the 
requested and requesting states, the absence of dual criminality has traditionally been a classic 
ground for the refusal to provide legal assistance, particularly with regard to measures such as 
search or seizure. Thus while none of the G8 member states, apart from Japan, base MLA in 
criminal matters on dual criminality, they make exceptions for requests that involve search, seizure, 
confiscation of assets or other coercive measures.449 Yet, investigations into a phishing attack 
mostly need to search or seize the perpetrator’s computer, hardware, log file, or other data or 
devices related to the offence in order effectively to maintain the integrity of the digital evidence450 
and trace back the methods and routes of how the attack was operated. Dual criminality hence 
inevitably becomes a requisite when a state seeks legal assistance in investigations of phishing 
attacks from a foreign jurisdiction.  
                                                     
448 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2011), 'Requesting mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters from G8 countries: A step-by-step guide, E/CN.15/2011/CPR.6', 20. 
<http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PC-OC/PCOC_documents/8_MLA%20step-by-step_CN152011_CRP.6
_eV1182196.pdf>, accessed September 15 2014. 
449 Ibid.  
450 Digital evidence is defined as “any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refuse a theory of 
how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense such as intent alibi.” Casey, Eoghan (2011), 




Given the requirement of dual criminality for MLA, a phishing perpetrator may find safe haven by 
intentionally including one or more country that lacks or has not fully developed laws in the area of 
phishing in order to impede investigation. Therefore, the first step to achieve a seamless web of 
legal enforcement is to ensure the prevalence of the criminalization of phishing among different 
jurisdictions. The uneven regulation of phishing resulting from the divergence between the phishing 
laws of different countries is another significant problem that can undermine legal enforcement. 
This should be addressed by international harmonization of legal standards to promote the 
consistency and compatibility of the national laws in relation to phishing.  
 
Several researchers studied the phishing laws that have been developed in various countries such as 
UK,451 USA,452 South Africa453 Saudi Arabia,454 Malaysia,455 India,456 and Taiwan.457 Instead 
of introducing a new provision specific to phishing, most countries deal with phishing by either 
applying their existing cybercrime laws or common laws in relation to spam,458 impersonation, 
theft or fraud or developing or updating the law of identity fraud or identity theft. Nevertheless, 
some studies suggested that the existing legal framework is inadequate to fully cover the conduct of 
phishing.459 It is essential to identify the gap in their context in order to make sure every element of 
phishing has been adequately accommodated. Section 6.3 will looks into the national phishing laws 
in different domains as well as the international legal instruments that have been developed over the 
                                                     
451 Bainbridge (2007), op. cit;Mcgowan (2006), op. cit. 
452 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Mcnealy (2008), op. cit. 
453 Granova and Eloff (2005), op. cit. 
454 Almerdas (2014), op. cit. 
455 Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit. 
456 Nappinai (2009), op. cit. 
457 Hsueh (2013), op. cit. 
458 For example, Canadian Anti-Spam Law (CASL) which came into effect on 1 July 2013 regulates phishing by imposing 
penalties for sending spam or installing spyware on computers without their owner’s consent (sec. 8). Bayley, Robin 
and Bennett, Colin (2014), 'Canada's "anti-spam" law comes into force on 1 July this year', Privacy Laws & Business 
International Newsletter, 129, 19-20;Gannon, James, Morgan, Charles S., and Salzman, Lorne P. (2010), 'Canadian 
Government's proposed anti-spam and anti-spyware legislation', World Data Protection Report, 10 (9), 9-11.  
459 Dinna et al. (2007), op. cit;Granova and Eloff (2005), op. cit;Nappinai (2009), op. cit. 
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past decade to respond to cybercrime and examine whether they can adequately cover phishing.  
 
6.2.2. Transient nature 
 
Apart from the challenges that the transnational element poses on investigation and prosecution 
work, the short lifetime of phishing sites460 and the speed at which phishers can move to another 
server or reappear after the counterfeit sites have been taken down places the legal enforcement 
agencies under heavy time pressure to identify and trace them.461 Tracking and tracing an attack 
may not only interrupt the attack in progress but the process of tracing may also be helpful in 
uncovering the route and relevant details of the attack techniques to facilitate the development of 
defensive measures that could prevent similar attacks in the future. 462  Importantly, it is a 
prerequisite for bringing the attacker to justice.  
 
However, the characteristics of cyberspace, in particular anonymity, invisibility and remoteness, 
enable phishing perpetrators to be at lower physical risk of being caught and prosecuted.463 In 
addition, a vast majority of phishing perpetrators deliver scam messages via botnets464 and tend to 
host phishing sites on free web space or compromised machines rather than on their own 
machines.465 These all drastically increase the difficulties for investigators to identify real phishers.  
 
                                                     
460 Apwg (2008a), op. cit. 
461 Varghese (2008), op. cit. 
462 Lipson, Howard F (2002), 'Tracking and tracing cyber-attacks: Technical challenges and global policy issues', (DTIC 
Document). 
463 Brenner, Susan W (2004), 'Toward a criminal law for cyberspace: A new model of law enforcement', Rutgers 
Computer & Tech. LJ, 30, 1;Katyal, Neal Kumar (2001), 'Criminal law in cyberspace', University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 1003-114. 
464 Bacher et al. (2005), op. cit;Feily, Shahrestani, and Ramadass (2009), op. cit;Ianelli and Hackworth (2005), op. 
cit;Milletary (2005), op. cit. 
465 Mcgrath and Gupta (2008), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit. 
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Several forensic protocols have been introduced by researchers for tracing phishing, such as hosting 
a honeynet466 that was attacked by phishers,467 using web bugs and honeytokens468 on the fake 
web site to trace the unauthorized access by phishers,469 and feeding phishers fingerprinted 
credentials (phoneytokens or phishing honeytokens) which look like a valid credential to the phisher 
but can be identified and traced.470 Nevertheless, the honeynet project was more interested in 
collecting information regarding the technical means used by phishers rather than in tracing 
phishers. In addition, a honeytoken is useful only when it can guarantee that the only access to that 
token would be by unauthorized parties, which means that the token’s tracking ability is likely to be 
compromised if the token could be viewed in normal interaction with a system.471 It seems that 
whether these methods can track down phishers and how far they are able to trace still need to be 
further proved and verified. Granted there is a tool that is able to accurately identify the location or 
even the identity of phishers, phishing perpetrators still have great chance to flee from arrest if the 
investigative authorities fail to react in a timely manner.  
 
                                                     
466 A honeynet is a network set up with intentional vulnerability, aimed to attract and trap attackers in order to gather 
information about their activities and study their motives and methods which can be subsequently used to increase 
network security. It usually contains one or more honeypot. According to the definition given by Lance Spitzner, a 
honeypot is “an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.” A 
honeypot can be a computer or merely a resource which is deployed intentionally for attackers to interact with. Rouse, 
Margaret (2007), 'Honeynet', TechTarget. <http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/honeynet>, accessed 
September 17 2014;Spitzner, Lance (2010), 'Honeytokens: The Other Honeypot', Symantec 
<http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/honeytokens-other-honeypot>, accessed September 20 2014. 
467 Watson, David, Holz, Thorsten, and Mueller, Sven (2008), 'Know your Enemy: Phishing', The Honeynet Project. 
<http://www.honeynet.org/papers/phishing/>, accessed September 15 2014. 
468 A honeytoken is a honeypot that can only come in the form of digital or information system resource. It can be a 
credit card number, Excel spreadsheet, PowerPoint presentation, a database entry, or a bogus login. As a honeytoken 
has no authorized use, no one should be using or accessing it. Therefore, any interaction with a honeytoken is very 
likely to be unauthorized or malicious activity. Spitzner (2010), op. cit. 
469 McRae, Craig M and Vaughn, Rayford B (2007), 'Phighting the phisher: Using web bugs and honeytokens to 
investigate the source of phishing attacks', in Jr.  Ralph H. Sprague (ed.), 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences 2007 (HICSS 2007) (Big Island, Hawaii: IEEE), 270c-70c. 
470 Birk, Dominik, et al. (2007), 'A forensic framework for tracing phishers', IFIP Summer School on The Future of 
Identity in the Information Society, Karlstad, Sweden;Gajek, Sebastian and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza (2008), 'A forensic 
framework for tracing phishers', in Simone Fischer-Hübner, et al. (eds.), The Future of Identity in the Information 
Society (Springer), 23-35. 
471 Birk et al. (2007), op. cit. 
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A quick response is crucial for a successful investigation, which can only be made by cooperation, 
both at domestic and international levels. As Sullins emphasized, the solution to phishing or other 
non-traditional crimes lies in cooperation in three areas: law enforcement, legislation and the private 
sector.472 Similarly, Lynch also manifested the necessity of coordination between potential victims, 
law enforcement agencies, and other organizations that have the means to control information and 
Internet security.473 Section 6.4 will look at the global and regional frameworks that have been 
developed to promote coordination and cooperation between legal enforcement agencies and private 
sectors involved against cybercrime.  
 
6.3. Legislative response to the threat of phishing 
 
The introduction of computer and Internet technologies has given rise to new forms of crime which 
pose crucial challenges to the national and international legal systems. To respond to the emergence 
of new offences, lawmakers must make necessary amendments to the existing criminal laws. 
Offences that have been criminalized under national criminal law need to be reviewed and updated 
to integrate new forms of cybercrime. For example, electromagnetic records or digital information 
need to be given equivalent status to traditional written documents.474  
 
The legislative adjustment may generally start with the identification of gaps in the criminal code. 
To ensure an effective legal foundation for combating cybercrime, it is essential to identify the gaps 
between the status of the criminal legal provisions in the existing national laws and the 
requirements arising from criminal offences which abuse the new technology. In many cases, 
                                                     
472 Sullins (2006), op. cit. 
473 Lynch (2005), op. cit. 
474 An example of the integration of digital sources is Section 11.3 of the German Criminal Code: “Audiovisual media, 
data storage media, illustrations and other depictions shall be equivalent to written material in the provisions which 
refer to this subsection.” Similar provision can also be found in the Criminal Code of Taiwan which provides the same 
status as document to “audio records, visual records, electromagnetic records or the voices, images or symbols that 
are illustrated through the computer process” (Art. 220.2). 
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cyber-related crimes are not new crimes but ones committed using information communication 
technologies which may be covered by existing offences. For example, the laws that address forgery 
may also apply to the treatment electromagnetic records. In this case, the legislative amendment 
needs to focus solely on those offences that are insufficiently covered by the national law.  
 
However, if the actions performed cannot be addressed by the existing laws, the drafting of new 
legislation is considered a necessity. One example is computer-related fraud. In the past, some 
countries had adequate provisions for regular fraud but were unable to deal with offences whereby a 
computer system was influenced, rather than a human. For these countries, the adoption of new 
laws which criminalize computer-related fraud has hence become indispensable.475 
 
The effective investigation and prosecution of phishing attackers is grounded on the universal 
criminalization of phishing. Several countries have undertaken legislative measures to respond to 
the increasing threat of phishing. First, this section provides an examination of the national laws, as 
illustrated by the example of UK and US laws on criminalizing phishing. This is followed by an 
overview of the international legal instruments that play a key role in the development of the 
criminal law provisions and cross-border legal enforcement cooperation addressing cybercrime, 
particularly identity or fraud-related crime.  
 
6.3.1. National laws on phishing-related crime 
 
The reason why I use the term ‘phishing-related crime’ is because there has been no specific law 
passed against the offence of phishing. A clear definition is the basis for the development of legal 
solutions. However, phishing is in general not a stand-alone crime, as it is considered as synonym of 
                                                     
475 As example of new legislation on computer-related fraud is Art. 339-3 of the Taiwanese Criminal Code, passed in 
1997, which makes it a crime to “obtain another person’s property or to cause another person to obtain unlawful profit 
of property by inputting false data or giving an unauthorized command to a computer or related equipment to create a 
false electromagnetic record relating to acquisition, loss, or alteration of property rights”.  
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identity theft in some countries476 and is usually covered by the concept of identity theft or identity 
fraud. The term ‘phishing’ can be used to describe a combination of acts. It contains two key 
elements: object (sensitive information belonging to another) and two acts. The first act is using the 
identity of a person or a corporation, for example, their name, email address, logo, or trademark, 
and the second act is obtaining data. The object ‘data’ can include identity-related information and 
other confidential information related to a person, enterprise, or country. Therefore, the identity can 
be either a tool or a target in some phishing cases whereby a phisher uses the identity of a person to 
acquire identity information from another person. 
 
The criminalization of phishing is usually covered by the offence of ‘identity theft’ or ‘identity 
fraud’, under an umbrella term ‘identity-related crime’. Identity-related crime concerns “all 
punishable activities that have identity as a target or a principal tool”,477 which may include 
identity fraud, identity theft or other related offences, such as the possession, distribution, and 
manufacture of relevant items, devices, etc. Although a commonly accepted definition of identity 
theft is still lacking,478 one of the general definitions is “the theft or assumption of a pre-existing 
identity (or significant part of it), with or without consent, and regardless of whether the person is 
dead or alive”.479 This definition contains the object (identity) and the act (assumption), which 
overlaps with the elements of phishing but cannot fully cover them. The object in this definition is 
only specified for identity-related information and the act focuses on obtaining the identity. Thus, 
the obtainment of information other than identity and the use of identity are not covered by this 
definition.  
 
                                                     
476 Acoca, B (2008), 'Scoping paper on online identity theft (Ministerial Background Report DSTI/CP (2007) 3/FINAL. 
Retrieved May 27, 2009'. 
477 Koops, Bert-Jaap and Leenes, Ronald (2006), 'Identity theft, identity fraud and/or identity-related crime', 
Datenschutz und Datensicherheit-DuD, 30 (9), 553-56. 
478 Koops and Leenes (2006), op. cit. 
479 Paget, François (2007), 'Identity theft', McAfee Avert Labs technical white paper. 
<http://www.pubblicaamministrazione.net/file/whitepaper/000042.pdf>, accessed September 17 2014. 
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‘Identity fraud’ arises “when a person pretends to be someone else through the taking over of a false 
identity or the adoption of a real person’s name with or without their permission to obtain goods 
and services”.480 This definition contains two acts – using (taking over/adoption) identity (fictitious 
or real identity) and obtaining monetary gain (goods and services). An overlap of these elements can 
be seen between phishing and identity fraud, as both use a false identity to defraud someone. 
However, identity fraud concentrates on monetary or property gain, while phishing targets a variety 
of sensitive information which may bring financial gain but not on every occasion. As a 
consequence, the definition of identity fraud may cover phishing, but only partially.  
 
The definition of identity theft or identity fraud varies in different publications and legislations. 
Some use the term ‘identity theft’ to describe any act of obtaining an identity, while others only use 
it to describe the use of another person’s identity in relation to other offences.481 While most US 
laws and publications use the term ‘identity theft’, the term ‘identity fraud’ is widely preferred in 
the UK laws.  
 
Nevertheless, the inconsistent use of the terms and gap between phishing and identity theft and 
identity fraud cause the main difficulty in the criminalization of phishing. This subsection studies 
and reviews the laws of the UK and US (including the failed Anti-Phishing Bill of 2005) as 
examples of national legislations in relation to Internet-related identity theft and fraud, and analyses 
the above statutes to evaluate the extent to which they already cover phishing.  
 
6.3.1.1. The UK Fraud Act 2006 
 
                                                     
480 United Kingdom Cabinet Office (2002), 'Identity Fraud: A Study'. 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/may/id-fraud-report.pdf>, accessed September 17 2014. 
481 Gercke, Marco (2007), 'Internet-Related Identity Theft', Economic Crime Division, Directorate General of Human 
Rights and Legal Affairs, Strasbourg, France. 
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The provisions involved in regulating phishing 
 
The UK Fraud Act 2006 has been the most significant law which strengthens the ability of the 
criminal law to deal with phishing and the possession, making or supplying of phishing kits.482 
There had been no single fraud legislation in English law until the Fraud Act 2006.483 The Fraud 
Act 2006 aims to close the loopholes existing in the old regime by tackling modern fraudulent 
activity and keeping pace with the rapid technological developments. This Act replaced a 
complicated array of deception offences484 by introducing three specific forms of fraud: fraud by 
false representation (section 2), fraud by failing to disclose information (section 3) and fraud by 
abuse of position (section 4).  
 
Section 2(1) outlaws conduct whereby a person: 
(a) Dishonestly makes a false representation, and 
(b) Intends, by making the representation to –  
(i) make a gain for himself or another, or  
(ii) cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss 
 
In R v. Ghost,485 Lord Lane CJ established a two-stage test to determine whether the defendant was 
acting dishonestly:486 
 
                                                     
482 Phishing kits refer to computer programs or data designed or used to launch phishing attacks.  
483 The Fraud Act 2006 received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006 and came fully into force on 15 January 2007.  
484 These deception offences include ‘obtaining property by deception’ (section 15 of the Theft Act 1968), ‘obtaining a 
money transfer by deception’ (section 15A of the Theft Act 1968), ‘obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception’ 
(section 16 of the Theft Act 1968), ‘procuring the execution of a valuable security by deception’ (section 20(2) of the 
Theft Act 1968), ‘obtaining services by deception’ (section 1 of the Theft Act 1978) and ‘evasion of liability by 
deception’ (section 2 of the Theft Act 1978). See the Explanatory Notes of the Fraud Act, para. 7.  
485 [1982] QB 1053.  
486 See the Explanatory Notes of the Fraud Act, para. 10.  
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[…], a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not 
dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution 
fails.  
 
If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself 
must have realized that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest. 
 
A representation is ‘false’ if it is untrue or misleading and the person making it knows that it is, or 
might be, untrue or misleading (section 2(2)). No limitation is placed on the way in which the 
representation must be expressed. A representation may be express or implied (section 2(4)), which 
can be stated in words or communicated by conduct. It could also be written, spoken or posted on a 
website.487 A representation may be regarded as ‘made’ if it is submitted in any form to any system 
or device designed to receive, convey or respond to communication (with or without human 
intervention) (section 2(5)). Accordingly, representation made by email is also included.  
 
In the Explanatory Notes of the Fraud Act 2006, the lawmakers particularly address that the section 
2 offence, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment (section 1 (3)(b)), would 
be committed by a person who engages in phishing when he disseminates an email to groups of 
people falsely representing that the email has been sent from a legitimate entity to prompt the 
recipients to provide information such as credit card and bank account numbers so that the phisher 
can gain access to the victims’ other assets.488 
 
In addition, this Act makes it a crime if a person has in his possession or under his control any 
article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud (section 6(1)). Under section 7 (1), 
                                                     
487 See the Explanatory Notes of the Fraud Act, para. 14.  
488 See the Explanatory Notes of the Fraud Act, para. 16.  
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this offence occurs when a person makes, adapts, supplies or offers to supply any article. The above 
statutes require the specific knowledge or intention of the accused. The accused needs to know that 
this article is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud, or intends this 
article to be used to commit, or assist in the commissions of fraud. ‘Article’ includes any program 
or data held in electronic form (section 8 (1)). Accordingly, a person who writes a program aimed at 
producing counterfeit websites or emails for the use of phishing, supplies it to another or simply 
possesses it, intending to commit phishing or facilitate the commission of phishing, constitutes a 
breach of sections 6 and 7.  
 
Gaps in application  
 
While the Fraud Act 2006 demonstrates an attempt to make phishing an offence of fraud by false 
representation (section 2), it fails to give comprehensive consideration to the discrepancy of the 
elements between fraud and phishing. The section 2 offence requires that the person must make 
representation; it nevertheless does not address certain malware attacks, where no such 
representation has been made.489 Spyware, for example a Trojan or keylogger program, is usually 
installed on individuals’ computers to collect the stored data or intercept their keystrokes once they 
visit a malicious website or a legitimate website which is nevertheless embedded with malware. 
This type of attack is performed without the users’ knowledge and is not necessarily based on an 
untrue or misleading representation  
 
The nature of the offence of fraud is that it is an economic crime. Although this section does not 
require that a gain or loss actually occurs,490 it requires that the person must intend to make a gain 
                                                     
489 Bainbridge (2007), op. cit. 
490 See the Explanatory Notes of the Fraud Act, para. 11. 
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or cause a loss or risk of loss to another. Section 5(2) defines ‘gain’ and ‘loss’491 as extending only 
to money or other property which refers to any property whether real or personal (including things 
in action and other intangible property). Accordingly, the section 2 offence can only cover the 
prosecution of a person who performs phishing intending to make monetary gain or cause a loss to 
the property of another person; it cannot be used to prosecute phishers with other intents.  
 
Unlike the offence of fraud, phishing is malicious conduct which endangers the integrity and 
confidentiality of computer system and data privacy. The type of data that a phishing perpetrator 
targets varies. The data targeted include financial information, such as credit card details or other 
banking information, which may yield monetary gain or cause a loss to another person’s property 
and other sensitive information which may not result in monetary gain or loss to that person whose 
information has been acquired. For example, a phisher who obtains the password of another person 
that enables access to non-financial accounts such as an email account may take over the account 
and use it for other illegal purposes. This causes an infringement of information privacy of that 
account owner but does not necessarily bring monetary loss to that person. Although the motive 
behind a significant number of phishing attacks may involve financial profit, the intent of monetary 
gain should not be considered as a prerequisite element when deciding whether an offence of 
phishing has been committed.  
 
6.3.1.2. The US Federal Legislation 
 
                                                     
491 ‘Gain’ includes a gain by keeping what one has as well as a gain by getting what one does not have (section 5(3)) 




Identity theft statutes 
 
The Identity Theft Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 was the first law to make identity theft a 
crime492 at the federal level. This act provided penalties for individuals who had either committed 
or attempted to commit identity theft. It also empowered the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
record the complaints of identity theft and refer them to the appropriate consumer reporting and law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
Identity theft is defined as a federal crime when someone: 
 
Knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any 
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a 
felony under any applicable State or local law.  
 
Based on the above definition of identity theft, law enforcement agencies can prosecute an offender 
once he ‘transfers’, ‘possesses’, or ‘uses’ identity-related information with the intention to commit, 
aid or abet an offence even if he either obtains or uses such information for criminal purposes.  
 
The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, which came into force in July 2004, amended to the 
federal criminal code to establish a new federal crime, aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. §1028A). 
This act further reinforced the federal government’s ability to prosecute identity theft by adding two 
years to prison sentences for identity theft committed in relation to specified felony violations.  
 
The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 made it the perpetrator’s responsibility 
                                                     
492 Identity Theft is codified at 18 U.S.C. §1028.  
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to make restitution to a victim of identity theft. Section 202 of this act authorized restitution to 
identity theft victims through compensation of an amount equal to the value of the time that the 
victim spent remedying the harm caused by the identity theft. This does not include any incidental 
losses that a victim may have incurred, for example, denial of credit or increased interest rates 
caused by identity theft.  
 
However, two gaps exist in the above statutes. The statutes only criminalize the transfer process 
initiated by the offender, which means that these provisions are inapplicable if the transfer process 
is initiated by the victim rather than the offender. This is especially relevant in the case of 
phishing.493 Phishing perpetrators usually tempt their victims into disclosing and transferring their 
information by themselves through the manipulation of social-engineering techniques. Due to the 
lack of a transfer process initiated by the offender, the above identity theft provisions cannot be 
used to prosecute phishing perpetrators.  
 
Second, as 18 U.S.C. §1028 and §1028A are limited to the illegal use of a means of identification of 
“a person”, it is unclear whether the federal government can prosecute an identity thief who misuses 
the identification of a corporation or organization, such as the logo or trademark of a legitimate 
business.494 In order to create a convincing website or email, a phishing attacker usually takes the 
name, logo and trademark of a trustworthy organization. This gap means that the law enforcement 
agencies cannot use those statutes to charge identity thieves who engage in phishing schemes by 
illegally using an organization’s name.  
                                                     
493 Gercke (2007), op. cit. 
494 The US President's Identity Theft Task Force (2007), 'Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan'. 
<http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/informationtechnology/resources/privacy/downloadabledocuments/combating_
identity_theft_a_strategic_plan.pdf>, accessed September 17 2014.This task force was created in May 2006 by 
Executive Order 13402 to coordinate federal agencies against identity theft and was charged with creating a strategic 
plan to combat identity theft. It made a legislative recommendation to the Congress to amend the identity theft 
statutes so that thieves who misappropriate the identities of corporations and organizations can be prosecuted. 
However, this recommendation has not yet been addressed by Congress. For more details, see Finklea, Kristin M 





The Federal Trade Commission Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
 
In July 2003, the FTC filed a lawsuit against a 17-year-old boy who sent emails purporting to be 
from America Online to scam the credit card numbers of the recipients.495 This is the first legal 
action of the FTC against a suspected phisher. As no specific law existed against phishing, charges 
were brought under the FTC Act,496 which prohibits unfair and deceptive practices (15 U.S.C. §45), 
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (hereinafter, GLB Act),497 which outlaws the obtainment of 
customers’ financial information under false pretenses.498 It constitutes a violation of the GLB Act, 
which relates to any person who obtains or attempts to obtain, or cause to be disclosed or attempt to 
cause to be disclosed to any person, customer information of a financial institution relating to 
another person by making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation to an officer, 
employee, or agent of a financial institution or to a customer of a financial institution (15 U.S.C. 
Subchapter II, §6821 (a)).   
 
However, two problems arise when applying the GLB Act to phishing cases. This act only covers 
fraudulent access to customers’ financial information, while phishing attackers target a variety of 
information which may include financial information, personally identifying data as well as other 
sensitive information such as trade or military secrets. Second, this act creates a significant number 
of exceptions of applicability for law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, insurance 
                                                     
495 Legon, Jeordan (2004), 'Phishing'scams reel in your identity', CNN. 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/07/21/phishing.scam/>, accessed September 16 2014. 
496 Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) empowers the FTC to prevent unfair methods of competition, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. See http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat1.shtm.  
497 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in November, 1999. It prohibits fraudulent access to customer’s financial 
information and encourages the institutions covered by the Act to implement safeguarding measures against such 
access (15 U.S.C. Subchapter II, §§6821-6827). See http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/glbsub2.htm.  
498 Moynahan, Moynahan (2005), 'Three ways to fight back against phishing', COMPUTERWORLD. 
<http://www.computerworld.com/article/2568318/security0/three-ways-to-fight-back-against-phishing.html>, 
accessed September 16 2014. 
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institutions, and private investigators under certain circumstances (§6821 (c)-(g)). However, it is 
also very likely to create loopholes in the legal protection against phishing due to the ample 
exceptions of the prosecution of phishing attackers in accordance with their positions.  
 
The Anti-Phishing Bill of 2005 
 
In February 2005, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill to criminalize Internet scams involving 
fraudulently obtaining personal information, commonly known as the Anti-Phishing Bill 2005 (s. 
472), to combat the weakness of the current laws. According to the statement made by Leahy,499 the 
threat of phishing attacks undermines the confidence and trust of Internet users in the Internet and 
online transactions, which has resulted in a profoundly negative influence on the viability of 
e-commerce. Leahy also indicated that the prosecutions of phishers, under the current wire fraud or 
identity theft statutes, can take place only after someone has been defrauded. A law enforcement 
official is unable to prosecute attackers when the official receives a report from a recipient of a 
phishing email unless the recipient actually suffers harm by disclosing his information.  
 
To address the inadequacy of the current laws, the Anti-Phishing Bill 2005 attempted to add two 
new offences to the U.S. code. First, it prohibited the creation or procurement of a website or 
domain name that represents itself as a legitimate business by which to induce the victim to divulge 
personal information with the intent to commit a crime of fraud or identity theft (section 
1351(a)).500 Second, it prohibited the creation or procurement of an email that represents itself as 
                                                     
499 Gross, Grant (2005), 'Proposed Law Aims to Fight Phishing', PCWorld. 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/119912/article.html>, accessed September 11 2014. 
500 Section 1351(a): whoever knowingly, with the intent to carry on any activity which would be a Federal or State 
crime of fraud or identity theft – (1) creates or procures the creation of a website or domain name that represents 
itself as a legitimate online business, without the authority or approval of the registered owner of the actual website 
or domain name of the legitimate online business; and (2) uses that website or domain name to induce, request, ask, 
or solicit any person to transmit, submit, or provide any means of identification to another; shall be fined under this 
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being sent by a legitimate business for the same purpose with the same intent as above (section 
1351(b)).501  
 
Although this Bill was not passed and its effectiveness was doubted as a delayed response to a 
problem that has spread rampantly,502 it was regarded as a step in the right direction and legislation 
that at least demonstrates a greater awareness of the phishing problem.503 The Bill criminalized the 
act of creating a phishing website or a phishing email regardless of whether fraud was committed. 
While it made an individual criminalization of phishing apart from the offence of fraud or identity 
theft, it still required that the person who creates a phishing website or email must intend to commit 
fraud or identity theft.  
 
This Bill was sui generis in nature in making it a crime to create or procure the creation of a 
counterfeit website or scam email for solicitation purposes; however, it did not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of phishing attacking models. Under the Bill, a counterfeit website 
was an indispensable element for phishers to induce individuals to reveal their identification 
information. Directing individuals to visit a fictitious website is a common tactic adopted in 
phishing schemes, but is not the only way to carry out phishing attacks. In the absence of a phishing 
website, phishers can still gain the data directly from the recipients’ computers through malware 
installation once the recipients open or execute the spyware in the attachment. A phishing email 
could be an email that includes a phishing URL and also an email that contains malicious codes or 
                                                                                                                                                                                
title or imprisoned up to 5 years, or both. 
501 Section 1351(b): whoever knowingly, with the intent to carry on any activity would be a Federal or State crime of 
fraud or identity theft sends any electronic mail message that – (1) falsely represents itself as being sent by a 
legitimate online business; (2) includes an Internet information location tool that refers or links users to an online 
location on the World Wide Web that falsely purports to belong to or be associated with such legitimate online 
business; and (3) induces, requests, asks, or solicits a recipient of the electronic mail message directly or indirectly to 
provide, submit, or relate any means of identification to another; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned up to 5 
years, or both. 
502 Germain, Jack M. (2004), 'Will Antiphishing Legislation Be Effective?', E-Commerce Times. 
<http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/38006.html>, accessed September 11 2014. 
503 Wilson and Argles (2011), op. cit. 
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malware; for example, a Trojan. Yet, the Bill only addressed one model of phishing attack with no 
regard to the technical-subterfuge scheme, thus reflecting an inadequate knowledge of the 




The lack of a precise definition may not hinder the development of legislation on identity theft or 
identity fraud in several countries; however, the incomprehensive understanding of the difference 
between the context of phishing and identity theft or fraud has resulted in gaps in the prosecution of 
phishing attackers. The diverse definitions of phishing make is difficult to identify the true extent of 
the problem, which also makes it more difficult to come up with an international approach and 
coordinate an international investigation, including trans-border evidence sharing, the extradition of 
offenders and mutual legal assistance. How to pursue a common and converged definition of 
phishing in both the national and international legal systems is a fundamental question that demands 
considerable attention in order to close the gaps existing in the criminal legal provisions to ensure 
the universal criminalization of phishing in the national laws and effective international cooperation 
over legal enforcement in the fight against phishing.  
 
6.3.2. International laws in combating phishing 
 
In order to eliminate safe havens for phishers and to improve the effective cooperation between the 
legal enforcement agencies in different countries, it is vital to promote the consistency and 
compatibility of the phishing laws between different jurisdictions and ensure that there is close 
cooperation between the countries involved in phishing investigations. Over the past decade, 
considerable progress has been made to develop a transnational legal instrument to respond to the 
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threat of cybercrimes. This subsection studies two international treaty instruments which provide a 
fundamental basis for the harmonization of the legal standards in the fight against cybercrime and 
particularly examines the effectiveness of these two treaties in regulating phishing. 
6.3.2.1. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
 
The United Nations has been actively involved in addressing computer-related crime since the 
eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Havana in 
1990. In December 2000, a United Nations symposium, themed ‘The Challenge of Borderless 
Cyber-Crime’, was held in conjunction with the Palermo signing conference of the Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime.504  
 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the TOC Convention),505 
adopted by General Assembly506 resolution 55/25 in November 2000, was opened for signature by 
the Member States in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000 and entered into force on 29 September 
2003. The TOC Convention, supplemented by three Protocols, including the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants; and 
the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, is the leading 
international instrument in combating transnational organized crime. It has been signed by 147 
states and has 166 parties (to date of 29 April, 2012).507  
 
                                                     
504 Challenge of Borderless ‘Cyber-Crime’ to International Efforts to Combat Transnational Organized Crime Discussed 
at Symposium, see http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/LPMO10.html.  
505 Full text of the TOC Convention and its Protocols, see 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.  
506 The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. 
It comprises all 193 members of the United Nations and gives all member nations equal representation. The GA meets 
in regular session from September to December each year, and votes on the resolutions brought forth by the member 
states. GA resolutions are generally non-binding on member states. See: http://www.un.org/en/ga/.  
507 On the signature and ratification status of the TOC Convention, see 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html. [Accessed 29 April 2012] 
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The TOC Convention enables MLA between countries and signifies the need to foster close law 
enforcement cooperation and promote training and technical assistance. Under the provision of the 
TOC Convention, the signatories shall develop or improve training for law enforcement personnel 
to deal with the methods for combating the misuse of computers or telecommunication networks 
(Art. 29.1 (h)). The TOC Convention also expressly requires capable states to provide assistance for 
developing countries in planning and training work for dealing with cybercrimes (Art. 29.2).  
 
Detailed and comprehensive provisions with respect to MLA can be found in Art. 18, which 
provides that states may seek assistance related to: taking evidence or statements from persons; 
executing searches and seizures; examining objects and sites; providing evidentiary items and 
documents; and identifying or tracing the proceeds of crime (Art. 18.3). Art. 27 deals with law 
enforcement cooperation which asks the member states to establish channels of communication 
between the legal enforcement authorities, to provide necessary items for analytical or investigative 
purposes, and to assist in identifying the suspected person and moving the equipment used for 
committing the offences covered by this Convention. Additionally, the Convention requires its 
member states to promote the exchange of personnel and other experts, including liaison officers 
and the exchange of information with regard to the methods used by organized criminal groups and 
measures for the early identification of the offences. States are encouraged to establish bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements based on the TOC Convention or to make full use of the 
existing agreements or arrangements to enhance the cooperation between their law enforcement 
agencies (Art. 27.2). 
 
The states that ratify this instrument commit themselves to creating several domestic offences, 
including participation in an organized criminal group (Art. 5), money laundering (Art. 6), 
corruption (Art. 8) and the obstruction of justice (Art. 23)508 as well as serious crimes. ‘Serious 
                                                     
508 See: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/.  
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crime’ is broadly defined in the TOC Convention as conduct which is transnational in nature, 
involves an organized criminal group (Art. 3.1. (b)) and attracts a penalty of four or more years’ 
imprisonment (Art. 2 (b)). An ‘organized criminal group’ means a group which consists of three or 
more persons and exists for a period of time in an attempt to commit serious crime in order to 
obtain financial or other material benefits (Art. 2 (a)). An offence is transnational in nature if it is (a) 
committed in more than one State; (b) committed in one State but prepared, directed or controlled in 
another State; (c) committed in one State but involving an organized group that engages in 
cross-border criminal activities; or (d) committed in one State but has substantial effects in another 
State (Art. 3.2).  
 
Although the TOC Convention is not specially designed for the regulation of cybercrime, it is a 
highly relevant global instrument which addresses the cybercrimes carried out by criminal networks 
in relation to serious crime.509 Most cybercrime qualifies as serious crime, as such offences usually 
involve at least three or more actors, affect more than one country, and are committed in an attempt 
to obtain financial or material benefits. INTERPOL (ICPO-INTERPOL, International Criminal 
Police Organization) has also indicated an emerging trend of organized syndicates comprising 
criminally minded technology professionals who work together and pool their resources and 
expertise.510  
 
The TOC Convention can be applicable in cases of phishing that are operated by organized rings 
and involve different jurisdictions. In most cases, a phishing group is formed by members from 
multiple countries, as it does not require much physical contact and can rely solely on Internet 
communication, for example, chat rooms or instant messages, to frame the plans and co-ordinate 
their activities. Following the development of anti-phishing techniques, the attacking tactics of 
                                                     
509 Broadhurst (2006), op. cit. 
510 See: http://www.interpol.com/Public/TechnologyCrime/Conferences/6thIntConf/Resolution.asp.  
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phishing have been continually refined and sophisticated. A phishing attack may be operated by a 
single person, but is now more likely to be exercised by a group of people who may largely promote 
the effectiveness of the attack through sharing the workload. A phishing organized group may 
include a person who creates a fake website, a spammer who sends scam emails, and another person 
who moves money from the victim’s bank account or abuses the victim’s identification information 
for subsequent criminal purposes. It may include only a few people or a large number of actors. For 
example, on 17 October, 2009, the FBI arrested nearly 100 people in the U.S. and Egypt as part of 
Operation Phish Phry, which targeted U.S. banks and stole online banking information from 
hundreds and possibly thousands of account holders. According to the FBI’s statement, this was the 
largest phishing group that has been uncovered to date and its members contained American 
residents from three states as well as Egyptian citizens.511  
 
Although the TOC Convention provides a comprehensive framework for MLA, it gives a requested 
state discretion to decline to render MLA on the ground of the absence of dual criminality (Art. 
18.9). However, as the legislation has not been fully developed in many countries in the area of 
phishing, the above provision may be used by states to refuse the request for legal assistance, which 
might enable organized phishing groups to abuse the legislation inconsistency existing in certain 
countries in order to impede cross-border cooperation over legal enforcement.  
 
6.3.2.2. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
 
                                                     
511 FBI (2009), 'Operation Phish Phry - Major Cyber Fraud Takedown', FBI. 





The Council of Europe (the CoE) first examined the issue of computer-related crime in 1985, with 
the establishment of an expert committee. This committee introduced a guideline on national 
legislation, which was later endorsed in a Recommendation by the Council of Ministers in 1989,512 
containing a “minimum list of offences necessary for a uniform criminal policy”,513 which outlined 
eight offences seen as critical computer misuse requiring criminalization, including gaining 
unauthorized access to a computer system or network by infringing security measures. In addition, 
this Recommendation included an “optional list” of four offences,514 which did not reach a 
consensus among the member states but were thought worthy of consideration, including computer 
espionage which acquires commercial secrets without right or any other legal justification by 
improper means with the intent either to cause economic loss to another person or to gain an 
unlawful economic profit.  
 
However, CoE Recommendations are not legally binding and can only have a limited effect. Based 
on the recognition of the need for a harmonized response between different countries to combating 
cybercrime and the belief that an effective fight against cybercrime requires rapid, well-functioning 
international cooperation over criminal matters, 515  the CoE European Committee on Crime 
Problems set up a committee of experts in 1996 to draft the Convention on Cybercrime, signed in 
Budapest late in 2001 and coming into force in July 2004. As of August 2014, the CoE Convention 
                                                     
512 Recommendation No. R. (89) 9.  
513 It includes computer fraud, computer forgery, damage to computer data or computer programs, computer 
sabotage, unauthorized access, unauthorized interception, unauthorized reproduction of a protected computer 
program and unauthorized reproduction of a topography.  
514 The optional list included the alteration of computer data or computer programs, computer espionage, 
unauthorized use of a computer and unauthorized use of a protected computer program. 




on Cybercrime has been signed by fifty-three countries and ratified by forty-two.516 
 
The Convention is the first and the only binding international instrument to deal with crimes 
committed via the Internet and other computer networks. It presents a significant step forward in 
fighting cybercrime as it commits the ratifying countries to prosecute computer-related crime more 
vigorously. The Convention is not a regional treaty, as it is open for signature by non-member 
countries which participated in the development of the Convention. It currently has four 
non-member signatories, including the United States, Canada, Japan and South Africa, but has only 
been ratified by the United States and Japan. The fact that it only has two non-European ratifying 
nations suggests that it cannot at present be described as a global convention, but it nevertheless has 
global significance and provides a fundamental guide for many countries outside Europe in 
formulating their national laws on cybercrime. However, critics also argue that the countries that 
participate in the Convention and abide by its mandates are not the countries where legal 
enforcement is in greatest demand.517  
 
Objective and Structure 
 
The main objective of the CoE Convention on Cybercrime (hereinafter, the Convention), as set out 
in the preamble, is to pursue a common criminal policy to protect society against cybercrime by 
harmonizing the relevant legislation at the national level and fostering effective international 
cooperation. To achieve this, the CoE adopts the approach of: laying down certain criminal offences 
to harmonize the national laws in order to eliminate problems of dual criminality; defining a 
common set of procedural powers in order effectively to investigate and prosecute cybercrime 
                                                     
516 See the status of signature and ratification to the Convention, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG.  
517 Archick, Kristin (2005), 'Cybercrime: The council of Europe convention', Congressional Research Service Report (CRS 
Report for Congress). <http://mail.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/10088.pdf>, accessed September 19 2014. 
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offences; and providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.  
 
The Convention consists of four chapters. Chapter I defines the terms used by this treaty. Chapter II 
includes a list of crimes – nine are mentioned in the Convention – that each signatory must 
incorporate into their domestic laws. The Convention also sets out certain procedural mechanisms 
which the signatories are required to implement within their laws, including granting the power to 
the law enforcement authorities to compel an Internet Service Provider to monitor a person’s online 
activities. Chapter III establishes a framework of cooperation and calls upon the signatories to 
provide international cooperation to the widest extent possible in the investigation and prosecution 
of cybercrime offences or the collection of evidence. The law enforcement agencies of each 
signatory are obligated to assist the police from other participating countries to respond to their 
mutual assistance requests. The final chapter includes miscellaneous provisions common to most 




The Convention obligates the signatories to criminalize nine offences in four categories. The first 
category addresses an “offence against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer 
data and systems”, including illegal access to a computer system (Art. 2), the illegal interception of 
non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system (Art. 3), 
interference with computer data (Art. 4), interference with a computer system (Art. 5), and the 
misuse of devices or computer passwords to access a computer system, including the production, 
sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or possession of such devices or passwords (Art. 6). 
The second category, “computer-related offences”, covers the traditional offences of forgery and 
fraud when committed through the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data or 
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through interference with a computer system (Art. 7 and 8). “Content-related offences” calls for the 
criminalization of offences related to child pornography (Art. 9). This is supplemented by an 
additional protocol518 adopted in November 2002, making it a criminal offence to disseminate 
racist and xenophobic material through computer systems. The fourth category criminalizes 
offences related to the infringement of copyright and related rights.  
 
Jurisdiction and Procedural Powers 
 
The Convention addresses the question of jurisdiction in relation to cybercrime offences, including 
the case of multiple jurisdictions and the way to solve jurisdictional conflicts. Art. 22 establishes 
criteria based on the principles of territoriality (Art. 22.1 (a)-(c)) and nationality (Art. 22.1 (d)), 
under which the contracting parties are obligated to establish jurisdiction over the criminal offences 
in the Convention. Each Party is required to punish the commission of the criminal offences 
enumerated in Art. 2-11 that are committed in its territory. This allows a participating state to assert 
jurisdiction regarding a computer crime involving a computer system within its territory, even if the 
perpetrator committed the offence outside the territory of the state.519 The provision also grants a 
state jurisdiction over a national of that state who committed the offences laid out in the Convention 
outside the state boundaries, provided that the said conduct also constitutes an offence under the 
domestic law of the state where it was committed or the conduct occurred outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any contracting state.520 In cases when more than one state has jurisdiction over an 
offence, the states involved shall consult with each other to determine the proper avenue for 
prosecution (Art. 22.5).  
                                                     
518 For the full text of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts 
of a racist or xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, see: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm.  
519 See the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/185.htm, para. 233.  




For procedural legal issues, the Convention requires the participating states to establish a minimum 
set of procedural tools whereby the legal enforcement agencies have procedural powers to conduct 
certain investigative measures specific to cybercrime offences. The procedural powers provided by 
the Convention include: common procedural rules (Art. 14 and 15), traditional measures such as the 
search and seizure of computer data (Art. 19) and new measures such as the expedited preservation 
of computer data (Art. 16) and expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data (Art. 17). 
Additional evidence collection measures such as the real-time collection of traffic data (Art. 20) and 
interception of content data (Art. 21) are also adapted by the Convention to include the collection of 
electronic data in the process of communication.  
 
International Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
 
The Convention establishes three general principles of international cooperation (Art. 23). First, it 
requires that international cooperation is to be provided among contracting states “to the widest 
extent possible”. Thus, the states are required to provide extensive cooperation to each other and to 
minimize any obstacles to the rapid flow of information and evidence.521 Second, the scope of the 
obligation to cooperation extends not only to the crimes set forth in this Convention, but also to all 
criminal offences related to computer systems and data, as well as to offences involving the 
collection of electronic evidence. Accordingly, provisions for international cooperation are 
applicable, whereby a crime is committed by using a computer system or where an ordinary crime 
is not committed by using a computer system but involves electronic evidence.522 Finally, the 
international cooperation provisions do not supersede the preexisting provisions of international 
                                                     
521 Ibid, para. 242. 
522 Ibid, para. 243.  
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agreements on these issues.523  
 
The Convention establishes general principles for mutual assistance (Art. 25) and also makes it 
possible for a state to request mutual assistance at the international level regarding the expedited 
preservation of stored computer data (Art. 29), the expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data 
(Art. 30), the accessing of stored computer data (Art. 31), the real time collection of traffic data (Art. 
33), and the interception of content data (Art. 34). Although the Convention permits trans-border 
access to stored computer data without the authorization of another state, such investigations are 
only allowed when accessing publicly available data or when the state obtains the lawful and 
voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data (Art. 32). It is 
worth nothing that the Convention does not see dual criminality as a prerequisite condition for the 
purpose of preserving computer data. Preservation, as foreseen by the drafters of the treaty, is not 
particularly intrusive and should be undertaken rapidly without unnecessary bureaucracy because 
electronic evidence is easily deleted, removed or altered within a very short time.524  
 
Application to the case of phishing 
 
All of the ratifying countries are required to criminalize certain computer-related offences (Art. 2-8), 
if they have not already done so. The following provisions are especially relevant to the case of 
phishing.    
 
Illegal Access (Art. 2): 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences under its criminal law, when committed 
                                                     
523 Ibid, para. 244.  
524 Ibid, para. 285.  
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internationally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without 
right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security 
measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or 
in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. 
 
This provision adopts a broad approach of the criminalization of the offence of an attack against the 
security of computer systems and data, such as hacking, cracking or computer trespass. It aims to 
protect the interests of organizations and individuals to manage and control their system without 
unauthorized disturbance and intrusion. The term ‘access’ does not depend on a specific method525 
and includes the entering of the whole or part of a computer system which contains hardware or 
stored data. This provision is applicable when a phishing perpetrator invades computer systems to 
acquire data directly through the infection of a computer or related devices with malware.  
 
Illegal Interception (Art. 3): 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences under its criminal law, when committed 
internationally, the interception without right, made by technical means, of 
non-public transmission of computer data to, from or within a computer system, 
including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such 
computer data. A Party may require that the offence be committed with dishonest 
intention, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another 
computer system. 
 
This provision criminalizes the violation of the right of privacy in respect of data communication, as 
the traditional taping and recording of oral conversations between persons. The Explanatory Report 
points out that the provision covers the communication process taking place within a computer 
system526 and applies to all forms of electronic data transfer, such as transfer by telephone, fax, 
                                                     
525 But the mere sending of an email or file to that system does not constitute ‘access’. See the Explanatory Report to 
the Convention on Cybercrime, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/185.htm, para. 46.  
526 “The communication in the form of the transmission of computer data can take place inside a single computer 
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email or file transfer. To avoid over-criminalization, this provision requires that the interception 
needs to be carried out by ‘technical means’ in relation to the listening to, monitoring or 
surveillance of the content of communication, either through accessing the computer system or 
through employing electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices.527 Technical means may include 
the use of software, passwords and codes. It hence does not cover acts of social engineering in the 
absence of the use of technical means. Under this provision, the offence of illegal interception 
would be committed where a phishing attacker intercepts the keystroke activities of an individual by 
technically installing a keylogger program onto the victim’s computer. 
 
Computer-related forgery (Art. 7): 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences under its criminal law, when committed 
internationally and without right, the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of 
computer data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or 
acted upon for legal purposes as if it was authentic, regardless whether or not the 
data is directly readable or intangible. A Party may require an intent to defraud, or 
similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches. 
 
In order to protect the security and reliability of electronic data, this Convention provides a parallel 
offence to the forgery of tangible documents. It aims to fill the gaps in the criminal law relating to 
the traditional forgery provisions that might be inapplicable to electronically stored data.528 The 
‘input’ of data corresponds to the production of a false tangible document529 and the subsequent 
acts enumerated in Art. 7 correspond to the falsification of an authentic document. This provision is 
especially relevant to email-based phishing scams and can be used to prosecute the creation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
system (flowing from CPU to screen or printer, for example), between two computer systems belonging to the same 
person, two computers communicating with one another, or a computer and a person (e.g. through the keyboard)” 
Ibid, para. 55.  
527 Ibid, para. 53.  
528 Ibid, para. 81.  
529 Ibid, para. 84.  
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fraudulent emails designed to perpetrate phishing attacks.  
 
Computer-related fraud (Art. 8): 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences under its criminal law, when committed 
internationally and without right, the causing of a loss of property to another 
person by:  
a. any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data; 
b. any interference with the functioning of a computer system, 
with fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic 
benefit for oneself or for another person. 
 
Financial gain has been the priority target in most phishing attacks. This can be achieved by money 
transfer or credit card fraud after phishing perpetrators obtain credit card details or banking 
information from their victims. The Convention makes it an offence to manipulate computer data or 
a computer system in the course of data processing which results in a loss of property to another 
person, with the intent to procure economic benefits for oneself or for another person fraudulently 
or dishonestly (Art. 8). The manipulation of data includes ‘input’, ‘alteration’, ‘deletion’ or 
‘suppression’. The offence of computer fraud is only constituted if the manipulation of data 
produces a loss of property to another person. The term ‘loss of property’ is broadly defined as any 
loss of money, tangibles and intangibles, with an economic value.530 
 
However, given the various possibilities of how phishing perpetrators can obtain sensitive data, it is 
necessary to point out that not all possible acts of phishing are covered by the Convention. The 
Convention deals with the preparatory phase of phishing – the falsification of scam emails (Art.7), 
access to a computer system which is usually accompanied by a malware attack (Art.2), the 
                                                     
530 Ibid, para. 88. 
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acquirement of information by intercepting communication through technical means, a keylogger 
program for example (Art.3), and the possible fraudulent use subsequent to obtaining the 
information (Art.8). Nevertheless, it does not cover the act which is most closely related to 
phishing – a social engineering attack. Phishing is usually performed by a social-engineering 
scheme by masquerading as a trustworthy person or entity through a seemingly electronic 
communication in order to lure the victim to a counterfeit website or to use software tools to 
automate an attack. The nature of a social engineering attack is the key element which makes 
phishing perpetrators different from other cyber criminals, such as hackers or crackers. To ensure 
the elimination of safe havens for phishing and coordinate the cross-border prosecution and 
investigation of phishing attackers, a review to close the gaps in the Convention on the 
criminalization of phishing should be given careful, favourable consideration.  
 
6.4. Global and regional approaches to combating identity-related crime 
 
In order to tackle the rise in the new forms of offences which abuse information technology, 
significant efforts have been made by several international organizations to coordinate actions 
against cybercrime. This section examines the work of the United Nations, OECD, G8 and APEC 
that has been developed to combat cybercrime, with a particular focus on identity-related crime and 
phishing, where appropriate.   
 
6.4.1. United Nations 
 
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/63 of 4 December 2000 and 56/121 of 19 December 
2001 on combating the criminal misuse of information technologies. In Resolution 55/63,531 the 
General Assembly noted a number of similar values in the G8 10-Point Action Plan of 1997 and 
                                                     
531 Full text of the Resolution 55/63, see: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5563e.pdf.  
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invited the States to take into account the measures identified in the resolution in their efforts to 
combat the criminal misuse of information technologies. This Resolution emphasized that “legal 
systems should protect data and computer systems from unauthorized impairment and ensure that 
criminal abuse is penalized”. It also stressed that the development of solutions against the criminal 
misuse of information technologies needs to “take into account both the protection of individual 
freedoms and privacy and the preservation of the capacity of Governments to fight such criminal 
misuse”.  
 
The Bangkok Declaration on “Synergies and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice”,532 endorsed by General Assembly resolution 60/177 of 16 December 2005, 
underlines the crucial importance of tackling document and identity fraud in order to curb organized 
crime and terrorism. This Declaration called on States to “improve international cooperation to 
combat document and identity fraud, in particular the fraudulent use of travel document, through 
improved security measures, and encourage the adoption of appropriate national legislation”. 
 
Given the increasing problems related to fraud and other illicit activities caused by taking and 
misusing personal identifying information, the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC)533 adopted a resolution (2004/26)534 on international cooperation over the prevention, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of fraud, the criminal misuse and falsification of identity 
and related crimes in 2004. In order to facilitate legal enforcement against fraud, the misuse and 
falsification of identity, the ECOSOC encouraged States to adopt the following measures: 
 
                                                     
532 UN (2005), 'Synergies and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice', (Bangkok, 
Tailand: The 11th UN Congress on Crime Preventation and Criminal Justice). 
533 The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is a principal organ for coordinating economic, social 
and related work, and serves as a central forum for discussing international economic and social issues. For more 
details, see: http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/.  




 To facilitate the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of 
fraud and the misuse and falsification of identity; and 
 To cooperate with one another in an effort to prevent and combat fraud and the misuse and 
falsification of identity.  
 
In addition, this Resolution requested the Secretary-General to convene an intergovernmental expert 
group to prepare a study on fraud and the criminal misuse and falsification of identity. States were 
invited to cooperate with and assist the intergovernmental expert group in its work and make 
voluntary contributions to support the intergovernmental expert group and facilitate the 
participation of experts from developing countries.  
 
Pursuant to the above ECOSOC resolution, UNODC commissioned a study on “International 
cooperation in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of fraud, the criminal 
misuse and falsification of identity and related crime” which was released in 2007.535 This study 
suggested that only six States reported that they had criminalized, in whole or part, the transfer, 
possession or use of another person’s identification or identity information or of a false identity in 
connection with another crime. It is worth noting that this study also pointed out the application gap 
between the existing criminal provisions and certain identity-related crimes, including phishing. It 
indicated that the existing theft offences may not always be applicable where intangible information 
may not be seen as property and where such information is taken from open sources. In addition, 
the existing offences of economic fraud may only be applicable in the case of phishing if the 
identity information that has been taken by deception has value.  
 
In ECOSOC resolution 2007/20,536 States were encouraged to establish or update criminal offences 
                                                     
535 The UNODC’s study contained the result of the study on identity-related crime, which was submitted to the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at its sixteenth session (E/CN.15/2007).  
536 For the full text of the Resolution 2007/20, see: 
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related to the illicit taking, copying, fabrication and misuse of identification documents and 
identification information. This resolution requested the UNODC to provide legal expertise or other 
forms of technical assistance to Member States in reviewing or updating their laws dealing with 
transnational fraud and identity-related crime. It also encouraged the promotion of mutual 
understanding and cooperation between public and private sector entities to bring the various 




In 1998, the OECD Committee on Consumer Policy started to develop a set of general guidelines to 
protect electronic commerce which was approved by the OECD Council in 1999. The 1999 OECD 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce (the 1999 
Guidelines)537 represented a recommendation to governments, businesses, and consumers about 
effective consumer protection for electronic commerce. In 2003, the OECD developed another 
guideline in respect of cross-border fraud (the 2003 Guidelines).538 These two Guidelines do not 
explicitly deal with an approach to how to criminalize identity theft but they set out the principles 
and serve as a solid basis for establishing a framework and strategies for effectively investigating 
and prosecuting online identity theft and other fraud.  
 
In 2008, the OECD published the ‘Scoping Paper on Online Identity Theft’539 which provides a 
detailed analysis of the characteristics of identity theft and different online identity theft scams, as 
well as dealing with aspects of victims and law enforcement schemes. The term ‘identity theft’ is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/ECOSOC_resolution_2007_20.pdf.  
537 OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, available at: 
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defined in this paper as: 
 
ID theft occurs when a party acquires, transfers, possesses, or uses the personal 
information of a natural or legal person in an unauthorized manner, with the intent 
to commit, or in connection with, fraud or other crimes.  
 
This definition applied to both individuals and legal entities, but was limited to identity that affects 
consumers. Phishing is regarded as the dominant method which enables the commission of ID 
theft.540 In section II ‘Online ID Theft Toolkit’, this paper makes specific address to phishing 
techniques and phishing’s evolution and trends. In the same year, the OECD also released the 
‘Policy Guidance on Online Identity Theft’. 541  This guidance provides an overview about 
responding to the initiatives regarding online identity theft, particularly focusing on the ways of 
enhancing the awareness of consumers, businesses and governments and improving data security 
through the use of education.  
 
6.4.3. The Group of Eight (G8) 
 
The Group of Eight (G8) is a forum for the governments of eight of the world’s largest 
industrialized economies, comprising Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Russia. It originated with a 1975 summit hosted by France and was originally 
established to co-ordinate economic policy; it nevertheless has also developed initiatives for dealing 
with international crime. At the Halifax Summit in 1995, the G7 established a senior experts group 
(the ‘Lyon Group’) to address measures for combating transnational organized crime. At the 
following summit held in Lyon in 1996, the Lyon Group released 40 recommendations (also known 
                                                     
540 OECD (2006), OECD Anti-Spam Toolkit of Recommended Policies and Measures (OECD Publishing). 




as the ‘Lyon Recommendations’)542 which aimed at promoting the efficiency of collective action 
against transnational organized crime by strengthening the investigation and prosecution powers for 
high-tech crime and enhancing a cross-border cooperation regime in related criminal matters.543  
 
To improve the implementation of the 40 Recommendations, the Lyon Group’s ‘High-Tech Crime 
Subgroup’ was set up in 1997. During the meeting in Washington D.C. in that year, the G8 Justice 
and Home Affairs Ministers adopted a set of principles and a 10-point Action Plan which was 
endorsed by the G8 Birmingham summit in May 1998 to ensure there were no “safe havens” for 
criminals who abuse information technologies. These principles included:  
 
 The investigation and prosecution of international high-tech crimes must be coordinated 
among all concerned States. 
 The legal systems must protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and 
systems from unauthorized impairment and ensure that serious abuse is penalized. 
 To the extent practicable, information and telecommunications systems should be designed to 
help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate the tracing of criminals and 
the collection of evidence. 
 
One of the practical achievements of the work done by the experts group has been the creation of 
the G8 24/7 High Tech Crime Network (G8 24/7 Network) in 1997 which requires the participating 
countries to establish contact points permitting the sharing of information on ongoing investigations 
against cyber criminals. This idea of a 24/7 Network has been picked up by a number of 
international approaches in the fight against cybercrime. One example is the CoE’s Convention on 
Cybercrime (Art. 35).544  
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At the Ministerial Conference in Moscow in 1999, the G8 specified their plans regarding the fight 
against high-tech crimes which called for the development of a dialogue and effective cooperation 
between the government and industry and a comprehensive response, including crime prevention, 
investigation, and prosecution relating to Internet Fraud.545 A mass of G8 discussions which were 
undertaken on the ministerial levels in the later 1990s served as a bridge between the summits and 
the experts and incorporated expert recommendations into statements that were then adopted by the 
G8 countries.546  
 
In May 2004, the G8 Ministers issued a joint communiqué at a meeting in Washington stating that, 
“all countries must continue to improve laws that criminalize misuses of computer networks and 
that allow for faster cooperation of Internet-related investigations”. The communiqué also 
emphasized that, with the activation of the CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime, the states should take 
steps to “encourage the adoption of the legal standards it contains on a broad basis”.547 During the 
2006 Moscow Meeting, the G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers discussed issues related to the 
effective countermeasures against IT terrorism and terrorists who act in the sphere of high 
technologies, which encompassed the work against the selling of private data, counterfeit 
information and application of viruses and other harmful computer programs.548  
 
At the Deauville summit in 2011, the heads of the G8, for the first time, discussed the issue of the 
Internet. The G8 leaders acknowledged the importance of the Internet especially in prompting 
freedom, democracy and human rights, and also recognized the role of governments, the private 
                                                     
545 The Communiqué of the Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Organized Crime, 
held in Moscow, October 19-20, 1999, see: http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/adhoc/crime99.htm.  
546 Gstöhl, Sieglinde (2007), 'Governance through government networks: The G8 and international organizations', The 
Review of International Organizations, 2 (1), 1-37. 
547 The Communiqué of the Meeting of G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, held in Washington, May 11, 2004, see: 
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sector, users, and other stakeholders in creating an environment for underpinning the development 
of a flourishing Internet in a balanced manner.549 During the summit, the G8 agreed on a number of 
key principles including “freedom, respect for privacy, multi-stakeholder governance, 
cyber-security, and protection from crime”.550  
 
The E-G8 Forum (the eG8) was held in Paris on 24-25 May, 2011, two days prior to the Deauville 
summit, to discuss and propose a series of initiatives on the Internet within the context of global 
policy. The eG8, convened by the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, invited the G8 leaders 
and the executives of global technology industries, including Google, Facebook, Amazon and eBay, 
to debate a wide range of key themes involving the Internet, including support for innovation, the 
future development of the Internet, the freedom of networks, the protection of personal data from 
cybercrime, the protection of minors, and the impact on a variety of fields such as economic growth, 
job creation, democracy, government administration, education, news and health.551  
 
This was the first time that the issue of the Internet had been included on the agenda of a meeting at 
such a high political level. The eG8 provided an opportunity for the policymakers and figures from 
the technology industries to converse about certain important issues relating to the Internet. 
However, due to their different positions, the two-day discussion manifested a tension between the 
technologists and policymakers and created a vivid debate between the more traditional content 
industry and new businesses that develop new services on the basis of the Internet, particularly over 
the protection of intellectual property rights.552 In general, while the G8 leaders tended to wish to 
                                                     
549 G8 Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, released on May 27, 2011, see 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/2011-declaration-en.html.  
550 G8 Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, released on May 27, 2011, see 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/2011-declaration-en.html.  
551 E-G8 Forum, Press Release, Paris, 30 May, 2011, see: 
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552 Blanco, Carlos L. (2011), 'The eG8 Summit in Paris – a step forward for global Internet and broadband policy', 
Telefonica. 
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step up the governance and strengthen the regulation of the Internet to deal with the problem of 
digital piracy, the representatives of the technology industries preferred a technological solution; for 
example, placing a limitation on the capacity of video traffic and bandwidth-heavy content passing 
through the telecommunications networks, rather than regulatory solutions.553 The communiqué of 
the first eG8 outlined the key notions of the discussion which were: “protect, without constraining; 




Although founded for the purpose of promoting economic growth and trade among the member 
economies, how to effectively protect economic development against the threat of cybercrime has 
also become an urgent issue in the discussions of the APEC over the past decade. After the 9/11 
attack on the U.S. in 2001, the APEC leaders issued a Statement on Counter-terrorism which 
condemned the terrorist attack and considered it imperative to reinforce collaboration in different 
respects to combat terrorism.555  
 
At a meeting held in Los Cabos, Mexico, in October 2002, APEC’s leaders, addressing the threat of 
terrorism and the importance of enhancing the cyber security infrastructure, collectively committed 
to:556 
 
a. Enact a comprehensive set of laws relating to cyber security and cybercrime which imitates 
                                                     
553 Pfanner, Eric (2011), 'G-8 Leaders to Call for Tighter Internet Regulation', New York Times. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/technology/25tech.html?_r=2&>, accessed September 17 2014. 
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UN GA Resolution 55/63 and the CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime; 
b. Identify national cybercrime units and international high-technology assistance contact points; 
and 
c. Establish institutions that exchange threat and vulnerability assessment, such as Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).  
 
APEC’s Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL),557 established in 1990, has 
been actively participating in APEC’s projects to strengthen the capacity of the APEC member 
economies for dealing effectively with cybercrime. In 2002, the APEC Ministers endorsed the 
APEC Cybersecurity Strategy558 which was developed by the TEL as a response to the call from 
the leaders to combat cybercrime and strengthen the critical infrastructure protection. The APEC 
Cybersecurity Strategy stressed the importance of a legal framework on cybercrime and encouraged 
APEC economies to adopt, develop and report on their comprehensive, substantive, procedural and 
mutual assistance laws and policies. It also highlighted the work of information sharing and 
cooperation, security and technical guidelines, public awareness, training and education and 
wireless security as the basis for APEC’s efforts with regard to cybercrime.  
 
To respond to the increasing misuse of the online environment through spam, identity theft, and 
fake websites which undermine the potential economic and social benefits by eroding the trust and 
confidence in the security of the online environment, the TEL adopted the APEC Strategy to Ensure 
A Trusted, Secure and Sustainable Online Environment559 in 2005, which expanded APEC’s work 
                                                     
557 The TEL is one of the APEC working groups which aims to improve telecommunications and information 
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on combating cybercrime, promoting information and network security and harmonizing 
frameworks for securing transactions and communication, and identified seven action item areas for 
promoting online security. The Strategy recognized the important roles of government, industry, 
academics and others in ensuring a trusted and secure online environment and emphasized the need 
to raise users’ awareness of online security. In addition, it encouraged its member economies to 
ensure their legal and policy frameworks by addressing the threat posed by the misuse of the online 
environment.  
 
The U.S. proposed a project in the APEC e-Security Task Group of the TEL and organized a 
conference on 21-25 July, 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. Attended by over 120 delegated from 17 
economies, this conference had three main objectives: to assist economies to develop the necessary 
legal frameworks for combating computer crime; to promote the development of the investigative 
capacity of the law enforcement units; and to enhance cooperation between the private and public 
sectors in addressing the threat of computer crime.560 This conference primarily focused on the 
issue of how to build a comprehensive legal framework to combat cybercrime in terms of 
establishing: substantive laws that criminalize conduct such as unauthorized access to a computer 
system; procedural laws for the collection of electronic evidence; and laws and policies that allow 
the cooperation of the member economies in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. In 
addition, the expert present agreed that the CoE Convention on Cybercrime serves as a valuable 
model for improving the domestic law on cybercrime.  
 
In 2005, the sixth APEC Ministerial Meeting on the Telecommunications and Information Industry 
passed the Lima Declaration, which encouraged “all economies to study the Convention on 
Cybercrime and to endeavor to enact a comprehensive set of laws relating to cybersecurity and 
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cybercrime that are consistent with international legal instruments, including UN General Assembly 
Resolution 55/63 and the Convention on Cybercrime”561 In September of that year, APEC TEL 
organized a Conference on Cybercrime Legislation, stating that the TEL Cybercrime Legislation 
initiative and Enforcement Capacity Building Project would support the member economies to 
implement new cybersecurity laws.  
 
Although APEC has endeavoured to enable its Member economies to adopt a set of unified legal 
standards against cybercrime on the basis on the Convention on Cybercrime and UN Resolution, the 
progress has not been very satisfactory due to the huge inconsistencies among its members. While 
some economies within the APEC have claimed that their laws have been or will be consistent with 
the Convention on Cybercrime, many other countries have quite different legal systems or even no 
cybercrime laws at all.562 Taiwan, for example, took the CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime as an 
important referral model for drafting a specific chapter of computer-related offences which was 
added to their Criminal Code in 2003. While nearly every article of the substantive laws set forth in 
the Convention was adopted in the Taiwanese Criminal Code, the procedural laws of the 
Convention were overlooked and have not been incorporated into the Taiwanese legislation to date. 
 
6.5. 24/7 network 
 
Cybercrime investigations are often time-sensitive, as traffic data are often deleted within a rather 
short period of time and related evidence can disappear quickly.563 Nevertheless, traditional legal 
methods for obtaining cross-border evidence often cannot keep up with the need for rapid 
                                                     
561 Art. 32 of Lima Declaration, the 6th APEC Ministerial Meeting on the Telecommunications and Information Industry, 
1-3 June, 2005, Lima, Peru. See: 
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562 Li, Xingan (2007), 'International actions against cybercrime: Networking legal systems in the networked crime 
scene', Webology, 4 (3), 1-45. 
563 Brenner and Schwerha Iv (2001), op. cit. 
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cybercrime investigations. To this end, the establishment of 24/7 contact points has been the 
consensus reached in most international approaches against cybercrime to enable countries to 
network with authorities in other countries and request immediate reaction and assistance in 
cybercrime investigation and evidence collection.  
 
As aforementioned, the G8 created a new mechanism to expedite contacts between countries in 
1997. The G8 24/7 High Tech Crime Network (HTCN) is an network which provides 
around-the-clock, high-tech expert contact points, which permits the sharing of information on 
ongoing investigations against cyber criminals.564 The CoE Convention, based on experience 
gained from the existing network created by the G8, also creates the legal basis for an international 
cybercrime assistance network – the 24/7 network – which supplements the existing channels of 
police cooperation and mutual assistance to address the challenges of the computer age effectively. 
Under Art. 35, states are obligated to designate a point of contact available 24 hours per day, 7 days 
per week, in order to ensure a rapid response and immediate assistance with regard to investigations 
within the scope of the Convention. Each national 24/7 point is either to facilitate or directly carry 
out technical advice, the preservation of data, the collection of evidence, and the locating of 
suspects. The establishment of a 24/7 network is regarded as one of the most important means 
provided by the Convention of ensuring the states’ effective response to the law enforcement 
challenges posed by computer crime.  
 
The installation of the contact points has two main functions regarding to cybercrime investigation, 
including: speeding up a. the communication by providing a single point of contact; and b. 
investigations by authorizing the contact point to carry out certain investigations right away.565  
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In addition, Interpol has developed a global police communication system, known as I-24/7 to 
connect law enforcement officers in all member countries. I-24/7 enables authorized users to share 
sensitive police information and enables investigators to access INTERPOL’s criminal databases 
with regard to suspected criminals, stolen and lost travel documents, stolen motor vehicles, 
fingerprints, DNA profiles, stolen administrative documents and stolen works of arts. To ensure the 
information reaches the specialized police units as fast as possible, the INTERPOL compiled a list 
of National Central Reference Points (NCRPs) to facilitate the prevention, investigation and 




The value of legal regulation is largely dependent upon effective legal enforcement, therefore 
phishing, especially because of its transnational and transient nature, has posed acute difficulties in 
investigating and prosecuting perpetrators and resulting in weak legal enforcement. This chapter has 
highlighted the need for universal criminalization of phishing, international harmonization of legal 
standards, and integrated efforts and cooperation between legal enforcement agencies across 
countries for a seamless web of legal enforcement and the problems of achieving these.   
 
Phishing, as a conduct which comprises multiple phases of acts, usually is not regarded as a 
stand-alone crime but is sometimes accommodated by traditional criminal actions such as spam, 
impersonation, theft or fraud or covered by new offences of identity theft or identity fraud. However, 
while some countries have undertaken legislation to develop or update the laws in relation to 
identity theft or identity fraud to respond to the rise of phishing, they appeared to have overlooked 
the distinction between phishing and these two offences in terms of the elements of acts and objects. 




Phishing is similar to identity theft in the sense that they both usually involve unauthorised use of 
another person’s identity. However, the object of identity theft is only specified for identity-related 
information while the object of phishing can include a variety of confidential information 
concerning a person, corporation or even a country. Phishing is also similar to identity fraud in the 
sense that they both use a false identity to defraud someone. Nevertheless, identity fraud 
concentrates on monetary or financial gain whereas phishing may target various sensitive 
information which may not necessarily have monetary value or bring financial gain. Phishing is 
similar to these two offences but is not equivalent to them.  
 
International law has similar problems. The CoE Convention on Cybercrime is the first and the only 
binding international instrument to deal with cybercrimes. While the Convention deals with the 
falsification of scam emails, access to a computer system through malware, the acquisition of 
information by technical interception means, and the possible fraudulent use subsequent to 
obtaining the information, this chapter pointed out that the Convention failed to cover some 
social-engineering phishing conduct. The gaps in the application of the existing legislation to 
phishing at both national and international levels resulting from failure to identify the true context 
of phishing have caused loopholes in the legal protection against phishing which are likely to be 
exploited by phishing attackers to create safe havens. How to pursue a clear understanding and 
converged definition of phishing in the legal context is a fundamental question that demands 
substantial consideration to promote consistency and compatibility of national laws and enable 
effective legal enforcement.  
 
In addition to cooperation between legal enforcement, the international frameworks against 
cybercrime that have been addressed in this chapter all underline the importance of cooperation and 
information sharing between the governments, private sectors and other stakeholders involved to 
effectively tackle cybercrime and ensure a secure online environment. While there has been 
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significant progress in the development of co-operation, there is much room for improvement. A 
key question is whether it is adequate to rely on legislators and prosecutors to plan and implement 
solutions in an area highly related to social-engineering and technical subterfuge schemes in which 
technology, Internet service providers, and even the potential victims have critical roles. What 
possible solutions do we have beyond law and who are the stakeholders involved in the regulation 




CHAPTER 7 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 





This chapter considers a broad form of regulation over laws that have been developed in multiple 
dimensions, including technology, education, and institutional network through an examination of 
the function as well as issues raised by each category of countermeasures in combating phishing. It 
also looks into the development of anti-phishing framework in Taiwan, with a particular focus on 
the progress over the past five years. To better understand the capacity of Taiwan’s multi-regulatory 
scheme for phishing and how different stakeholders contribute to the anti-phishing work, the 
chapter provides an analysis which is primarily based on existing documentary resources and 
literature but supplemented by the information obtained from interviews with the key persons from 




A successful phishing attack, as suggested by Chapter 2, not only exposes the weakness in legal 
protection but also unveils the vulnerabilities existing in technical infrastructure, inadequate 
awareness and knowledge of information security, and weak administration of domain and websites. 
Chapters 4-6 have demonstrated the challenges to the effectiveness of law in the context of legal 
provisions and law enforcement in combating phishing. Legal solutions may be part of the answer 
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but are not capable of adequately addressing the problem of phishing. This makes it necessary to 
look for a broader form of regulation covering multi-dimensional phishing countermeasures that 
have been developed. 
 
The previous chapters focused on the role of legal regulation, and while this chapter also considers 
issues involved in the practical implementation of legal regulation, its focus is on the examination 
of technology, education, and institutional networking. The chapter provides an overview of the 
phishing countermeasures along the general process of a phishing attack and aims to investigate 
how each form of regulation functions as well as the problems they may experience in combating 
phishing.  
 
Prior to 2010, as indicated in Chapter 3, phishing has been an issue which was discussed mostly in 
the technological research arena in Taiwan. The introduction of the Taiwan Anti-Phishing Working 
Group (APWG) and Anti-Phishing Notification Window (APNOW) in 2010 not only established a 
landmark in the progress of Taiwan’s anti-phishing work but also manifested the ambition of 
Taiwan to combat phishing through joint efforts of different stakeholders across sectors. 
Nevertheless, this movement did not spur further research over the role of different stakeholders in 
current anti-phishing work. This chapter aims to shed a light on the roles of the major stakeholders 
in the anti-phishing community by examining their work in responding to phishing attacks and the 
additional efforts they can devote or are expected to devote to the fight against phishing. This is 
assisted by a qualitative empirical study involving in-depth interviews with key persons from 
various regulatory bodies, including law enforcement, NCC, ISPs, CERTs, online merchants, and 
information security industry to explore their work and opinions on the effectiveness of current 
efforts and suggestions for future work. This is a small-scale field work, but, to the best of my 
knowledge, it is the first study conducted in Taiwan that synthesizes the opinions of experts from 




7.2. Limitations of legal regulations relating to phishing 
 
Legal regulations are generally regarded as a slow countermeasure in responding to computer 
technology crimes which usually involve swift change of tactics by increasing the sophistication 
and complexity of attacks, as legislation is usually created passively to respond to known cyber 
misconduct which may have been practised for quite a long time, by making it an offence. The 
criminalization of phishing conduct is always a requisite for making phishing perpetrators 
accountable for their conduct; however, it does not necessarily lead to the successful prosecution of 
phishers. Taking the example of the Taiwanese Criminal Code, prosecutors cannot indict a person 
who obtains confidential information performed in electronic format without authorization from the 
other person unless the victim makes a complaint (Art. 359, 364).566 While the absence of the 
victim’s compliant is probably a factor leading to the failure to prosecute, the previous chapters 
have demonstrated that the difficulties of identifying genuine phishing perpetrators is the main 
determinant of a successful prosecution.567  
 
Legal regulations, as a corrective measure to deter phishing through coercion and punishment, are 
only made possible if they can successfully increase the risk of conviction experienced by phishing 
perpetrators. Nevertheless, Chapter 6 has demonstrated the huge challenges that the transnational 
and transient elements of phishing have posed to legal enforcement agents to track and identify real 
phishers.568 The fact that only a few phishing perpetrators are arrested and prosecuted represents a 
major problem of the effectiveness of law and the investigative and prosecutorial agencies.569  
                                                     
566 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.2.  
567 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.5 and Chapter 6, section 6.2. 
568 See Chapter 6, section 6.2.  
569 Sofaer and Goodman suggest that it may, on the contrary, be a mistake to give the investigative and prosecutorial 
agencies the main responsibility to deal with cybercrime, as the above agencies are most concerned with using 
information to track down and arrest criminals rather than warning users of an attack in progress or developing 




Therefore, phishing demands a broad approach to regulation that goes beyond law, and a combined 
approach, as suggested by several researchers, may be the only solution to phishing.570 It is not an 
option but a necessity to develop a multi-dimensional regulatory framework in order to effectively 
diminish phishing problem. 
 
7.3. Multi-Dimensional Regulations for Combating Phishing 
 
This section firstly identifies the context and coverage of the regulation of phishing and then 
provides an overview of the general process of a phishing attack combined with the 
countermeasures that have been proposed in relation to technology, education and institutional 
framework against each step in the process. 
 
7.3.1. Scope of the regulations 
 
Although law has typically served as an essential tool to constrain certain behavior in both real and 
virtual world, it alone is incapable of adequately addressing phishing. Lessig571 argued that the 
‘Code’, i.e. software and hardware, which constitute the architecture of cyberspace is a key 
regulator in virtual space. Reidenberg572 also argued that law is not the only source of rule-making 
and put forward a notion ‘Lex Informatica’ which suggested that network technology itself impose 
rules regarding the access and use of information. A good example of regulation through technical 
rules is the use of cryptography to prevent unauthorized access to data. Instead of Lessig’s statement 
                                                     
570 Lynch (2005), op. cit;Mcnealy (2008), op. cit;Sullins (2006), op. cit;Wilson and Argles (2011), op. cit. 
571 Lessig (2006), op. cit. 
572 Reidenberg, Joel R (1997), 'Lex informatica: The formulation of information policy rules through technology', Tex. L. 
Rev., 76, 553. 
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“code is law,” there was another approach based on “code meets law,”573 which suggested that law 
and software together determine the overall regulatory environment.574  
 
Yet, a phishing attack exploits not only the vulnerability in law or technical infrastructure but also 
the weakness in administration of domain or websites and user’s awareness of information security. 
Therefore this chapter argues that phishing demands a broader form of regulation which is not 
limited to law or technology but refers to any force which makes it possible to prevent or interrupt a 
phishing attack or which helps to control or mitigate the potential risk which is likely to be caused 
by phishing. A regulation of phishing, in this sense, can be understood as a countermeasure or a 
solution against phishing. It can be a piece of legislation, a software or hardware, a management 
system or even an educational or training programme. Appropriate regulation therefore involves not 
only consideration of these various forms but also their interaction.    
 
Phishing can be constrained by increasing the costs or difficulties of performing phishing or by 
decreasing the probabilities of success. The costs may include time, money, or even freedom. For 
example, if legal rules can raise the cost of criminal activity, such as increase of penalty or jail time, 
to a would-be perpetrator, it may promote deterrence of that wrongdoing in the first place.575 
Technology makes it more costly and difficult to phishers to succeed by interrupting phishing 
attacks through detection, interference with navigation, prevention of transmission of information or 
rendering the stolen information useless. A close connection between victims, CERTs, and ISPs to 
prompt takedown of phishing sites is important to diminish potential victims and losses which in 
turn makes phishing less productive. Education can also deter phishing in the way that promoting 
users’ knowledge about phishing and fostering users’ awareness of information security by which 
not only helps them stay away from ongoing phishing attacks but also enables them to engage in 
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more secure online behaviours to prevent potential exploitations by phishers.  
 
7.3.2. Overview of countermeasures against phishing 
 
Significant research has been undertaken to develop phishing countermeasures in various areas, 
most of which focuses on proactive measures for detection of phishing. Several researchers 
provided a general overview of the different methods that have been developed against phishing.576 
Purkait577 generated a comprehensive literature review of the available anti-phishing solutions in 
2012, to determine how research has evolved in terms of quantity, content and publication outlets. 
Emigh578 provided a detailed analysis of the technology employed by phishers as well as the 
countermeasures that can be applied along with the information flow of phishing attacks. It is 
considered to be very helpful to obtain a quick understanding of various phishing countermeasures 
by outlining the general process of a phishing attack and identifying the applicable countermeasures 
at each step in the process of controlling phishing. As we saw in Chapter 2, a phishing attack 
usually involves at least the following steps: 
 
STEP1 Preparation: the phisher registers domain names or hacks into a legitimate website and 
creates a phishing website.  
STEP 2 Delivery of the lure: the phisher sends scam emails to the user to tempt him/her into 
clicking the URL link which directs him/her to the phishing website.  
STEP3 Biting the bait: the unsuspecting user follows the path set forth by the phisher to visit the 
phishing site.  
STEP 4 Request for information: the user is prompted to enter his/her confidential information to 
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(John Wiley & Sons), 31-64. 
269 
 
respond to the request of the spoof website.  
STEP 5 Submission of information: the user renders the information.  
STEP 6 Collection of data: the phisher assembles the target data which may be sold to a third party 
or personally used for subsequent fraudulent purposes. 
 
Step 1 can be interrupted by suspending the abusive domains579 or by forbidding the creation, 
transferal or possession of phishing tools for the creation of phishing websites and ensuring website 
security against hacking.580 Phishing email filters581 can help to defend against Steps 2 and 3 by 
preventing phishing emails from reaching users and deterring them from connecting to phishing 
websites. An anti-phishing toolbar582 can hinder the process at Step 4 by warning users of the 
potential hazards associated with the fraudulent website that he/she is visiting. In addition, taking 
down phishing websites is an important countermeasure that has been largely adopted to break the 
chain of attack at Step 4.583 The education of the end users584 is a key defence to protect users 
against Steps 3 – 5. Proper training and education about phishing can teach users to spot phishing 
emails (Step 3) and identify faux websites (Step 4-5), and hence helps users to make better 
decisions to avoid suspicious phishing links and not reveal any confidential information. A phishing 
attack can be frustrated at Step 6 by the countermeasure of a component or an extension to a web 
browser which hides the genuine information submitted by users among bogus credentials to 
                                                     
579 APWG (2008b), 'Best Practices Recommendations for Registrars'. 
<http://docs.apwg.org/reports/APWG_RegistrarBestPractices.pdf>, accessed September 15 2014;Konings, Marika 
(2009), 'Final report of the GNSO Fast Flux Hosting Working Group'. 
<http://gnso.icann.org/files/gnso/issues/fast-flux-hosting/fast-flux-final-report-06aug09-en.pdf>, accessed September 
20 2014;Rodenbaugh, Mike (2009), 'ICANN policy developments on abusive domain name registrations', The IP 
Litigator: Devoted to Intellectual Property Litigation and Enforcement, 15, 9-15. 
580 See Chapter 2, section 2.5.2.  
581 Abu-Nimeh et al. (2007), op. cit;Basnet, Mukkamala, and Sung (2008), op. cit;Bergholz et al. (2010), op. cit;Ceesay 
(2008), op. cit;Chandrasekaran, Narayanan, and Upadhyaya (2006), op. cit;Fette, Sadeh, and Tomasic (2007), op. 
cit;Fette, Sadeh, and Tomasic (2007), op. cit;Islam and Abawajy (2013), op. cit. 
582 Apple op. cit;Chou et al. (2004), op. cit;Google op. cit;Kirda and Kruegel (2005), op. cit;Microsoft op. cit;Netcraft op. 
cit. 
583 Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2008), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit;Nero et al. 
(2011), op. cit;Netcraft op. cit. 
584 Kumaraguru et al. (2008), op. cit;Kumaraguru (2009), op. cit;Kumaraguru et al. (2009), op. cit;Kumaraguru et al. 
(2010), op. cit;Robila and Ragucci (2006), op. cit;Sheng et al. (2007), op. cit;Sheng et al. (2010), op. cit;Von Solms 
(2013), op. cit;Yang et al. (2012), op. cit. 
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prevent them from being accessed by phishers.585  
 
The forgoing countermeasures against phishing can be generally categorized into three groups: 
technology, institutional network which is exampled by notice-and takedown scheme, and education. 
The following sections will continue to examine both the strengths and weaknesses of each category 




A phishing attack is typically carried out using an email in an attempt to lure recipients to visit a 
bogus website in order to deceive them into disclosing their personal credentials or tempt them into 
executing malware designed to steal their confidential data in storage. Technology functions in the 
regulation of phishing by physically constraining phishing attackers from engaging in or 
successfully performing certain behaviours, for example, preventing phishing emails from reaching 
intended recipients or preventing access to phishing sites. Significant work has been conducted to 
develop various technical methods to detect or filter phishing, which can be implemented at the 
phishing email level and the phishing website level.  
 




At first, spam-filter techniques such as Bayes filters587 were prevalently employed to tackle 
                                                     
585 Yue, Chuan and Wang, Haining (2008), 'Anti-phishing in offense and defense', Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference, 2008  (ACSAC 2008) (Anaheim, California, USA: IEEE), 345-54;Yue and Wang (2010), op. cit. 
586 A brief overview of the available technical means has been provided in Chapter 2, section 2.5.3. This section looks 
into the different technical approaches in more details, with a particular focus on the examination of their 
effectiveness and ineffectiveness in tackling phishing.  
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phishing emails; however, it appeared inadequately effective to intercept phishing messages as soon 
as phishing strategy became more sophisticated and targeted. Spam is generally known as 
unsolicited bulk email which is sent in large quantities indiscriminately for commercial purpose. 
Similarly, both spam and phishing emails are undesirable messages which contain no useful 
information for the intended recipients. However, the purpose of spam is to sell products or services, 
while a phishing message is delivered in a malicious attempt to dupe the recipients into believing 
that it is from a legitimate source and so revealing their confidential information.  
 
A typical phishing attack is broad-based, which usually involves a high volume of scam emails to 
non-specified recipients. Nevertheless, the past few years have witnessed a changing trend of 
phishing tactics, which are now much more targeted, with low volumes of messages being sent to a 
specific group of people or even a specific person.588 In a further effort to bypass spam filters based 
on the naïve Bayes methodology, phishing messages are increasingly being crafted to imitate 
legitimate emails by duplicating the look, feel, and structure as well as the logos of legitimate 
organizations. While text-based classification may do well with regard to identifying spam, it 
appears inadequately effective to stop phishing messages, especially those designed to look almost 
identical to real emails. This suggests that the development of a filter specific to the features of a 
phishing message is critical to effectively stop phishing emails.  
 
Phishing email classifiers 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
587 Bayesian spam filtering is a statistical technique of email filtering based on the naïve Bayes classifier which works 
by correlating words with spam and non-spam emails and calculating the probability of an email being spam or not. 
Bayesian spam filters assume that an email message is an unordered collection of words selected from one of two bags: 
one bag is filled with words found in spam messages, such as “Viagra”, “stock” or “buy”, while the other, which is 
usually called ‘ham’, is filled with words found in legitimate messages; for example, words related to the recipient’s 
acquaintances or work. It classifies an email message according to which bag it is more likely to be by using Bayesian 
probability based on the text of the message. For more information about Bayesian spam filtering, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_spam_filtering. Bag-of- words model, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bag-of-words_model.  
588 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 and Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2. 
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A popular approach is content-based classification centered on machine learning techniques which 
is capable of distinguishing phishing and legitimate messages automatically. A classifier, in the case 
of phishing classification, will classify an email either as phishing or legitimate by learning specific 
features in the email. There are several different phishing filtering techniques such as Logistic 
regression, Support Vector Machines (SVM),589 Random Forests,590 and Bayesian classification.591 
Some researchers also proposed a multi-tier phishing classifier that combines multiple classification 
techniques.592  Abu-Nimeh et al.593  compared the performance of different machine learning 
techniques in terms of the predictive accuracy on a phishing data set. They concluded that the 
inclusion of additional features might be helpful to improve the predictive accuracy of classifiers.  
 
Chandrasekaran et al.594 proposed a technique to detect phishing emails based on their structural 
properties. The authors used a total of 25 features consisting of a mixture of style markers, such as 
the words suspended, account, and security and structural attributes, such as the structure of the 
subject line and the greeting in the body. By employing SVM as the classification technique, the 
authors tested 400 emails (200 phishing emails and the rest were normal), and the results claim a 
detection rate of 95% of phishing emails with minimum errors. However, as pointed out by the 
authors themselves, it is difficult to draw a broader conclusion given the small size of the email 
collection. 
 
Fette et al.595 presented a classifier, PILFER, which identifies phishing emails by using ten features 
                                                     
589 Bergholz et al. (2010), op. cit;Chandrasekaran, Narayanan, and Upadhyaya (2006), op. cit. 
590 Fette, Sadeh, and Tomasic (2007), op. cit. 
591 Cao, Han, and Le (2008), op. cit;Chen, Chia-Mei, Guan, DJ, and Su, Qun-Kai (2014), 'Feature set identification for 
detecting suspicious urls using bayesian classification in social networks', Information Sciences;Zhang et al. (2011), op. 
cit. 
592 Abawajy, Jemal and Kelarev, Andrei (2012), 'A multi-tier ensemble construction of classifiers for phishing email 
detection and filtering', in Xiang Yang, et al. (eds.), Cyberspace Safety and Security, 4th International Symposium, CSS 
2012, (Melbourne, Australia: Springer), 48-56;Islam and Abawajy (2013), op. cit. 
593 Abu-Nimeh et al. (2007), op. cit. 
594 Chandrasekaran, Narayanan, and Upadhyaya (2006), op. cit. 
595 Fette, Sadeh, and Tomasic (2007), op. cit. 
273 
 
handpicked - nine of these features can be extracted from the email itself,596 the tenth feature, i.e. 
the age of the linked-to domain name, has to be obtained by performing a WHOIS query at the time 
when the email is received.597 The authors tested the proposed method on 860 phishing emails and 
6,950 legitimate emails, and correctly identified over 96% of the phishing emails with a false 
positive rate of 0.1%. The proposed method can also be used in detection of phishing webpages.  
 
Bergholz et al.598 proposed a more sophisticated classification using a number of novel features 
which include statistical models of email topics, sequential analysis of email text and external links, 
the detection of embedded logos and indicators for hidden salting. The authors tested a dataset of 
20,000 ham and phishing emails and successfully identified 99.46% of the phishing emails.  
 
However, while researchers are trying to achieve high accuracy, none of the current research claims 
zero false positive. The false positive is always a problem to phishing filters. One false positive 
alarm can potentially cause serious problems for the user. As indicated by Islam and Abawajy,599 
“user can often live with some false negative instead of losing even one legitimate email.” In 
addition, since the content of phishing emails is continually evolving, it is necessary for the filters to 
keep updated through active and dynamic learning. The foremost drawback of content-based 
classifiers is their weakness in detecting spear phishing or other targeted phishing messages which 
are highly personalized and crafted for a particular group or person, in which no specific features 
can be identified.  
                                                     
596 These nine features include: IP-based URLs, nonmatching URLs, ‘here’ links to non-modal domain, HTML emails, 
number of links, number of domains, number of dots, contains javascript, untrained SpamAssassin Output. Fette, 
Sadeh, and Tomasic (2007), op. cit.SpamAssassin is a freely-available computer program which has been widely 
deployed for spam filtering based on content-matching rules. See: http://spamassassin.apache.org/.  
597 WHOIS is a query and response protocol that is used for querying databases, such as domain names and IP 
addresses. When the phishing website’s URL is entered into the WHOIS search field, the directory information reveals 
when the websites was registered and by whom. In order to deceive users, it is a common tactic that the phishers 
register a domain name which looks similar to the legitimate one, e.g. yaho0.com or yahooo.com. Given the short 
lifespan of phishing domains, phishers tend to use these domains shortly after registration. The age of the domain 
hence becomes a distinctive indicator of phishing websites.   
598 Bergholz et al. (2010), op. cit. 






The key to the success of a phishing attack is convincing the recipient that the source of the 
communication is an entity that he/she trusts. The higher perceived reputation of the sender can 
increase the percentage of recipients who comply with the request for personal information. The 
spoofing of email senders has thus been a common tactic used by phishers. Email authentication 
hence may serve as an effective means to reduce phishing by detecting spoofed emails.600  
 
Some methods have been proposed to validate senders particularly against phishing emails, such as 
digitally signed mails601 and identity-based digital signatures.602 The three main approaches to 
sender authentication are Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Sender ID Framework (SIDF) and 
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM),603 which differ with regard to the specific part of an email 
that each checks.  
 
The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) - an Internet standard for email transmission across IP 
networks - permits any computer to send email claiming to be from any source address. This 
security flaw of the SMTP is often exploited by phishers to forge sender addresses in order to hide 
their true identity. The Sender Policy Framework (SPF), as an extension of SMTP, is an email 
validation system designed to prevent email spoofing by verifying envelope sender addresses.604 
SPF allows the owner of an Internet domain to specify their mail sending policy in an SPF record, 
e.g. which mail severs are authorized to send mail from their domain. The receiving server can 
                                                     
600 Watson (2004), op. cit. 
601 Garfinkel et al. (2005), op. cit. 
602 Adida, Hohenberger, and Rivest (2005), op. cit. 
603 Herzberg (2009b), op. cit;Lininger and Vines (2005), op. cit. 
604 Like conventional mail, email messages have at least two sender addresses – one on the envelope and one on the 
letterhead. The envelope sender’s address, which is usually not displayed to the recipients, is used for the delivery of a 
message during its transit from one mail server to another. The header’s sender address is contained in the “From” or 
“Sender” header and is displayed to the recipients by mail programmes.  
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check and may reject a message if it comes from an unauthorized server which does not comply 
with the SPF records before receiving the body of the message.   
 
Sender ID provides another anti-spoofing method which consists of two parts: SPF classic and 
Purported Responsive Address (PRA). In addition to the information in the envelope, Sender ID 
also checks sender-related information in the header to identify if the message actually came from 
the domain that it appears to be from by comparing it with the information published by the domain 
owners.  
 
DomainKeys is a Yahoo!-proposed technology used to combat email forgery by verifying both the 
domain of the email sender and the message’s integrity. It verifies that an email is really from the 
domain it claims to be through the use of public key encryption technology at the domain level. 
Yahoo! Mail users can find a DomainKeys icon, i.e. a small icon showing an envelope and key, in 
the email header if this message has been verified (see figure 7.1).605  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Example of the DomainKeys icon 
 
A study606 of the adoption of SPF in Sweden published in 2007 pointed out that the adoption-ratio 
of SPF as an anti-phishing mechanism is extremely low, only 1.63% among all Swedish domains 
have a published SPF policy. The low adoption-ratio could be down to several causes: limited 
knowledge about SPF, lack of visual indicators in software that the policy is absent, and failure to 
                                                     
605 Information and example icon of DomainKeys, see: http://antispam.yahoo.com/phishing.  
606 Görling (2007), op. cit. 
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recognize the danger of un-validated sender addresses.  
 
Both SPF and DomainKeys aim to validate whether an email message comes from a legitimate 
domain; however, they are unable to verify if this message is really from the person from whom it 
appears to be. A phishing email can easily bypass SPF and DomainKeys checks as long as it does 
not involve domain spoofing. Email authentication is helpful in detecting one aspect of phishing 
attacks, but cannot stop phishing messages sent from a legitimate source, for example a bot-infected 
or a compromised computer, but by the wrong person.  
 
7.4.2. Phishing website level 
 
Keeping users away from phishing sites is another promising approach to disrupting phishing 
attacks. Phishing do not necessarily, but usually, involves the use of a bogus website which mimics 
the genuine one in order to trick visitors into entering their personal or financial information. As 
users’ confidential data is exposed to immediate risk of being compromised once they access a 
spoofed site, it is very important to spot the danger to protect users. Considerable researches have 
been conducted for detection of phishing at the website level, which generally fall into two main 




Blacklisting is a common approach that concentrates on combating phishing websites and 
protecting users from accessing them. It functions by checking the website against a list of reported 
phishing URLs when a web address is rendered in a browser and is typically built into web 
browsers607 and available as a web browser toolbars.608 The SmartScreen Filter,609 for instance, is 
                                                     
607 Apple op. cit;Google op. cit;Microsoft op. cit;Mozilla op. cit. 
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a feature in Windows Internet Explorer that helps to detect phishing websites. The web address of 
the site that a user is visiting will be sent to the SmartScreen service for comparison with a dynamic 
list of known phishing sites. Internet Explorer will display a warning notifying the user that the site 
has been blocked once the SmartScreen Filter finds a match on the blacklist and advises the user not 
continue to the unsafe website. In the Mozilla Firefox browser,610 each web page requested by a 
user of the browser is checked against a blacklist of reported phishing and malware sites which is 
automatically downloaded and updated every 30 minutes. Wherever there is a match on the 
blacklist, Firefox will block the page from loading and display a Reported Web Forgery warning.  
 
Several software developers have also proposed web browser toolbars which help to detect phishing 
websites based on the blacklisting model. McAfee SiteAdvisor,611 for example, is a browser plug-in 
that gives safety advice about websites before a user clicks on them. SiteAdvisor works by adding 
site rating icons, i.e. red, yellow and green, to users’ search results and a browser button to alert 
users about potentially risky sites. With SiteAdvisor software installed, phishing websites are 
automatically rated red and a user is automatically re-directed to a warning page whenever he/she 
tries to browse a phishing website.  
 
Blacklists of phishing URLs can be produced in different ways, including automatic categorization 
using a set of classification rules based on previous phishing patterns, manual classification by 
administrators or crowd sourcing by users.612 The above methods can be used individually or 
alongside each other. PhishTank is a typical example which uses crowd sourcing. It provides a 
community-based system whereby anyone can submit suspected phishes while other users can 
verify whether a submission is a phishing website or not. However, while the manually-verified 
                                                                                                                                                                                
608 Mcafee op. cit;Netcraft op. cit. 
609 Microsoft op. cit. 
610 Google op. cit;Mozilla op. cit. 
611 Mcafee op. cit. 
612 Wilson and Argles (2011), op. cit. 
278 
 
phishing URLs list has a high level of accuracy, it is a rather time-consuming process. The 
automatic categorization process may classify a high volume of phishing URLs, those are 
nevertheless more likely to be false positive. 
 
More importantly, the time gap between the appearance of phishing sites and the updating of the 
blacklist is always a problem with the effectiveness of this approach, which in turn produces 
advantages to the phishers. New phishing sites appear frequently and are ephemeral in nature. For 
example, an average of more than 1,960 unique phishing sites was detected per day in February 
2012,613 which usually existed for only few days, and many of them disappeared within hours. In 
addition, phishing sites are ephemeral in nature, usually existing for only few days, and many of 
them disappear within hours. Nevertheless, it always takes some time before a new phishing site is 
reported and added to the blacklist. A study614 indicated that over half of stolen data is harvested 
within the first hour of a phishing email being received, which makes it a pressing task to block a 
phishing site within the first 60 minutes of its existence. Sheng et al.615 tested eight anti-phishing 
toolbars with 191 fresh phish that were less than 30 minutes old and they found blacklists were 
ineffective at hour zero and could only identify 47% - 83% of phishing even after 12 hours. The 
time-lag in updating the blacklist has become the major challenge to the effectiveness of 
blacklisting.  
 
To change the reactive nature of blacklists, some researchers proposed predictive blacklisting which 
is capable of detecting phishing based on known bad domains616, features of known phishing 
sites617 or URLs,618 or a relevance ranking scheme borrowed from the link-analysis community.619 
                                                     
613 APWG (2012), 'Phishing Activity Trends Report - 1st Quarter (January -March) 2012'. 
<http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q1_2012.pdf>, accessed September 9 2014. 
614 Klein (2010), op. cit. 
615 Sheng et al. (2009b), op. cit. 
616 Felegyhazi, Kreibich, and Paxson (2010), op. cit. 
617 Prakash et al. (2010), op. cit. 
618 Ma et al. (2009), op. cit. 
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Felegyhazi et al. inferred an average 3.5 to 15 new domains from a given known-bad domain 
grounded on registration and name serve information. The authors attempted to demonstrate the 
potential of a domain-based proactive blacklisting, and their analysis showed that 93% of these 
interfered domains subsequently appear suspect and nearly 73% eventually appear on a reactive 
blacklist about 2 days after. However, as indicated by the authors themselves, a significant variable 
of gain exists in different domains. In addition, there apparently exists a problem of false positive 




Heuristic-based technique functions by estimating whether a given page has certain phishing 
characteristics. Most of heuristic-based researchers identify phishing sites by looking into URL 
features620 or/and website content,621 including textual and visual content such as words, titles, or 
images in the website.  
 
For example, Garera et al.622 extracted a set of features from phishing URLs alone to tell whether a 
URL is a phishing or benign one. Ludl et al.623 discovered a list of 18 properties of a phishing site, 
two of which are derived from the page’s URL and the remaining features are extracted from the 
HTML source of a page. CANTINA (Carnegie Mellon Anti-Phishing and Network Analysis Tool) 
is another content-based approach developed by Zhang et al.624 to determine the legitimacy of a 
website. It works by calculating a lexical signature using TF-IDF by taking five terms from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
619 Zhang, Porras, and Ullrich (2008), op. cit. 
620 Alsalman (2012), op. cit;Garera et al. (2007), op. cit;Hsu, Wang, and Pu (2011), op. cit. 
621 Chen et al. (2009), op. cit;Chen, Dick, and Miller (2010), op. cit;Liu et al. (2006), op. cit;Ludl et al. (2007), op. 
cit;Medvet, Kirda, and Kruegel (2008), op. cit;Nirmal, Ewards, and Geetha (2010), op. cit;Pan and Ding (2006), op. 
cit;Wenyin et al. (2005), op. cit;Xiang and Hong (2009), op. cit;Zhang, Hong, and Cranor (2007a), op. cit;Zhang et al. 
(2011), op. cit. 
622 Garera et al. (2007), op. cit. 
623 Ludl et al. (2007), op. cit. 
624 Zhang, Hong, and Cranor (2007a), op. cit. 
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phishing-suspicious page and feeding them into a search engine. If the domain name of the given 
web page matches the domain name in the top 30 results, then it is considered legitimate. There was 
also a proposal of content-based framework which takes into account both textual and visual 
contents to measure the similarity between the legitimate and suspicious web pages by using a 
Bayesian approach.625  
 
While nearly all the above methods claimed to have reached a very high accuracy rate in spotting 
phishing sites, researchers suggested that the performance largely depended on the source of 
phishing URLs and the freshness of the URLs tested and found many of the anti-phishing tools 
were vulnerable to simple exploits.626 The advantage of the heuristics approach is that it can detect 
phishing sites as soon as they are launched without the need to wait for blacklists to be updated. 
However, due to the high similarity between phishing and legitimate pages, the heuristic technique 
is likely to mislabel a legitimate site as phish and is hence rarely used in a web browser given its 
high false positive rate. Another problem is that attackers may be able to design their attacks to 
circumvent heuristic-based detection as long as long as they know the current strategies being 
used.627  
 
Technology features largely in the fight against phishing, although each approach has its advantages 
and disadvantages. While undoubtedly there is much that can be done technically to detect phishing 
attacks, there is unlikely to be a perfect solution that can completely prevent them. It was suggested 
that a combination of these techniques is probably a way to optimize the ability to detect phishing 
accurately while achieving the least false positive rate.628  
 
However, several researchers argued the effectiveness of both server-side security indicators and 
                                                     
625 Zhang et al. (2011), op. cit. 
626 Zhang et al. (2007b), op. cit. 
627 Bin, Qiaoyan, and Xiaoying (2010), op. cit;Sheng et al. (2009b), op. cit. 
628 Wilson and Argles (2011), op. cit. 
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client-side toolbars and warnings in helping users avoid phishing attacks.629 Most users frequently 
ignore the warning stated on the toolbar630 or the cues such as HTTPS indicators631 that tell them 
that the websites are very likely to be malicious. Wu et al.632 tested three security toolbars and other 
browser security indicators on 30 subjects with previous experience in online shopping and found 
they were all ineffective in preventing users from phishing attacks. Their analysis indicated that 
many of the subjects failed to continuously check the browser security indicators and the others 
disregarded or explained away the toolbars’ warning even when they had noticed suspicious signs 
coming from the indicators. Schechter et al.633 examined the effect of security indicators (HTTPS 
indicators and site authentication images) by asking 67 customers of a single bank to login to that 
bank’s website. The result revealed that all the participants entered their passwords even when 
HTTPS indicators were absent and 92% of the participants who used their own accounts entered 
their passwords even after their site authentication images were removed. The authors concluded 
that the security indicators have rather limited effectiveness as users hardly pay attention to the 
alarming clues that their connections are insecure.  
 
Researchers suggested that most users do not see maintaining security as their primary goal634 and 
they are generally lacking a baseline level of security awareness.635 Users are often not clear about 
how to interpret a warning sign and what they are expected to respond to warnings.636 Many users 
even do not understand phishing attacks and what to look for in phishing messages.637 Although 
various technical solutions have been developed to defend against phishing, the above usability 
                                                     
629 Aburrous et al. (2010), op. cit;Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst (2006), op. cit;Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor (2006), op. 
cit;Egelman, Cranor, and Hong (2008), op. cit;Herzberg (2009a), op. cit;Schechter et al. (2007), op. cit;Wu, Miller, and 
Garfinkel (2006b), op. cit;Zhang et al. (2007b), op. cit. 
630 Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006b), op. cit. 
631 Schechter et al. (2007), op. cit. 
632 Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006b), op. cit. 
633 Schechter et al. (2007), op. cit. 
634 Kumaraguru et al. (2010), op. cit;Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006b), op. cit. 
635 Bakhshi, Papadaki, and Furnell (2009), op. cit;Furnell (2007), op. cit. 
636 Furnell (2009), op. cit. 
637 Furnell (2007), op. cit. 
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studies of anti-phishing tools prove that technology alone is not enough to combat phishing.  
 
More importantly, phishing tactics are constantly being modified and refined in order to take 
continual advantage of the weakness of computer systems. A flawless technical solution is almost 
impossible, as the development of the anti-phishing technology is always a few steps behind 
creation of new phishing techniques. Provided there is a perfect anti-phishing technique which 
could spot all phishing, it is still likely to be bypassed by users if they fail to realize how dangerous 
and sophisticated phishing attacks can be and what they are expected to do in responding to 
phishing.  
 
7.5. Education of users 
 
While considerable effort has been devoted to solving the phishing problem through the prevention 
and detection of spoofed emails and websites, comparatively little research has been done in the 
area of education and training of users to recognize phishing attacks. Technical solutions can be 
used as the front line of defence against phishing; however, these solutions are unlikely to perform 
flawlessly and cannot eradicate phishing by themselves but should be complemented with a key 
component – user education. 
 
Phishing relies on social engineering which largely exploits the weakness of humans rather than 
technical vulnerabilities. A successful phishing attack not only abuses the weakness in human nature 
but also takes advantage of a user’s inability to discern phishing emails or websites from legitimate 
ones. A study638 found that, when users were asked to determine whether a website was valid or not, 
the incorrect choice was made 40% of the time. This study also revealed that a well-crafted 
phishing site was able to fool more than 90% of the participants, including even the most 
                                                     
638 Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst (2006), op. cit. 
283 
 
sophisticated users. This result demonstrated that users generally experience difficulties in 
distinguishing fraudulent sites from legitimate ones, which highlights the need for the education of 
users to spot phishing and actively protect themselves from phishing attacks.  
 
Education and training is another dominant countermeasure against phishing by enabling users to 
engage in secure online behaviours.639 Many financial and commercial institutions have invested in 
an education campaign to teach their users to interact safely with emails and websites and not to 
engage in potentially risky activities that may lead them to being victimized. Anti-phishing 
education for customers is usually performed by providing advice in the form of guidelines on or 
tips about recognizing phishing. For example, eBay provides tutorial advice to users about how to 
spot spoof emails and fake websites as well as how to report suspicious emails. It also includes 
behavioral tips regarding the protection of users’ information from being stolen, such as “never 
click on a link in an email if you are unsure of its origins” or “never provide sensitive personal 
information in an email”.640 
 
A variety of anti-phishing educational materials is also available online. For example, APWG 
provides a set of public education initiatives which include the Phishing Education Landing Page 
Program that functions by redirecting users towards instructional materials instead of an error page 
at the “most teachable moment” – when these users have just clicked on a link in a phishing 
communication (email or otherwise).641  
 
Nevertheless, a study642 indicated that users rarely look for anti-phishing educational materials and 
tend to ignore emails that direct them towards theses. An interactive approach, which is mostly 
                                                     
639 Ademaj and Schuck (2009), op. cit;Arachchilage and Love (2013), op. cit;Davinson and Sillence (2010), op. 
cit;Jerram et al. (2012), op. cit;Liang and Xue (2010), op. cit;Von Solms (2013), op. cit. 
640 eBay 'Recognizing spoof (fake) eBay websites'. <http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/recognizing-spoof.html>, 
accessed September 8 2014. 
641 APWG Public Education Initiatives (PEI), http://phish-education.apwg.org/. 
642 Kumaraguru et al. (2010), op. cit. 
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designed in the format of games or web-based tests, is generally considered to be more helpful to 
improve users’ resistance to phishing by allowing them to assess their likely vulnerability to 
phishing or teach them how to identify phishing in a natural and interactive environment for 
learning by doing. Several proposals for anti-phishing education or training programs have been put 
forward in both academics and industry.643 SonicWALL, for instance, has set up a website 
containing a Phishing IQ test,644 which takes the form of a sequence of phishing email screen shots 
and scores based on how well the participants can identify potential phishing emails.  
 
Anti-Phishing Phil,645 an online game proposed by Sheng et al. that enhances users’ ability to avoid 
phishing by teaching them how to spot phishing URLs, where to seek out cues in web browsers, and 
how safely to use search engines to find legitimate websites. The authors compared the 
effectiveness of their proposed method with the existing online training materials and security 
tutorials and found that the participants who played the game were better at spotting phishing 
sites.646 Another well-known example is PhishGuru,647 an email-based education system using 
embedded training methodology and learning science principles that delivers training messages to 
users at the moment users actually fall for phishing attacks. The authors also demonstrated the 
effectiveness of their proposed education tools to help users to better recognize phishing by the 
results of both lab and real-world experiments.648 
 
However, some researchers argued that user education “puts the burden on the wrong shoulder”649 
                                                     
643 Kumaraguru et al. (2008), op. cit;Kumaraguru (2009), op. cit;Kumaraguru et al. (2009), op. cit;Kumaraguru et al. 
(2010), op. cit;Robila and Ragucci (2006), op. cit;Sheng et al. (2007), op. cit;Sheng et al. (2010), op. cit;Von Solms 
(2013), op. cit;Yang et al. (2012), op. cit. 
644 SonicWALL Phishing IQ Test, http://www.sonicwall.com/furl/phishing/.  
645 Anti-Phishing Phil, http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/antiphishing_phil/; Sheng et al. (2007), op. cit. 
646 Kumaraguru et al. (2010), op. cit;Sheng et al. (2007), op. cit. 
647 Kumaraguru (2009), op. cit. 
648 Kumaraguru et al. (2008), op. cit;Kumaraguru (2009), op. cit;Kumaraguru et al. (2009), op. cit. 
649 Nielsen, Jakob (2004), 'User education is not the answer to security problems', Nielsen Norman Group. 
<http://www.nngroup.com/articles/security-and-user-education/>, accessed September 17 2014. 
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and indicated that user security education was a “myth”.650 Anandpara et al.651 indicated that the 
only measurable effect of phishing tests is to increase the participants’ suspicion about phishing 
rather than to improve their ability to recognize phishing attempts. Davison and Sillence652 also 
questioned the effects of Anti-Phishing Phil on promoting secure behaviour beyond the specific 
points it trained on. Whether the knowledge provided by training materials can be transferred to 
secure online behaviour in a real world setting and how long the knowledge can be retained is an 
important problem needing to be addressed when developing education frameworks.  
 
Another important reason which makes educational measures ineffective is a general shortage of 
motivation among the end users to learn about security, as most users only consider security to be a 
secondary goal and tend to disregard the signs of risk.653 End users can be security conscious, as 
long as they perceive the danger of phishing and the need to adopt secure behaviour in order to 
avoid being phished.654 Arachchilage et al.655 proposed a game-based education framework to 
enhance user avoidance behaviour through intensifying avoidance motivation, which is, according 
to Liang and Xue,656 determined by the elements of perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, 
safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy. Users develop a threat perception when 
they believe that the threat is real (perceived susceptibility) and could be severe (perceived severity). 
When threatened, users are more motivated to avoid the threat if they believe the recommended 
measure is effective (safeguard effectiveness) and the cost is reasonable (safeguard cost) and they 
can successfully perform it (self-efficacy). Similar opinion was also held by Comesongsri.657 
 
                                                     
650 Görling, Stefan (2006), 'The myth of user education', Virus Bulletin Conference (11; Montreal, Canada), 13. 
651 Anandpara et al. (2007), op. cit. 
652 Davinson and Sillence (2010), op. cit. 
653 Anandpara et al. (2007), op. cit. 
654 Adams, Anne and Sasse, Martina Angela (1999), 'Users are not the enemy', Communications of the ACM, 42 (12), 
40-46. 
655 Arachchilage and Love (2013), op. cit. 
656 Liang and Xue (2010), op. cit. 
657 Comesongsri (2010), op. cit. 
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The cost of education and training is also a problem.658 It is hard to expect that the user training 
program can get instant results. To educate the users and employees to prevent phishing attacks 
which are constantly updated and reformed, the businesses need to maintain periodical training 
programs with ongoing cost but without immediate benefit. This may negatively influence the 
eagerness of the business to spend on training and education.  
 
A successful phishing attack largely relies on exploitation of human vulnerability, which is almost 
impossible to control and manage. Although it is difficult to see an immediate effect of education 
and expect all users have adequate knowledge to spot phishing or act like educated users when 
responding to the warnings, education is always an essential baseline of defense by helping users 
protect themselves from falling for phish even if there is no any technical defense. However, how 
educational materials can be effectively transferred to users’ secure online behaviours is an 
important question that needs to be taken into account when developing education or training 
programs. To encourage users to engage in secure online behaviours and intensify their motivation 
of pursuing information security education and training, it is necessary to strengthen their awareness 
of the correlation between their behaviours, e.g. misjudging threats as non-threats or bypassing 
warning sign and security indicators, and the enormous damage that could cause to themselves and 
a great number of other users.  
 
7.6. Institutional network – an example of the notice-and-takedown 
scheme 
 
According to Castells,659 ‘networks’ are the unit of a network society; and the social power in a 
network society is primarily exercised through networks. ‘Institutional network’, which refers to an 
                                                     
658 Purkait (2012), op. cit. 
659 Castells (2011), op. cit. 
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organized cooperation and connection between institutions in different interfaces, can serve as a 
powerful measure to control certain behaviour which is against laws or social order. Institutional 
network can be operated nationally or internationally; and the institutions can be public or private 
institutions. The best example of the regulation of phishing in institutional network fashion is the 
notice-and-takedown strategy.  
 
‘Notice-and-takedown’ is a promising scheme used for removing undesirable content from the 
Internet. Moore Clayton undertook a study of the removal times and the number of visitors based on 
a sample of 144 phishing sites and found each site attracted around 18 visitors if it is removed 
within one day of being reported, rising by 8 victims for each successive day.660 Their study 
illustrated an important fact: the longer a phishing site exists, the more users are victimized. This 
highlights the significance of an immediate reaction consisting of taking down phishing sites in 
order to minimize the potential damage as well as protect more users from falling victims.  
 
The removal of phishing websites is another countermeasure that has been prevalently employed 
especially among banks or financial organizations that are likely to be spoofed to combat phishing. 
Many financial institutions contract takedown companies to remove spoofed sites as soon as they 
are detected. The takedown process generally starts when a takedown company is altered to 
existence of a phishing site and that company then contacts the domain registrars, the hosting 
companies or the system administrators (sysadmin), or ISPs to bring that phishing site down. The 
process usually takes a few hours but could take several days or even longer when the server is 
geographically operated outside national boundaries. Netcraft, a well-known phishing takedown 
company, pointed out that a savvy phishing attacker often host the spoofed site in countries with 
inadequate legal enforcement resources, to ensure that the process is as difficult and 
                                                     
660 Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit. 
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time-consuming as possible.661  
 
There are different actors responsible for phishing takedown according to the types of phishing 
attack.  
 
7.6.1. Web-hosting companies, system administrators, and ISPs 
 
In order to evade being traced, most phishing attackers host websites in free hosting environment or 
on compromised machines such as a residential machine or a server in a data center rather than on 
their own machines.662 To get a phishing site removed from free web space, a takedown company 
needs to contact the free web-hosting companies to ask them to remove the bogus site and cancel 
the hosting account. When the phishing website is hosted on a compromised machine, a takedown 
request will be sent to the relevant ISP who will temporarily take the website in question offline or 
disable connection to the offending web pages and approach the administrator to ask him to remove 
the website and fix the machine. The message to administrators usually has to be delivered through 
ISPs as the information about them mostly is not made public.  
 
A research663 which was conducted by Moore and Clayton over a large set of phishing sites hosted 
on free web space and compromised machines indicated that the phishing sites were removed fairly 
promptly once the hosting companies and the administrators of compromised machines received the 
takedown request, but, they could remain up considerably longer if they are missed by the brand 
owners. The authors concluded that how quickly the phishing sites are removed largely depends on 
whether the brand owners are aware of the existence of these websites. It was also suggested that 
                                                     
661 Netcraft op. cit. 
662 Mcgrath and Gupta (2008), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit. 
663 Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit. 
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responses from ISPs often vary largely depending on company, country, and the competence and 
language skills of the requesting organization.664  
 
7.6.2. Domain registrars and registries 
 
In the case that a domain name has be registered especially for phishing use or in some complex 
cases involving rock-phish or fast-flux phishing networks,665 it is necessary to contact the domain 
name registrars and registries to ask for suspension of the domain name in question. Phishers 
exploit the DNS by registering domains and use them to send scam and host fraudulent sites. Recent 
statistics666 revealed that 27% of the 82,163 domains used for phishing were registered maliciously 
by phishing attackers in the second half of 2013. McGrath et al.667 conducted an analysis of 
registration of phishing domains and the machines used to host the phishing sites and found most 
domains registered for the purpose of phishing become active almost immediately upon registration. 
When a fraudulent site has been taken down, it can be moved to a different host or ISP, and the 
domain point to the new site. To suspend the resolution of the phishing domain is the only way to 
stop this cycle.  
 
Rock-phish and fast-flux phishing sites have become a huge challenge to the effectiveness of 
takedown strategies and they were found to be able to survive much longer than ordinary phishing 
sites by obfuscating phishing behaviours to complicate takedown procedures.668 Rock-phish gangs 
operate by making a network of compromised machines as proxies to relay request. Taking down a 
proxy cannot really remove phishing sites, as rock-phish sites automatically switch to another 
                                                     
664 Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit. 
665 The discussion about rock phish and fast-flux technology, see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.  
666 APWG (2014), 'Global Phishing Survey: Trends and Domain Name Use in 2H2013'. 
<http://docs.apwg.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishingSurvey_2H2013.pdf>, accessed September 9 2014. 
667 Mcgrath and Gupta (2008), op. cit. 
668 Mcgrath, Kalafut, and Gupta (2009), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit;Moore and Clayton (2009), op. cit. 
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machine which is still working. Fast-flux network works by changing IP addresses in seconds and 
rapidly moving the phishing sites around to make it almost impossible to take them down.  
 
The only practical way to remove rock-phish and fast-flux sites is to have the domain name 
suspended. Nevertheless, it becomes very difficult if the domain registrar requested fails to 
recognize that the domain name in question is an impersonated one.669 The person who requests the 
suspension of a particular domain name might be required to present evidence which can prove its 
fraudulent nature. For example, the Austrian domain registrar nic.at initially refused to remove 
rock-phish domains and asked the reporter, Spamhaus - an email-blacklist operator, to prove that 
these domains had been registered by non-existent persons.670 This may cause additional difficulty 
to the takedown procedure which, in turn, extends the lifetime of phishing websites. While the 
average lifetime of ordinary phishing websites was found to be less than 60 hours, the rock-phish 
domains could remain alive for more than 90 hours and the lifetime of the fast-flux domains even 
reached up to nearly 19 days on average.671 
 
Domain registrars and registries are one of the key actors responsible for phishing takedown; 
however, their reaction to phishing incidents was described rather “lagging”,672 even though they 
are very often the victims involved in phishing attacks too. 673  APWG produced a set of 
recommendations for domain registrars and registries which particularly focused on the assistance 
                                                     
669 Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit;Rodenbaugh (2009), op. cit. 
670 Warrner (2007), op. cit. 
671 Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit. 
672 Sheng et al. (2009a), op. cit. 
673 A report released by the Security and Stability Advisory Committee of ICANN indicated that domain names have 
become a popular target of phishing attackers. Increasing number of phishers impersonate a registrar to obtain the 
account credentials of the registrar’s customers by which they can modify the customer’s domain registration for 
malicious purpose or use the credit card or other forms of payment on file to purchase more domains for subsequent 
illegal use. ICANN, Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) (2008), 'SAC 028: SSAC Advisory on Registrar 
Impersonation Phishing Attacks '. <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-028-en.pdf>, accessed September 
15 2014. 
In addition, criminals register new domains mostly by using stolen credit or debit cards. The registrars are the ones 
that eventually take the charge back for these fraudulent domain registrations. Apwg (2008b), op. cit;Rodenbaugh 
(2009), op. cit. Sheng et al. (2009a), op. cit.   
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that they are able to provide in law enforcement, screening of fraudulent domain registrations, and 
takedown of phishing domains. 674  Registrars were encouraged to share fraudulent domain 
registration information such as registrant IP addresses or registrant’s personal information with law 
enforcement authorities to assist in investigation. APWG also suggested registrars to periodically 
check against the blacklists of phishing URLs from different sources to identify malicious domains 
before they take effect. Registrars and registries should make timely response to domain takedown 
requests by suspending or terminating phishing domains as quickly as they are notified. While 
domain registrars and registries were regarded to stand in an excellent position in combating 
phishing, a study of the anti-phishing efforts of the domain registrar community indicated that some 
registrars and registries will act upon complaints but the others, including their downstream 
resellers, will not take any action or investigation because domain registrars generally are low 
margin businesses owning very limited manpower and resources and many of them are also 
unwilling to take the cost of customer service to address domain abuse.675    
 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)676 funded in 1998 is a 
nonprofit organization responsible for managing global domain name system (DNS) and IP 
addressing functions to ensure the network’s stable and secure operation. ICANN coordinates the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, including management of Top-Level 
Domains (TLDs),677 operation of root name servers,678 assignment of IP address blocks to regional 
domain registries, and allocation of Internet numbering resources.679 Although ICANN does not 
take phishing complaints directly, it has key influence over the response of domain registrar 
community to phishing by developing policies and setting and negotiating contractual standards for 
                                                     
674 Apwg (2008b), op. cit. 
675 Rodenbaugh (2009), op. cit. 
676 ICANN, https://www.icann.org/.  
677 TLDs are the domains at the highest level in the hierarchical DNS. A TLD is the last segment immediately following 
the final dot in a web address. For example, www.google.com, com is the TLD.   
678 Root name servers are resolvers that translate host name to IP address to find TLDs.  
679 The work of ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/welcome-2012-02-25-en.  
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registrars and registries. Experts suggested that ICANN should establish a set of minimum 
standards of domain abuse and enforce compliance through accreditation mechanism, and 
encourage adoption of anti-abuse policies by regularly publishing data on registries’ performance 
on phishing takedown and taking anti-abuse metrics as part of evaluation criteria for registry 
application.680  
 
In May 2008, ICANN’s GNSO (Generic Names Supporting Organization)681 Council formed a 
working group on fast flux to consider the problem of fast-flux hosting and how it can be mitigated 
by ICANN contracting parties. The final report of this Working Group was released in August 
2009.682 This report demonstrated that some proposals are taking in place that help to mitigate 
malicious domain registrations, recommended the adoption of a Fast Flux Data Reporting System 
for ICANN members to submit potential fast flux domains to better monitor illegal activity, and 
considered ICANN as the facilitator to set policy and ensure the implementation of best practices 
among its contracted parties.  
 
The SSAC of ICANN issued an advisory which encouraged each registrar to provide an effective 
and responsive contact point of abuse matters that is capable of responding quickly to domain abuse 
complaints.683 In 2009, Rodenbaugh produced a document addressing the state of ICANN effort 
and policy development on abusive domain name registrations.684 This document indicated that the 
APWG have been working with the registry representatives on developing a suspension process for 
phishing domains with a hope that can effectively cut down the up-times of phishing domains while 
reduce false positive complaints. The registry will suspend a domain in question if the registrar or 
registrant fail to address the suspension request within a certain timeframe. This suspension process 
                                                     
680 Sheng et al. (2009a), op. cit. 
681 ICANN GNSO, http://gnso.icann.org/en/index.htm.  
682 Konings (2009), op. cit. 
683 ICANN, Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) (2009), 'SAC 038: Registrar Abuse Point of Contact'. 
<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-038-en.pdf>, accessed September 15 2014. 
684 Rodenbaugh (2009), op. cit. 
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nevertheless is only applicable to the domains that are used solely for phishing and only admits the 
suspension requests filed by accredited anti-phishing teams. This suspension process can be adopted 
by other registries on a voluntary basis if it proves effective. 
 
This section demonstrates how phishing attacks can be controlled by systematic connection and 
organized cooperation between different organizations, exampled by notice-and-takedown strategy. 
However, the effectiveness of this strategy has been questioned, as the phishing sites, especially 
those on compromised machines, may continue to reappear shortly after they are first taken down. 
Taking down a phishing site only hastens the phisher’s movement from one host to another, and 
many users continue to fall for phish. This is like a cat and mouse game, with takedown companies 
always being a few steps behind the fraudsters, as fraudsters operate in real time but takedown 
solutions can only be reactive in nature.685  
 
Although the removal of phishing websites is often perceived as an endless task, it does help to 
lower the damage that a phishing site may cause and prevent potential victims by removing the site 
as soon as it is known by the brand owners, takedown companies or other anti-phishing 
organizations.686 An effective takedown strategy relies on the joint effort of different institutions 
involved, including the organizations that are impersonated, takedown companies, web-hosting 
companies, ISPs, system administrators, and domain registrars and registries. The effectiveness can 
be improved by coordinating the action of the actors responsible for takedown to removal requests 
and enhancing information sharing between different takedown companies.687  
 
While takedown companies only focus on removing those phishing sites that directly attack their 
client, it is considered to be very important to set up a publicly available notice-and-takedown 
                                                     
685 Varghese (2008), op. cit. 
686 Moore and Clayton (2007), op. cit. 
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mechanism which allows every user to report phishing sites or emails with all types of contents. 
The next section (7.7) looks into the anti-phishing work that has been undertaken in Taiwan, with a 
particular focus on the establishment and operation of the Taiwan anti-phishing working group and 
the phishing reporting system established in late 2010.  
 




The Computer Emergency Response Team / Coordination Center (CERT/CC) was first founded by 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA, now ARPA) in 1988 as a result of the 
first automated network security incident encountered by ARPANET,688 usually referred to as the 
“Morris Worm”.689 The initiative of CERT/CC sprang up quickly worldwide and these incident 
response teams created an informal organization known as the Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST) in 1990.690 The computer centre of National Sun Yat-Sen University has 
been in charge of the operation of TWCERT/CC since its establishment in September, 1998.691 
                                                     
688 ARPANET (The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), founded by DARPA of the U.S. Department of 
Defense in 1969, was the world’s first operational packet switching network and served as the beginning of the 
Internet. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARPANET.  
689 A student at Cornell University, Robert T. Morris, wrote a program that would connect to another computer to find 
and use one of several vulnerabilities to copy itself to that second computer and continue to repeat these actions at 
the new location on ARPANET. An explosion of copies caused by this self-replicating, automated network attack tool 
consumed a great volume of system resources which significantly influenced the function of the attacked computers. In 
consequence, 10% of the U.S. computers connected to ARPANET stopped at about the same time. The Morris Worm 
prompted DARPA to establish a computer emergency response team to coordinate responses to network emergencies. 
Regarding the history of the Morris Worm, see: Longstaff, Thomas A, et al. (1997), 'Security of the Internet', The 
Froehlich/Kent Encyclopedia of Telecommunications, 15, 231-55. 
690 The idea of FIRST can be traced back to 1989. While the number of incident response teams continued to grow, the 
interaction between these experienced difficulties due to the different languages, timezones, and standards employed. 
This highlighted the need for better communication and coordination between teams and prompted the creation of 
FIRST which brings together a wide variety of security and incident response teams, including teams from the 
government, commercial, and academic sectors. FIRST is a recognized global leader which enables incident response 
teams to respond to security incidents more effectively by providing access to best practices, tools and trusted 
communication with team members. See: http://www.first.org/.  
691 In addition to coordinating the responses to computer security incidents, the main tasks of TWCERT/CC also involve 
uniting the system and network related resources to assist sites that detect potential vulnerabilities and to improve the 
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TWCERT/CC joined FIRST in October 2001 and, since then, has acted as the international contact 
window of Taiwan in respect of computer security incidents as well as a bridge between different 
CERTs.  
 
However, the operator of TWCERT/CC - an academic team which is subordinate to a university – 
has been restricted by its limited manpower and resources, which has posed a crucial challenge to 
TWCERT/CC in effectively implementing communication and coordination work among CERTs at 
either the domestic or transnational level.692 As a result, in 2009, the Taiwan Network Information 
Center (TWNIC)693 was commissioned by the National Information and Communication Security 
Taskforce (NICST)694 to administer the operation of TWCERT/CC on behalf of the computer 
centre of National Sun Yat-Sen University for a three-year period between 2009 and 2012 to 
enhance the transformation of TWCERT/CC and, above all, to strengthen its role in coordinating 
the different CERTs to handle computer security incidents.695 No single organization alone has all 
of capability or information needed to deal with information security incidents. Given the 
importance of collaboration over different computer security teams across different sectors in 
responding to arising security breaches, TWCERT/CC called on the stakeholders involved, 
including government agencies, ISPs, academic units, computer security industries, and business 
                                                                                                                                                                                
security of sites, and educate network users about computer security. See: http://www.cert.org.tw/eng/index.htm.  
692 Lin, Yi-Long (2010), 'The Relay Position of the TWNIC to Enable the TWCERT/CC to Transform and Restart', 
TWCERT/CC Newsletter, 1. 
693 The Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC), established at the end of 1999 and supervised by the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication, is a unique neutral, non-profit organization that oversees domain name 
registration and IP address allocation in Taiwan. In addition to providing specialized Internet services, TWNIC is also 
committed to coordinating and facilitating the activities and cooperation between national and international 
Internet-related organizations such as ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) and APNIC (Asia 
Pacific Network Information Center) as well as the equivalent national Internet organization in other countries, 
including JPNIC (Japan), CNNIC (China) and KRNIC (Korea). See Background and Mission of TWNIC, 
http://www.twnic.net.tw/english/about/about_01.htm.  
694 NICST was established in 2001, following the passing of the Executive Yuan’s ‘National Information and 
Communication Infrastructure Security Mechanism Plan’ (2001-2004). The main task of NICST is to promote the tasks 
of building the information security foundation of Taiwan. In 2009, NICST gave impetus to the ‘National Information & 
Communication Security Development Plan’ (2009-2012), aiming at achieving the goal of “Safe and Trustworthy 
Intelligence Taiwan, Safe and Quality Digital Life.” See http://www.icst.org.tw/Intro.aspx?lang=en.    
695 Liu, Jin-Han (2010), 'The Activation of the Taiwan Information Security Strategic Alliance', TWCERT/CC Newsletter - 
Special Periodical for the Taiwan Information Security Strategic Alliance. 
<http://www.myhome.net.tw/cert01/cont04.htm>, accessed September 16 2014. 
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corporations, collectively to build up a joint defensive alliance to remove sectoral barriers and 
reinforce the cooperation among different teams regarding tackling issues relating to information 
security.  
 
7.7.2. Structure and cooperation model  
 
The Taiwan Information Security Strategic Alliance (hereinafter, the Alliance), which was formally 
established on 23 September, 2010, aims at “establishing a collectively defensive mechanism and 
reinforcing information security systems”. The Alliance currently has two working groups: the 
anti-phishing working group and honeynet696 working group (Cyber Clean Center). The Advisory 
Committee - the main body of the Alliance comprising all of the members - meets twice a year to 
consider the suggestions or reports submitted by the working groups, make the rules and decide the 
direction for the work. The Alliance also holds meetings every three months to discuss and share 
information and experiences regarding Internet security techniques.  
 
Diagram 7.1: Organizational Structure of the Alliance 
Source: TWNIC 
                                                     
696 A honeynet is a network set up with intentional vulnerability, aimed to attract and trap attackers in order to gather 
information about their activities and study their motives and methods which can be subsequently used to increase 
network security. It usually contains one or more honeypot, which are computer systems on the Internet designed 





The Alliance is primarily constructed based on three existing CERTs, including TWNCERT 
(Taiwan National CERT), the TANet CERT (Taiwan Academic Network CERT), and the NCC 
CERT (National Communication Commission CERT). The above three are the teams responsible 
for responding to the computer security incidents occurring on governmental, academic, and 
commercial networks, respectively. The Alliance, under the supervision provided by the Science 
and Technology Advisory Group of the Executive Yuan (the STAG, now the OBOST),697 currently 
embraces the members of government agencies –the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications, the Ministry of Education, the NCC, the Research, Development and Evaluation 
Commission of the Executive Yuan (the RDEC),698 the Information and Communication Security 
Technology Center (the ICST),699 the Ministry of Education; the Taiwan Internet Association (the 
TWIA);700 and the five leading Taiwanese telecom enterprises in terms of revenue and customer 
numbers that provide Internet access services (IASPs) - HiNet by Chunghwa Telecom, Far Eastone 
Telecom, Taiwan Fixed Network, So-net Taiwan, and Asia Pacific Telecom.  
 
                                                     
697 STAG, which was established in December 1979, turned into the Office of the Board of Science and Technology of 
Executive Yuan (OBOST) on 01 January 2012 as a result of organizational reform. It is responsible for making 
administrative policies with regard to science and technology at the level of central government and also in charge of 
execution of the policies. See: http://www.bost.ey.gov.tw/Default.aspx.  
698 The RDEC, established in 1969, is responsible for “policy research and development, policy planning, policy 
supervision and evaluation, government’s IT management, circulation of government publications, archives and other 
tasks assigned”. It was dissolved in January 2014 and the superseding agency is the National Development Council. See: 
http://www.ndc.gov.tw/.   
699 The ICST belongs to one of the seven groups of the NICST – the Government Information and Communication 
Security Working Group, which is in charge by the RDEC. The ICST is responsible for helping the RDEC to carry out the 
related work of the above group and provides pre-incident protection, during-incident handling, and post-incident 
forensics and recoveries to all government agencies. In order to detect information security incidents early, the ICST 
establishes the Government Security Operation Center (G-SOC) to execute information security monitoring services for 
government agencies. The ICST also operates the Government Information Sharing and Analysis Center (G-ISAC) 
whereby the ICST gives counsels, provides technical services, and publishes messages related to information security to 
government agencies. The G-ISAC also organizes, integrates and distributes the information related to computer 
security through the system automation and information standardization of the information sharing process. See: 
http://www.icst.org.tw/index_e.aspx.  
700 TWIA, formed in late 1999, is a non-governmental organization, aimed at providing a communication and 
cooperation platform for domestic industries in related to Internet services in order to facilitate innovation and the 
free development of Internet-related industries. TWIA welcomes domestic ISPs (Internet service providers), ICPs 
(Internet content providers), operators of portal sites or electric commerce or individuals who would be interested in 
this issue as members. See: http://www.twia.org.tw/.  
298 
 
The Alliance aims at building trusted relationship among its members to enable them to carry out 
collective defence against information security threats horizontally. Thereby, they can expand the 
safeguard scope and improve the reactive speed to information security incidents. The cooperation 
model of the Alliance is shown in Diagram 7.2.  
 
 
Diagram 7.2: Cooperation Model of the Alliance 
Source: TWNIC 
 
7.7.3. Taiwan Anti-Phishing Working Group (TAPWG) and Anti-Phishing 
Notification Window (APNOW) 
 
Given the increasing threat of phishing attacks in Taiwan, the Alliance members reached a 
consensus that anti-phishing work should be prioritized by first organizing an anti-phishing working 
group and establishing an ‘anti-phishing notification window’ to streamline the reporting procedure 
for phishing incidents. TWCERT/CC first introduced the Taiwan Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(TAPWG) in July 2010. TAPWG, which includes the members of TWNCERT, TANet CERT, NCC 
CERT, ISPs and academic departments, attempts to combine the knowledge and ability of the public 
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and private sectors as well as research units to produce responding measures through undertaking 
joint deliberation for tackling the potential risk of phishing and dealing with phishing incidents that 
have been detected.701  
 
Following TAPWG, TWCERT/CC activated a phishing reporting mechanism known as the 
Anti-Phishing Notification Window (APNOW) in October 2010. APNOW serves as both an internal 
and external window to receive reporting regarding phishing attacks. Reporting may come from a 
variety sources; for example, individual users, domestic and foreign CERTs or other entities.  
 
7.7.3.1. APNOW reporting procedure 
 
APNOW provides an exclusive platform for reporting suspected phishing incidents, which do not 
include other cyber-attacks, such as malware attacks or computer system intrusion. It is worth 
noting that APNOW is only involved in the reporting of suspected phishing websites hosted in 
Taiwan. For phishing notification in relation to foreign domain names or IP address, APNOW 
forward them to relevant foreign CERTs in conjunction with notifying the Anti-Phishing Working 
Group (APWG), PhishTank, and browser industries, such as Microsoft, Firefox or Google. In this 
case, users are also encouraged to notify APWG of suspected phishing emails or websites directly.  
 
Through visiting the website of APNOW (www.apnow.tw), users can not only make reports but are 
also able to trace the progress of reports that have been previously submitted. On the front page of 
                                                     
701 Lin, Shun-Jie (2011a), 'The Introduction of the Taiwan Anti-Phishing Reporting Mechanism and Platform', 
TWCERT/CC Newsletter, 6.  
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APNOW, users are provided with three options regarding submitting reports in accordance with the 
types of phishing incident, which include phishing emails, phishing websites, and phishing webpage 
injection. If users are uncertain about the reporting type, they can go to ‘Others’ and the personnel 
of the back-end system will help them to categorize them (see Figure 7.2).  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Front page of APNOW website 
Source: http://www.apnow.tw/ 
 
The more information that users provide, the more efficient the back-end system of APNOW 
processes submission. At a minimum, APNOW asks users to provide the URL of the suspected 
website and indicate the date and time on which they detected it. Users can copy the phishing 
message contents into the text box and identify the concrete contents of reports, if they wish. 
However, users need additionally to submit their personal information, including their name, email 
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Figure 7.3: APNOW Reporting Format 
Source: http://www.apnow.tw/index2.cgi?s=2 
 
7.7.3.2. APNOW processing procedures  
 
The APNOW processing procedures of phishing reports are primarily operated via an automated 
system. First, the APNOW system provides the reporter with an individual reference number for his 
submission, for tracking use. Second, the system roughly verifies the report to determine whether or 
not it is a real phishing case, finds the IP address of the suspected website and passes the case, along 
with the relevant evidence collected from the website in question, to the corresponding CERT. 
Following further verification of the factuality of the phishing website in question, the CERT, at the 
third step, asks the operators or sysadmins of the website or hosting companies to take the necessary 
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measures, including repairing, shutting down or blocking access to the website. However, in most 
cases, the APNOW system notifies the ISPs directly, thereby bypassing the NCC-CERT once the IP 
of the suspected website has been identified to be a commercial net to produce a more effective 
outcome.  
 
On the other hand, the APNOW system continues tracking the handling of phishing sites. Each 
phishing site is checked hourly to confirm its availability till it is declared to be down. The 
corresponding CERT or ISP is required to complete the response measures to the phishing site 
within a specific time frame or else its office director needs to assist if the phishing site is still 
active after 16 hours and its supervisory authority needs to intervene after 24 hours.  
 
Finally, to end the case, the CERT or ISP is required to report back to APNOW by logging on the 
system to record the handling result of the phishing site; for example, if the site has been taken 
down or its access has been blocked. The reporter is also kept informed about the eventual result via 





Diagram 7.3: APNOW processing procedures 
 
7.7.3.3. Requirement of processing time 
 
The longer a phishing site remains alive, the more risk is posed to potential victims. The lifetime of 
phishing websites is a vital factor which affects how damaging phishing attacks are, as well as 
measuring the success of any mitigation efforts. The statistics compiled by the APWG indicated that 
the average uptime of phishing attacks in the second half of 2009 was 31 hours 38 minutes, while 
the average lifetime during the same period in Taiwan was 51 hours 42 minutes.702 Inspired by this 
statistic, the Advisory Committee of the Alliance sought to lower the lifetime of a phishing site and 
suggested a deadline by which to finish dealing with a phishing report.703  
 
The current requirement set by the Alliance regarding the processing time of a phishing report is 24 
                                                     
702 APWG (2010b), 'Global Phishing Survey: Trends and Domain Name Use in 2H2009'. 
<http://apwg.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishingSurvey_2H2009.pdf>, accessed 9 September 2014. 
703 Lin (2011a), op. cit. 
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hours. As mentioned above, the APNOW system checks the availability of the phishing site every 
hour since it passed the report on to the corresponding ISP. The system additionally sends an email 
notification at the 4th and 10th hour if the phishing site is still active. At the 16th hour, the system 
automatically requires the office director of the ISP to assist in terminating the connection to the 
phishing site and, at the 24th hour, the system informs the supervisory authority of the ISPs, i.e. the 
NCC, and requests appropriate intervention in the processing of phishing reports.  
 
7.7.3.4. Suggestions to the APNOW 
 
Having presented an overview of the operation of the APNOW reporting system, this research 
proposes the following suggestions regarding the future work of APNOW.  
 
Elimination of the language barrier 
 
This research firstly points out the language problem existing in the APNOW user interface. In 
addition to accepting reports from Taiwanese users, APNOW serves as an external window for 
receiving phishing reports from other countries. However, APNOW currently only adopts a 
Mandarin interface, and this language barrier leads to difficulties for users who wish to access the 
system but do not know Mandarin. The aim of APNOW to provide an effective international contact 
window for phishing incidents will fail if it cannot provide a friendly interface for international 
users.  
 
Reduction of processing time required to take down a phishing site 
 
Research shows that the first hour of phishing emails being received is the “golden hour” of 
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phishing attack, as over half of stolen data is harvested within the first 60 minutes.704 This means 
that successfully blocking a phishing site within the 60 minutes of its existence becomes absolutely 
crucial. Klein goes on to suggest that 80 per cent of stolen credentials are gathered and become 
usable by phishers within the first 5 hours and that, by 10 hours, more than 90 per cent of the data 
that a phishing site is able to collect has already been harvested.  
 
Accordingly, it is vital that a phishing site is blocked or taken down within 5 to 10 hours. Therefore, 
the current APNOW requirement of processing time for a phishing report, i.e. 24 hours, appears to 
need to be further reduced in order to provide better protection for phishing victims.  
 
The monitoring of phishing websites that have been taken down 
 
Some phishing websites, particularly those hosted on botnets, may remain alive after the first 
attempt to remove them. In fact, more than 10% of phishing websites re-activate after one hour of 
being taken down. A phishing website can be declared down only if it can be confirmed to be no 
longer alive. Therefore, it is necessary for APNOW to continue to monitor each phishing website 
that has been shut down to ensure it stays down for a certain period of time.  
 
Promotion of visibility to the public 
 
According to the statistics gathered by TWNIC between 23 September 2010 and 18 February 2011, 
the number of suspected phishing sites reported to APNOW accounted to 147, including domestic 
and foreign IPs, with 144 targeted at foreign entities and only 3 targeted at local brands.705 This 
figure shows that the phishing sites hosted in Taiwanese domains mostly focus on corporations 
                                                     
704 Klein (2010), op. cit. 
705 Shiu, Nai-Wen (2011a), 'The Report of the Current Status of the Taiwan Information Security Strategic Alliance', 
TAIS International Conference 2011 (TWNIC). 
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outside Taiwan, as most phishing perpetrators attempt to abuse the jurisdictional gaps to evade 
investigation and prosecution. Nevertheless, the big difference between the quantity of local and 
foreign reports also reflects the relatively low visibility of APNOW to Taiwanese users. Over nearly 
five months, there were only three reports of phishing attacks which targeted Taiwanese companies. 
One was hosted in a Taiwanese domain but was eventually verified a not a phish and the other two 
were hosted in foreign domains. The very few reports may be attributed to the insufficient 
awareness or knowledge of users about phishing. However, they can also be explained by the 
possibility that this newly-established reporting system is still not widely-known among general 
Internet users in Taiwan.  
 
To address this problem, it is vital to promote the visibility of APNOW in a variety of ways, such as 
the public media, cross-sites’ linkage or information security education or training. It is also worth 
introducing APNOW and providing its URL link in security reminder messages for users on portal 
sites and login pages which are particularly sensitive to financial information; for example, online 
banking login pages. Above all, it is necessary to ensure that APNOW is known in every aspect by 
all the CERTs or units that are in charge of handling computer security incidents in both the public 
and private sectors.   
 
Enhancement of immediate communication and coordination with foreign CERTs  
 
As aforementioned, the work of APNOW is primarily operated by an automated system, including 
the initial verification of phishing sites, assignment of reports to the corresponding teams, 
subsequent tracing of processing progress, and notification of the related persons or government 
authorities. The timeliness of phishing response should not be hindered by the delay caused by the 
need for human intervention.706 However, APNOW still needs to rely on human intervention where 
                                                     
706 Wardman, Brad and Warner, Gary (2008), 'Automating phishing website identification through deep MD5 
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the suspected phishing sites that have been reported are hosted in other countries. Given the 
difficulty of adhering to the 24-hour time limit for dealing with foreign suspected phishing sites due 
to the time difference and the potential delay caused by human operation between countries, the 
requirement of the processing time of a phishing report presently applies to phishing sites hosted in 
Taiwan only, and does not include foreign phishing sites.  
 
However, an immediate reaction to cut phishing lines as soon as they are detected is crucial in order 
to succeed in the fight against phishing attacks. Any undue delay in taking down phishing sites 
should be avoided, even if these sites are hosted in other countries. The workload of APNOW 
should be handled by automating the notice-and-takedown process as far as possible. This makes it 
pressing to build an automatic reporting mechanism which bridges different CERTs between 
countries to optimize the ability of CERTs to make immediate response and take down verified 
phishing sites in a timely manner.  
 
7.8. Taiwan’s Anti-Phishing Scheme 
 
Phishing arose as an issue in the late 1990s but did not receive proper attention in Taiwan until 
recent years. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3 (section 3.4), there was very little scholarly 
discussion on phishing countermeasures in Taiwan prior 2008. Although some progress had been 
made on anti-phishing research since 2008, it apparently only focused on the development of 
technical tools with very little attention to the countermeasures that can be implemented in other 
dimensions. The establishment of the TAPWG in July 2010 was a major breakthrough in the 
progress of Taiwan’s anti-phishing work, as it manifested Taiwan government’s ambition to 
coordinate the effort of the stakeholders in different fields – academia, CERTs of governmental, 
academic and commercial network and ISPs in responding to growing phishing attacks, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
matching', eCrime Researchers Summit, 2008 (IEEE), 1-7. 
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introduction of the APNOW in October 2010 further reflected the focus of Taiwan’s anti-phishing 
work has shifted from concentrating on technological development only to notice-and-takedown 
strategy based on institutional network.  
 
Nevertheless, things seem not to change too much. As I have pointed out in previous section (7.4), 
there are several problems regarding the usability and operation of the APNOW which may restrict 
its effectiveness and demand proper improvements. In addition, all the information about the 
TAPWG’s meetings and the statistical data about the APNOW’s reports and processing time are 
inaccessible, as this information is not released publicly but is only shared among their members. 
The effectiveness of APNOW in tackling phishing hence still remains a question and needs to be 
further examined. The existing Taiwanese literature only provides general information about the 
background, structure and the process of the above anti-phishing schemes,707 there is no further 
research-based literature available which can provide a clue about the practical engagement of 
different stakeholders in current anti-phishing work. What work have various stakeholders 
undertaken to control phishing? What efforts have they made to engage in cooperation with other 
stakeholders, both nationally and internationally? How do they evaluate their work and the work of 
the other stakeholders? What improvement may be required to enhance future anti-phishing scheme? 
To provide insights into these questions, it was considered necessary to conduct an empirical study 
through holding interviews with the experts selected from different regulatory bodies, including law 
enforcement, NCC, ISPs, CERTs, online merchants, and key information security industry, to learn 
how and to what extent they get involved in anti-phishing work and seek their expertise on the 
effectiveness of the anti-phishing countermeasures that have been implemented, combined with 
their suggestions for future work.708  
 
                                                     
707 Lin (2010), op. cit;Lin (2011a), op. cit;Liu (2010), op. cit. 
708 The list of the interviewees, see Appendix A.  
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It should be borne in mind that the examination of Taiwan’s multi-dimensional regulation of 
phishing is primarily based on existing documents and resources, but supplemented with insights 
provided by the information obtained from the interviews. Although this is a small-scale field work, 
it is the first study that synthesizes the opinions of Taiwanese experts from different fields, and 
examines the efforts that various stakeholders have devoted or are expected to devote to the 
Taiwanese anti-phishing work.  
 
This compares and contrasts with a US study that integrates the expert opinions from various areas 
and examines the incentives of different stakeholders to devote to anti-phishing work by Sheng et 
al.709 The authors conducted 31 semi-structured interviews with the experts selected from academia, 
law enforcement, CERTs, APWG and industry in the USA between May 2008 and May 2009 to 
seek their expertise on the state of phishing attacks, the countermeasures need to implemented, and 
the incentives of various stakeholders to engage in the fight against phishing. The study of Sheng et 
al. aimed to shed a light on the three main questions: where stakeholders should place their efforts? 
Do they have sufficient incentives to contribute? What countermeasures should be prioritized for 
the anti-phishing work?  
 
My study also compares with another US study conducted by Nero et al.710 who carried out 
telephone interviews with the representatives from five major financial institutions and five 
take-down companies to ask the interviewees to determine the most successful phishing 
countermeasure to financial institutions. This study especially sought to learn how financial 
institutions follow up with law enforcement to tract, arrest, and prosecute a phishing perpetrator.  
 
The main findings of the Taiwan study are indicated below followed by a comparison with the US 
                                                     
709 Sheng et al. (2009a), op. cit. 
710 Nero et al. (2011), op. cit. 
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studies. This is followed by a more detailed exploration of the Taiwan study. 
 
7.8.1. Key findings of the Taiwan study 
 
All the experts interviewed agreed that it is extremely difficult to catch phishing perpetrators in vast 
majority of cases, especially when they involve multiple jurisdiction. Although Taiwan became a 
member of G8 24/7 network in 2004, the expert, who was also the key person pushed Taiwan’s 
entrance through, expressly indicated that it is almost impossible for Taiwan to receive assistance 
with the transnational investigation into phishing cases through the above network in practice. The 
expert also indicated that the companies which have been targeted mostly tend to resort to ISPs 
directly to ask for a removal of phishing sites rather than work with law enforcement agents due to a 
lack of confidence in the effectiveness of criminal investigation and prosecution.  
 
Most of the experts identified that the ISPs of Taiwan stands in a key strategic position in combating 
phishing, especially in terms of proactive detection of phishing attacks and taking-down of phishing 
sites. Nevertheless, the expert from the largest ISP of Taiwan stressed that they have practical 
difficulty spotting phishing proactively. Some of the experts indicated that the ISPs sometimes are 
hesitant to suspend the connection to suspicious phishing sites in an absence of legal authorization 
and hence suggested a need for legal amendment. The expert from the NCC further emphasized the 
necessity of reinforcing the ISPs’ legal responsibility for information security management. 
 
Although most of the experts did not exclude from cooperating and exchanging the phishing 
database with other stakeholders, the expert from information security industry only preferred the 
cooperation model directed by industry, not government. In terms of evaluation of the current 
anti-phishing work, most of the experts agreed that the lack of users’ awareness of information 
security and incentive to act in coordination with the security advices given by either the 
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government, ISPs or industry has posed a crucial challenge to anti-phishing work. Some of the 
experts identified that the major weakness lies in insufficient capacity of Taiwan’s businesses, in 
particular SMBs, for ensuring web security and respond to information security incidents.  
 
In terms of suggestions for future anti-phishing schemes, some of the experts recognized users’ 
education as a fundamental solution and suggested that more efforts should be made to promote 
users’ knowledge and awareness regarding information security. Some of the experts indicated that 
the priority should be placed upon the systematic development and planned training of IT personnel 
who are capable of ensuring web security and properly responding to phishing attacks.  
 
7.8.2. Comparison with US studies 
 
The field work I conducted is similar to the work of Sheng et al. in the sense that both invited the 
experts from different fields which are highly related to phishing and sought their opinions, 
standing in the position of various stakeholders, on phishing countermeasures that have been 
implemented and should be implemented. Nevertheless, the differences in the situation in the US 
and Taiwan are reflected in some of the differences in approach. The two works are different in 
terms of scale and methodology. While Sheng et al. focused on where the efforts should be placed 
to achieve effective action by asking the experts to specifically prioritize the recommendations on a 
list compiled by the authors through their research, my work aims to examine the individual role of 
each stakeholder in the fight against phishing and how they evaluate their work and the work of the 
other stakeholders. Given the difference of working background between the interviewees, the 
interview questionnaires were designed individually for each interviewee but they were all 
structured based on the following key themes: background information, involvement in the 
anti-phishing work, cooperation and connection with the other stakeholders, comments on the 




Nevertheless, there were similarities between the findings of these two studies. While the potential 
victims who may suffer direct loss from phishing are usually expected to have an incentive to invest 
resources in safeguard measures to protect themselves, the experts suggested that many potential 
victims, especially customers and SMBs, act in a quite opposite way. In fact, a lot of potential 
victims do not feel the need to particularly strengthen the protection of their machines or servers 
because they fail to realize the threat of phishing and the impact that phishing could cause upon 
them and the integral security of Internet network, or we can say, they do not think that they will be 
the target. Although most experts identified the key position of ISPs in helping their customers with 
the compromised machines, the experts from the ISPs of both USA and Taiwan felt not much 
interested in undertaking this task as it is costly and its effect is rather limited. 
 
Yet, there was a distinct difference in the experts’ opinions on the priority of countermeasures 
between Taiwan and USA. While the US experts identified improving law enforcement and shutting 
down money trails as top priorities, the Taiwan experts suggested that more effort should be placed 
on facilitating taking-down procedure and enhancing training and education of IT personnel and 
customers. In fact, all of the Taiwan’s experts regarded law enforcement as a countermeasure that is 
very unlikely to be effective against phishing because of the peculiar political situation of Taiwan. 
As emphasized in Chapter 6, an effectual legal enforcement largely relies on effective international 
cooperation between the related agents across countries from which the Taiwan experts could hardly 
expect too much. Taiwan has been suffering from its disadvantaged international status for more 
than four decades, and this has caused a significant obstacle for Taiwan to establishing or engaging 
in international cooperation with other countries.711  
 
My work is also similar to the work of Nero et al., as both sought to learn how the institutions 
                                                     
711 See Chapter 3, section 3.6 and Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.5.  
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interviewed cooperate with law enforcement in prosecuting phishers. Nevertheless, we had different 
groups of interviewee. While Nero et al. invited the employees from selected financial institutions 
and take-down companies, the experts in my study were selected from various stakeholders but not 
including the above two. Yet, the interviewees of the two studies had rather similar opinions about 
the effectiveness of law enforcement. Nero et al. study revealed a common complaint of the 
financial institutions interviewed about the slow pace of the legal enforcement and found none of 
them sought prosecutions against phishing attackers. One of the main reasons was the financial 
institutions stood on a different side to the law enforcement agencies, where the former were eager 
to take down the phishing website as quickly as possible, but the latter focused on collecting 
evidence for investigation and prosecution purposes, which may require them to keep the phishing 
website active for a certain time. Similar opinion could also be found in my study in the interview 
with the expert from online merchant.  
 
7.8.3. Criminal investigation and prosecution 
 
If there is someone who has ever postulated that criminal prosecution is the main approach that 
Taiwan has taken to deter phishing, the analysis demonstrated that this presumption is incorrect. All 
the interviewees acknowledged that phishing perpetrators were rarely prosecuted in the vast 
majority of cases, especially when they were operating in a cross-border manner.  
 
7.8.3.1. Obstacles to investigation712 
 
The interviewees gave multiple reasons for the ineffectiveness of the investigation of phishing. One 
of the criminal investigators interviewed (Interviewee A) stated: 
 
                                                     
712 The challenges posed by phishing to legal enforcement, see Chapter 6, section 6.2. 
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There are many methods that can be used to evade investigation. For example, I 
could place my [phishing] web page in a temporary web space which might be 
untraceable. I could even hide my IP address through an anonymous proxy if I am 
technically capable of doing so. These all greatly increase the difficulty of the 
investigation and tracking work.  
 
Anonymity, as an important feature of the Internet, was frequently abused by phishing perpetrators 
to impede the investigations. The difference between the time at which the information was stolen 
and the phishing was discovered was another key factor that exaggerated the obstacle to identify the 
phishing perpetrator. The other investigator (Interviewee B) stated: 
 
In most cases, people are less likely to be aware of the fact that their account 
information has been stolen unless the information is used for illegal purposes 
such as online auction fraud. There is always a time lag. Also, the person who 
steals the information might sell it to a third party. Even if we know the time and 
the IP address where someone has logged into a victim’s account from the logging 
record, we can hardly find out when, how and by whom the information was 
stolen. It is a troublesome situation unless we can catch the person who logs onto 
the victim’s account and then trace this back to the phishing perpetrator where the 
success rate is very low. 
 
Most importantly, the transnational nature of phishing attacks poses a severe challenge to the arrest 
of phishing perpetrators. Few efforts can be made by Taiwan’s investigation organization to 
continue tracing the location of the IP as well as the phishing perpetrator once the fraudulent 
website has been identified as being hosted in a foreign country. The barrier to the cross-border 
investigation of a phishing case was largely due to the shortage of an effective cooperation network. 
Interviewee A stated: 
 
A majority of [phishing] cases are carried out across jurisdictions. If the phishing 
website is hosted in other countries, for example China, Vietnam or the U.S., I can 
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only trace it to the IP gateway, at most. We are unable to continue tracing the IP 
outside Taiwan as we do not have a cooperation mechanism with other countries. 
This is a dilemma for the investigation of phishing cases that we currently face. 
 
Based on our previous experience, it is most unlikely that we will receive 
assistance from other nations. Therefore, when someone in Taiwan reports a 
foreign-hosted phishing website, we can only reply to the reporter or victim that 
this website is hosted in another country and we are hence unable to go any 
further. 
 
7.8.3.2. Mutual legal assistance 
 
In fact, Taiwan joined the G8 24/7 network713 (hereinafter, the network or 24/7 network) as its 35th 
member country in 2004.714 However, the legal specialist interviewed (Interviewee C), who played 
the principal role in pushing Taiwan’s entrance through, stated that Taiwan could hardly seek 
assistance with the transnational investigation of phishing cases from the above network in practice. 
Interviewee C also confessed that there was clearly a gap of the effectiveness of this network in 
facilitating mutual legal assistance between what he had expected initially and the one that it 
actually had displayed. Interviewee C stated: 
 
I had very high expectations at first. However, granted that we know each other 
and have the contact email of other member countries, we rarely report a case to 
the network unless it involves terroristic attacks or a significant loss. Phishing, in 
simple terms, is a type of Internet fraud or a pre-phased act of Internet fraud. A 
case like phishing is unlikely to be admitted into the network. We once found that 
some hackers in China were attacking Taiwan’s government through websites 
                                                     
713 For a discussion of the G8 24/7 network, see Chapter 6, section 6.5.  
714 While the entrance into the G8 24/7 network under the name of ‘Taiwan’ has generally been regarded as a material 
breakthrough in Taiwan’s diplomatic development, it displeased the Chinese government and was criticized as an act of 
country division. To date, China still refuses to join the above network. See ‘A warning of Taiwan’s diplomatic 




hosted in Japan. We tried to request assistance from the Japanese police through 
the network but received no response from them. We even asked the U.S. 
Department of Justice to communicate our request to Japan, but the result was the 
same. A case like this still failed to attract their attention. One can well image that 
a phishing case cannot get through the network.  
 
In a further question asking about the evaluation of the effectiveness of the G8 24/7 network 
compared with the interviewee’s own expectation, Interviewee C answered straightforwardly “It 
surely falls short of my initial expectation”.  
 
Every country had different levels of procedural requirement for initiating an investigation, such as 
access to private records or a search for evidence. While some countries empowered investigators to 
perform investigations to a certain extent by their authority, others required that a court order must 
be granted before the investigators can take certain investigative actions regarding a case. However, 
in practice, it was less possible to have a court order if the case were unrelated to the requested 
country, especially when it only involved damages and victims in the requesting country. This was a 
crucial factor which led to the ineffectiveness of the 24/7 network. Interviewee C explained: 
 
There are differences existing in the procedural requirements for performing 
investigations. For example, a U.S. prosecutor cannot access IP records or other 
information unless he is given a court order. If we inform the U.S. investigation 
organizations of the existence of a phishing website [which is hosted in America 
but targets Taiwanese users] and request them to access the relevant records for 
the phishing website in question, they tend to ignore such a request, as it is very 
unlikely that they will be granted a court order, since all of the victims of this case 
reside in Taiwan. 
 
I once brought up this question in a talk with the representative from the FBI in 
Japan and asked him why they always cannot provide Taiwan with assistance in 
investigative matters. The reason he gave me was that they are not allowed to do 
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this without court orders. 
 
On the contrary, as Taiwan had a lower procedural requirement for investigators to access to IP 
records, the investigators in Taiwan usually positively responded to other countries’ requests to the 
least extent by verifying the IP location and identifying the potential phishing perpetrator. The 
investigators might perform further investigation if the information collected from the requesting 
country proved that Taiwan’s domestic users were also being victimized. However, considering the 
low likelihood of acquiring information from the requesting country, the investigators usually tried 
to shut down the phishing website instead of carrying out any further investigation. Interviewee A 
stated: 
 
At least, we will verify where the IP [of the phishing website] is and whether the 
user of the hosting machine is unwitting or intentional. If this user is the 
perpetrator, we may try to ask for information from the requesting country to see 
if there is any victim in Taiwan. We may then apply for a search warrant to 
perform the subsequent investigation after collecting relevant evidence, if there 
are victims in Taiwan. However, such an investigation is hardly possible in the 
absence of judicial agreements, as it involves differences in laws and the problem 
of jurisdiction. Our experience of communicating with other countries reveals that 
it seems impossible to acquire information regarding an investigation from them. 
Afterwards, we turn to the measure of taking-down phishing websites. This is the 
simplest method which can deal with the problem in the speediest way. 
 
7.8.3.3. Mistrust of the effectiveness of investigation 
 
The ineffectiveness of criminal investigations into phishing also influences the intention of the 
financial institutions that are likely to be targeted to cooperate with the legal enforcement agencies 
when they detect an imitation website. This point is similar to Nero et al. findings,715 as mentioned 
                                                     
715 Nero et al. (2011), op. cit. 
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in section 7.8.2. Interviewee C, who had served as a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for 
a world well-known online merchant, stated: 
 
Rather than rely on polices to tackle phishing websites, we actually resorted to the 
collective defence operated among ISPs on a global scale. At the time when I 
worked for [the name of an online merchant], our major work in respect of 
phishing was to search for every phishing website related to our company. If we 
found a phony website, we contacted the CISO of that country where the phishing 
website was hosted so that they could go to the ISP and request a taking-down of 
that website.  
 
Going to the ISP was much more efficient than going to the police to take the 
phishing website down. The longer a phishing website existed, the more users 
were victimized. While phishing websites can never be eliminated, what we could 
do was to remove them as soon as they were detected. We barely reported 
phishing cases to the police, as we knew that the chance of catching the phishers 
was extremely low.  
 
In summary, the legal enforcement officers interviewed explained the particular challenges posed by 
the global nature of phishing to the investigation, and expressly admitted the ineffectiveness of 
cross-border legal enforcement in tackling phishing activities in practice even though Taiwan has 
become a member of the G8 24/7 network in 2004. Although Taiwan participated in the 24/7 
network, which was established to connect the police and investigation agencies across borders, the 
actual effectiveness of the network in improving the collaboration of the investigative powers of 
different countries was doubted. The inconsistent procedural requirements for initiating 
investigations were deemed a key factor leading to different responses to MLA requests in different 
countries which significantly diminished the effectiveness of the transnational cooperation network 
in the fight against phishing. Another major cause which hampered the follow-up investigation and 
prosecution of phishing perpetrators was the negative response from other countries to Taiwan’s 
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request for information sharing.  
 
The priority for the financial institutions that were likely to be targeted was how they could enable a 
phishing website to be shut down as soon as it was detected. Given the slow pace of law 
enforcement regarding this point and the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation into phishing, 
the financial institutions resorted to ISPs directly in order to remove the fraudulent websites instead 
of reporting the case and working with law enforcement agencies.   
 
7.8.4. ISPs’ work in regulating phishing 
 
This subsection aims to examine how the ISPs of Taiwan have engaged in the anti-phishing work 
and the practical challenges encountered by the ISPs in dealing with phishing. This was primarily 
conducted by interviewing the representative (Interviewee D) from the information security 
department of Taiwan’s largest ISP.716 This subsection also attempts to generate an analysis of the 
opinions of the other interviewees about how the ISPs can refine their role and strengthen their 
participation in the task of combating phishing.  
 
According to Interviewee D, the ISP participated intently in the tasks of TAPWG and worked 
closely with TWNIC in drawing up the anti-phishing policies and constructing the phishing 
reporting system by exchanging opinions at regular periodical meetings of the TAPWG and 
providing assistance with testing the operation of APNOW. The representative from TWNIC 
(Interviewee E) also stated that the ISPs provided solutions at the request of TWNIC to block all 
visit and access to a phishing website once it had been detected which had the least influence on the 
unsuspecting customers’ connection to the Internet.  
                                                     
716 This is the largest provider in Taiwan in terms of revenue and customer numbers for fixed line services, mobile 
services, Internet connection services, and other Internet services, such as web hosting or information and 




Taiwan’s ISPs plays a crucial role in the current anti-phishing network, especially in two respects: 
the proactive detection of phishing attacks via the disposal of honeypots and the taking-down of 
verified phishing websites as soon as they are detected or reported.  
 
7.8.4.1. Proactive detection measures 
 
Under the vertical reporting system directed by the NCC, the five leading ISPs of Taiwan are 
required to dispose honeypots in their central control room to detect malicious attacks by 
non-actively attracting attackers and to gather information about attacking activities, including the 
collection of malicious emails such as phishing messages. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of 
honeypots in terms of the detection of phishing, particularly targeted phishing attacks, was doubted 
by Interviewee D and the specialist (Interviewee F) from a world reputed company for security 
software. Interviewee F stated: 
 
A thing like a honeypot is hardly able to catch information about attacks. How do 
I let attackers know that we have a website here which is waiting for attacks? 
What makes an attacker target a honeypot among the enormous number of 
websites available? Attackers may sometimes blunder into the honeypot, which 
means that most honeypots can only detect the type of attack with unspecified 
targets but barely have a chance to attract attackers who have set a particular 
attacking object. 
 
In addition to honeypots, the ISP attempted to prevent phishing emails, in the format of spam, from 
being delivered to users’ inboxes through the use of a spam filter. For outbound emails, the ISP 
would stop users who had sent emails exceeding a certain volume within a short timeframe from 
continuing mailing. Although Interviewee D admitted the restricted function of the spam filter in 
detecting phishing emails, particularly targeted phishing messages, the interviewee stressed that it 
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was an unavoidable situation under the requirement of privacy policy that should be observed by an 
ISP. Interviewee D stated: 
 
Being an ISP, we will never watch the content of emails because it is highly 
related to customers’ privacy. We usually identify a spam email by only focusing 
on the mail header or other patterns which are usually related to a spam, and we 
absolutely won’t touch the mail content. Therefore, we are unable to detect a 
targeted phishing email if it is undetectable without looking into its content. 
 
Interviewee D also emphasized that the ISP only guaranteed the security of the web hosting server 
and provided pay services such as vulnerability scanning for its customers to strengthen their 
website security. However, as an ISP had to avoid interfering with the content of websites, it hence 
became extremely difficult for an ISP to detect a phishing website hosted on its server at the time 
when the website was created. Interviewee D claimed: 
 
So far, we have been unable proactively to spot phishing in most cases. We 
usually learn of the existence of phishing from the reports originating in Taiwan 
or other countries.  
 
7.8.4.2. The taking-down of phishing websites 
 
As aforementioned, reports were the major source for the ISP to learn about phishing. According to 
the statement by interviewee D, all of the reports of phishing were handled by the specialists of the 
Security Operation Center (SOC) at 24 hours. Once a report of a phishing website had been 
delivered, the SOC would test the website reported and block the Internet connection to this website 
by suspending the TCP Port 80 as soon as it was confirmed to be a phishing site and also return to 
the reporter in four hours. The SOC would capture the evidence from the phishing website and 
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contact the user of the hosting machine by email or phone within 24 hours to ask that user to 
remove the phishing website. During the time before the phishing website was taken down, the ISP 
would continue to suspend the connection to the website based on the terms and conditions of the 
ISP service contract engaged between the ISP and the user.717  
 
While Interviewee D claimed that the ISP’s practice of suspension was adequately supported by the 
contractual agreement and it incurred complaints from customers only under very exceptional 
circumstances, Interviewee E mentioned that the ISPs of Taiwan sometimes were hesitant to take 
suspension measures in the absence of legal authorization. Interviewee E stated: 
 
In some cases, especially when the customer is also the victim, unaware that 
his/her machine has had a phishing page inserted, the ISPs have scruples about 
suspending the connection instantly because of their fear of being sued by the 
customer. This makes it pressing for NCC, the supervisory authority of the ISPs, 
to give an impetus to amend the Telecommunication Act to empower the ISPs to 
take the necessary measures in responding to phishing. 
 
An amendment bill to the Telecommunication Act was drafted by NCC to explicitly allow the ISPs 
to discontinue providing Internet services where necessary to the protection of information and 
telecommunication security. In the meantime, it requires the ISPs to enable their customers to be 
aware of the potential disadvantages upon them if there is a violation against information security. 
The need to strengthen the legal basis to support the ISPs was also recognized by the official 
representative from NCC (Interviewee G). Interviewee G stated: 
 
The ISPs will hold back from disconnecting, especially when the attack is not that 
                                                     
717 According to the terms of service contract, the ISP is entitled to suspend or terminate Internet services or 
terminate the contract under one of the following situations: if the user: 1. steals, alters or destroys the other person’s 
information; 2. endangers the security of telecommunication or influences the other user’s rights; or 3. sends email to 
other people without authorization which has caused persecution to the recipients.  
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evident, if there is a shortage of distinct legal authorization. We drafted an 
amendment bill to the Telecommunication Act by adding an article which 
authorizes the ISPs entirely or partially to suspend or terminate their services 
while encountering grave information security incidents.718 The ISPs are also 
obligated to enumerate the forbidden circumstances that may result from the 
suspension of the service contract and the ISP’s operating instructions to enable 
their customers to be aware of the above information to the largest extent.719 If 
the forgoing article becomes law, the NCC will be authorized to make rules for 
the ISPs to define the specific content of a ‘grave information security incident’. 
Although we have been able to find similar stipulations in nearly all the ISPs’ 
contracts, we believe that it will help the ISPs thoroughly to practise the 
suspension or termination of service according to the agreement without 
hesitation if their above actions are also clearly authorized by law. 
 
7.8.4.3. Reinforcement of ISPs’ responsibility to safeguard information security 
 
To ensure the security of Internet services, the NCC’s draft of the Telecommunication Act also 
requires ISPs to be responsible for taking specific information security initiatives, including 
establishing a security management system, installing safeguarding and detection devices, and 
setting up a collaborative defence and response mechanism to deal with reports of security incidents, 
handle these incidents and return to the reporter (Art. 55.1). The failure of ISPs to meet the 
requirements provided under Art. 55.1 and 55.4 attracts a fine of NT 60,000 -300,000 (Art. 86.1 (2)). 
Interviewee G emphasized that the above compulsory provisions were added to the 
Telecommunication Act in order to ensure the fulfillment of the ISPs’ duty to safeguard information 
security. Interviewee G explained: 
 
I repeatedly highlight a conception at every meeting with the ISPs. The customers 
are your bread and butter. Since you are paid by your users for Internet services, 
you are naturally responsible for safeguarding the security of these services. An 
                                                     
718 Art. 55.3 of the amendment bill of the Telecommunication Act.  
719 Art. 55.4 of the amendment bill of the Telecommunication Act. 
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appropriate analogy would be that you build a highway and charge drivers toll 
fees. Of course, it is your duty to ensure the safety of the highway by setting up 
traffic signs, maintaining the road or installing other facilities to protect the 
drivers. At present, we are unable to punish the ISPs if they fail to carry out their 
duty. This is why we need a compulsory provision to force the ISPs 
collaboratively to protect and safeguard the security of information and 
telecommunication.   
 
7.8.4.4. Challenges to the ISPs’ work 
 
Interviewee D saw the general lack of awareness about self-responsibility involving information 
security among Taiwanese users as the major challenge to the ISP’s work in dealing with 
information security incidents. Most users recognized neither the necessity of securing their 
computers nor the potential threat it might cause to information security in relation to themselves 
and other users if they failed to protect their computer. Interviewee D stated: 
 
In our experience of dealing with botnet, we find that the users whose computers 
have been identified as suspected bot-infected machines often do not realize their 
responsibility to keep their computers secure from being exploited for malicious 
use. In most cases, the users see themselves as innocent victims and don’t feel 
that there is a need particularly to strengthen the security of their computer even 
after we inform them of the security problem with their machine. There is an 
apparent lack of users’ consciousness of individual responsibility in respect to 
information security as a participant in the cyber world. We also feel a lack of 
users’ perceptions of the interrelation between their behavior and the integral 
security of the Internet network. 
 
Another setback for the ISP’s work in combating malicious attacks was the low willingness of the 
users to coordinate with the information security policy of the ISP. The ISP interviewed made 
considerable effort to help its users to protect their computer against invasion or infection; however, 




Being an ISP, we often suggest that our customers should install at least anti-virus 
software or take some measures to protect their computer, but we find that, 
overall, the purchase rate of anti-virus software has been rather low. Although we 
have made great effort to contact the customers who may have computer security 
problems and give them advice about how to solve the problem, our work appears 
unhelpful in raising the awareness and motivation of users to secure their 
computer. They usually won’t take any measure such as virus scanning or 
reinstallation unless we suspend their connection. I’ve been dealing with this kind 
of cases for many years but I feel very frustrated about this situation.  
 
To sum up, the ISPs play a key role in Taiwan’s anti-phishing work in both TAPWG and APNOW. 
Besides the participation in the policy-making work in TAPWG, the ISPs mainly function by taking 
phishing websites offline as soon as they receive phishing reports which may come from financial 
organizations or individual users directly or be forwarded via the platform of APNOW or NCC.  
 
The interviewee from the ISP claimed that they had no scruples about taking down a phishing 
website immediately, as this practice was upheld by the agreements contained in its Internet service 
contract. However, the interviewees from NCC and TWNIC held different opinions and recognized 
the hesitation among ISPs to suspend an Internet connection right away in responding to a violation 
of information security in the absence of a distinct legal authorization. The interviewee from NCC 
also particularly highlighted the need to strengthen the legal requirement laid down in the 
Telecommunication Act for ISPs in respect of ensuring the security of the facilities and services and 
conducting specific initiatives for information security purposes.  
 
In addition to the taking-down strategy, the ISP employed honeypots and spam filters in order to 
mitigate the threat of phishing. However, the above attempt proved ineffective in proactively 
spotting phishing activities, especially in the detection of targeted phishing attacks. The insufficient 
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awareness among users about their roles and responsibility involving integral information security 
posed a crucial challenge to the ISP’s work. The interviewee from the ISP also revealed a great 
frustration about users’ noncooperation with the ISP on enhancing security measures to protect their 
computer devices from being exploited for malicious attacks.  
 
7.8.5. Other problems with Taiwan’s anti-phishing work 
 
This subsection attempts to examine other problems raised up by the interviewees about Taiwan’s 
anti-phishing work and find suggestions for improving the capability and strength of Taiwan in the 
fight against phishing.  
 
7.8.5.1. Cooperation and exchange of databases on phishing 
 
Interviewee E expressed an intention of the TWNIC to seek cooperation with other companies or 
institutions which also assembled phishing data, for example browser industries or Internet search 
service providers, to facilitate the exchange of information and databases on phishing in order to 
deal with the phishing websites hosted in Taiwan more effectively. Interviewee E stated: 
 
We are trying to contact some organizations to build up a cooperative relationship 
in order to exchange information and databases about phishing. For example, 
Internet Explorer has done a lot of work to prevent its users from visiting 
suspicious phishing websites. If they pass the list of blocked phishing websites to 
us, we can remove those websites rather than solely blocking visits. Also, if we 
can obtain more information about malicious websites generated through web 
search engines from search service providers such as Google, we can take these 
known phishing websites down or cope with them in a better way. It needs some 
time and more communication still needs to be done, but we will continue to look 





However, the representative from Taiwan’s top-ranked company in terms of market share for 
anti-spam products and services (Interviewee H) mentioned that they used to consult with TWNIC 
for the purpose of interchanging research data but they received a negative answer. Interviewee H 
stated: 
 
We used to talk to TWNIC to see if it was possible to exchange research data 
about botnets, but they were unable to cooperate with us in this aspect. We have 
barely had any discussion with them on this issue since then. 
 
Notably, in responding to the question about engagement in cooperation, Interviewee H revealed a 
preference for working alone, building up its own database for the company’s exclusive use and 
showed no interest in coordinating with other companies or institutions, especially if this 
cooperation model was directed by the government. Interviewee H stated: 
 
We would prefer to establish a research unit on our own. In fact, we already have 
an anti-spam research centre which not only conducts research on spam but also 
continues to accumulate data about spam mails. As our company is the only 
sponsor of this research centre at present, the research outcome and database 
currently are not released to the public but exclusively used by our company for 
developing our commercial products.  
 
In our long-term plan, we’re considering making our database available to 
domestic or foreign organizations for a fee if this research centre can be 
independently operated but, given the difficulties of harmonizing the different 
views posed by various stances, we would prefer not to cooperate with others but 
do the work on our own in order to have better control.   
 
Furthermore, Interviewee H pointed out the major differences between a government-directed 
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cooperation scheme and a non-government-based cooperation model in terms of the attitude 
towards operations, flexibility in the management of funds, and coordination of the conflict of 
interests between the participants. Interviewee H stated: 
 
There is a huge difference between the fundamental standpoints and perceptions 
of the government and non-government organizations so that it is hard to expect 
the government to establish a cooperation scheme from the angle of a commercial 
operator. The government officials always make us undertake a particular task by 
ordering but they barely consider the reasons why we should take the orders if we 
don’t mutually benefit from the same thing. It is absolutely unacceptable to be 
forced to contribute only, without being given any favour.  
 
The fund is also a problem, as it involves a government budget which does not 
allow us to manage and control it in a flexible way. Another problem is the 
coordination among different information security companies. These companies 
are usually the main contributors but very often they are also industrial 
competitors. It will be a hard challenge to the government to deal with the conflict 
of interests between members.  
 
7.8.5.2. Training and education of information security specialists 
 
The insufficient ability of information technology personnel (IT personnel) of businesses to ensure 
web security and properly respond to information security incidents was deemed by some of the 
interviewees as a major weakness in effectively combating phishing. According to Interviewee F, 
this was largely caused by the fact that the enterprises failed to give adequate weight to the 
information technology department and to respect the professionalism of information security. 
Interviewee F stated: 
 
Generally speaking, the field of information technology does not receive 
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appropriate attention from most enterprises in Taiwan. A majority of Taiwanese 
enterprises see IT as a department which only consumes money without bringing 
too much benefit. Thus, these enterprises usually ask their IT personnel to be an 
all-purpose engineer who needs to do all of the works related to computers, the 
Internet, or even machines in order to save costs. I used to be asked to repair air 
conditioning and fire equipment when I was a web engineer for a private 
corporation before. Taiwan’s enterprises are used to ask their IT personnel to do 
as much work as possible, no matter if they are capable of doing so. Unreasonable 
workloads on IT engineers have, in fact, resulted in great vulnerabilities in the 
websites of many enterprises in Taiwan. Unfortunately, this is a common failing 
in Taiwan. 
 
Interviewee F pointed out that the size of enterprise was a key factor in determining the amount of 
resource available to information security work. Since small and medium-sized business (SMBs) 
form the majority in Taiwan,720 it was hence difficult to expect most of Taiwan’s businesses to 
employ an IT engineer to take charge of information security. In the opinion of Interviewee F, the IP 
personnel in Taiwan’s private sector generally had a weak capacity for responding to phishing 
incidents, which highlighted the need particularly to strengthen the ability of the IT personnel to 
serve as a competent first responder. Interviewee F stated: 
 
I feel that Taiwan’s IT personnel should improve their first responder ability. In 
the field of computer forensics, a first responder is the person who first arrives at 
the crime scene. This person does not necessarily need to have excellent, 
sophisticated computer skills but he needs to clearly know what necessary 
evidence he must preserve, to the least extent. If I were a first responder, I have to 
cordon off the scene as soon as an information security incident is detected. It 
didn’t matter whether I knew how to analyze the evidence or not, as the main task 
of a first responder is to preserve the integrity of the evidence. Once a first 
responder fails in his/her task, the following investigation and analysis of 
evidence will become useless. 
 
                                                     
720 See Chapter 3, section 3.3.2.  
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While Interviewee D from the ISP considered that the solution to improving the capacity of IT 
personnel in responding to and dealing with information security incidents should be grounded in 
school education, Interviewees F and H recognized that the systematic development and planned 
training provided by a selected group of information security professionals should be prioritized.  
 
Interviewee F stated:  
 
It requires a long-term training and a rich-resourced environment. Sound learning 
under the guidance of information security experts and an adequate knowledge 
base are the two essential elements in developing competent information security 
engineers. Finding several seeded companies which conform to the above two 
conditions to take on training work may be worthwhile considering. 
 
Interviewee H further attacked the government’s neglect of national cyber security in terms of 
fostering and retaining information security talents. This exposed the sensitive information systems 
and networks of government agencies to an increasing threat of cyber-attacks, particularly the 
malicious attacks launched by China’s Cyber Army.721 Interviewee H claimed: 
 
In fact we have many top hackers in Taiwan but the government seldom considers 
systematically recruiting these people. Taiwan has been a well-known attacking 
object of China’s Cyber Army. Although several hackers in Taiwan have 
attempted to create an underground defence against attacks originating from 
China, individual effort solely based on voluntary action can only produce very 
limited effects. I feel that the government really needs to concentrate more on this 
problem. There is still a lot of work to be done by the government either 
                                                     
721 May 2011 bought a revelation that China’s military had set up an elite Internet security task force, called the 
“Cyber Blue Team”. Being the core force of the People’s Liberation Army, it was constituted of 30 members and 
organized under the Guangdong military command in the country’s south. Although China’s Cyber Army was created to 
fend off external cyber-attacks, more and more countries alleged that it was in fact designed for launching immense 
cyber-attacks on the computer systems of governments and corporations worldwide. Yu, Eileen (2011), 'China 
dispatches online army', ZDNet. <http://www.zdnet.com/china-dispatches-online-army-2062300502/>, accessed 
September 12 2014. The intense malicious cyber-attacks from China to Taiwan, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.4. 
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systematically to organize these information security talents or to employ them to 
find and train more information security specialists and thereby reinforce 
Taiwan’s cyber defensive strength. 
 
7.8.5.3. Promotion of users’ awareness of information security  
 
While the promotion of users’ awareness of information security was recognized by most of the 
specialists interviewed as an essential solution to combating phishing, it was also regarded as the 
most difficult part to address. Not only had the interviewee from the ISP experienced significant 
difficulty in improving users’ awareness of information security, but the interviewees from NCC 
and the information security service provider also mentioned the dilemma of having users to act in 
coordination with the necessary practice in order to protect themselves from falling victim to 
cyber-attacks. Interviewee G stated: 
 
Dealing with the computer security problem existing at the user end is always the 
toughest work. This is also a common consensus reached by different countries at 
some international conferences and meetings that I have attended. We may inform 
users of the security vulnerabilities that have been detected on their computers 
and suggest how they can fix them with patches722 or by re-installment. However, 
we have no alternative if a user chooses to ignore our information except that the 
security problem of this user’s computer has endangered other users. It is hard to 
expect every user to know about information security.  
 
Interviewee F demonstrated that most customers were unwilling to take security measures in 
coordination with the advice given by their information security consultants unless certain damage 
had occurred.  
 
                                                     
722 A patch is a piece of software designed to update a computer program to improve its usability or performance or 
fix problems such as security holes and bugs. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patch_(computing).   
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In most cases, the victims are not conscious that they have become victims and 
usually are loath to work with you as they think it is your problem. They will start 
to act in coordination with your advice only if the security problem has physically 
caused damage to them. 
 
Interviewee G suggested two ways to improve users’ awareness of information security: 
fundamental school education and assistance from ISPs with detecting and dealing with security 
vulnerabilities. Interviewee G stated: 
 
The current education has apparently fallen behind the fast-changing development 
of information technology. This proves that there exists a need to strengthen 
information security education, particularly fundamental school education, to 
improve public awareness of information security. Another way is to enhance free 
or pay service of ISPs to help their users to ensure the security of their websites or 




Phishing demands a broad understanding of regulation which refers to any force that makes it 
possible to prevent or interrupt a phishing attack. Regulation of phishing can be a piece of 
legislation, a computer program, a management initiative, or even an educational programme, as 
long as it can effectively increase the cost or difficulty to attackers to perform phishing or reduce 
the probability of attackers to succeed. This chapter considered a multi-dimensional regulatory 
framework which primarily consists of law, technology, education and institutional networking. 
While the previous chapters have focused on the legal regulation of phishing, this chapter examined 





Technology features largely in the fight against phishing and has served as the front line of defense 
through proactive detection of phishing at email or website level. However, a number of usability 
studies demonstrated the ineffectiveness of technical tools in preventing users from falling for phish, 
as users often explain away the warnings of anti-phishing toolbars or ignore suspicious signs 
coming from the browser security indicators due to a lack of a baseline level of security awareness. 
Phishing is a typical social engineering attack which exploits the weakness in human nature and 
also takes advantage of users’ inability to distinguish spoofed emails or websites from legitimate 
one. Education is used as the baseline of defense by teaching users to spot phishing and prevent 
them from engaging in potentially risky activities. However, the difficulty of inspiring users’ 
motivation of pursuing education and the obstacles to transferring education materials to users’ 
secure online behaviours are always the problems that may negatively influence the effectiveness of 
education measures. Notice-and-takedown is another dominant anti-phishing approach based on 
institutional network which functions by removing a phishing website as soon as it is detected in 
order to minimize the potential damage and victims that the site may cause. However, the phishing 
sites that are hosted in free web-hosting environment or on compromised machines, in particular 
fast-flux and rock phish sites, have posed a crucial challenge to takedown strategy. The actors 
responsible for phishing takedown are not equally-cooperative and some of them, especially domain 
registrars, may even disregard the removal requests. This can be addressed by ICANN by setting 
standards for registrars and registries to respond to domain abuse and enforcing compliance through 
accreditation mechanism.   
 
There is no single perfect solution that can adequately deal with phishing, as each countermeasure 
has its strengths and weaknesses. This chapter does not intend to provide a flawless strategy but 
suggests the essential elements that should be included in the regulatory framework for phishing. A 
combined approach that comprises laws, technology, education and institutional network may be an 




An effective anti-phishing strategy largely relies on the joint efforts of the stakeholders from 
various fields. The establishment of the TAPWG and the APNOW showed that Taiwan is in a right 
direction, but whether these initiatives can practically produce effect on combating phishing still 
remains a question. This chapter observed several problems from the APNOW based on the existing 
available resources and data and suggested that it should endeavor to reduce the process time 
required of takedown, continually monitor the phishing sites that have been taken down, improve its 
visibility and usability, and enhance immediate communication with Foreign CERTs.  
 
Nevertheless, the existing Taiwanese literature only provides general background information about 
the current anti-phishing initiatives. There is a lack of scholarship that examines the role and 
contribution of different stakeholders in Taiwan’s anti-phishing community. Moreover, all the 
information about the internal operation of TAPWG and the statistics regarding APNOW’s process 
times are not unveiled publicly but only shared among their members. Given the shortage of 
research-based literature, I conducted an empirical study to synthesize the opinions of the key 
persons from different organizations involved in order to provide insight into the efforts that various 
stakeholders have devoted and are expected to devote to anti-phishing work combined with the 
difficulty that they have experienced in combating phishing.  
 
There were several key findings. The cross-border nature of phishing posed a huge challenge for 
Taiwan’s investigators in tracing phishing perpetrators even though Taiwan is the member of the G8 
24/7 network. The weak legal enforcement of phishing led to a general mistrust in the regulatory 
power of laws and also undermined the intention of the financial institutions that were likely to be 
spoofed to work with law enforcement agencies when they detected a phishing site.  
 
The ISPs were identified as being in a key position in combating phishing. While going to the ISPs 
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directly to take phishing sites down was generally regarded to be a more efficient method of dealing 
with phishing, the ISPs sometimes were hesitant to take suspension measures. An explicit 
authorization by law was considered helpful to back up the ISPs to take the suspected phishing sites 
offline immediately after verification without hesitation. Another major deterrent to the ISPs’ 
anti-phishing work came from inadequate customers’ awareness of computer and information 
security. Most customers were unconscious of their responsibility in respect of information security 
and therefore seldom to act in concert with the security policy of the ISPs.  
 
There was currently no significant development of cooperation and information sharing in terms of 
phishing between the stakeholders. The government and industry usually had different requirements 
and expectations about a cooperation model, and it is hard to achieve co-ordination or reconcile 
conflicting interests of stakeholders.  
 
The major weaknesses of the anti-phishing work were identified to lie in the lack of users’ 
awareness of information security and insufficient capacity of Taiwan’s businesses, in particular 
SMBs, for ensuring web security and respond to information security incidents. Therefore, in terms 
of suggestions for further work, the priority was placed on effective education of users that can 
promote users’ knowledge and awareness about phishing and information security and systematic 
training of IT personnel that can enable competence in ensuring web security and properly respond 




CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION                       
 
The increasing threats to information privacy and the great costs to society have inspired growing 
demands for the regulation of phishing. However, the question is: how can we effectively regulate 
phishing? It can also be asked in another way: how can we effectively prevent phishing or diminish 
the damage that phishing is likely to cause? In my opinion, the regulation of phishing can be 
achieved in two ways: increasing the cost or difficulty of performing phishing and decreasing the 
possibility of successful phishing.   
 
An analogy would be if we wished to prohibit any person from approaching a lake to fish. We could 
position a warning notice by the lake, saying ‘No fishing allowed. Violators will be punished or 
fined’. We could also build a fence around the lake to stop fishermen getting close to the fish or 
establish an alarm system which will report to the patrolman if someone casts a hook into the water 
so that the patrolman will come to cut the fishing line as soon as he has been alerted. Teaching fish 
to be more skilled in distinguishing real food and lures is also a way to protect them from being 
hooked.  
 
There are many possible ways to deter fishermen or prevent successful fishing, but there is no 
perfect solution that can provide a watertight safeguard. Fishermen are very likely to ignore the 
warning notice if they feel that they are very unlikely to be caught. A thinking fisherman can also 
easily get through the fence as long as he can find a crack or successfully bore a hole in it. A 
patrolman may be able to stop the continuation of fishing, but would be unable to determine how 
many fish may have been caught before he arrives and when or where the fisherman will return. 
Fish have a great chance to take the bait if they fail to detect a lure due to inadequate knowledge or 
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do not fully perceive the danger that the lure may pose for them.  
 
In terms of regulation of phishing, law serves as a typical deterrent by imposing a threat of 
punishment. Law can also be used to promote security, privacy, and anti-phishing conscious 
behaviour among technology providers. Technology features largely in the regulation of phishing, 
as it physically constrains phishers from performing attacks through the codes embedded in the 
hardware and software. Institutional networking controls phishing by monitoring or interrupting the 
performance of phishing through close cooperation encouraged where appropriate by legal 
measures between different institutions involved. Teaching users to spot phishing signs and act as 
an educated user about information security is also an important measure helping users to stay from 
phishing traps which in turns reducing the probability of success of phishing.  
 
Each form of regulation can produce different regulatory effects upon phishing, but their effect is 
limited in certain aspects. Given the unique function of different forms of regulation combined with 
their strengths as well as weaknesses in combating phishing, this research proposed a 
multi-dimensional regulatory framework incorporating the countermeasures developed in various 
areas, including legal, technical, educational, and institutional networking, in order to maximize the 
regulatory power at each step of the process of a phishing attack. 
 
This research examined the regulation of phishing in Taiwan, with a primary focus on law but also 
other forms of regulation, and, because of the transnational nature of phishing, law and regulation in 
other domains and the interaction between Taiwan and international regulatory interfaces. This 
concluding chapter revisits the research questions set out in the Introduction to draw conclusions 
about the examination of each form of regulation – what their respective roles are in the fight 
against phishing, how they have been developed to date and the factors that may impede their 
effectiveness. It also includes suggestions for the future development of Taiwan’s multi-dimensional 
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regulatory framework to strengthen the overall defensive and responsive capacity against phishing 
and improve the domestic and transnational cooperation between different regulatory bodies.  
 
8.1. Legal regulation – an essential but weak countermeasure 
 
This study has raised concerns about the effectiveness of the traditionally national legal approach of 
criminalization of phishing as well as of the international approach of harmonization of legal 
standards and cross-border cooperation between legal enforcement agencies.  
 
8.1.1. Gaps between laws and phishing 
 
Outlawing phishing is the first step to make a phishing attacker accountable for his conduct and is 
also the fundamental work to enable the universal criminalization of phishing in order to achieve 
effective international regulation of phishing. As phishing is generally not regarded as a sui generis 
problem, most countries usually deal with phishing by upgrading existing provisions to cover 
phishing or doing nothing but applying the existing law to phishing. The research examined the 
criminal laws in Taiwan and also other countries such as UK and USA as well as the relevant 
international laws relating to cybercrime and found that there have existed several gaps between the 
coverage of these laws and the true context of phishing, which raise a question about the capability 
of legal regulation to deal adequately with phishing.  
 
It found that most of the gaps between laws and phishing results from inadequate understanding of 
the characteristics of phishing and insufficient consideration of the compatibility of the elements of 




8.1.1.1. Misunderstandings of the nature of phishing 
 
A clear understanding of the nature of phishing is very important to identify the true context of 
phishing so that we can easily recognize the elements that have been legally addressed and those 
that may have been missed.  
 
Phishing can be carried out by both social engineering and technical subterfuge schemes, which 
may involve illegal access to computer storage along with malware infection but not always the 
case. A phishing attack may target a variety of confidential information, ranging from financial or 
personally sensitive information to business or even national security secrets, which usually do not 
have business value and cannot be transacted. Although many phishing attacks are motivated by 
financial gain, the target of phishing is actually obtainment of confidential information which may 
not necessarily yield financial profit. Phishers may make profit directly from solicited data but can 
also exploit it as a stepping stone for subsequent malicious use. Most importantly, phishing is not an 
offence against property but an offence against information security. As, unlike a physical movable 
property, an electromagnetic record is duplicable in nature, acquisition of certain sensitive 
information is very often not accompanied by a loss of data subjects or data controllers of that 
information. Obtainment of confidential information does not necessarily mean monetary damage to 
data subjects or controllers. The damage that phishing is likely to cause includes not only direct loss 
of money or goods but also indirect cost used to redress phishing as well as loss of potential 
customers or damage to credit or reputation. The reason why phishing demands criminalization is 
not because it causes violation against property interests but it constitutes infringement of 
information security which involves computer security and information privacy. 
 




Phishing is a malicious cyber activity that directly targets the obtainment of personal, financial or 
other confidential information by masquerading as a trustworthy source to deceive users into 
rendering target information or gaining direct access to data storage through malware infection. It 
consists of two elements: object (confidential information) and two acts (using the identity and 
obtaining information). 
 
In some countries, such as the US and UK, the criminalization of phishing is covered by the offence 
of identity theft or identity fraud, under the umbrella term ‘identity-related crime’. While there are 
certain overlaps of the elements between these two offences and phishing, this research argued that 
they are unable to fully cover phishing but only partially. Phishing is similar to identity theft, as 
both activities usually involve the unauthorised use of another person’s identity. However, the 
object of identity theft is only specified for identity-related information while the object data of 
phishing can include not only information related to identity but also a variety of confidential 
information concerning a person, corporation or country. Phishing is also similar to identity fraud, 
as it also uses false identity to defraud someone. Nevertheless, identity fraud concentrates on 
monetary or financial gain whereas phishing may do so but not always.  
 
8.1.1.3. ‘Obtaining’ information, not ‘stealing’  
 
Taiwan introduced two major legal amendments in 1997 and 2003 which brought the Criminal 
Code of Taiwan into a new era in responding to the rise of new forms of offences committed by 
computer technologies and Internet networks. The 1997 Act provided electromagnetic records the 
same legal status as a movable property and expanded the object of property crime, such as larceny 
or fraud, from physical property to electromagnetic records. Nevertheless, the lawmakers apparently 
failed to take into account of duplicable nature of electromagnetic records. The obtainment of an 
electromagnetic record by duplication does not simultaneously destroy the original possession of 
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that record so that such obtainment is unable to satisfy the elements of larceny. The above 
incompatibility also happened in fraud law. In short, electromagnetic records, strictly speaking from 
a legal perspective, can only be ‘obtained’, not ‘stolen’. 
 
8.1.1.4. Consent obtained by fraud is not an authorisation 
 
The 2003 Act, which took the CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime as a model, created a sui generis 
chapter for the regulation of the offences against computer use and electromagnetic records. This 
Act removed electromagnetic records from the objects of the larceny law and replaced it with Art. 
359 which deals with obtainment of electromagnetic records from another person’s computer or 
related equipment without authorisation. This removal also produced the same effect, mutatis 
mutandis, on the law of fraud. The 2003 Act was particularly important to the regulation of phishing, 
as it explicitly provided protection for information security by granting electromagnetic records an 
independent legal status separate from the general movable property protected under the larceny or 
fraud law. 
 
The enactment of Art. 359, theoretically, should have put an end to the debate over whether the 
larceny or fraud law is applicable to the case of illegal obtainment of electromagnetic records. 
However, researchers still argued that phishing should be dealt with by the fraud law, as Art. 359 
can only apply to the case where the obtainment of data is undertaken without the awareness of the 
victim; for example, phishers access the data storage by malware infection. In the case where 
phishers deceive another person into giving away his information is not unauthorised obtainment as 
this obtainment is carried out under consent, even if fraudulent.  
 
This research questioned the above approach and suggested that ‘unauthorised’ should be seen as a 
special element purposely laid down by the lawmakers in the offences against personality and 
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should not be excluded by the excuse that applied to the offence against property. In addition, the 
commitment of the offence of fraud requires an occurrence of actual damage to property (Art. 339). 
It argued that this is unlikely to happen in the case of phishing unless the targeted information itself 
has business value and this value will transfer to phishers immediately following the delivery of 
information.  
 
8.1.1.5. The main concern about phishing is its threat to information security, not property 
 
Acquisition of another person’s electromagnetic records without authorisation does not constitute an 
offence if no damage has been caused to that person or to the public pursuant to Art. 359. But the 
question is: what is the context of damage and how to determine whether damage has been caused?  
 
There is a difference of opinion between researchers and the judges of Taiwan. For researchers, the 
damage does not have to be monetary damage and should be capable of a broad interpretation; but 
for the judges, a person should not be found guilty if the record has no value or the obtainment has 
not resulted in monetary damage. Judges see unauthorised obtainment of electromagnetic records as 
an offence against property, even though the 2003 Act clearly indicated that Art. 359 was intended 
to protect information security. This judicial interpretation opens a loophole where the victim fails 
to specify his monetary loss. This research suggested that it is necessary to escape from the old 
thinking and adopt a broad interpretation of damage under Art. 359.  
 
The various gaps between law and phishing raise questions about the capability of the Criminal 
Code in addressing phishing and suggest the need to consider alternatives.  
 




8.1.2.1. The role that has been ignored 
 
Law can not only serve as a corrective measure which constrains phishing through coercion or 
punishment but also act as a preventative through ensuring protection of information privacy, an 
area which has been ignored in current legal discussion. This research suggested that, apart from 
being a direct infringement of information privacy, phishing is often used as a leading vector for 
data breach which usually involves exploitation of personal information gathered from social 
networking sites. More and more phishing attacks, especially spear phishing, target enterprises and 
even governments rather than end users, as the attackers can easily walk off with enormous personal 
data as long as they can get the key to the database systems. The abundant personal information 
available on social networking sites, in this case, provides the best materials for phishers to craft a 
highly convincing lure to gain a toehold in a specific target’s environment.   
 
There is a complementary relationship between phishing and data breach. While phishing largely 
enhances the chance of attackers to successfully breach a database system, the huge amount of 
stolen personal data obtained from data breach, on the other hand, also greatly promotes the 
creation of numerous phishing scams. There is a need to ensure the legal protection of personal 
information, especially in respect of maintaining the confidentiality of personal data, strengthening 
data controllers’ obligation towards security of data, and reinforcing individuals’ control and choice 
regarding their information in order to achieve effective legal regulation of phishing.  
 
8.1.2.2. The awkward position of the Personal Information Protection Act of Taiwan 
 
This research examined the legal frameworks of personal data protection that have been developed 
at three different levels, including global, Asia-Pacific region, and Taiwan national level to explore 
the interaction between different regulatory interfaces, with a primary focus on the analysis of 
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whether the personal information protection law of Taiwan is able to provide adequate protection of 
personal information in responding to the requirements raised from the regulation of phishing.  
 
Taiwan started its legislation work on personal data protection in the 1980s and passed its first data 
protection law, which was largely built upon the OECD Guidelines, in 1995. In order to better 
harmonize with international standards of personal data privacy, Taiwan additionally incorporated 
several data protection principles set out in the EU Directive and adopted the APEC Privacy 
Principles in its enactment of the PIP Act, which was passed in 2010 and came into force in 2012. 
The PIP Act made several key amendments to the previous law which were seemingly very useful 
in offering a more comprehensive protection for personal information but in fact did very little to 
limit phishing, as the devil is in the detail. 
 
The PIP Act not only failed to redress the pre-existing problems of the previous law but also 
appeared to be incapable of providing effective protection for personal information and even caused 
a reverse-effect on the data protection against phishing. The fundamental problem lies in the failure 
of the lawmakers to achieve a balance between the protection of two values - the value of 
information privacy and the value of efficiency of data collection, processing, and use. This 
argument was based on the following defects observed in the Act.  
 
Ample exceptions to data collection prohibitions and improper use of indeterminate legal 
concepts  
 
In 2004, the constitutional status of the right of privacy was for the first time recognized by the 
Taiwan Constitutional Court, which further defined the right of privacy as “the right to decide 
whether or not to disclose their personal information, and, if so, to what extent, at what time, in 
what manner and to what people such information will be disclosed.” The right of information 
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privacy is a recognized fundamental human right which can only be restricted by explicit laws 
under very exceptional circumstances pursuant to the Constitution. However, the PIP Act provided 
ample exceptions for both government and non-government agencies for justifying their collection 
of personal data, with little respect for information privacy.  
 
Moreover, it largely used different indeterminate legal concepts in its provision in relation to the 
exceptions to data collection prohibitions. The use of indeterminate legal concepts itself is not 
improper and sometimes is unavoidable given the flexibility for administrative authorities in 
determining its content. However, their excessive use raises questions of propriety, especially 
currently Taiwan in the absence of a specific authority to deal effectively with disputes. This 
indeterminacy in legal protection of personal information even indirectly encourages phishers to 
leverage efforts to obtain personal information from so-called ‘publicly available resources’, 
irrespective of the awareness of the data subjects, for subsequent malicious use.  
 
Insignificant distinction between identifiable information and de-identifiable information 
 
The term ‘personal information’, according to the PIP Act, referred to the information which may be 
used to identify a natural person, both directly and indirectly (Art. 2(1)). This research questioned 
the significance of distinguishing ‘identifiable information’ from ‘un-identifiable information’. The 
line between these two kinds of information has become blurred, as supposedly anonymous 
information can still be linked to an individual through a combination of anonymous data or a use 
of technology. More importantly, the constraint on the scope of personal information leaves an 
unregulated circumstance in which the information is sensitive to a person but may not be linked to 
him, such as financial information that has been at the highest risk of being phished. The context of 
personal information should not be subject to discrimination based on whether or not it can be used 




Disadvantaged position of data subjects 
 
Taiwan’s personal information protection law, as aforementioned, has no specific authority to 
supervise the data controllers and monitor their compliance with the laws, and where necessary, 
prosecute and sue corporations which fail to comply with the legal requirements leading to the theft 
of personal information. An independent privacy protection authority is not only important for 
dealing with disputes over indeterminate legal concepts but also particularly valuable to ensure the 
protection of data subjects by representing the interests of individuals to compete against the power 
of the government agencies and large, wealthy corporations.  
 
Compromise to data controllers 
 
The increase in the prohibition and liability of the data controllers with regard to the unauthorised 
collection and use of personal information in the PIP Act created extreme anxiety among both 
government and non-government agencies. The PIP Act, particularly the prohibition of collection, 
processing or use of special categories of data (Art. 6), the criminal liability for non-compliance 
with the Act (Art. 41) and the one year notice duty (Art. 54) led to strong complaints among 
Taiwanese enterprises about the difficulty of implementation. The continuous interventions by these 
enterprises deterred the enforcement of the PIP Act for 28 months and, in consequence, they have 
successfully impeded the enforcement of Art. 6 and 54 and also propelled the government to initiate 
re-amendment to the Act by adding two extra exceptions to data collection prohibitions easing the 
notice duty of the controllers.  
 
There was a fundamental difference in the expectations regarding the PIP Act between the data 
controllers and subjects. The primary concern of enterprises was how they can ‘legally’ collect 
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individuals’ personal information to the maximum standard while decreasing their risk of being 
punished or sued for compensation to the minimum standard. Very little consideration has been 
given to improvement of the protection of information privacy by reducing the unnecessary 
collection of personal information and underpinning security measures to safeguard information 
against illegal access such as phishing. The regular compromise towards data controllers reveals the 
lawmakers’ bias in favour of the convenience and efficiency of data collection and against the 
information privacy of the data subjects.  
 
8.1.3. Challenges to legal enforcement  
 
While the power of legal regulation, to a certain extent, depends on successful prosecution and 
conviction of criminals, the transnational and transient nature of phishing has significantly 
increased the difficulty for law enforcement agencies to trace and prosecute phishing perpetrators. 
The challenges posed by phishing to law enforcement work have to be addressed by international 
harmonization of legal standards and cross-border cooperation between law enforcement agencies, 
which is not an easy task to achieve if there exists no mutual legal assistance agreements and is 
particularly difficult for Taiwan which suffers from political obstacles in engaging in international 
conventions and cross-border cooperation.  
 
8.1.3.1. General challenges and corresponding measures 
 
Phishing, by its transnational and transient natures, has caused problems for law enforcement. A 
phishing attack usually involves two or more jurisdictions, but cross-border investigation is not 
made possible without cooperation of the law enforcement agencies in all of the countries involved. 
MLA has been an essential tool to achieve law enforcement cooperation which is on dual 
criminality, but dual criminality sometimes becomes a necessary requirement when it comes to 
348 
 
coercive measures such as search or seizure which are often required in phishing investigations. It is 
hence very important to ensure the prevalence of the criminalization of phishing and promote the 
consistency and compatibility of the national laws by establishing transnational legal standards to 
eliminate safe havens for phishers and diminish uneven regulation of phishing resulting from the 
divergence between the phishing laws of different nations.   
 
The CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime is the first and the only binding international instrument to 
deal with cybercrimes, which represents a significant step forward in fighting cybercrime by 
providing a fundamental basis for European countries as well as many countries outside Europe to 
formulate their national laws on cybercrime. This research found that while the Convention deals 
with the falsification of scam emails (Art. 7), access to a computer system by malware infection 
(Art. 2), the obtainment of information by interception of communication through technical means 
(Art. 3), and the possible fraudulent use subsequent to obtaining the information (Art. 8), it fails to 
address the act which features largely in phishing – a social engineering attack. A review of the 
Convention in respect of the regulation of phishing is therefore necessary. 
 
The transient nature of phishing is another crucial challenge to legal enforcement. Phishing websites 
usually exist for only few days or even few hours and the speed at which phishers can shift to 
another sever after the bogus sites have been taken down largely increase the difficulty of 
investigation and place the law enforcement agencies under heavy time pressure to identify and 
trace of phishing perpetrators. Cybercrime investigations are time-sensitive, which makes it an 
imperative to ensure the close cooperation and timely communication between law enforcement 
agencies. To keep up with the need for rapid cybercrime investigations, there has been an 
international progress in the establishment of 24/7 contact points to provide assistance in the 




The creation of G8 24/7 Network in 1997 set a dominant model for a number of international 
protocols to construct a 24/7 network to speed up the communications between countries and 
expedite investigations against cyber criminals. However, whether or not the 24/7 network is 
practically effective in facilitating a global seamless web of legal enforcement against phishing is a 
question that remains unanswered.  
 
8.1.3.2. Dilemma of Taiwan 
 
Taiwan has been at great risk of phishing but also has been experiencing particular difficulty in 
pursuing effective cross-border legal enforcement. A major deterrent is its disadvantaged political 
status. Because of the political tensions between Taiwan and China, Taiwan has struggled to regain 
its pre-1971 international recognition status. In the circumstances, Taiwan has focused on 
membership of international organizations. However, pressure from China continues to impede 
Taiwan’s attempts to take part in the international arena. Taiwan has long been excluded from most 
international organizations and has been prevented from being a signatory to a great majority of 
international conventions, but has been permitted as Chinese Taipei to join the G8 24/7 network.  
 
This research provided an analysis of the data collected from the interviews with the key persons 
selected from different regulatory bodies in Taiwan, which revealed a general mistrust about the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s legal enforcement in phishing cases. The weak legal enforcement was 
attributed to several factors, but the transnational element of phishing was regarded as the most 
crucial barrier to investigation, as it was almost impossible for the investigators to track the IP any 
further once the phishing site had been identified as being housed in a foreign country due to a lack 
of MLA. In spite of Taiwan’s membership of the G8 24/7 network, it has been very difficult to seek 
assistance from other countries even in cases involving national security. This is largely due to the 
different procedural requirements in countries for launching an investigation. While many countries 
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require a court order before certain investigative actions are triggered, it has been practically 
difficult to have a court order if the case is unrelated to the requested country, especially when it 
only concerns damage and victims in the requesting country. 
 
The analysis also demonstrated that ineffective law enforcement undermined the intention of other 
stakeholders, especially the potential victims such as online merchants, to cooperate with the law 
enforcement agencies when they detect a phishing site. In addition, the priority of the merchants 
was how they could enable a spoofed site to be shut down as soon as it was known, whereas the law 
enforcement agencies focused on evidence collection which may require the bogus site to be kept 
active for a certain period. Therefore, the merchants tended to resort to ISPs directly for removal of 
phishing sites instead of working with law enforcement agencies.  
 
Although law has been an essential regulator in the both real and virtual world, its regulatory power 
is hardly fulfilled if it fails to increase the risk experienced by perpetrators of being prosecuted and 
make them accountable for their conduct. This research suggested that while legal regulation is 
important, it has to be located within a broader multi-dimensional regulatory framework in order to 
effectively combat phishing.  
 
8.2. Technology – the defective front-line countermeasure  
 
The technical regulation of phishing refers to any software or hardware that physically constrains 
the performance of certain behaviours involved in a phishing attack. Significant technical 
countermeasures have been developed to interrupt phishing at different steps, and most of which 
focus on detection of phishing to prevent phishing emails from reaching intended recipients or 
prevent potential access to phishing sites. This research considered various technical approaches for 
identification of phishing emails; for example spam filters, phishing emails classifiers, and email 
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authentication or for detection of phishing sites such as blacklisting and heuristic-based approaches.   
 
Technical tools are often used as the front line of defence against phishing. While much work can 
be done technically to detect phishing, a solution that can perform flawlessly is unlikely. At the 
early stage, spam filtering techniques were prevalently used to prevent the delivery of phishing 
messages; however, it appeared inadequately effective to intercept phishing as soon as the phishing 
strategy became more sophisticated and targeted. Phishing classification is another popular 
approach which is capable of distinguishing phishing and legitimate messages automatically by 
learning specific features in the emails. While much research on phishing classification claimed to 
have achieved high accuracy in identifying phishing emails, false positive is always a problem for 
phishing classifiers to overcome. It is also necessary for the classifiers to keep updating their 
systems since the content of phishing emails is continually evolving. In addition, a content-based 
classifier is usually weak in detecting spear phishing which is highly personalized for a particular 
group or person and has no specific identifiable features. Sender authentication can help to reduce 
phishing by detecting spoofed emails. Both SPF and DomainKeys aim to validate whether an email 
comes from a legitimate domain; however, as a vast majority of phishing emails are sent from 
bot-infected or compromised computers, an email that has been verified as coming from a 
legitimate source does not necessarily suggest that it has been sent by the person it appears to be.  
 
Considerable research has also been conducted into ways keeping users from phishing sites. 
Blacklisting, which is typically built into web browsers and available as a web browser toolbar, 
functions by checking the websites against a list of reported phishing URLs when a web address is 
rendered into a browser to prevent users from accessing suspicious phishing sites. However, this 
approach always suffers from the time gap between the appearance of phishing sites and the 
updating of the blacklist, as it always needs to take some time before a new phishing URL is 
reported and added to the blacklist. The lag before verification has been the major challenge to a 
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blacklisting approach in protecting users from phishing sites in time. Heuristic-based techniques can 
estimate whether a given page is phishing by looking into certain phishing characteristics in URL 
or/and website content. Although a heuristic-based approach is able to intercept phishing sites as 
soon as they are launched with no need to wait for blacklists to be updated, it is very likely to 
produce high false positive rates due to the high similarity between phishing and legitimate sites.  
 
The NCC of Taiwan required the five leading ISPs in Taiwan to dispose honeypots in order to detect 
phishing attacks by non-actively attracting phishing. Spam filtering was also a common method 
adopted by the ISPs to protect their users away from scam emails. However, some of the 
interviewees, including the interviewee from the largest ISP of Taiwan, admitted that the above 
attempts proved practically ineffective in intercepting phishing messages, particularly those, such as 
spear phishing, designed for specific recipients.  
 
Having examined a series of technical countermeasures against phishing, this research found a 
flawless technical solution is almost impossible, as each has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Phishing tactics are constantly being modified and refined to exploit the vulnerability of computer 
systems embedded in software and hardware. It is like a race between the technology developer and 
the phishers, where the attackers can easily find ways to circumvent phishing detection by abusing 
the faults existing in the codes or launching zero-day attacks, the technology developers find it hard 
to predict the next step of the attackers.  
 
Most importantly, phishing abuses the weakness of both computer infrastructure and humankind, 
and the variable of humans should also be taken into account in order to make any meaningful 
evaluation of the effectiveness of technological measures. Even if there was a perfect solution 
which could identify all phishing sites, the result of several usability studies showed that technology 
alone is not enough to combat phishing as users are very likely to bypass the warnings or ignore the 
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clues that tell them that the websites are very likely to be malicious if they lack a baseline level of 
security awareness.  
 
8.3. Education of Users – the unmanageable base-line countermeasure 
 
An experienced fisher is skilled at luring fish to take the bait, and a skilled phisher is proficient at 
manipulating the weakness in human nature to entice users to respond to his requests. Phishing is a 
typical form of social engineering attack which attempts to persuade potential victims with appeals 
to strong emotions such as curiosity, excitement, or fear or creations of feeling of trust and 
commitment. In addition, most users find it difficult to distinguish deceptive sites from genuine 
ones, and even the most sophisticated users are likely to be fooled by a well-crafted bogus site. This 
highlights the need for the education of users, which serves as the baseline of defence to protect 
users from falling phish by teaching them to spot phishing and enabling them to engage in secure 
online behaviour.  
 
A variety of anti-phishing educational materials is available online; however, this research indicated 
that users seldom look for these materials and tend to ignore the emails that direct them towards 
these. An interactive protocol in the format of games or tests is generally considered to be more 
effectual by providing a natural and interactive environment allowing users to assess their 
vulnerability to phishing or learn to spot suspicious phishing by doing. Several proposals for 
anti-phishing education programs have been put forward in both academic work and industry, most 
of which demonstrated satisfactory results in helping users to better identify potential phishing. 
Nevertheless, an alternative opinion argued that phishing tests only increase users’ suspicion about 
phishing rather than improve their ability to recognize phishing. Some also questioned whether the 
knowledge provided can be really transferred to secure online behavior and how long the 
knowledge can be retained beyond the specific points it trained on. The most important factor that 
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undermines the effectiveness of educational measures is the difficulty of inspiring users’ motivation 
of pursuing education while most users only see security as a secondary goal.  
 
The lack of users’ awareness of information security and insufficient incentive to act in coordination 
with the security advices such as installation of anti-virus program or repair of computer infection 
were regarded by most of the interviewees as a crucial challenge to the anti-phishing work in 
Taiwan. Most users did not realize their individual responsibility in respect of information security 
as a participant in the cyber world nor did they recognize the potential damage it is likely to cause 
upon them and others if they fail to secure their computers. Although some of the interviewees 
stated that they had made significant efforts to customer education, they found this attempt proved 
unfruitful in raising users’ awareness of information security. 
 
A prominent feature of phishing is that it targets the weakest link in the security chain, namely 
human, which is almost impossible to manage and control. Education may serve as the best 
effective regulation of phishing if we assume that users are all aware of the need to pursue 
knowledge about phishing and act as educated users in responding to phishing attempts. 
Nevertheless, the above assumption can hardly be realized in reality. Users can be phishing 
conscious, as long as they realize how they are related to phishing and perceive the danger of 
phishing as well as the need to adopt secure behaviour in order to avoid being phished. To intensify 
users’ motivation to learn how to detect and respond to phishing, it is important to strengthen their 
awareness of the correlation between their engagement in potentially risky behaviours and the huge 
damage that could cause to themselves and lots of other users.  
 
8.4. Institutional Network – a cat and mouse game  
 
Institutional networking is a regulatory device to constrain certain prohibited behaviour through 
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national or international organized cooperation and connection between public and/or private 
institutions in different interfaces. The best example of the regulation of phishing in institutional 
network fashion is the notice-and-takedown strategy. A takedown scheme has been widely 
employed as a response to phishing attacks, which functions by removing fraudulent websites as 
soon as they are detected in order to minimize the potential damage and prevent more users from 
falling victims.  
 
A takedown process usually starts when the brand owners, for example banks or financial 
institutions, or their contracted takedown company are alerted to existence of a spoofed site and 
then contact the hosting companies, the system administrators, or ISPs to bring that site down or go 
to the domain registrars to suspend the domain name. While the value of a takedown strategy lies in 
speedy communication between institutions and immediate reaction to have phishing sites shut 
down, smart phishers usually host their websites in the countries with inadequate legal enforcement 
resources to ensure that the process is as time-consuming as possible. Most phishers also host 
websites in free hosting web space or on compromised machines in order to evade being traced. In 
this case, a takedown company needs to approach the free web-hosting companies or the system 
administrators to ask them to remove the website or contact the ISPs to request a disconnection to 
the offending web pages. Research pointed out that phishing sites usually are removed speedily 
once the hosting companies and administrators receive the takedown request, but how long the 
phishing sites stay alive is primarily decided by how quickly the brand owners are aware of the 
existence of these sites.  
 
However, in the case that attackers register a domain name especially for phishing use or operate 
rock-phish or fast-flux phishing network, the only viable way to remove the website is to have the 
domain name suspended. While domain registrars and registries are one of the key actors 
responsible for phishing takedown and stand in an excellent position in combating phishing, their 
356 
 
reaction to phishing incidents is rather lagging. A study indicated that some registrars and registries 
will act upon complaints but the others will take no action due to limited manpower and resources 
and low incentive to spend money to address domain abuse. This research suggested that ICANN 
should exert a key influence over the response of the domain registrar community to phishing by 
setting standards of domain abuse for registrars and registries, ensuring compliance through the 
accreditation mechanism and intensify the incentive of registries to adopt anti-abuse policies by 
taking it as part of evaluation criteria for registry application. 
 
While the removal of phishing sites may be helpful in reducing potential damage and number of 
victims by bringing the sites down in a timely manner, it is often perceived as an endless task 
because many phishing sites, especially those on compromised machines, are very likely to 
reappear shortly after they are first taken down and continue to make users fall for phish. Phishing 
attackers operate in real time whereas takedown measures can only be reactive in nature. This is 
like a cat and mouse game, and takedown companies always fall behind the phishers.  
 
A notice-and-takedown strategy has been adopted as salient countermeasures in Taiwan to combat 
phishing attacks since 2010. Taiwan activated a phishing reporting platform known as APNOW in 
October 2010 which serves as an internal and external window for receiving reporting of suspected 
phishing incidents coming from a variety of sources. Once a phishing site has been reported, the 
APNOW passes to the corresponding CERTs or directly to the ISPs after a preliminary verification. 
The CERTs or ISPs then ask the hosting companies or administrators to repair or shut down the 
website in question. This process is required to be completed within 24 hours.  
 
However, this research raised several questions regarding the practical operation of APNOW and 
questioned its effectiveness in combating phishing. One major problem is the delay in removing 
foreign-hosted phishing sites. As it still needs to rely on human operation where the phishing site 
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reported is housed in other countries, in this case which is very often true in the phishing attacks 
that target Taiwan users, the takedown process is free of the time frame based on the 24-hour 
requirement. While the speed to have a phishing site removed is the key determining the 
effectiveness of a takedown scheme, it is necessary to cut down the time required for the removal of 
phishing sites by enabling a full- automatic notice-and-takedown system which can promptly bridge 
the CERTs between different countries to ensure immediate communication within the institutional 
network.  
 
Some of the interviewees indicated that the ISPs of Taiwan hesitate to make an immediate Internet 
disconnection to the phishing sites in the absence of explicit legal authorisation, especially when the 
attack is not that evident or their customer is also a victim of phishing, for example, the operator of 
a compromised website. It is necessary to amend the Telecommunication Act to provide a legal 
basis to support the ISPs’ termination or suspension measures; but in the meantime, the new law 
should include the requirement for the ISPs to enable their customers to be aware of the forbidden 
circumstances and the potential disadvantages for them to the largest extent.  
 
8.5. Suggestions for future anti-phishing work in Taiwan 
 
Although phishing arose as an issue in the 1990s, Taiwan’s movement on anti-phishing work was 
very slow until 2010. The introduction of TAPWG and APNOW in 2010 was the first national 
response to phishing which declared an attempt to assemble the effort of the stakeholders across 
sectors in combating the growth of phishing attacks. However, having examined the legal regulation 
of phishing in Taiwan and also the countermeasures that have been undertaken in other dimensions 
on the basis of the existing literature and the insights provided by the interviews, this research found 
that there exist many problems in current Taiwan regulation of phishing that have significantly 
impeded the fulfillment of an effective multi-dimensional regulatory framework. I therefore propose 
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the following suggestions for the future work. 
 
8.5.1. Review of the laws  
 
A review of the Criminal Code and the Personal Information Protection Act is necessary in order to 
ensure adequate criminalization of phishing and sufficient protection of information privacy. Both 
the elements of ‘obtainment’ and ‘damage’ laid down in Art. 359 of the Criminal Code should be 
capable of a broad interpretation and should not be subject to discrimination based on obtainment 
methods and monetary loss. To enable the PIP Act better to respond to the requirements raised from 
the regulation of phishing, it is necessary to re-define the term ‘personal information’ and reduce 
exceptions to unauthorised collection as well as the use of indeterminate legal concepts. It should 
not be an option but a sine qua non to have an independent privacy protection authority representing 
individual data subjects to compete against the power of both public and private data controllers. 
 
The lawmakers should re-consider carefully the line between the protection of information privacy 
and the efficiency of personal information handling. The anxiety of the data controllers about the 
PIP Act mostly arises from their uncertainty about the extent to which they are allowed for data 
collection and the obligations they are required to fulfill to avoid being punished. This should be 
explicitly indicated in the Enforcement Rules of the PIP Act or the administrative guidance 
provided by the supervisory authorities for the related sectors rather than addressed by continuous 
compromise of the lawmakers to the interests of the data controllers.  
 
8.5.2. Improvements in APNOW 
 
The existing APNOW user interfaces demands some improvements especially in the language 
options to make it friendlier to international users. Given many phishing sites may be re-activated 
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after the first attempt to remove them, it is necessary for APNOW to continue to monitor each site 
after it has been brought down to ensure that it is no longer live. It is also important to devote more 
resources to promotion of the visibility of APNOW to make sure it is well known, nationally and 
internationally, by the users and CERTs in both the public and private sectors. APNOW should be 
operated on an automated base to the largest extent in order to cut down the time required for the 
removal of phishing sites, in particular those hosted in other countries.  
 
8.5.3. Reinforcement of the role of ISPs in the regulation of phishing 
 
ISPs actually stand in a key strategic position in the regulation of phishing but their role needs to be 
reinforced by laws. ISPs should be explicitly authorized and required by laws to take necessary 
measures, such as disconnection or termination of the Internet services, when confronting incidents 
that have endangered information and telecommunications security. An ISP is not only the provider 
of connection or other services related to the infobahn, it should commit itself to ensure the security 
of the services provided for its users. It is necessary to strengthen ISPs’ responsibility to prevent, 
manage, and report phishing attacks by requiring them to take appropriate measures; for example, 
strengthening detection and monitoring systems, providing assistance or pay services for their 
customers to deal with phishing, and coordinating the response to phishing incidents with other 
ISPs, to safeguard the security of their services.  
 
8.5.4. Promotion of information security education and professional training  
 
Taiwan is a highly computerized country, with high level of Internet usage and connectivity but a 
general lack of information security awareness and insufficient management of web server security. 
While there is a great number of Internet users in Taiwan, many care very little about the issue of 
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information security or do not realize the importance of information security. Nor do they feel any 
responsibility to protect their computers as being netizens. This research suggests that the education 
of information security should be given as early as possible and rooted in school education in order 
to foster online secure behaviour and consciousness of the threat of various malicious attacks.  
 
In addition, insufficient capacity of Taiwan’s businesses, in particular small and medium-size 
businesses, for ensuring web security and respond to information security incidents has been a 
major weakness in the regulatory framework of phishing. This is largely because most IT personnel 
are not capable of information security tasks, which should be addressed by the government to 
organize or encourage systematic and solid training for the IT personnel to improve their ability to 
manage information security work and respond to information security incidents.  
 
8.5.5. Enhancement of cooperation between stakeholders  
 
This research suggests that the TAPWG introduced in 2010 should invite the participation of more 
stakeholders involved in the fight against phishing; for example law enforcement agencies, 
technology industries and potential victims and enhance cooperation and facilitate exchange of 
phishing data between stakeholders. To encourage the engagement of the industries, it is advisable 
to promote a more flexible cooperation model ensuring that each participant can benefit from this 
cooperation.   
 
Besides cooperation between national stakeholders, it is necessary to promote international 
cooperation between non-governmental stakeholders. This is particularly important to Taiwan, as 
Taiwan suffers from political obstacles to intergovernmental cooperation. This research suggests 
that both ISPs and CERTs can play a very good role in bridging communication and coordinating 
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APPENDIX A – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES           
 
 
CODE NAME POSITION 
Interviewee A Police officer from the specialized investigation unit for Internet crime  
Interviewee B Police officer from the specialized investigation unit for Internet crime 
Interviewee C Lawmaker for the cybercrime laws of Taiwan 
Executive of an online merchant 
Interviewee D Expert from the information security department of the leading ISP of Taiwan 
Interviewee E Expert from TWNIC 
Interviewee F Expert from information security industry 
Interviewee G Official from the Resources and Technologies Department of NCC 
Interviewee H Expert from information security industry 
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Art. 22 – 
All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare 
shall be guaranteed under the Constitution. 
 
Art. 23 – 
All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law 
except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to 




Art. 184 -  
A person who, intentionally or negligently, has wrongfully damaged the rights of another is bound 
to compensate him for any injury arising therefrom. The same rule shall be applied when the injury 
is done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals. 
A person, who violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others and therefore 
prejudice to others, is bound to compensate for the injury, except no negligence in his act can be 
proved. 
 
Civil Procedure Code 
 
Art. 1.1 – 
A defendant may be sued in the court for the place of the defendant's domicile or, when that court 
cannot exercise jurisdiction, in the court for the place of defendant's residence. A defendant may 
also be sued in the court for the place of defendant's residence for a claim arising from transactions 
or occurrences taking place within the jurisdiction of that court. 
 
Art.15.1 – 





Art. 22 – 
When several courts may have jurisdiction over an action, a plaintiff may choose to initiate the 
action in any one of those courts. 
 
Application Laws for Foreign-related Civil Law 
 
Art. 25-  
Claims grounded on tort shall be governed by the law of the State in which the tort was committed. 
 
Art. 28.1-  
Claims grounded on tort committed by disseminative means, such as the press, radio, television, 
computer Internet or other media methods shall be governed by the following three choices of laws 
at the option of the injured party: 
 
a. The law of the State in which the tort was committed or the law of the State of domicile of the 
tortfeasor if the place of commitment cannot be identified;  
b. The law of the State in which the injuries or the infringement have occurred if the tortfeasor 
should have foreseen that the injuries would occur in that State; and 




Art. 3.1(1) and (5) –  
For the purposes of this Act the following definitions shall apply: 
1."Work" means a creation that is within a literary, scientific, artistic, or other intellectual 
domain. 
5."Reproduce" means to reproduce directly, indirectly, permanently, or temporarily a work by 
means of printing, reprography, sound recording, video recording, photography, handwritten 
notes, or otherwise. This definition also applies to the sound recording or video recording of 
scripts, musical works, or works of similar nature during their performance or broadcast, and also 
includes the construction of an architectural structure based on architectural plans or models. 
 
Art. 84 – 
The copyright holder or the plate rights holder may demand removal of infringement of its rights. 
Where there is likelihood of infringement, a demand may be made to prevent such infringement. 
 
Art. 88.1 – 
A person who unlawfully infringes on another person's economic rights or plate rights out of 
intention or negligence shall be liable for damages. Where multiple persons engage in unlawful 
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infringement, they shall bear joint and several liability for damages. 
 
Art. 91-1.2 – 
A person who distributes or with intent to distribute publicly displays or possesses a copy knowing 
that it infringes on economic rights shall be imprisoned not more than three years and, in addition 
thereto, may be fined not less than seventy thousand and not more than seven hundred and fifty 




Art. 70.2 – 
Any of the following acts, without consent of the proprietor of a registered trademark, shall be 
deemed infringement of the right of such trademark:  
[…] (2) knowingly using words contained in another person’s well-known registered trademark as 
the name of a company, business, group or domain or any other name that identifies a business 
entity, and hence there exists a likelihood of confusion on relevant consumers or a likelihood of 
dilution of the distinctiveness or reputation of the said well-known trademark; […] 
 
Art. 69.1 – 
A proprietor of a registered trademark is entitled to demand a person who infringes or is likely to 
infringe the trademark right to stop or prevent such infringement. 
 
Art. 69.3 – 
The proprietor is entitled to demand the infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to 
know, infringed such trademark rights to pay the proprietor damages. 
 
Personal Information Protection Act (PIP Act) 
 
Art. 1 – 
Personal Information Protection Act（hereinafter “this Law”）is enacted to govern the collection, 
processing and use of personal information so as to prevent harm on personality rights, and to 
facilitate the proper use of personal information. 
 
Art. 2 – 
The terms used herein denote the following meanings: 
1. Personal information: the name, date of birth, I.D. Card number, passport number, characteristics, 
fingerprints, marital status, family, education, occupation, medical record, medical treatment, 
genetic information, sexual life, health examination, criminal record, contact information, financial 
conditions, social activities and other information which may be used to identify a natural person, 
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both directly and indirectly; 
2. Personal information file: A collection of personal information built to allow information retrieval 
and management by automatic or non-automatic measures; 
3. Collection: To collect personal information in any form and way; 
4. Processing: To record, input, store, compile, correct, duplicate, retrieve, delete, output, connect or 
internally transmit information for the purpose of establishing or using a personal information file; 
5. Use: All methods of personal information use other than processing; 
6. International transmission: The cross-border processing or use of personal information; 
7. Government agency refers to a government agency or administrative juridical person at the 
central or local government level which is empowered to exercise sovereign power; 
8. Non-government agency refers to the natural persons, juridical persons or groups other than those 
stated in the proceeding item; 
9. The Party means an individual of whom the personal information has been collected, processed 
or used in accordance with this Law. 
 
Art. 5 – 
The rights and interests of the Party should be respected in collecting, processing or using personal 
information and the information should be handled in accordance with the principle of bona fide. It 
should not go beyond the purpose of collection and should be reasonable and fair. 
 
Art. 6 (suspended) – 
Personal information of medical treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health examination and 
criminal record should not be collected, processed or used. However, the following situations are 
not subject to the limits set in the preceding sentence: 
1. when in accordance with law; 
2. when it is necessary for the government agency to perform its duties or for the non- government 
agency to fulfill the legal obligation, and when there are proper security measures. 
3. when the Party has disclosed such information by himself, or when the information concerned 
has been publicized legally; 
4. when the personal information is collected, processed or used under certain methods by a 
government agency or an academic research institution based on the purpose of medical treatment, 
personal hygiene or crime prevention statistics and/or study. 
The rules of the range, procedure and any other items to be followed concerning Item 4 of the 
preceding Paragraph should be set by the government authority in charge of subject industry at the 
central government level in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice. 
 
Art. 8 – 
The following items should be told precisely to the Party by a government agency or 
non-government agency, in accordance with Article 15 or Article 19: 
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1. the name of the government agency or the non government agency; 
2. purpose of collection; 
3. classification of the personal information; 
4. time period, area, target and way of the use of personal information; 
5. rights of the Party and ways to exercise them as prescribed in Article 3; 
6. the influence on his rights and interests while the Party chooses not to provide his personal 
information; 
The following situations may be exempted from the notice prescribed in the preceding Paragraph: 
1. when in accordance with law; 
2. when the collection of personal information is necessary for the government agency to perform 
its official duties or the non government agency to fulfill the legal obligation; 
3. when the notice will impair the government agency in performing its official duties; 
4. when the notice will impair the interests of a third person;. 
5. when the Party should have known the content of the notification already. 
 
Art. 9 – 
A government agency or non-government agency should notify the Party of the source of 
information and Item 1 to 5 of Paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, before processing or using 
personal information collected in accordance with Article 15 or 19 which was not provided by the 
Party. 
The notification mentioned in the preceding Paragraph may not be given for the followings: 
1. Under one of the situations listed in Paragraph 2 of the preceding Article; 
2. When the Party has disclosed such information by himself or when the information has been 
publicized legally; 
3. When the notification may not be made to the Party or his legal representative; 
4. When it is necessary for public interests on statistics or the purpose of academic research. The 
information may not be used to identify a certain person after a treatment of the provider or the 
disclosure of the collector; 
5. Personal information collected by the mass media for the purpose of news reporting on the basis 
of public interests; 
The notification mentioned in Paragraph 1 may be undertaken when the personal information is 
used against the Party for the first time. 
 
Art. 11 – 
The government agency or the non government agency should ensure the accuracy of personal 
information, and correct or supplement it, ex officio or upon the request of the Party. 
In the event of a dispute regarding the accuracy of personal information, the agency should 
discontinue processing or using the information, ex officio or upon the request of the Party. 
However, the preceding sentence may not be applicable when it is necessary for the performance of 
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an official duty or fulfillment of a legal obligation and has been recorded, or when it is agreed by 
the Party in writing. 
The information collected should be deleted, discontinued to process or use, ex officio or upon the 
request of the Party when the specific purpose no longer exists or time period expires. However, the 
preceding sentence may not be applicable when it is necessary for the performance of an official 
duty or fulfillment of a legal obligation and has been recorded, or when it is agreed by the Party in 
writing. 
The information collected should be deleted, discontinued to process or use, ex officio or upon the 
request of the Party in the cases where a violation of this Law occurred during collecting, 
processing or using that information. 
In the cases where the government agency or the non-government agency should be attributed to of 
not correcting or supplementing personal information, persons to whom the personal information 
was provided should be notified after correction or supplement. 
 
Art. 12 – 
When the personal information is stolen, disclosed, altered or infringed in other ways due to the 
violation of this Law, the government agency or non-government agency should notify the Party 
after an inspection. 
 
Art. 15 – 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the government agency should not collect 
or process personal information unless there is a specific purpose and should comply with one of 
the following conditions: 
1. it is within the scope of job functions provided by laws and regulations; 
2. a written consent has been made by the Party; and 
3. the rights and interests of the Party may not be harmed. 
 
Art. 16 – 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the government agency should use the 
personal information in accordance with the scope of its job functions provided by laws and 
regulations, and in compliance with the specific purpose of collection. However, the information 
may be used outside the scope upon the occurrence of one of the following conditions: 
1. Where in accordance with law; 
2. Where it is for national security or to promote public interests; 
3. Where it is to prevent harm on the life, body, freedom or property of the Party; 
4. Where it is to prevent harm on the rights and interests of other people; 
5. Where it is necessary for public interests on statistics or the purpose of academic research 
conducted by a government agency or an academic research institution, respectively. The 
information may not lead to the identification of a certain person after the treatment of the provider 
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or the disclosure of the collector; 
6. Where such use may benefit the Party; and 
7. A written consent of the Party has been obtained. 
 
Art. 18 – 
The government agency which keeps personal information files should assign personnel(s) on 
security and maintenance of those files to prevent them from being stolen, altered, damaged, 
destroyed or disclosed.  
 
Art. 19 – 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the non-government agency should not 
collect or process personal information unless there is a specific purpose and should comply with 
one of the following conditions: 
1. Where in accordance with law; 
2. Where there is a contract or quasi-contract between the Party and the agency; 
3. Where the Party has disclosed such information by himself or when the information has been 
publicized legally; 
4. Where it is necessary for public interests on statistics or the purpose of academic research 
conducted by a research institution. The information may not lead to the identification of a certain 
person after the treatment of the provider or the disclosure of the collector; 
5. Where a written consent has been made by the Party; 
6. Where the public interest is involved; and 
7. Where the personal information is obtained from publicly available resources. However, it is 
exempted if the information is limited by the Party on the processing or use and the interests of the 
Party should be protected. 
By the time when the collector or processor realizes or has been notified of the provision in Item 7 
of the preceding Paragraph by the Party, he should delete, stop processing or using the personal 
information, ex officio or upon the request of the Party. 
 
Art. 20 – 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the non-government agency should use 
the personal information in accordance with the scope of the specific purpose of collection provided. 
However, the information may be used outside the scope upon the occurrence of one of the 
following conditions: 
1. Where in accordance with law; 
2. Where it is to promote public interests; 
3. Where it is to prevent harm on the life, body, freedom or property of the Party; 
4. Where it is to prevent harm on the rights and interests of other people; 
5. Where it is necessary for public interests on statistics or the purpose of academic research 
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conducted by a government agency or an academic research institution, respectively. The 
information may not lead to the identification of a certain person after the treatment of the provider 
or the disclosure of the collector; 
6. Where a written consent of the Party has been obtained. 
When the non-government agency uses the personal information for the purpose of marketing 
pursuant to the preceding Paragraph and has been turned down by the Party, the agency should stop 
its action. 
The non-government agency should notify the Party the measures of refusal at the first marketing 
action and should pay for fees necessary. 
 
Art. 27.1, 27.2– 
The non-government agency which keeps personal information files should adopt proper security 
measures to prevent them from being stolen, altered, damaged, destroyed or disclosed. 
The government authority in charge of subject industry at the central government level may 
designate a non-government agency for setting up the plan of security measures for the personal 
information file or the disposal measures for the personal information after termination of business. 
 
Art. 28 – 
A government agency should be liable for damages and compensation caused by illegal collection, 
processing and using of personal information, or other ways of infringement on the rights of the 
Party due to violation of this Law. However, it does not apply to damages caused by natural disaster, 
incident or other force majeure. 
A proper amount of monetary compensation may be requested for damage not to properties. A 
proper rehabilitation action may be requested upon infringement to reputation. 
The total amount of compensation for the damages referred to in the two preceding Paragraphs shall 
be no less than NT$500 but no more than NT$20,000 for each case of damages per person in the 
cases where the victims in the two preceding Paragraphs may not or cannot provide evidence for 
actual damage amount. 
With regard to damages caused to multi parties by the same cause and fact, the total amount of 
compensation should not exceed NT$200 million. However, if the interests involved are over the 
amount in the preceding sentence, the amount of interests should be set as the limit. 
If the total amount of damage caused by the same cause and fact exceeds the amount mentioned in 
the preceding Paragraph, the compensation amount to the victim should not be limited by the 
baseline（NT$500）set in Paragraph 3 of this Article. 
The right of claim referred to in the second Paragraph above should not be transferred or inherited. 
However, it does not apply to the situation where the monetary compensation has been undertaken 
according to an agreement or the case has been brought to the court. 
 
Art. 29 – 
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A non-government agency should be liable for damages and compensation caused by illegal 
collection, processing and using of personal information, or other ways of infringement on the 
rights of the Party due to violation of this Law. However, it does not apply to the situation where the 
non-government agency can be proved to be unintentional or non-negligent. 
The provisions of Paragraphs 2 to 6 of the preceding Article are applicable to claims for damages 
made in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Paragraph. 
 
Art. 41 – 
A violation to Paragraph 1 of Article 6, Articles 15, 16, 17, 19 and Paragraph 1 of Article 20, or an 
order or disciplinary action of the limitation on international transmission made by the government 
authority in charge of subject industry at the central government level in accordance with Article 21 
which may harm other people’s rights should be imposed of a sentence or custody of no more than 2 
years, or a fine of no more than NT$200,000, or both. 
A person who intends to commit the crime in the preceding Paragraph should be imposed of a 
sentence of no more than 5 years and a fine of no more than NT$1,000,000. 
 
Art. 54 (suspended) – 
For the personal information which is not provided by the Party before the amendment of this Law 
and is subject to a notice to the Party prior to processing or use in accordance with Article 9, the 
personal information controller should fulfill its notice duty within one year after the effective date 
of this Law Amendment. Any processing or use of the personal information without notification in 
the overdue period of time is regarded as violation of Article 9. 
 
 
Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act 
 
Art. 3 – 
“Other information which may be used to identify a natural person indirectly” referred to in Item 1 
of Article 2 of the Act shall mean that the government agency or the non-government agency 
possessing the information can not directly identify the specific person without comparing to, 
combining with or connecting to other information. 
 
Art. 12 – 
“Proper security measures” referred to in Item 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 6, “security and 
maintenance” referred to in Article 18, and “proper security measures” referred to in Paragraph 1 of 
Article 27 of the Act shall mean the technical or organizational measures taken by the government 
agency or the non-government agency for the purpose of preventing personal information from 
being stolen, altered, damaged, destroyed or disclosed. 
The measures prescribed in the preceding paragraph may include the following matters and shall 
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follow the principle of appropriate proportionality to achieve the objective of personal information 
protection: 
(1) allocating management personnel and substantial resources; 
(2) defining the scope of personal information; 
(3) establishing the mechanism of risk evaluation and management of personal information; 
(4) establishing the mechanism of preventing, giving notice of, and responding to accidents; 
(5) establishing an internal management procedure of collecting, processing, and using personal 
information; 
(6) managing information security and personnel; 
(7) promoting acknowledgement, education and training; 
(8) managing facility security; 
(9) establishing a mechanism of auditing information security; 
(10) keeping records of the use, locus information and proof; and 
(11) Integrated persistent improvements on the security and maintenance of personal information. 
 
Art. 19 – 
When requesting the government agency or the non-government agency to correct or supplement 
his/her personal information, the Party shall make an appropriate explanation. 
 
Art. 22 – 
“Appropriate methods of notification” referred to in Article 12 of the Act shall mean prompt words, 
written document, telephone, text message, email, facsimile, electronic record or other manners 
which will be sufficient to make or likely make the Party know such notification. However, if the 
notification costs too much, in consideration of the technical feasibility and privacy protection of 
the Party, such notification may be made via internet, news media or other appropriate manners to 
notice. 
The contents of “notification to the Party” referred to in Article 12 of the Act shall include the fact 
that personal information has been infringed and the responding measures which have been taken. 
 
Art. 25.1 – 
“Personnel(s)” referred to in Article 18 of the Act shall mean personnel with the ability to manage 
and maintain personal information files and to sufficiently perform the regular task of securing and 
maintaining personal information for the agency. 
 
Art. 28 – 
“Publicly available resources” referred to in Item 7 of Paragraph 1 of Article 19 of the Act shall 
mean mass media, internet, news, magazine, government gazette and other accesses through which 






Art. 3 – 
This Code shall apply to an offense committed within the territory of the Republic of China. An 
offense committed on board a vessel or aircraft of the Republic of China outside the territory of the 
Republic of China shall be considered an offense committed within the territory of the Republic of 
China. 
 
Art. 4 – 
Where either the conduct or the result of an offense takes place within the territory of the Republic 
of China, the offense shall be considered as committed within the territory of the Republic of China. 
 
Art. 5 – 
This Code shall apply to any of the following offenses outside the territories of the Republic of 
China: 
1. The offense of sedition specified in Article 100. 
2. The offense of treason specified in Article 103. 
3. The offense of obstructing governmental operation specified in Article 135, 136 or 138. 
4. The offenses against public safety specified in Article 185-1 or 185-2. 
5. The offenses of counterfeiting currency specified in Article 195 to 199. 
6. The offenses of counterfeiting securities specified in Articles 201 to 202. 
7. The offenses of forgery specified in Articles 211, 214, 218 or 216, in which only includes using 
forged official documents as specified in Articles 211, 213 and 214. 
8. The drug offenses specified in Chapter 20, except for the offenses of drug abuse or possession of 
drugs, seeds or application tools or drug. 
9. The offenses against personal freedom specified in Articles 296 and 296-1 
10. The offenses of piracy specified in Articles 333 and 334. 
 
Art. 6 – 
This Code shall apply to any of the following offenses committed by a public official of the 
Republic of China outside the territory of the Republic of China： 
1. The offenses of malfeasance specified in Articles 121 to 123, 125, 126, 129, 131, 132, or 134. 
2. The offense of facilitating escape specified in Article 163. 
3. The offenses of forgery specified in Article 213. 
4. The offenses of embezzlement specified in Article 336,paragraph 1. 
 
Art. 7 – 
This Code shall apply where any national of Republic of China commits an offense which is not 
specified in one of the two preceding articles but is punishable for not less than 3 years of 
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imprisonment outside the territory of the Republic of China; unless the offense is not punishable by 
the law of the place where the offense is committed. 
 
Art. 10.6 – 
The term electromagnetic recording means records for computer process made through the use of 
electronic, magnetic, optical or other similar means. 
 
Art. 320 – 
A person who for purpose to exercise unlawful control over other’s property for himself or for a 
third person unlawfully takes movable property of another commits larceny and shall be sentenced 
to imprisonment for not more than five years, short-term imprisonment, or a fine of not more than 
five hundred yuan. 
A person who for purpose to gain unlawful benefit of himself or of a third person unlawfully 
occupies the real property of another shall be punished in accordance with provisions of the 
preceding paragraph. 
An attempt to commit an offense specified in one of the two preceding paragraphs is punishable. 
 
Art. 339 – 
A person who by fraud causes another to deliver to him property belonging to such other or to a 
third person for purpose to exercise unlawful control over other’s property for himself or for a 
fourth person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or short-term 
imprisonment; in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, a fine of not more than one thousand yuan may 
be imposed. 
A person who by the means specified in the preceding paragraph takes an illegal benefit for himself 
or for a third person shall be subject to the same punishment. 
An attempt to commit an offense specified in one of the two preceding paragraphs is punishable. 
 
Art. 358 – 
A person who without reason by entering another’s account code and password, breaking his 
computer protection, or taking advantage of the system loophole of such other accesses his 
computer or relating equipment shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or 
short-term imprisonment; in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, a fine of not more than one hundred 
thousand yuan may be imposed. 
 
Art. 359 – 
A person without reason obtains, deletes or alters the magnetic record of another’s computer or 
relating equipment and causes injury to the public or others shall be sentenced to imprisonment of 
no more than five years or short-term imprisonment; in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, a fine of 




Art. 360 – 
A person who without reason interferes, through the use of computer programs or other 
electromagnetic methods, with the computer or relating equipment of another person and causes 
injury to the public or another shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more that three years or 
short-term imprisonment; in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, a fine of not more than one hundred 
thousand yuan may be imposed. 
 
Art. 361 – 
A person who commits the offenses specified in the three preceding articles against the computers 
and relating equipment of a public office shall be punished by increasing the punishment up to one 
half. 
 
Art. 362 – 
A person who makes computer programs specifically for himself or another to commit the offenses 
specified in this Chapter and causes injury to the public or another shall be punished for 
imprisonment for not more than five years or short-term imprisonment; in lieu thereof, or in 
addition thereto, a fine of not more than two hundred thousand yuan may be imposed. 
 
Art. 363 – 
The prosecution of the offenses specified in articles, 358 through 360, may be instituted only upon 
complaint. 
 
Criminal Procedure Code 
 
Art. 5 – 
A court of the place where an offense is committed or where an accused is domiciled, resides, or is 
located shall have jurisdiction over the case. 
If an offense is committed on a vessel or an aircraft of the Republic of China outside the territory of 
the Republic of China, the court of the place where the vessel is registered or from which the 
aircraft departed or landed after the commission of the offense shall also have jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
